Kristi Freeman v. Willapa Harbor Hospital ( 2015 )


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  •           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    WILLAPA HARBOR HOSPITAL AND                            NO. 73664-7-1
    THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
    CT>
    INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF
    WASHINGTON,
    Respondents,
    DIVISION ONE
    CD
    CO
    KRISTI FREEMAN,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                       FILED: December 14, 2015
    Lau, J. — Under well settled law, judicial appeal of a decision by the Board of
    Industrial Insurance Appeals (the Board) is de novo, but is based solely on the evidence
    and testimony presented to the Board. Here, the trial court exceeded its authority when
    it granted Willapa Harbor Hospital's Civil Rule 35 motion and remanded to the Board
    with instructions to allow supplementation of the record with additional evidence. We
    reverse the trial court's order, lift the stay previously imposed, and remand to the trial
    court with instructions to reinstate the jury trial.
    No. 73664-7/2
    FACTS
    On March 11, 2011, Kristi Freeman sustained an injury while working as a
    registered nurse at Willapa Harbor Hospital (the Hospital). She filed a workers'
    compensation claim with the Hospital, a self-insured employer. She received medical
    care and benefits under her claim. During the course of her treatment, questions
    surfaced over a possible mental health condition related to her recovery.
    On July 31, 2012, the Hospital scheduled Freeman for an independent mental
    health evaluation (IME) to be performed by Dr. Richard Schneider. After evaluating
    Freeman, he concluded that Freeman's pain disorder was preexisting and not caused or
    aggravated by her work injury. He recommended treatment from a pain psychologist.
    On September 25, 2012, Monty Meier, Ph.D., a pain psychologist, evaluated
    Freeman and concluded that she suffered from a mental health condition causally
    related to the work injury. Dr. Schneider reviewed Meier's evaluation and adhered to
    his prior opinion.
    On October 9, 2012, Freeman requested the Department of Labor and Industries
    (the Department) to order allowance of her mental health condition under her claim.
    On October 19, 2012, the Hospital informed the Department that it planned to
    schedule Freeman for a second examination by Dr. Schneider to evaluate whether her
    condition had worsened or changed.
    On December 19, 2012, the Hospital informed Freeman that it scheduled an
    evaluation with Dr. Schneider. The same day, the Department entered an order
    denying coverage for Freeman's pain disorder.
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    No. 73664-7/3
    Freeman responded by notifying the Hospital that she would not attend the
    evaluation with Dr. Schneider.
    On January 23, 2013, Freeman appealed the Department's December 2012
    order.
    On April 18, 2013, the Hospital moved the Board under CR 351 for an order
    compelling Freeman to submit to a mental health evaluation. The Hospital argued it
    expected Freeman to claim her condition had worsened.
    On May 7, 2013, an Industrial Appeals Judge (IAJ) denied the Hospital's CR 35
    motion. The IAJ reasoned that another examination was unnecessary because the
    question was not whether Freeman's condition had changed, but whether it was
    causally related to her workplace injury:
    In this case, the Employer has not shown that there is a change of
    circumstances that necessitates subjecting the claimant to another examination
    by the same IME doctor who evaluated her less than one year ago and already
    opined that her pain disorder condition was not proximately caused or
    aggravated by her industrial injury. I agree with the claimant that to the extent
    that her pain disorder may have worsened, it is not relevant to the issue on
    appeal, which is simply acceptance of the condition. In addition, without a
    showing of a change of circumstances by the Employer, it would be unfair to
    require the claimant to submit to another mental status examination that is likely
    to cause her more stress and has the potential for emotional harm.
    Certified Board Record (CBR) at 152.
    1 CR 35(a)(1) provides:
    When the mental or physical condition ... of a party, or of a person in the
    custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in
    which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical
    examination by a physician, or a mental examination by a physician or
    psychologist or to produce for examination the person in the party's
    custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good
    cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all
    parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
    the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
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    No. 73664-7/4
    On May 13, 2013, the Hospital filed an interlocutory appeal with the Board. The
    Board declined review of the Hospital's interlocutory appeal.
    On June 24, 2013, the IAJ presided over a hearing on the question of whether
    Freeman's mental condition was related to her injury. After considering evidence and
    testimony from both parties, the IAJ reversed the Department's December 19 order and
    concluded Freeman's "pain disorder with a general medical condition and psychological
    factors" should be accepted as proximately caused by her industrial injury. CBR at 43.
    On December 3, 2013, the Hospital petitioned for review from the Board.
    On December 18, 2013, the Board denied review and the Hospital appealed to
    Pacific County Superior Court.
    On September 11, 2014, the Hospital filed a motion with the superior court
    entitled, "MOTION FOR CR 35 EXAMINATION." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. In an
    attached affidavit,2 trial counsel described the procedural history before the Board and
    claimed the Hospital lost the chance to update its medical assessment when Freeman
    refused to attend the scheduled examination and its CR 35 motion was denied.
    Counsel further alleged that these actions denied it due process.
    Freeman argued in response, "Willapa's motion is more accurately an appeal of
    the Board's denial of its earlier motion for a CR 35 exam. As such, Willapa fails to
    establish the Board abused its discretion when it denied Willapa's earlier motion." CP at
    21.
    2 The affidavit was entitled "SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER'S AFFIDAVIT IN
    SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CR 35 MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION." CP at 4.
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    No. 73664-7/5
    On September 26, 2014, Freeman argued to the trial court that its authority is
    limited under RCW 51.52.115:
    I do though, Your Honor, feel that as an officer of the court, I need to make
    the Court aware of RCW 51.52.115. That is that statute that discusses the
    standard of—the burden of proof in an appeal that's taken from the Board
    to Superior Court. In that statute it states that this actually—that there's
    going to be no new facts entered into the record. The record is as set
    below unless there is some sort of procedural mishandling or issue that's
    brought up that's not aired out in the record.
    RP(Sept. 26, 2014) at 18-19.
    On October 3, 2014, the trial court issued an order granting the Hospital's motion
    for a CR 35 examination. The order directed the Board to supplement the record with
    additional evidence from Dr. Schneider and to allow Freeman to supplement the record
    with additional evidence if necessary.
    THIS MATTER came before the Court on September 26, 2014 on a
    motion by the Self-Insured Employer, Willapa Harbor Hospital, for the
    granting of a CR 35 mental health examination that was denied by the
    assigned Industrial Appeals Judge, Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals.
    Said motion was based upon affidavits on file with the Court. After
    considering the substance of the motion, arguments of counsel, and being
    otherwise fully advised, the Court does herby [sic] find that the motion for
    a CR 35 mental health examination by Dr. Richard Schneider is herby [sic]
    granted and the matter is remanded to the Board of Industrial Insurance
    Appeals with direction to allow the Self-Insured Employer, Willapa Harbor
    Hospital, [sic] have a mental health examination of the claimant by Dr.
    Richard Schneider and to thereafter supplement the record with additional
    evidence from the testimony of Dr. Schneider and in addition to grant the
    claimant the opportunity to supplement the record with further medical
    evidence, if deemed necessary.
    CP at 32-33.
    On October 8, 2014, the trial court entered an order striking the previously
    scheduled jury trial.
    No. 73664-7/6
    Freeman appeals.3
    ANALYSIS
    Both parties argue the propriety of the trial court's ruling under CR 35's good
    cause requirement. Under the limited circumstances presented here, the parties'
    arguments implicate the court's statutory authority to order the relief it granted.
    The Industrial Insurance Act abolished all jurisdiction of the courts of this state for
    workers' injuries except as set out in RCW 51.52.110. Fay v. Nw. Airlines. Inc., 
    115 Wn.2d 194
    , 197, 
    796 P.2d 412
     (1990); RCW 51.04.010. "Appeals from administrative
    tribunals invoke the appellate, not the general or original, jurisdiction of the superior
    court." Fay, 
    115 Wn.2d at 197
    . "Jurisdiction of the superior court is limited to review of
    departmental proceedings on appeals from orders of the Board." Dils v. Dep't of Labor
    & Indus.. 
    51 Wn. App. 216
    , 217, 
    752 P.2d 1357
    (1988); RCW 51.52.110-115.
    "The Industrial Insurance Act, [chapter 51.52 RCW], provides for de novo
    superior court review of the Board's determination." Cascade Valley Hosp. v. Stach.
    
    152 Wn. App. 502
    , 506, 
    215 P.3d 1043
     (2009); see also Rogers v. Dep't of Labor and
    Indus., 
    151 Wn. App. 174
    , 179, 
    210 P.3d 355
     (2009). Under RCW 51.52.115, the
    superior court reviews the Board's determinations de novo, applying the standards set
    out in RCW 51.52.115:
    The Board's decision is prima facie correct under RCW 51.52.115, and a
    party attacking the decision must support its challenge by a
    preponderance of the evidence. On review, the superior court may
    substitute its own findings and decision for the Board's only if it finds "from
    a fair preponderance of credible evidence, that the Board's findings and
    decision are incorrect."
    3 After the appeal was filed, Division Two of this court granted Freeman's motion
    to stay the superior court's order pending the resolution of this appeal.
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    No. 73664-7/7
    Ruse v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 
    138 Wn.2d 1
    , 5, 
    977 P.2d 570
     (1999) (citation omitted)
    (quoting McClelland v. ITT Ravonier. Inc.. 
    65 Wn. App. 386
    , 390, 
    828 P.2d 1138
    (1992)).
    Although review is de novo, under RCW 51.52.115 superior court review is
    limited to the proceedings below and the record before the Board.4 The superior court
    may only take testimony in cases of alleged procedural irregularities before the Board
    not shown in the record:
    The hearing in the superior court shall be de novo, but the court shall not
    receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered
    before the board or included in the record filed by the board in the superior
    court as provided in RCW 51.52.110: PROVIDED, That in cases of
    alleged irregularities in procedure before the board, not shown in said
    record, testimony thereon may be taken in the superior court.
    RCW 51.52.115 (emphasis added). Absent an alleged procedural irregularity, the
    superior court reviews the Board's decision based solely on the evidence and testimony
    presented to the Board. Stelter v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 
    147 Wn.2d 702
    , 707, 
    57 P.3d 248
     (2002).
    On appeal, RCW 51.52.140 governs our review of the superior court decision.
    RCW 51.52.140 states that "[a]ppeal shall lie from the judgment of the superior court as
    in other civil cases." We review the superior court's CR 35 decision for an abuse of
    discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
    is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 
    156 Wn.2d 677
    , 684, 
    132 P.3d 115
     (2006). If the trial court's ruling is based on an
    4 Unlike the Administrative Procedure Act chapter 34.05 RCW, chapter 51.52
    RCW contains no provision authorizing the trial court to remand a matter to an agency
    for further fact finding. See RCW 34.05.562.
    -7-
    No. 73664-7/8
    erroneous view of the law or involves application of an incorrect legal analysis it
    necessarily abuses its discretion. Dixv. ICT Group. Inc.. 
    160 Wn.2d 826
    , 834, 
    161 P.3d 1016
    (2007).
    The trial court lacked authority to grant the CR 35 motion and order remand to
    the Board for additional evidence. The Hospital cites no authority to support the relief
    ordered here. Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court may
    assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none. Lodis v. Corbis Holdings.
    Inc.. 
    172 Wn. App. 835
    , 862, 
    292 P.3d 779
     (2013).56
    CONCLUSION
    Under the unique circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that the
    superior court erred by granting the Hospital's CR 35 motion and remanding to the
    Board to reopen the evidentiary record. We reverse the superior court's order, lift the
    previously imposed stay, and remand to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the
    jury trial.
    WE CONCUR:
    |^\vKfc>/ j 4
    5 At oral argument to this court, the Hospital claimed this issue was not raised in
    the briefing or below. The Hospital is mistaken. Review of the record shows Freeman
    discussed RCW 51.52.115 both in her briefing before this court and in the superior
    court.
    6 We do not decide the question of when, or under what circumstances, the
    superior court may remand to the Board to reopen the evidentiary record.
    -8-