Diane Armesto v. Parris Andrea Rosolino ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
DIANE ARMESTO, a single woman, No. 70424-9-1
Respondent,
v.
PARRIS ANDREA ROSOLINO, fka
PARRIS ANDREA TILTON, fka
PARRIS ANDREA LORING, a single
woman, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: July 7, 2014
Verellen, A.C.J. — When a trial court imposes an extreme discovery sanction
such as striking defenses to a claim and imposing a default judgment, our Supreme
Court strictly requires that the trial court "explicitly consider" less restrictive sanctions.1
Here, the trial court recited that "the court considered and imposed lesser sanctions and
they have not sufficed."2 But there is no indication in the record whether the court
considered lesser sanctions of limiting or precluding the testimony of the defendant
rather than a default. The record also must support the trial court's finding that the
sanctioned party's misconduct was willful. The record on appeal does not demonstrate
whether the trial court's finding of willfulness was premised in part on Parris not paying
monetary sanctions, despite her in forma pauperis status.
1 Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997).
2 Clerk's Papers at 1831.
No. 70424-9-1/2
Parris appeals from trial court orders striking her defenses to Armesto's
defamation claim and entering default judgment as a discovery sanction, imposing a
broad injunction, awarding Armesto attorney fees for her entire lawsuit pursuant to
CR 11, and awarding damages in excess of $500,000.
We reverse the default judgment and award of CR 11 sanctions. We vacate the
permanent injunction. Because guidance may be helpful on remand, we also address
some questions regarding the injunction.
FACTS
Parris was born on November 4, 1963. Her birth certificate states that she is the
daughter of Leslie Bashore and Ed Loring. She was raised by Bashore, who separated
from Loring.3 When Parris was approximately three years old, Bashore married Frank
Rosolino, a noted musician. Rosolino never adopted Parris. Parris lived with Bashore
and Rosolino until Bashore committed suicide. Parris, then age 7, was adopted by her
maternal grandparents, Clark and Darline Tilton. In the 1972 adoption proceedings, the
King County Superior Court found that Loring was Parris's father, consistent with the
information on her birth certificate.
In 1978, Rosolino died of an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound. Armesto,
who dated and lived with Rosolino, was a named beneficiary in Rosolino's will and
executrix of his estate. Rosolino's will made bequests to Armesto and to Rosolino's
sons. The will expressly disinherited others, as well as those not specifically named.
Parris was not named in the will.
Loring was deceased by the time events relevant to this appeal occurred.
No. 70424-9-1/3
Parris filed for bankruptcy in 2004. Also in 2004, Parris commissioned a DNA4
test to determine whether she was biologically related to Rosolino. The test found to a
96 percent degree of certainty that she is not biologically related to Rosolino. A sibling
DNA test from 2008 produced an "inconclusive" result.5
During 2005 and 2006, Parris began to research potential royalties associated
with the Rosolino estate. In 2007, Parris changed her last name to Rosolino in King
County District Court. Also in 2007, Parris contacted record companies claiming to be
Rosolino's daughter and seeking to access funds associated with Rosolino's estate.
In conjunction with these efforts, Parris repeatedly posted extremely
inflammatory material on the Internet and in other writings, claiming that Armesto killed
Rosolino and committed other egregious crimes. In publishing these allegations, Parris
claimed to be Rosolino's biological daughter and an heir to his estate.
Armesto initiated a lawsuit against Parris for defamation, false light, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that Parris "is not the
natural born daughter of Mr. Rosolino, and he never adopted her," that Parris changed
her name in 2007 "falsely claiming to have once been a Rosolino," and that Parris
frequently purported to be Rosolino's "natural born daughter" and claimed rights to
Rosolino's estate.6
Parris primarily defended the action pro se, but had counsel at times. The trial
court granted her in forma pauperis status. She filed a counterclaim against Armesto,
which she later dismissed.
4 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
5 Clerk's Papers at 138.
6 Clerk's Papers at 3, 5.
No. 70424-9-1/4
During discovery, the trial court sanctioned Parris in July 2011, but that order was
subsequently vacated. The trial court later intervened when Parris refused to answer
questions about her biological parentage and her alleged effort to embezzle. On
July 26, 2012, the court ordered Parris to supplement her discovery responses and to
pay a $500 sanction. Parris refused to comply with either. The trial court imposed
additional sanctions totaling $2,610 and required Parris to pay within five days. The trial
court stated that it would strike Parris's defenses to the complaint if she failed to comply
with its orders. Parris did not pay the sanctions or provide the discovery requested.
The trial court struck Parris's defenses to the complaint and allowed Armesto to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for entry of default judgment.
The trial court accepted the findings substantially in the form presented and later
entered supplemental findings and conclusions. The trial court found that Loring, not
Rosolino, was Parris's biological father. The court vacated the 2007 Seattle district
court order changing Parris's last name to Rosolino and permanently enjoined Parris
from certain speech and conduct, including use of the name Rosolino. The court
awarded Armesto $400,000 in damages for emotional distress and $100,000 in
economic damages. The court also ordered Parris to pay Armesto's attorney's fees
under CR 11.
Parris appeals.
No. 70424-9-1/5
ANALYSIS
Discovery Sanctions
Parris asserts that the trial court abused its discretion under CR 37 by entering a
default judgment in favor of Armesto as a discovery sanction for Parris's failure to pay
over $3,000 in terms and refusal to comply with discovery orders. We agree.
CR 37 provides that if a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, the court in which the action is pending may enter "such orders in regard to
the failure as are just," including:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him
or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused
by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.'71
When the trial court chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), it
must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly (1) finds that the party
willfully or deliberately violated the discovery rules and orders, (2) finds that the
7 CR 37(b)(2).
No. 70424-9-1/6
opposing party was substantially prejudiced in its ability to prepare for trial, and
(3) considers whether lesser sanctions would have sufficed.8 Our Supreme Court
recently held that
[fjindings regarding the Burnet factors must be made on the record orally
or in writing. Thus, where [a discovery sanction order] is entered without
oral argument or a colloquy on the record, findings on the Burnet factors
must be made in the order itself or in some contemporaneous recorded
finding.[9]
Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in imposing sanctions, and a determination on
sanctions should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.10
Here, the limited findings and record do not satisfy the requirements that the trial
court explicitly considered less restrictive sanctions and made a proper willfulness
determination. The trial court order recites that "[tjhis Court has considered and
imposed lesser sanctions and they have not sufficed" and that Parris's violation was
willful.11 The order states that Parris was previously compelled, sanctioned, or held in
contempt and that she violated the court's November 16, 2012 discovery order by failing
to respond fully to deposition questions and by failing to pay $500 in terms and $2,610
in attorney fees.
Of greatest concern is the trial court's conclusion that no lesser sanctions are
practical because attempts at prior sanctions failed. The record reveals that the other
sanctions the trial court attempted were narrow and few. The trial court ordered Parris
8 Burnet, 131 Wn.2dat494.
9 Teter v. Deck, 174 Wn.2d 207, 217, 274 P.3d 336 (2012) (citation omitted).
10 Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P .3d 115 (2006).
11 Clerk's Papers at 1831.
No. 70424-9-1/7
to answer requests for production and pay $500 in July 2012, and on November 16,
2012, ordered her to answer and pay $500 plus $2,610 within five days or the court
would strike her defenses to the complaint. Other discovery hearings are of little
consequence. The July 2011 sanction was subsequently vacated. At the November 1,
2012 hearing, the court cautioned Parris to carefully consider before she refused to
answer any questions about paternity or embezzlement, but did not impose or discuss
any sanctions.12
Striking defenses and entering a default judgment is the ultimate discovery
sanction against a defendant. There is no indication in the record before us that the trial
court considered less severe sanctions such as limiting the scope of Parris's testimony
at trial or precluding any testimony by Parris. If the court considered such alternatives
and rejected them, the record should contain an indication, either in a written order or a
transcription of a hearing, with an explicit explanation as to why those lesser sanctions
were not suitable here.13 The order granting default judgment does not fully set forth
the basis for the trial court's determination that lesser sanctions would not have been
adequate.
Regarding willfulness, it is clear that Parris intentionally refused to answer
legitimate discovery questions. Parris willfully refused to answer questions about her
claim that she is the natural born daughter of Rosolino and about the basis for her
12 We grant Armesto's unopposed motion to supplement the record with the
November 1 and November 16, 2012 hearings.
13 See Burnet, 131 Wn.2d at 497 ("it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to impose the severe sanction of limiting discovery and excluding expert witness
testimony . . . without first having at least considered, on the record, a less severe
sanction that could have advanced the purposes of discovery") (emphasis added).
No. 70424-9-1/8
related claim that she is an heir entitled to royalties. Parris's objections to both requests
for production and her objections during her deposition establish no valid justification for
failing to answer those questions. But it is unclear from the record whether the court
based its willfulness finding, in part, upon Parris's failure to pay the sanctions when
Parris may have merely lacked the ability to pay them.
The trial court's January 17, 2013 order identifies Parris's failure to pay the $500
sanctions imposed on July 26, 2012 and the $2,610 imposed on November 16, 2012 as
part of the basis for imposition of default as a discovery sanction. A person's financial
inability to comply with a monetary penalty imposed by a court does not support a
finding that the party willfully failed to comply.14 Accordingly, when a court has
recognized a party's in forma pauperis status, the record must be sufficiently developed
to allow the determination whether the party's inability to pay sanctions lacks a valid
excuse or justification (such as a showing that the party no longer has in forma pauperis
status). Absent a factual basis in the record demonstrating that Parris willfully failed to
pay monetary sanctions, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding of willfulness
was based on a sound exercise of its discretion.
It is not clear whether the trial court "explicitly considered" whether lesser
sanctions would have been ineffective and whether the trial court's willfulness finding is
based upon Parris's inability to pay. Under the circumstances of this case, the record
does not reveal whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing the
extreme discovery sanction of default. We reverse the default judgment.
14 See Thomas v. Gerber Productions. 703 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1983) (abuse of
discretion to impose $750 discovery sanction when court knows unable to pay the
sanction).
No. 70424-9-1/9
CR11
Parris challenges the trial court's award to Armesto of $162,117.20 in attorney
fees as a CR 11 sanction against Parris. This award encompassed the entire cost of
Armesto's lawsuit, including prosecuting her own claim and defending against Parris's
counterclaim.
An award of attorney fees under CR 11 is limited to amounts "'reasonably
expended in responding to [specified] sanctionable filings,"' and appellate courts will
remand unless the trial court articulates clear grounds for any award of CR 11 sanctions
and limits its award accordingly.15 We review a trial court's award of attorney fees
under CR 11 for an abuse of discretion.16
The trial court erred by imposing CR 11 sanctions encompassing the entirety of
Armesto's attorney fees without any segregation and without a demonstration that the
fees were incurred due to specific "sanctionable filings." Here, the trial court made no
findings that specific filings by Parris were deficient. Both the lack of segregation and
the failure to tie the amounts to specific sanctionable filings compel reversal of the
CR 11 award to Armesto.
Injunction
Parris also challenges the injunctive relief granted. Because we reverse the
default judgment, the permanent injunction is necessarily vacated. Because the trial
court may ultimately confront a renewed request for an injunction and some guidance
15 Just Dirt. Inc. v. Knight Excavating. Inc.. 138 Wn. App. 409, 418, 157P.3d431
(2007) (quoting Biggs v. Vail. 124 Wn.2d 193, 201, 876 P.2d 448 (1994)).
16 Harrington v. Pailthorp. 67 Wn. App. 901. 910. 841 P.2d 1258(1992).
No. 70424-9-1/10
may be helpful on remand, we address some troublesome aspects of the injunctive
relief granted.
Following entry of default, the trial court entered a permanent injunction.
Parris attacks portions of the injunction on the grounds of unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech, vagueness, and overbreadth. Specifically, Parris asserts that (1) the
restriction on any Internet postings about Armesto is an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech, (2) the restriction on "implied" defamatory communications is
unconstitutionally vague, and (3) the provisions of the injunction relating to Parris's
name change exceed the trial court's authority.
Freedom of speech is not an absolute right, and the State may punish its
abuse.17 "It is important to safeguard First Amendment rights; it is also important to give
protection to a person who is intentionally and maliciously defamed, and to discourage
that kind of defamation in the future."18 Washington trial courts have the authority to
enjoin dissemination of abusive speech, which includes defamation and harassment.19
A trial court's decision to grant an injunction and its decision regarding the terms of the
injunction are reviewed for abuse of discretion.20
17 Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 226, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
18 Maheuv. Hughes Tool Co.. 569 F.2d 459, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1977).
19 Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 244; Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wn.2d 226, 237,
654 P.2d 673 (1982), affirmed, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1984); Jn
re Marriage of Meredith. 148 Wn. App. 887, 902, 201 P.3d 1056 (2009) (remanding to
family court to craft a protective order to prevent further harassing and libelous
communications); cf. Maheu, 569 F.2d 459, 480 (holding that "the state's interest in
deterring malicious defamation, for the purpose of protecting privacy and reputation,
even when public figures are involved, is compelling").
20 State v. Kaiser. 161 Wn. App. 705, 726, 254 P.3d 850 (2011).
10
No. 70424-9-1/11
Prior restraints on speech before publication are disfavored because such
restraints burden the exercise of the right to speak before any abuse of the right is
shown.21 Post-publication restrictions, on the other hand, "simply prohibit further
exercise of the right after a showing of abuse."22 Subsequent punishment of abusive
speech, including an injunction of repetitive defamation, is not a prior restraint.23
Parris argues that the provision enjoining her from "expressly or impliedly posting
on the Internet about Armesto" encompasses her ability to speak truthfully about
Armesto and thus is not specifically crafted to prohibit only unprotected speech. Such
broad prohibitions can be "unconstitutional prior restraints]."24
Parris also argues that certain terms of the injunction are "hopelessly vague,"
such as the prohibition against posting "'any content on the Internet that expresses or
implies that [she] is the natural, biological or adopted daughter of Frank Rosolino.'"25
When "'ordinary people [can't] understand what conduct is prohibited,' a prohibition is
void for vagueness."26 Post-publication restraints on defamation can extend to implied
comments. Our Supreme Court has long recognized that speech may be defamatory
by implication.27 Moreover, restrictions against implying a biological or adoptive
21 Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wn.2d 747, 756, 505 P.2d 126 (1973).
22 Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 243.
23 See jd. at 235 (emphasizing "important distinction between prior restraint and
subsequent punishment"); Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Librarv Dist.. 168 Wn.2d 789, 802,
231 P.3d 166 (2010) ("A prior restraint seeks to prohibit future speech rather than to
punish speech that has occurred.").
24 Meredith, 148 Wn. App. at 898.
25 Brief of Appellant at 10 (quoting Clerk's Papers at 2170).
26 lg\ (alteration in original) (quoting O'Dav v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 811,
749 P.2d 142 (1988)).
27 See Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 823-26, 108 P.3d 768 (2005).
11
No. 70424-9-1/12
relationship to an individual may, in some circumstances address specific tortious
speech. Here, however, the court itself recognizes Parris's arguable status as
Rosolino's step-daughter. IfArmesto prevails on remand, any restriction should be
properly tailored. For example, a photo of Parris as a child with Rosolino, without
additional comment, would not be troublesome. A reference to Rosolino as her step
father, alone, would not be troublesome. References to herself as the natural born,
biological, or adoptive daughter or heir of Rosolino would be troublesome.
The trial court's purported vacation of the district court order changing Parris's
last name to Rosolino also raises significant procedural concerns. Generally, superior
courts and district courts have authority to change an individual's name,28 and a "trial
court is vested with a broad discretionary power to shape and fashion injunctive relief to
fit particular facts, circumstances, and equities of the case before it."29 However, in
awarding remedies for a default judgment, the trial court may not order relief in excess
of or substantially different from that described in the complaint.30 Armesto never
requested that the trial court invalidate Parris's name change. The trial court, sua
sponte, proposed this remedy. It is also a concern when a superior court purports to
2815A Karl B. Tegland & Douglas J. Ende, Washington Practice: Washington
Handbook on Civil Procedure § 9.4, at 179 (2013-2014 ed.) (both superior courts and
district courts have jurisdiction over name changes); Moore v. Perrot, 2 Wash. 1, 4, 25
P. 906 (1891) (superior courts have "universal original jurisdiction.").
29 Rupert v. Gunter, 31 Wn. App. 27, 30, 640 P.2d 36 (1982).
30 In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 617, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989).
Generally, "'[o]ne has a right to assume that the relief granted on default will not exceed
or substantially differ from that described in the complaint and may safely allow a default
to be taken in reliance upon this assumption.'" Columbia Valley Credit Exch.. Inc. v.
Lampson, 12 Wn. App. 952, 954-55, 533 P.2d 152 (1975) (alteration in original) (quoting
Sceva Steel Bldqs.. Inc. v. Weitz, 66 Wn.2d 260, 262, 401 P.2d 980 (1969)).
12
No. 70424-9-1/13
vacate a district court order outside of the parameters of a RALJ appeal or a writ
proceeding.
Attorney Fees on Appeal
Because Parris's appeal is meritorious, we deny Armesto's requests attorney
fees on appeal under RAP 18.9(a).31
We reverse the default judgment and CR 11 sanction award, vacate the
permanent injunction,32 and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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31 Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wn. App. 708, 723, 735 P.2d 675 (1986).
32 Of course, Armesto may seek a temporary injunction pending the outcome of
the litigation.
13