Olivia Mora v. Green River College ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
OLIVIA MORA,
No. 75324-0-1
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
V.
GREEN RIVER COLLEGE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent. FILED: June 12, 2017
SPEARMAN, J. — There is a three-year statute of limitations for disability
discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities
Act(ADA), the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Olivia Mora filed her complaint alleging
these causes of action nearly nine years after she was asked to withdraw from
an aviation course at Green River College (GRC), which is the factual basis for
her complaint. The trial court properly dismissed her complaint as time barred.
We affirm.
FACTS
Olivia Mora attended GRC in 2007 and was enrolled in an aviation class.
On May 15, 2007, Mora met with her teacher and the Director of Disability
Support Services. Both advised Mora to consider withdrawing from the course
No. 75324-0-1
because she was failing. They encouraged Mora to consider career options
outside of aviation. Mora was upset by the school's advice and felt humiliated.
Mora filed a complaint against GRC and other defendants in United States
District Court in December 2012. She alleged that the defendants violated her
civil rights with respect to the aviation course. The court found that the complaint
was barred by the statute of limitations, deficient service of process, and that
Mora failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Her complaint was
dismissed with prejudice.
Then, on January 13, 2016, Mora filed a complaint against GRC in King
County Superior Court concerning the same 2007 aviation course. Mora alleged
disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act,1 ADA,2 and WLAD.3 Mora
amended her complaint adding a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
GRC moved to dismiss, arguing that Mora's complaint was barred by the
statute of limitations, res judicata, and that the complaint was not properly
served. GRC requested attorney fees and costs for defending against a frivolous
suit. The trial court dismissed Mora's claims based on the statute of limitations
and res judicata. In spite of an oral ruling to the contrary, the trial court found in
its written order that the lawsuit was frivolous and awarded fees under CR 11.
1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796/.
2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
3 Ch. 49.60 RCW.
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No. 75324-0-1 -
GRC later moved for attorney fees under CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185 and was
awarded $2,500.
DISCUSSION
Mora argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims as barred
by the statute of limitations and res judicata.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss. McAfee v.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 193 Wn. App. 220, 226, 370 P.3d 25(2016).
"[W]e accept as true the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint and any reasonable
inferences therein." Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 201, 961 P.2d 333(1998). Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate "only if it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery." Cutler v. Phillips
Petrol. Co., 124 Wn.2d 749, 755, 881 P.2d 216 (1994).
Each cause of action pleaded by Mora carries a three-year statute of
limitations. Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 261-62, 103 P.3d 729(2004)(WLAD); Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wn. App. 176, 190,
222 P.3d 119(2009)(negligent infliction of emotional distress); see Pickern v.
Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)(Americans
with Disabilities Act); Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823
n.11, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001)(Rehabilitation Act).4
4 The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not have their own statute of limitations, so the
court applies the statute of limitations of the most analogous state law. Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1137
n.2. The analogous state law is an action for personal injury. Id. The Washington statute of
limitations for personal injury actions is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2).
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No. 75324-0-1
Mora filed her complaint in January 2016, which is nearly nine years after
she withdrew from the aviation course in May 2007. A statute of limitations may
be tolled in some circumstances, but Mora has not alleged facts related to
minority, incompetency, or incarceration that would toll the limitations period.
RCW 4.16.190. Mora argues that CR 15(c) cures the untimeliness of her
complaint because it allows amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the
original pleading. But Mora's original state complaint was filed in January 2016,
which is also well after the statute of limitations expired. Mora's claims are barred
by the three-year statute of limitations.
Having found that the complaint is time-barred, we need not decide
whether Mora's claims are also barred by res judicata.
Mora assigns error to the written order finding that her suit was frivolous
because the judge made an oral ruling that she would not enter such a finding.
But a judge's oral opinion "has no final or binding effect unless formally
incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment." State v. Collins, 112
Wn.2d 303, 306, 771 P.2d 350(1989)(quoting State v. Mallory, 69 Wn.2d 532,
533-34, 419 P.2d 324 (1966)). Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.
Mora additionally argues that she was denied a fair hearing on GRC's
motion to dismiss because the judge dated the order May 5, 2016, rather than
May 6, which was the date of the hearing. In spite of this discrepancy, the record
indicates that the judge received, reviewed, and signed the order on May 6,
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No. 75324-0-1
2016. The date was merely a scrivener's error that is immaterial to the fairness of
the proceeding.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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