Dwa Investments Llc v. Marcel Maddox ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                     FILED        -
    OW    1
    COUWf OF APPEALS1-11.01.!
    STATE OF WASH;n
    .2111B     16 V:111 t GO
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DWA INVESTMENTS, LLC,
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/
    No. 77153-1-1
    Respondent,
    DIVISION ONE
    V.
    MARCEL MADDOX BEY,                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                     FILED: January 16, 2018
    SPEARMAN, J. — The buyer at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale may bring an
    unlawful detainer action if the previous owner does not vacate. The only issue in an
    unlawful detainer action is the right to possession. DWA Investments, LLC(DWA)
    bought Marcel Maddox Bey's' home at a trustee's sale and brought an unlawful
    detainer action when Maddox Bey did not vacate the premises. The trial court ruled
    that DWA was entitled to possession and issued a writ of restitution. Maddox Bey
    appeals, asserting, among other arguments, that the trustee's sale was void, DWA did
    not prove it purchased the property, and DWA was not a bona fide purchaser. Finding
    no error, we affirm.
    1 Marcel Maddox is the named defendant in this action. He refers to himself as Marcel Maddox
    Bey. We follow his usage.
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/2
    FACTS
    Maddox Bey defaulted on a home loan and the lender foreclosed. A
    trustee's sale was set for July 22, 2016. On July 20, Maddox Bey named the
    lender in an action to quiet title.2 Maddox Bey declared that he rescinded his
    signature on the deed of trust and was no longer liable for any debt arising from
    the deed. He also filed documents proclaiming that, as a Moorish-American, he
    was immune from taxation as well as criminal and civil jurisdiction of the United
    States. Maddox Bey's complaint did not seek to restrain the trustee's sale.
    The trustee's sale took place as scheduled on July 22. DWA bought the
    property. Maddox Bey did not vacate and, on August 12, DWA brought an
    unlawful detainer action. The trial court found that DWA purchased the property
    at the trustee's sale. The trial court also found that Maddox Bey received notice
    that his right to occupy the property had terminated and he failed to show any
    ground permitting his continued occupation. The court ruled in favor of DWA and
    issued a writ of restitution. Maddox Bey appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    An unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding for determining the
    right of possession of real property. Munden v. Hazelriqg, 
    105 Wash. 2d 39
    , 45, 711
    P.2d 295(1985)(citing RCW 59.12.030). Because it is a summary proceeding,
    the action is limited to the question of possession. 
    Id. (citing Kessler
    v. Nielsen, 
    3 Wash. App. 120
    , 
    472 P.2d 616
    (1970)). Unlawful detainer is available to the buyer
    21n a related appeal, Maddox Bey challenges the trial court's dismissal of his quiet title action.
    See Maddox Bey v. Guild Mortgage Company, No. 77153-1-1.
    2
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/3
    at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale if the previous owner does not vacate. RCW
    61.24.060(1). The buyer must comply with statutory notice requirements. RCW
    61.24.060(2).
    We review the trial court's findings of fact in an unlawful detainer action for
    substantial evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. Pham v. Corbett, 
    187 Wash. App. 816
    , 825, 351 P.3d 214(2015)(citing Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co.,
    Inc., 
    132 Wash. App. 546
    , 555-56, 
    132 P.3d 789
    (2006)). Unchallenged findings of
    fact are verities on appeal. 
    Id. (citing Cowiche
    Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley,
    
    118 Wash. 2d 801
    , 808, 828 P.2d 549(1992)).
    In this case, the trial court found that DWA purchased the property at the
    trustee's sale. The trial court also found that Maddox Bey received notice but
    failed to vacate the property. Maddox Bey does not challenge these findings.
    They are verities on appeal.
    Maddox Bey contends the trial court erred in issuing a writ of restitution for
    several reasons. He argues that DWA failed to prove that it purchased the
    property at the trustee's sale because, at the hearing, DWA did not call any
    witnesses with first-hand knowledge. Maddox Bey also asserts that the trustee's
    sale was void and could not result in lawful title. Neither argument has merit.
    First, the trial court found that DWA purchased the property and, because
    Maddox Bey did not challenge the finding, it is a verity on appeal. Pham, 187 Wn.
    App. at 825.
    Second, Maddox Bey acknowledges that DWA submitted a trustee's deed
    in support of its claim that it legitimately purchased the property. It is well settled
    3
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/4
    that a trustee's deed that recites the facts showing that the sale was conducted in
    compliance with the Deed of Trust Act(DTA)is "prima facie evidence of such
    compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers. . .
    RCW 61.24.040(7).
    Here, Maddox Bey's assertion that the sale was void rests solely on his
    unilateral rescission of his signature on the deed of trust. But he cites no
    authority recognizing unilateral rescission of signature as a ground to escape
    contractual obligations. Nor does he challenge the deed's adequacy or point to
    any evidence that the sale failed to comply with the DTA. The trial court did not
    err in rejecting his argument that the trustee's sale was invalid.
    Maddox Bey next contends that DWA was not a bona fide purchaser. A
    bona fide purchaser is one who buys real property for valuable consideration
    without notice of title or sale defects. 
    Albice, 174 Wash. 2d at 573
    . The party
    challenging the buyer's status has the burden of proving that the buyer had
    actual or constructive notice of such a defect. Glaser v. Ho!doff, 
    56 Wash. 2d 204
    ,
    209, 352 P.2d 212(1960). A buyer who has knowledge or information that would
    cause a reasonable person to inquire has constructive knowledge of everything
    the inquiry would have revealed. 
    Albice, 174 Wash. 2d at 573
    . See also Steward v.
    Good, 
    51 Wash. App. 509
    , 513, 754 P.2d 150(1988)(where a buyer has reason to
    inquire, and inquiry would lead to the discovery of defects in the title, the buyer is
    not a bona fide purchaser)(citations omitted).
    4
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/5
    Maddox Bey asserts that he informed Jeremie Dufault, one of DWA's
    principals, that he had filed a lawsuit to quiet title to the property.3 But, even if
    Dufault had notice of Maddox Bey's lawsuit, any inquiry into the action would
    have revealed no title or sale defects. Maddox Bey's quiet title complaint did not
    allege that he had satisfied the underlying debt or that the trustee's sale failed to
    comply with statutory procedures. The complaint did not seek to enjoin the sale.
    If DWA had a duty to inquire, the inquiry would have revealed the validity of the
    trustee's sale. Maddox Bey fails to show that DWA was not a bona fide
    Purchaser.
    It is difficult to follow Maddox Bey's further arguments. He challenges the
    trial court's ruling for DWA on the grounds that he is not subject to the jurisdiction
    of the United States or the State of Washington and the unlawful detainer action
    violates his treaty and constitutional rights as a Moorish-American. He appears to
    argue that DWA failed to honor a tender of credit posted while this appeal was
    pending and this failure constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Maddox Bey
    asserts that he is entitled to money damages for wrongful eviction and violation
    of his liberty. We do not consider these arguments because Maddox-Bey fails to
    explain how they are pertinent to the unlawful detainer action or support them
    with relevant authority.4
    3 Maddox Bey relies on evidence of his conversation with Dufault. DWA contends this evidence
    was not in the record below and should not be considered on this appeal. Because the evidence is not
    relevant to our resolution of the issue, we do not address its admissibility.
    4 The authority Maddox Bey cites, including the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
    the Washington State Constitution, provides no support for his assertions.
    5
    No. 77154-0-1/Linked w/77153-1-1/6
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    6
    LU
    CCAJRI OF APT- EALS L1W
    STATE. OF WASI -0;.1
    00
    VIII M.1 15 AV: 11 t
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DWA INVESTMENTS, LLC,
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/
    No. 77153-1-1
    Respondent,
    DIVISION ONE
    V.
    MARCEL MADDOX BEY,                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                      FILED: January 16, 2018
    SPEARMAN, J. — The buyer at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale may bring an
    unlawful detainer action if the previous owner does not vacate. The only issue in an
    unlawful detainer action is the right to possession. DWA Investments, LLC(DWA)
    bought Marcel Maddox Bey's1 home at a trustee's sale and brought an unlawful
    detainer action when Maddox Bey did not vacate the premises. The trial court ruled
    that DWA was entitled to possession and issued a writ of restitution. Maddox Bey
    appeals, asserting, among other arguments, that the trustee's sale was void, DWA did
    not prove it purchased the property, and DWA was not a bona fide purchaser. Finding
    no error, we affirm.
    1 Marcel Maddox is the named defendant in this action. He refers to himself as Marcel Maddox
    Bey. We follow his usage.
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/2
    FACTS
    Maddox Bey defaulted on a home loan and the lender foreclosed. A
    trustee's sale was set for July 22, 2016. On July 20, Maddox Bey named the
    lender in an action to quiet title.2 Maddox Bey declared that he rescinded his
    signature on the deed of trust and was no longer liable for any debt arising from
    the deed. He also filed documents proclaiming that, as a Moorish-American, he
    was immune from taxation as well as criminal and civil jurisdiction of the United
    States. Maddox Bey's complaint did not seek to restrain the trustee's sale.
    The trustee's sale took place as scheduled on July 22. DWA bought the
    property. Maddox Bey did not vacate and, on August 12, DWA brought an
    unlawful detainer action. The trial court found that DWA purchased the property
    at the trustee's sale. The trial court also found that Maddox Bey received notice
    that his right to occupy the property had terminated and he failed to show any
    ground permitting his continued occupation. The court ruled in favor of DWA and
    issued a writ of restitution. Maddox Bey appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    An unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding for determining the
    right of possession of real property. Munden v. Hazelriqg, 
    105 Wash. 2d 39
    , 45, 711
    P.2d 295(1985)(citing RCW 59.12.030). Because it is a summary proceeding,
    the action is limited to the question of possession. 
    Id. (citing Kessler
    v. Nielsen, 
    3 Wash. App. 120
    ,
    472 P.2d 616
    (1970)). Unlawful detainer is available to the buyer
    2In a related appeal, Maddox Bey challenges the trial court's dismissal of his quiet title action.
    See Maddox Bey v. Guild Mortgage Company, No. 77153-1-1.
    2
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/3
    at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale if the previous owner does not vacate. RCW
    61.24.060(1). The buyer must comply with statutory notice requirements. RCW
    61.24.060(2).
    We review the trial court's findings of fact in an unlawful detainer action for
    substantial evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. Pham v. Corbett, 
    187 Wash. App. 816
    , 825, 351 P.3d 214(2015)(citing Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co.,
    Inc., 
    132 Wash. App. 546
    , 555-56, 
    132 P.3d 789
    (2006)). Unchallenged findings of
    fact are verities on appeal. 
    Id. (citing Cowiche
    Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley,
    
    118 Wash. 2d 801
    , 808, 828 P.2d 549(1992)).
    In this case, the trial court found that DWA purchased the property at the
    trustee's sale. The trial court also found that Maddox Bey received notice but
    failed to vacate the property. Maddox Bey does not challenge these findings.
    They are verities on appeal.
    Maddox Bey contends the trial court erred in issuing a writ of restitution for
    several reasons. He argues that DWA failed to prove that it purchased the
    property at the trustee's sale because, at the hearing, DWA did not call any
    witnesses with first-hand knowledge. Maddox Bey also asserts that the trustee's
    sale was void and could not result in lawful title. Neither argument has merit.
    First, the trial court found that DWA purchased the property and, because
    Maddox Bey did not challenge the finding, it is a verity on appeal. Pham, 187 Wn.
    App. at 825.
    Second, Maddox Bey acknowledges that DWA submitted a trustee's deed
    in support of its claim that it legitimately purchased the property. It is well settled
    3
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/4
    that a trustee's deed that recites the facts showing that the sale was conducted in
    compliance with the Deed of Trust Act(DTA)is "prima facie evidence of such
    compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers... ."
    RCW 61.24.040(7).
    Here, Maddox Bey's assertion that the sale was void rests solely on his
    unilateral rescission of his signature on the deed of trust. But he cites no
    authority recognizing unilateral rescission of signature as a ground to escape
    contractual obligations. Nor does he challenge the deed's adequacy or point to
    any evidence that the sale failed to comply with the DTA. The trial court did not
    err in rejecting his argument that the trustee's sale was invalid.
    Maddox Bey next contends that DWA was not a bona fide purchaser. A
    bona fide purchaser is one who buys real property for valuable consideration
    without notice of title or sale defects. 
    Albice, 174 Wash. 2d at 573
    . The party
    challenging the buyer's status has the burden of proving that the buyer had
    actual or constructive notice of such a defect. Glaser v. Holdorf, 
    56 Wash. 2d 204
    ,
    209, 352 P.2d 212(1960). A buyer who has knowledge or information that would
    cause a reasonable person to inquire has constructive knowledge of everything
    the inquiry would have revealed. 
    Albice, 174 Wash. 2d at 573
    . See also Steward v.
    Good, 
    51 Wash. App. 509
    , 513, 754 P.2d 150(1988)(where a buyer has reason to
    inquire, and inquiry would lead to the discovery of defects in the title, the buyer is
    not a bona fide purchaser)(citations omitted).
    4
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/5
    Maddox Bey asserts that he informed Jeremie Dufault, one of DWA's
    principals, that he had filed a lawsuit to quiet title to the property.3 But, even if
    Dufault had notice of Maddox Bey's lawsuit, any inquiry into the action would
    have revealed no title or sale defects. Maddox Bey's quiet title complaint did not
    allege that he had satisfied the underlying debt or that the trustee's sale failed to
    comply with statutory procedures. The complaint did not seek to enjoin the sale.
    If DWA had a duty to inquire,•the inquiry would have revealed the validity of the
    trustee's sale. Maddox Bey fails to show that DWA was not a bona fide
    purchaser.
    It is difficult to follow Maddox Bey's further arguments. He challenges the
    trial court's ruling for DWA on the grounds that he is not subject to the jurisdiction
    of the United States or the State of Washington and the unlawful detainer action •
    violates his treaty and constitutional rights as a Moorish-American. He appears to
    argue that DWA failed to honor a tender of credit posted while this appeal was
    pending and this failure constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Maddox Bey
    asserts that he is entitled to money damages for wrongful eviction and violation
    of his liberty. We do not consider these arguments because Maddox-Bey fails to
    explain how they are pertinent to the unlawful detainer action or support them
    with relevant authority.4
    3 Maddox Bey relies on evidence of his conversation with Dufault. DWA contends this evidence
    was not in the record below and should not be considered on this appeal. Because the evidence is not
    relevant to our resolution of the issue, we do not address its admissibility.
    4 The authority Maddox Bey cites, including the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
    the Washington State Constitution, provides no support for his assertions.
    5
    No. 77154-0-I/Linked w/77153-1-I/6
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    6