State Of Washington v. Christopher John Pletenik ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                                                LA')\u u i
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    No. 73051-7-1
    Respondent,
    DIVISION ONE
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER JOHN PLETENIK,                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                    FILED: March 14, 2016
    Becker, J. — The issue in this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support an order of restitution. We affirm.
    On April 24, 2014, appellant Christopher Pletenik unlawfully entered an
    upscale clothing store in Seattle after hours. He stole store merchandise and
    items from the store's employee lockers. Many expensive items were ruined by
    becoming soaked with blood when Pletenik cut his hand smashing into a glass
    display case for watches. Pletenik pleaded guilty to burglary in the second
    degree and identity theft in the second degree.
    On January 12, 2015, the trial court held a hearing to determine
    restitution. The State provided documentation of the retail value of the
    merchandise stolen and damaged by Pletenik, among other itemized claims.
    According to Pletenik's brief on appeal, the total in this category was $4,490.
    The State asked the court to order restitution of the full retail value of the
    No. 73051-7-1/2
    merchandise. The court decided that using the store's replacement cost as a
    measure of value would be more fair. There was no evidence in the record of the
    replacement cost. The court estimated the replacement cost at 25 percent of the
    retail value: "I think it's unreasonable to give the store what they would have sold
    it at. The question is how can they replace it? They replace it by their costs. You
    haven't given me their costs. I know retail has a large markup, so I'm saying 25
    percent of these costs would be reasonable." Pletenik objected that the number
    calculated in this manner was speculative. He appeals on the same basis.
    A Washington court's authority to order restitution is derived solely from
    statute. State v. Gonzalez. 
    168 Wash. 2d 256
    , 262, 
    226 P.3d 131
    , cert, denied. 
    562 U.S. 928
    (2010). Restitution may be ordered whenever the offender is convicted
    of an offense which results in damage to or loss of property. RCW 9.94A.753.
    Restitution ordered by a court pursuant to a criminal conviction shall be
    based on "easily ascertainable damages" for injury to or loss of property. RCW
    9.94A.753(3). The amount of harm or loss need not be established with specific
    accuracy. State v. Kinneman. 
    155 Wash. 2d 272
    , 285, 
    119 P.3d 350
    (2005).
    Evidence supporting restitution is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for
    estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or
    conjecture. 
    Kinneman, 155 Wash. 2d at 285
    .
    The statute "does not say that the restitution ordered must be equivalent
    to the injury, damage or loss, either as a minimum or a maximum." 
    Kinneman, 155 Wash. 2d at 282
    . The statute "allows the judge considerable discretion in
    determining restitution, which ranges from none (in some extraordinary
    No. 73051-7-1/3
    circumstances) up to double the offender's gain or the victim's loss." 
    Kinneman. 155 Wash. 2d at 282
    . We will find abuse of that discretion only where its exercise is
    manifestly unreasonable, or where it is exercised on untenable grounds or for
    untenable reasons. State v. Pollard. 
    66 Wash. App. 779
    , 785, 
    834 P.2d 51
    . review
    denied. 
    120 Wash. 2d 1015
    (1992).
    The documentation provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to
    ascertain the retail value of the lost and damaged items. It was not unreasonable
    for the court to decide that restitution would be too high if set in that amount. The
    trial court acted within its broad discretion by reducing the amount requested by
    the store to account for the reality of the markup between cost and retail price.
    The 25 percent estimate was not unreasonable. We find no abuse of discretion.
    Affirmed.
    ^ecSCe*StK
    WE CONCUR:
    yflr^r/fl <~j C^X                          \tQAAN$k.({
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 73051-7

Filed Date: 3/14/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021