Woodburn Industrial Capital Group, V. Robert Plummer Sr & Robert Plummer Jr. ( 2022 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 19, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
WOODBURN INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL No. 55135-7-II
GROUP, an Oregon limited liability company,
Appellant,
v.
ROBERT PLUMMER SR., an individual, and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROBERT PLUMMER JR., an individual,
Respondents.
VELJACIC, J. — Woodburn Industrial Capital Group (WICG) offered to buy Plummer Sr.’s
(Plummer) property by sending him a purchase and sales agreement (PSA). The PSA included an
offer deadline, and Plummer failed to sign the PSA by the deadline. After the deadline had passed,
WICG and Plummer continued to communicate regarding the offer, and WICG extended the
deadline during a phone conversation. Plummer signed and returned the PSA without modifying
any terms. A few weeks later, Plummer attempted to escape the contract by sending WICG a letter
indicating his signature was intended as a counteroffer not an acceptance, and that he revoked the
counteroffer. WICG sued for specific performance. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The superior court granted Plummer’s motion. WICG appeals, arguing that when Plummer signed
the PSA they entered into a valid contract, that the agreement includes a sufficient property
description to satisfy the statute of frauds.
55135-7-II
We conclude Plummer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because whether
WICG extended its offer deadline and Plummer’s acceptance was valid are genuine issues of
material fact. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTS
WICG sought to purchase Plummer’s real property. In early October, WICG sent Plummer
an offer to purchase his real property in the form of a standard PSA. The PSA contained a
description of the property using a street address and tax parcel number. It also contained a “Time
for Acceptance” clause that stated: “If Seller does not return to Buyer a signed and dated version
of this Agreement on or before 5:00 PM Pacific Time on October 10, 2018, then the [e]arnest
[m]oney shall be promptly refunded to Buyer and thereafter, neither party shall have any further
right or obligation hereunder.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 14. The PSA also included a time-is-of-
the-essence clause.
Plummer failed to sign the PSA before the offer deadline passed. WICG did not abandon
its efforts to purchase Plummer’s property, and the parties continued to communicate regarding
WICG’s offer. On January 8, WICG spoke with Plummer over the phone and informed him that
the offer was still open. The same day, Plummer signed the PSA without altering any terms and
returned it to WICG. Approximately two weeks after signing the PSA, Plummer contacted WICG
stating that his signature on the PSA did not constitute acceptance but was instead a counteroffer,
which he was now revoking.
Prior to WICG suing Plummer, Plummer’s sons requested a court determine he was
incapacitated. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who issued a report. In a response to such
report, Plummer’s son issued a response in which he acknowledged that Plummer had come to
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him and stated that he wanted “to get out of the contract.” CP at 100. The court ruled that Plummer
was not an incapacitated person.
After the guardianship proceeding, WICG sued Plummer seeking specific performance,
and sued Plummer Jr. for tortious interference with contract. Both parties moved for summary
judgment. In its motion for partial summary judgment as to Plummer Sr., WICG argued that when
Plummer signed the PSA it created an enforceable contract and that specific performance was
appropriate. Plummer also moved for summary judgment, arguing his signature on the PSA was
a counteroffer that was properly revoked, WICG’s offer had expired therefore acceptance was
impossible, and the PSA failed to include a property description that satisfied the statute of frauds.
In his declaration attached to the motion, Plummer did not contest WICG’s declaration that
stated it had extended the deadline, nor did he dispute his prior statement that he wanted to escape
the contract. He stated “After I failed to accept the offer WICG's agent Stephen Ford contacted
me multiple times over the next couple of months, trying to get me to sign” and “I heard nothing
from . . . WICG regarding acceptance of the [PSA] after I signed on January 8, 2019. On January
25, 2019, at my request my attorney sent a letter to WICG withdrawing the offer to sell contained
in the [PSA] I had signed on January 8, 2019.” CP at 117.
The superior court granted Plummer’s order for summary judgment and denied WICG’s.
WICG appeals the superior court’s order.
ANALYSIS
WICG argues that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment
because it extended its offer deadline and Plummer accepted it. In the alternative, it argues the
trial court erred when it granted summary judgment for Plummer because whether it extended the
offer deadline and whether Plummer accepted the offer by signing the PSA are genuine issues of
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material fact. We agree with WICG that there are material issues of fact precluding summary
judgment.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a superior court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, and performs the
same inquiry as the superior court. Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296, 300, 449 P.3d
640 (2019); Estate of Carter v. Carden, 11 Wn. App. 2d 573, 581, 455 P.3d 197 (2019). We
consider the facts and the inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Bremerton Pub. Safety Ass'n v. City of Bremerton, 104 Wn. App. 226, 230, 15 P.3d 688(2001). We may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions establish
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. CR 56(c); RockRock Grp., LLC v. Value Logic, LLC, 194 Wn. App. 904, 913,
380 P.3d 545 (2016). “A genuine issue is one upon which reasonable people may disagree,” and
“[a] material fact is one upon which all or part of the outcome of the litigation depends.” Youker
v. Douglas County, 178 Wn. App. 793, 796, 327 P.3d 1243 (2014); Hill v. Cox, 110 Wn. App. 394,
402, 41 P.3d 495 (2002).
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Purchase and sales agreements are contracts for the conveyance of real property.
Geonerco, Inc. v. Grand Ridge Props. IV LLC, 146 Wn. App. 459, 465, 191 P.3d 76 (2008). To
form a contract, including purchase and sales agreements, the contracting parties must have a
“meeting of the minds” as to the essential terms of their agreement. Id. We follow the “‘objective
manifestation theory of contracts.’” Carden, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 581-82 (quoting Hearst
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005)). When
interpreting a contract, we attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties by examining the objective
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manifestations of the parties. Carden, 11. Wn. App. 2d at 582. To that end, we apply the “context
rule” to interpret contracts, allowing us to consider extrinsic evidence, including the
“‘circumstances leading to the execution of the contract.’” Roats v. Blakely Island Maint. Comm'n,
Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 274, 279 P.3d 943 (2012) (quoting Shafer v. Bd. of Trustees of Sandy
Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc., 76 Wn. App. 267, 275, 883 P.2d 1387 (1994)).
“The statute of frauds requires all real estate conveyances, including a purchase and sales
agreement's conveyance of a future interest, to contain ‘a description of the land sufficiently
definite to locate it without recourse to oral testimony.’” Grand Ridge Props., 146 Wn. App. at
465-66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Key Design, Inc. v. Moser, 138 Wn.2d 875,
881, 983 P.2d 653 (1999)). Without a sufficient description of the land, a contract for the
conveyance of real property is legally void. Grand Ridge Props., 146 Wn. App. at 466. Tax parcel
numbers satisfy the legal description for property tax purposes. RCW 84.04.055.
III. ANALYSIS
We conclude that the superior court erred in granting Plummer’s motion for summary
judgment because whether the offer was still valid when Plummer signed the PSA due to WICG
extending its offer deadline is a genuine issue of material fact. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to WICG, WICG extended its offer and Plummer signed the valid offer. WICG
argues that it extended its offer deadline, thereby allowing Plummer to accept its offer after the
deadline had passed. Plummer admits that WICG continued to speak with him after the deadline,
encouraging him to sign the offer. Plummer’s statement to his son that he wanted to escape the
contract also implies that Plummer understood the deadline had been extended.
Further, Plummer’s conduct implies he knew the offer deadline had been extended.
Plummer signed the PSA the same day he spoke with WICG, and he returned it without modifying
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any terms within the document. The facts available to us, viewed in the light most favorable to
WICG, show that WICG extended its offer deadline, thereby making the offer valid when Plummer
signed it. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact bearing on whether the parties had a
meeting of the minds and made an enforceable contract; Plummer was not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
Although we conclude that whether WICG extended its offer, thereby making Plummer’s
signature an acceptance, is a genuine issue of material fact, we additionally note that the PSA
included a sufficiently definite property description to satisfy the statute of frauds. In his brief,
Plummer acknowledges that the parcel number is sufficient as a legal description, but argues the
parcel number is negated by the additional language ““Legal Description to be determined in
Escrow.” Resp’t at 18. Plummer fails to cite to any legal authority to support that proposition.
The statute of frauds merely requires a description sufficient to identify the property without oral
testimony. Grand Ridge Props., 146 Wn. App. at 465-66. The parcel number in the PSA satisfies
that requirement by Plummer’s own admission and RCW 84.04.055, therefore the PSA does not
violate the statute of frauds.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
Plummer argues that, although no agreement exists between him and WICG, pursuant to
their nonexistent agreement he is entitled to attorney’s fees.
“In Washington, reasonable attorney fees may be awarded when authorized by a contract.”
Salewski v. Pilchuck Veterinary Hosp., Inc., P.S., 189 Wn. App. 898, 910, 359 P.3d 884 (2015).
When a contract provides for attorney’s fees, such provision includes fees on appeal. Id. Under
RCW 4.84.330, when a contract includes terms that allow collection of attorney’s fees, the
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prevailing party is entitled to such fees. A prevailing party is one that receives a judgment in its
favor. Mike's Painting, Inc. v. Carter Welsh, Inc., 95 Wn. App. 64, 68, 975 P.2d 532 (1999).
We conclude that Plummer is not entitled to attorney’s fees because summary judgment
was improper and he is therefore not the prevailing party on appeal. See RCW 4.84.330; Carter
Welsh, 95 Wn. App. at 68.
CONCLUSION
We conclude Plummer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because whether
WICG extended its offer deadline and Plummer’s acceptance was valid is a genuine issue of
material fact. The grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Veljacic, J.
We concur:
Worswick, P.J.
Cruser, J.
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