State of Washington v. David Pete Aleck ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    MARCH 22, 2018
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
    )         No. 34904-7-111
    Respondent,               )
    )
    V.                                      )
    )
    DAVID PETE ALECK,                              )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    Appellant.                )
    KORSMO, J. -David Aleck appeals from convictions for second degree unlawful
    hunting of big game and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that his
    trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert a tribal hunting right
    defense. Since the facts necessary to establish the defense are not present in the record
    and since the defense would not apply to the unlawful possession charge, we affirm.
    FACTS
    Briefly stated, the charges arose from an incident where Mr. Aleck shot a deer on
    a road in Klickitat County at a time when deer season was closed. The deer leaped a
    fence onto private property, where it died. The property owners heard the gunshot and
    reported the incident to law enforcement. Mr. Aleck was apprehended by fish and
    wildlife officers as he drove away from the scene.
    No. 34904-7-111
    State v. Aleck
    Mr. Aleck testified that he is a member of the Yakama Tribe and that he knew the
    road was outside of the reservation's borders and was not an "in-lieu" site on which tribal
    members are entitled to hunt. Instead, he believed that the road was "open and
    unclaimed" land on which a tribal member could hunt. His counsel did not propose a
    jury instruction asserting the affirmative defense that he was exercising his treaty hunting
    rights. However, counsel twice asked the court for such an instruction. The judge turned
    him down, stating that a defendant's mistaken subjective belief did not authorize an
    affirmative defense. Report of Proceedings (Nov. 10, 2016) at 88-89. The court gave an
    example:
    If we had a thirty year old in here saying on the stand I thought that I could
    have consensual sex with a fifteen year old and that that was okay, we
    would allow the Defendant to make that comment from the stand as his
    opinion of what the law is, he would n·ever get an instruction to that effect
    and so forth and so on.
    A Defendant can always have a misapprehension of the law and
    express that, that's his rationale for doing it. That doesn't mean he gets a
    jury instruction.
    
    Id. at 89.
    The court permitted the defense to argue Mr. Aleck's mistaken belief, but without
    an affirmative defense instruction. The jury convicted Mr. Aleck on both counts as
    charged. He timely appealed to this court. A panel considered the matter without
    hearing argument.
    2
    No. 34904-7-111
    State v. Aleck
    ANALYSIS
    The sole issue presented by the appeal is whether or not defense counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by failing to present an affirmative defense instruction. On this
    record, Mr. Aleck cannot establish that his counsel erred. Moreover, since the defense
    would not be available to the unlawful possession count, he also cannot establish
    prejudice with respect to that charge.
    The issue presented by this appeal is controlled by well settled law. With respect
    to Mr. Aleck's status as a member of the Yakama Nation, the United States Supreme
    Court has noted that "it has never been doubted that States may punish crimes committed
    by Indians, even reservation Indians, outside of Indian country," including on lands
    where tribes have reserved hunting and fishing rights. Organized Village ofKake v.
    Egan, 
    369 U.S. 60
    , 75, 
    82 S. Ct. 562
    , 
    7 L. Ed. 2d 573
    (1962); see also Nevada v. Hicks,
    
    533 U.S. 353
    , 362, 
    121 S. Ct. 2304
    , 
    150 L. Ed. 2d 398
    (2001) ("It is also well established
    in our precedent that States have criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians for crimes
    committed . .. off the reservation.").
    An Indian going outside of the reservation is subject to nondiscriminatory state
    laws unless there is express federal law to the contrary. United States v. Washington, 
    520 F.2d 676
    , 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
    411 U.S. 145
    ,
    148-149, 
    93 S. Ct. 1267
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 114
    (1973)). A treaty exemption is an express
    federal law. However, the assertion of a treaty right as an affirmative defense must be
    3
    No. 34904-7-111
    State v. Aleck
    pleaded by the defendant. State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104,110,483 P.2d 832 (1971). To
    establish the affirmative defense,the defendant must show by a preponderance of the
    evidence (1) the existence of the treaty,(2) of which he is a beneficiary,and (3) that,as a
    matter of law,the treaty bars him from the operation and enforcement of the hunting laws
    and regulations. State v. Posenjak, 127 Wn. App. 41,48,111 P.3d 1206 (2005).
    The 1855 Treaty with the Yakama Nation ceded tribal land back to the federal
    government but retained tribal hunting and fishing rights on the ceded land. State v. Jim,
    173 Wn.2d 672,676,273 P.3d 434 (2012) (citing Treaty between the United States and
    the Yakama Nation of Indians,arts. 1-3,June 9,1855,12 Stat. 951,953). This land later
    became part of Washington State when it joined the Union in 1889. The Treaty also
    permits hunting on "open and unclaimed lands," but does not extend to hunting on
    privately owned lands. See State v. Chambers, 81 Wn.2d 929,934-936,506 P.2d 311,
    cert. denied, 
    94 S. Ct. 447
    (1973). "Open and unclaimed " lands has been interpreted to
    mean lands that are publicly owned,including national forest service lands,and other
    lands not settled or privately owned. State v. Buchanan, 
    138 Wash. 2d 186
    , 209, 
    978 P.2d 1070
    (1999).
    Similarly,the standards governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims also are
    well settled. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
    effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's failure to live up to those standards will require
    a new trial when the client has been prejudiced by counsel's failure. State v. McFarland,
    4
    No. 34904-7-III
    State v. Aleck
    
    127 Wash. 2d 322
    , 334-335, 
    899 P.2d 1251
    (1995). In evaluating ineffectiveness claims,
    courts must be highly deferential to counsel's decisions. A strategic or tactical decision is
    not a basis for finding error. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 689-691, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984). Under Strickland, courts apply a two-prong test,
    evaluating whether or not (1) counsel's performance failed to meet a standard of
    reasonableness and (2) actual prejudice resulted from counsel's failures. 
    Id. at 690-692.
    When a claim can be disposed of on one ground, a reviewing court need not consider both
    Strickland prongs. 
    Id. at 697;
    State v. Foster, 
    140 Wash. App. 266
    , 273, 
    166 P.3d 726
    ,
    review denied, 
    162 Wash. 2d 1007
    (2007). If the evidence necessary to resolve the
    ineffective assistance argument is not in the record, the claim is not manifest and cannot
    be addressed on appeal. 
    McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 334
    . Typically, the remedy in such
    situations is for the defendant to bring a personal restraint petition (PRP) so that additional
    evidence can be added to the record. 
    Id. at 338
    n.5; State v. Norman, 
    61 Wash. App. 16
    , 27-
    28, 
    808 P.2d 1159
    (1991).
    The initial Strickland prong is dispositive here for a pair of reasons. First, counsel
    did twice ask the court for an instruction, although nothing in our record shows whether a
    written instruction was proffered. The court, as noted above, expressly rejected the
    request since the only basis was the defendant's subjective belief that he could hunt on
    the land. Counsel tried, but failed, to obtain the instruction. Having requested the
    instruction from the court, counsel's performance was not deficient. Secondly, the claim
    5
    No. 34904-7-III
    State v. Aleck
    fails due to the status of the record. There is no evidentiary support for the proposition
    that the land on which Mr. Aleck was hunting constituted open and unclaimed lands. The
    property owner testified that it was not open or unclaimed. Absent some affirmative
    evidence that the land was open, the court had no basis for instructing on the potential
    defense. 1
    For both reasons, Mr. Aleck has failed to show that his counsel performed
    deficiently and his claim of ineffective assistance fails. However, there is an additional
    reason that his ineffective assistance argument fails. The Treaty hunting right affirmative
    defense would not extend to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. As noted
    previously, the State is entitled to enforce nondiscriminatory state laws unless there is
    express federal law to the contrary. 
    Washington, 520 F.2d at 684
    . That is the case here.
    Even if Mr. Aleck was entitled to hunt where this incident occurred, he was not entitled
    to possess a firearm. Preventing felons from possessing firearms is a nondiscriminatory
    law that the State can legitimately enforce in this circumstance. Thus, even if counsel
    should have sought an affirmative defense instruction, Mr. Aleck was not prejudiced on
    the unlawful possession charge since the defense would not have applied to that count.
    Any error was not prejudicial, so counsel did not perform defectively on that count.
    1
    If Mr. Aleck has contrary evidence concerning the nature of the land, he is free to
    bring that evidence in a PRP. 
    McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 338
    n.5; 
    Norman, 61 Wash. App. at 27-28
    .
    6
    No. 34904-7-III
    State v. Aleck
    Mr. Aleck has not satisfied his heavy burden of establishing that his counsel
    performed deficiently to his prejudice. The convictions are affirmed. 2
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
    2.06.040.
    WE CONCUR:
    .                      ((
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    Lawrence-Berrey,                 .C.J.
    ' Pennell, J.
    Mr. Aleck asks that we waive costs in this appeal. The State agrees that waiver
    2
    is appropriate. We thus order that no costs will be imposed.
    7