State of Washington v. Nathan John Calvert ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                   FILED
    JANUARY 18, 2018
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )         No. 34924-1-111
    )
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                              )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    NATHAN J. CALVERT,                            )
    )
    Appellant.               )
    LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.CJ. - Nathan Calvert appeals his convictions for
    residential burglary and attempt to elude a police officer. He argues the trial court erred
    when it denied his motion to suppress his custodial statements. He also argues the trial
    court erred when it imposed the $200 criminal filing fee as part of the judgment and
    sentence. We disagree and affirm.
    FACTS
    Javier Zuniga and Sofia Aguilera returned home one evening to find an intruder in
    their garage. The intruder fled, and Zuniga's daughter called the police. Spokane County
    Sheriffs Corporal Jeff Thurman, together with his police K-9, responded to the call.
    No. 34924-1-111
    State v. Calvert
    While en route, Corporal Thurman noticed a car driving without any headlights. He
    initiated a traffic stop. The car sped to get away, attempted to make a tum, and hit a
    parked vehicle. The driver, Nathan Calvert, exited the car and ran. Corporal Thurman
    and his K-9 tracked Calvert and found him beneath a vehicle. The K-9 bit Calvert, and
    Corporal Thurman placed Calvert under arrest.
    Sheriffs Deputy Clay Hilton arrived to assist Corporal Thurman. Deputy Hilton
    searched Calvert for weapons. Deputy Hilton advised Calvert of his Miranda 1 rights.
    While Deputy Hilton advised Calvert of his rights, Calvert was yelling at Corporal
    Thurman about his injury. After Deputy Hilton fully advised Calvert of his rights, Deputy
    Hilton asked Calvert if he understood his rights. Calvert did not respond.
    About 20 minutes later, Corporal Thurman went to the hospital to speak with
    Calvert. Calvert agreed to talk with Corporal Thurman. During the conversation, Calvert
    admitted that he had been in the garage when Zuniga and Aguilera arrived.
    In addition to other charges, 2 the State charged Calvert with residential burglary
    and attempting to elude a police vehicle. Calvert's defense to the residential burglary
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966).
    2
    We do not discuss these other charges because they are unrelated to the subject
    incident and because Calvert pleaded guilty to them before trial.
    2
    No. 34924-1-III
    State v. Calvert
    charge was that he was not the person in the garage when Zuniga and Aguilar arrived.
    His defense depended on having the admission he made to Corporal Thurman suppressed.
    Calvert scheduled his CrR 3 .5 hearing the day of trial. The State presented the
    testimonies of the arresting officers. Calvert chose not to testify. The trial court denied
    Calvert's suppression motion. Pertinent to the issue raised on appeal, the trial court
    found:
    3 .2    The defendant was advised of his constitutional rights.
    3.3     Although the defendant did not verbally acknowledge those
    rights, there is no evidence that he didn't understand these rights.
    3 .4    The State has established that the defendant understand [sic]
    these rights when he made statements on [the] scene and at the hospital.
    3.5     These statements[ 3l were knowing, voluntary and intelligent.[4l
    Clerk's Paper (CP) at 96.
    After trial, the jury found Calvert guilty of residential burglary and attempting to
    elude a police vehicle. The trial court later entered a judgment of conviction against
    Calvert, sentenced him, and imposed various financial obligations including a $200
    criminal filing fee.
    3
    Both parties acknowledge that the proper inquiry is whether the waiver of
    Miranda rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
    4
    Although these four paragraphs are listed under conclusions of law, they are
    findings of fact, and we treat them as such. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 
    162 Wash. 2d 340
    , 353, 
    172 P.3d 688
    (2007).
    3
    No. 34924-1-111
    State v. Calvert
    Calvert timely appealed.
    ANALYSIS
    A.     KNOWING WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
    Calvert challenges findings 3.3-3.5, set forth above. He argues that substantial
    evidence does not support the trial court's finding that he knowingly waived his Miranda
    rights. He argues the uncontested evidence establishes he was yelling at Corporal
    Thurman while Deputy Hilton recited his Miranda rights and when Deputy Hilton asked
    him if he understood his rights, he did not acknowledge that he understood them. Based
    on this uncontested evidence, he argues the State failed to establish that he heard or
    understood his rights. And unless he understood his rights, he could not have validly
    waived them.
    A trial court's CrR 3 .5 findings of fact will be upheld on appeal if supported by
    substantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118,131,942 P.2d 363 (1997); see
    State v. Radcliffe, 164 Wn.2d 900,907, 
    194 P.3d 250
    (2008). Substantial evidence exists
    where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded,
    rational person of the truth of the finding. State v. Hill, 
    123 Wash. 2d 641
    , 644, 
    870 P.2d 313
    (1994).
    4
    No. 34924-1-111
    State v. Calvert
    At the suppression hearing, the State elicited the following testimony from Deputy
    Hilton concerning whether Calvert heard and understood his Miranda rights:
    Q.     Was there any indication that he did not hear you or did not
    understand that you were reading him his rights?
    A.     No.
    Report of Proceedings (RP) at 31-32. This testimony is sufficient to persuade a
    fair-minded, rational person that Calvert heard the rights that had been read to him.
    A related question is whether the State, having established that Calvert
    heard his Miranda rights, sufficiently established that Calvert also understood
    those rights. We note that Calvert had no difficulty communicating in English
    with Corporal Thurman either during the arrest or at the hospital. We also note the
    trial court's unchallenged finding that at the time of his arrest, Calvert did not
    appear to have been unduly influenced by any substances. We treat this
    unchallenged finding as a verity on appeal. Davis v. Dep 't of Labor & Indus., 
    94 Wash. 2d 119
    , 123, 
    615 P.2d 1279
    (1980). Given Calvert's fluency in English and
    lack of noticeable impairment at the time of his arrest, we see no evidentiary basis
    to overturn the trial court's finding that Calvert understood the rights read to him
    by Detective Hilton.
    5
    No. 34924-1-III
    State v. Calvert
    For these reasons, we uphold the trial court's determination that Calvert
    understood his Miranda rights and knowingly waived them when he later spoke with
    Corporal Thurman at the hospital. The trial court properly denied Calvert's motion to
    suppress.
    B.     CALVERT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS NONCONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
    CRIMINAL FILING FEE
    Calvert next argues the trial court erred when it imposed the $200 criminal filing
    fee under RCW 36. l 8.020(2)(h); He argues the criminal filing fee is a discretionary cost
    that may not be imposed unless the trial court first inquires into his current and likely
    future ability to pay.
    Calvert did not make this argument to the sentencing court. We generally refuse to
    consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal unless one of three exceptions
    applies. RAP 2.S(a). Calvert does not argue that any exception to RAP 2.S(a) applies.
    We, therefore, refuse to review this claim of error.
    C.     IMPOSITION OF THE $200 CRIMINAL FILING FEE WAS NOT A MANIFEST ERROR
    AFFECTING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
    Calvert further argues that imposition of the $200 criminal filing fee violates state
    and federal equal protection because a criminal defendant is required to pay a criminal
    6
    No. 34924-1-111
    State v. Calvert
    filing fee if convicted, whereas a civil litigant can apply to have the civil filing fee waived
    in accordance with GR 34.
    Calvert did not make this argument to the sentencing court. Nevertheless,
    RAP 2.5(a)(3) permits an appellate court to review an unpreserved claim of error if it
    involves a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Our RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis
    involves a two-prong inquiry. First, the alleged error must truly be of constitutional
    magnitude. State v. Kalebaugh, 
    183 Wash. 2d 578
    , 583, 
    355 P.3d 253
    (2015). Second, the
    asserted error must be manifest. 
    Id. The first
    prong is met. Invoking both the state and federal constitutions, Calvert
    argues there is no rational basis to require all convicted criminal defendants to pay the
    criminal filing fee but allow some civil litigants to have their filing fee waived under
    GR 34. Calvert's claim of error therefore is truly of constitutional magnitude.
    The second prong is not met. We construe RAP 2.5(a)(3) in a manner that strikes
    a careful policy balance between requiring objections to be raised so trial courts can
    correct errors and permitting review of errors that actually resulted in serious injustices to
    the accused. 
    Kalebaugh, 183 Wash. 2d at 583
    . "Manifest" has been described as an error of
    law "that the trial court should have known." 
    Id. at 584.
    In addition, "manifestness
    'requires a showing of actual prejudice."' 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted) ( quoting
    7
    No. 34924-1-111
    State v. Calvert
    State v. O'Hara, 
    167 Wash. 2d 91
    , 99,217 PJd 756 (2009)). "To demonstrate actual
    prejudice, there must be a 'plausible showing ... that the asserted error had practical and
    identifiable consequences"' in the case. 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (quoting
    State v. Kirkman, 
    159 Wash. 2d 918
    , 935, 
    155 P.3d 125
    (2007)). By limiting our review of
    unpreserved constitutional errors to truly constitutional errors that are obvious and
    resulted in actual prejudice, we strike the proper balance.
    Here, it is not obvious that the trial court violated Calvert's state and federal equal
    protection rights when it imposed the $200 criminal filing fee. Calvert's argument has
    not been addressed in a published decision by our appellate courts. For this reason, we
    refuse to review this claim of error.
    D.     APPELLATE COST AWARD
    Calvert requests that we deny the State an award of appellate costs in the event the
    State substantially prevails. We deem the State the substantially prevailing party. If the
    State seeks appellate costs, we defer the issue of appellate costs to our commissioner in
    accordance with RAP 14.2.
    8
    No. 34924-1-III
    State v. Calvert
    Affirmed.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    Lawrence-Berrey, A.CJ.
    j
    WE CONCUR:
    9