City Of Longview Police Dept. v. Sidney A. Potts ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                               Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    December 27, 2017
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    CITY   OF           LONGVIEW           POLICE                      No. 48410-2-II
    DEPARTMENT,
    Respondent,
    v.
    SIDNEY A. POTTS,                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    LEE, J. — Sidney A. Potts appeals the superior court’s order dismissing his appeal of an
    administrative action forfeiting Potts’s property, cash, and bank accounts. Potts argues that (1)
    this court’s ruling in his criminal case is dispositive, (2) the superior court erred in denying his
    motion to vacate, (3) the superior court erred in dismissing his appeal, and (4) the superior court
    erred in denying his motion to compel production of records. We reverse the superior court’s order
    dismissing Potts’s appeal of the administrative action forfeiting Potts’s property, cash, and bank
    accounts, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    No. 48410-2-II
    FACTS
    A.     POTTS’S CRIMINAL CASE1
    In July 2012, the City of Longview Police Department (the City) conducted several
    controlled   buys   with   Potts.      State   v.       Potts,   No.   45724-5-II,   slip   op.   at   2-3
    (Wash. Ct. App. July 6, 2016), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2045724-5-
    II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. On August 10, the City applied for a search warrant for three
    properties connected to Potts: Potts Family Motors, Potts’s second car dealership, and Potts’s
    home.2 Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 5. However, the actual warrant only listed Potts Family
    Motors in the finding of probable cause. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 5. Despite this, the City
    searched all three properties, and under RCW 69.50.505, seized tools, vehicles, cash, and bank
    accounts. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 10; Clerk’s Papers at 6-7, 10.
    Potts was arrested and charged with one count of leading organized crime (count I), three
    counts of violating the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) with delivery within 1,000
    feet of a school bus route stop (count II, III, V), one count of violating the UCSA with possession
    within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop (count VI), one count of violating the UCSA with
    delivery (count IV), and one count of money laundering (count VII). Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip
    op. at 6. The State also filed aggravating factors, alleging that the current offense was a major
    1
    The facts pertaining to Potts’s criminal case are taken from our decision in his criminal appeal,
    which was included in the supplemental clerk’s papers for this case. State v. Potts, No. 45724-5-
    II,     slip      op.      at      2      (Wash.        Ct.     App.      July       6,      2016),
    http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2045724-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
    2
    In the City’s response to Potts’s motion to vacate, it noted that the search warrants were for three
    addresses in Longview, Washington: 411 Oregon Way (Potts Family Motors); 1275 Alabama
    Street (Potts’s second dealership); and 2839 Louisiana Street (Potts’s home).
    2
    No. 48410-2-II
    violation of the UCSA for criminal profiteering. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 6. Subsequently,
    count VII was dismissed and the sentencing enhancements on counts V and VI were also
    dismissed. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 6.
    While charges were pending, Potts moved for the return of his property. Potts, No. 45724-
    5-II, slip op. at 10 n.7. The trial court denied Potts’s motion. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 10
    n.7.
    In November 2013, Potts was convicted of all the remaining counts and aggravators. Potts,
    No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 19. Potts appealed his convictions. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at
    19. Potts also challenged in a statement of additional grounds the trial court’s denial of his motion
    for the return of property. Potts, No. 45724-5-II, slip op. at 50.
    On July 6, 2016, we affirmed his convictions, but held that the search warrant only
    authorized a search for the property connected with Potts Family Motors.3 Potts, No. 45724-5-II,
    slip op. at 47. We also held that “because Potts will not be retried and because we conclude above
    that the search warrant for Potts’s home [2839 Louisiana Street] was invalid, we conclude the
    property seized from Potts’s home should be returned to its rightful owner(s).”4 Potts, No. 45724-
    5-II, slip op. at 51.
    3
    On appeal, the State conceded that the warrant did not authorize seizure of tools. Potts, No.
    45724-5-II, slip op. at 47 n.25.
    4
    The opinion is silent as to whether the property from Potts’s second dealership located at 1275
    Alabama Street was to be returned to the rightful owner.
    3
    No. 48410-2-II
    B.       POTTS’S CIVIL FORFEITURE CASE
    On December 19, 2013, prior to this court’s decision in Potts’s direct appeal, a civil
    forfeiture hearing was held regarding property the City had seized from Potts.5 The hearing officer
    concluded that the property was obtained in the commission of a felony relating to the sale or
    delivery of illegal controlled substances, and was subject to forfeiture under former RCW
    69.50.505(a)(4).6 On January 29, 2014, the hearing officer entered findings of fact and conclusions
    of law, and ordered the property forfeited to the City.7
    On March 5, Potts filed a notice of appeal with the superior court, appealing the order of
    forfeiture, and mailed a copy to the City. Potts stated that he was notified of the forfeiture of his
    property, attached the hearing officer’s order, and requested the superior court set a schedule for
    pursuing the appeal.
    On July 1, the City filed a motion to dismiss Potts’s appeal, arguing that the City was not
    properly served with the notice of appeal. On July 10, Potts filed a judicial notice of fact, which
    included additional facts and argument against forfeiture, and requested that his property be held
    until a final decision on appeal. On July 30, the superior court subsequently granted the City’s
    motion and dismissed Potts’s appeal of the forfeiture order.
    5
    The seized property at issue in the forfeiture hearing included 29 vehicles, 19 tools and pieces of
    equipment, and almost $56,000 in cash and bank accounts.
    6
    RCW 69.50.505 was amended in 2003. No substantive changes were made; rather, the
    paragraphs within this statute were renumbered. LAWS OF 2003, ch. 53, § 348. The provision cited
    to by the hearing officer is now RCW 69.50.505(1)(d).
    7
    The order was served on Potts on February 18, 2014.
    4
    No. 48410-2-II
    On August 6, Potts appealed the superior court’s dismissal of his appeal to this court. On
    appeal, the City withdrew its argument that it was not timely served with the notice of appeal. City
    of Longview Police Dep’t v. Potts, No. 46574-4-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 14, 2015),
    http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2046574-4-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
    Rather, the City argued for the first time on appeal that the appeal was properly dismissed because
    Potts failed to comply with the requirements of RCW 34.05.546. Potts, No. 46574-4-II, slip op.
    at 2.
    We treated the City’s withdrawal of its untimely service argument as a concession that the
    superior court erred in dismissing Potts’s appeal, held that the superior court improperly dismissed
    Potts’s appeal, and remanded the case to the superior court. Potts, No. 46574-4-II, slip op. at 2, 3-
    4. We did not address the City’s argument on RCW 34.05.546 raised for the first time on appeal,
    but expressly stated that “[o]n remand, the City is free to argue that Potts’s notice of appeal did
    not comply with RCW 34.05.546.” Potts, No. 46574-4-II, slip op. at 4.
    On August 10, 2015, Potts filed a supplemental notice of appeal in the superior court. The
    supplemental notice included additional facts and argument against forfeiture, such as the lack of
    probable cause for the seizure of property, and requested that such property be returned. The City
    responded by filing a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Potts failed to comply with RCW
    34.05.546.
    On October 14, the superior court held a hearing on the City’s motion and granted the
    City’s motion to dismiss Potts’s appeal pursuant to RCW 34.05.546. On November 9, Potts
    appealed the superior court’s order of dismissal pursuant to RCW 34.05.546. We accepted review
    on April 7, 2016. .
    5
    No. 48410-2-II
    After we accepted review, Potts filed a motion in the superior court to compel the City to
    produce the agency record for his appeal pursuant to RCW 34.05.566(1). The superior court held
    a hearing on Potts’s motion to compel and denied the motion.
    Also after we accepted review, Potts filed a motion in the superior court to vacate the order
    dismissing his appeal. The superior court denied Potts’s motion.
    ANALYSIS
    A.     DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
    Potts argues that the superior court erred when it dismissed his appeal pursuant to RCW
    34.05.546. Specifically, Potts argues that the superior court had jurisdiction over his appeal,8 his
    notice of appeal complied with RCW 34.05.546, his notice of appeal substantially complied with
    RCW 34.05.546, he remedied any noncompliance, and the dismissal was not the proper remedy
    for any noncompliance.9
    1.      Compliance with RCW 34.05.546
    Under RCW 34.05.546, the petition for review must include:
    (1) The name and mailing address of the petitioner;
    8
    Potts argues that the superior court had jurisdiction to review his appeal, and because the City
    does not dispute this, we do not address the issue.
    9
    Potts also argues in his reply that the superior court violated his due process rights when it granted
    the State’s motion to dismiss his appeal pursuant to RCW 34.05.546. Although this alleged
    violation was noted in Potts’s notice of appeal, he failed to provide argument in his opening brief
    as required by RAP 10.3, and does so for the first time in his reply. We will not consider due
    process arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Joy v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 
    170 Wash. App. 614
    , 630, 
    285 P.3d 187
    (2012), review denied, 
    176 Wash. 2d 1021
    (2013). Potts also fails
    to provide any relevant legal argument or support for his argument. He only cites to the civil rules
    and judicial rules of conduct but does not explain how his due process rights were violated by a
    violation of these rules. Therefore, we decline to address this claim. Cowiche Canyon
    Conservancy v. Bosley, 
    118 Wash. 2d 801
    , 809, 
    828 P.2d 549
    (1992).
    6
    No. 48410-2-II
    (2) The name and mailing address of the petitioner’s attorney, if any;
    (3) The name and mailing address of the agency whose action is at issue;
    (4) Identification of the agency action at issue, together with a duplicate copy,
    summary, or brief description of the agency action;
    (5) Identification of persons who were parties in any adjudicative proceedings that
    led to the agency action;
    (6) Facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review;
    (7) The petitioner’s reasons for believing that relief should be granted; and
    (8) A request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested.
    In his petition for review, Potts only noted when he was informed of the forfeiture of certain
    property, acknowledged the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal, requested the superior
    court set a schedule for the appeal, and attached the hearing officer’s forfeiture order. Potts did
    not include his mailing address, the “name and mailing address of the agency whose action [was]
    at issue,” “[i]dentification of the agency action at issue, together with a duplicate copy, summary,
    or brief description of the agency action,” “[i]dentification of persons who were parties in any
    adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action,” “[f]acts to demonstrate that the petitioner
    [was] entitled to obtain judicial review,” “reasons for believing that relief should be granted,” nor
    “[a] request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested.” RCW 34.05.546.
    While Potts argues that he complied with RCW 34.05.546 by attaching the forfeiture order,
    this argument is not persuasive. Such attachment has only been held as substantial compliance
    when the content of the attachment meets the requirements of RCW 34.05.546. See Skagit
    Surveyors & Eng’rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 
    135 Wash. 2d 542
    , 557, 
    958 P.2d 962
    (1998).
    Potts did not comply with the requirements of RCW 34.05.546 by attaching the forfeiture
    order. Unlike Skagit Surveyors where the missing required information was included in the
    forfeiture order, the missing and required information here was not stated in the hearing officer’s
    forfeiture order. Neither Potts’s petition nor the forfeiture order included Potts’s mailing address,
    7
    No. 48410-2-II
    facts to demonstrate that he was entitled to obtain judicial review, reasons for believing that relief
    should be granted, nor a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested.
    Therefore, Potts did not comply with RCW 34.05.546.
    2.      Substantial Compliance with RCW 34.05.546
    Alternatively, Potts argues that he substantially complied with RCW 34.05.546 by
    attaching the forfeiture order to his notice of appeal. Again, we disagree.
    “[A]n essential aspect of substantial compliance is some level of actual compliance with
    the substance essential to the statute, although a procedural fault rendered the compliance
    imperfect.” Clymer v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 
    82 Wash. App. 25
    , 28-29, 
    917 P.2d 1091
    (1996). But “a
    failure to comply (through inaction, inadvertence, or in a manner which does not fulfill the
    objective of the statute), or belated compliance, cannot constitute substantial compliance with the
    requirements relating to the filing of a petition for judicial review.” 
    Id. at 29.
    Here, Potts argues that he substantially complied with RCW 34.05.546 by attaching the
    forfeiture order to his notice of appeal. But attaching the forfeiture order did not constitute
    substantial compliance. While the forfeiture order included his business mailing address, the name
    of the agency whose action was at issue, identified the agency action at issue, and identified
    persons who were parties in proceedings that led to the action at issue, the forfeiture order did not
    include all the requirements that were missing in his notice of appeal. Specifically, the forfeiture
    order did not include “[f]acts to demonstrate that the petitioner [was] entitled to obtain judicial
    review,” “reasons for believing that relief should be granted,” or “[a] request for relief, specifying
    the type and extent of relief requested.” RCW 34.05.546. Because there was no level of
    compliance with these requirements, Potts failed to substantially comply with RCW 34.05.546.
    8
    No. 48410-2-II
    3.      Noncompliance Cured
    Potts argues that his judicial notice of fact and supplemental notice of appeal cured any
    noncompliance with RCW 34.05.546. We agree.
    A petition for review must be timely filed and contain the statutorily required information.
    See RCW 34.05.542 and .546. But when procedural defects exist in a timely filed petition, courts
    should provide a reasonable time to cure once the defect is brought to the attention of the petitioner.
    See e.g., Biomed Comm, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Bd. of Pharmacy, 
    146 Wash. App. 929
    , 938, 
    193 P.3d 1093
    (2008).
    Here, Potts’s petition seeking review of the forfeiture order by the superior court was timely
    filed on March 5, 2014, but the petition did not contain the information required under RCW
    34.05.546. Potts endeavored to cure any noncompliance with RCW 34.05.546 by filing his judicial
    notice of fact on July 10, 2014. Potts’s judicial notice of fact, combined with his original petition
    and attached forfeiture order, contained all of the information required under RCW 34.05.546.
    Potts first appealed the superior court’s order dismissing his appeal of the forfeiture order
    on August 6, 2014. The City argued for the first time in that appeal that Potts failed to meet the
    requirements of RCW 34.05.546. We reversed the superior court’s dismissal of Potts’s petition
    and held that the City was free to argue that Potts failed to meet the requirements of RCW
    34.05.546 on remand.
    After we filed our decision, Potts filed a supplemental notice of appeal. The supplemental
    notice contained additional facts to demonstrate that the seizure of property from Potts’s home and
    second dealership was done without probable cause, additional reasons for believing relief should
    be granted (that the seizure was unlawful), and another request for return of the unlawfully seized
    9
    No. 48410-2-II
    property. These additional facts, reasons, and requests for relief further cured Potts’s initial
    noncompliance with RCW 34.05.546. Under these circumstances, we hold that Potts cured any
    noncompliance with RCW 34.05.546.
    B.        EFFECT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
    Potts argues that this court’s holding in his criminal case controls the outcome of the civil
    forfeiture action. We agree.
    1.     Collateral Estoppel
    Criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, while parallel, are separate. See
    RCW 69.50.505; Deeter v. Smith, 
    106 Wash. 2d 376
    , 378, 
    721 P.2d 519
    (1986). But courts have
    found that a criminal ruling, including rulings on the legality of a seizure, controls in a parallel
    civil forfeiture proceeding when collateral estoppel applies. See Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake,
    
    84 Wash. App. 135
    , 145, 
    925 P.2d 1289
    (1996); see also City of Walla Walla v. $401,333.44, 
    150 Wash. App. 360
    , 365-66, 
    208 P.3d 574
    (2009).
    Collateral estoppel requires a showing of: (1) identical issues, (2) a final judgment on the
    merits, (3) the party against whom the issue is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with
    a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) application of the doctrine must not work an injustice on
    the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied. 
    $401,333.44, 150 Wash. App. at 365
    . “Privity
    denotes a mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property.” 
    Barlindal, 84 Wash. App. at 143
    .
    Here, collateral estoppel applies. First, the issues are identical—whether there was a search
    pursuant to a valid warrant. Second, there is a final judgment on the legality of the search issue
    on the merits—the State Supreme Court denied Potts’s petition for review in the criminal case and
    10
    No. 48410-2-II
    a mandate has been issued. Third, privity exists between the City and the State. The City and the
    State both operated under the same state law, relied upon the same search warrant and subsequent
    search, and both would benefit from an order of forfeiture as 10 percent of the proceeds of any
    property forfeited must be remitted to the state treasurer and deposited into the state general fund.
    See RCW 69.50.505(9)(a). The City and the State “had a mutual interest and shared a common
    purpose in a successful prosecution . . . as well as a successful forfeiture of [the owner’s]
    possessions.”10 
    Barlindal, 84 Wash. App. at 143
    . Fourth, injustice would not result against the City
    because its officers conducted the initial investigation and created the affidavit of probable cause,
    the affidavit was then used to support the warrant used in this case to conduct the search and
    seizure, and that affidavit and warrant was reviewed at trial and on appeal. Therefore, collateral
    estoppel applies.11
    2.      Void Forfeiture Order
    Applying our prior holding in the criminal appeal, we hold the forfeiture order was void as
    it related to the property seized from Potts’s home and his second dealership.
    10
    Furthermore, “the inability of a [City] attorney to control the prosecution does not diminish the
    common interests that both agencies have in the outcome of the prosecution.” Barlindal, 84 Wn.
    App. at 144.
    11
    Potts also argues that (1) the search warrant did not authorize seizure of certain property from
    Potts Family Motors, and thus, that property could not be forfeited; and (2) the Department failed
    to follow RCW 69.50.505’s notice requirements. Our record on appeal contains neither the search
    warrant nor evidence of any notice or lack thereof. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.
    Wash. Pub. Tr. Advocates v. City of Spokane, 
    120 Wash. App. 892
    , 898, 
    86 P.3d 835
    (2004) (“If the
    record is insufficient for review, we may decline review of a particular issue.”).
    11
    No. 48410-2-II
    a.      Legal principles
    Under RCW 69.50.505(1)(b), any equipment used, or intended to be used, to produce or
    deliver any controlled substance under the chapter, is subject to forfeiture. Any vehicles used, or
    intended to be used, to facilitate the sale, delivery, or receipt of any controlled substance under the
    chapter are also subject to forfeiture. RCW 69.50.505(1)(d). And any monies furnished or
    intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the chapter are also
    subject to forfeiture. RCW 69.50.505(g).
    Property subject to forfeiture may be seized by any law enforcement officer without
    process if the seizure is incident to a search warrant. RCW 69.50.505(2)(a). The authority to order
    forfeiture is statutory and must comply with proper forfeiture procedure. City of Walla Walla v.
    $401,333.44, 
    164 Wash. App. 236
    , 246, 
    262 P.3d 1239
    (2011).
    We review final agency orders under the APA, “stand[ing] in the shoes of the superior
    court.” Musselman v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 
    132 Wash. App. 841
    , 846, 
    134 P.3d 248
    (2006).
    When a trial court lacks the authority to enter an order, the order is void. Servatron, Inc. v.
    Intelligent Wireless Prods., Inc., 
    186 Wash. App. 666
    , 679-80, 
    346 P.3d 831
    (2015). We review de
    novo whether a judgment is void. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of Kansas v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
    176 Wash. App. 185
    , 195, 
    312 P.3d 976
    (2013), review denied, 
    179 Wash. 2d 1010
    (2014).
    b.      Property illegally seized from Potts’s home and second dealership
    Here, we held in Potts’s criminal appeal that the search warrant used by the City to search
    Potts’s home and his second dealership, and seize property from those properties, was invalid. See
    Potts, slip. op. at 47-48, 51. Therefore, the seizure of property from those two properties was
    unlawful.
    12
    No. 48410-2-II
    Potts argues that this seizure pursuant to an invalid warrant for lack of probable cause
    rendered the hearing officer without jurisdiction. But the lack of probable cause for a seizure goes
    to the merits of a forfeiture claim, and not to a court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
    $401,333.44, 164 Wash. App. at 251
    .
    Here, because the City unlawfully seized the property from Potts’s home and the second
    dealership, the hearing officer could not find that the property was seized pursuant to RCW
    69.50.505, which allows officers to seize property without process if done so under a search
    warrant. Without such a finding, the hearing officer could not order the property forfeited.
    Therefore, we hold that the forfeiture order relating to the property seized from Potts’s home and
    his second dealership was void and vacate those portions of the order.12
    C.      MOTION TO VACATE
    Potts argues that the superior court erred when it denied his motion to vacate the dismissal
    of his appeal. We do not address this claim.
    Under RAP 5.3(a), a notice of appeal must “designate the decision or part of decision which
    the party wants reviewed.” We will review a trial court decision not designated in the notice of
    appeal, “if (1) the order or ruling prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice, and (2)
    the order is entered, or the ruling is made, before the appellate court accepts review.” RAP 2.4(b).
    If a party wants to seek review of a trial court decision entered “after review in the same case has
    12
    We note that it would be the height of irony in this case if the State were allowed to keep
    unconstitutionally seized property because Potts did not provide a mailing address under RCW
    34.05.546.
    13
    No. 48410-2-II
    been accepted by the appellate court, the party must initiate a separate review of the decision by
    timely filing a notice of appeal.” RAP 5.1(f).
    Here, Potts did not designate the superior court’s denial of his motion to vacate in his notice
    of appeal. And Potts did not initiate a separate review of the denial by filing another notice of
    appeal. Furthermore, the superior court’s denial of Potts’s motion to vacate the order does not
    prejudicially affect the order of dismissal pursuant to RCW 34.05.546, which is the decision on
    appeal. The superior court’s denial of Potts’s motion to vacate is not before this court on appeal,
    and we do not address it further.13
    D.     MOTION TO COMPEL
    Potts argues that the superior court erred when it denied his motion to compel agency
    records. The record on appeal does not contain Potts’s motion, but contains only objections and
    responses thereto. The record is insufficient for us to address this claim. Wash. Pub. Tr. Advocates
    v. City of Spokane, 
    120 Wash. App. 892
    , 898, 
    86 P.3d 835
    (2004).
    13
    Potts also argues that we should vacate the hearing officer’s forfeiture order and the superior
    court’s dismissal order because: the hearing officer did not have personal jurisdiction over the
    property seized from Potts Family Motors due to the City’s failure to provide the required notice
    to Potts Family Motors, notice was served on the hearing officer that the property belonged to
    Potts Family Motors, and no hearing was held to determine the ownership of the property seized.
    However, the record is insufficient for us to address this issue. Wash. Pub. Tr. 
    Advocates, 120 Wash. App. at 898
    . The notice allegedly provided does not exist in the record. Therefore, we decline
    to address this claim.
    14
    No. 48410-2-II
    We reverse the superior court’s order dismissing Potts’s appeal of the administrative action
    forfeiting Potts’s property, cash, and bank accounts and remand for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
    2.06.040, it is so ordered.
    Lee, J.
    We concur:
    Worswick, P.J.
    Sutton, J.
    15