State of Washington v. Larry Edward Siltman ( 2019 )

FILED
MAY 16, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 35507-1-III
Respondent, ) (Consolidated with
) No. 35655-8-III)
v. )
)
LARRY EDWARD SILTMAN, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. — Larry Siltman appeals from convictions, in two separate
prosecutions, for fourth degree assault, resisting arrest, and violation of a no-contact
order. Concluding that the trial court did not err in limiting evidence at the stipulated
trial and did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Siltman’s motion for a new trial, we
affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The operative facts of these appeals are primarily procedural in nature. In 2013,
Mr. Siltman was charged in the Okanogan County Superior Court with four counts of
felony violation of a no-contact order and one count of resisting arrest. Concerns about
his competency to stand trial resulted in an evaluation at Eastern State Hospital. Dr.
Daniel Lord-Flynn ultimately concluded that Mr. Siltman, while suffering from an
No. 35507-1-III (Consolidated with No. 35655-8-III)
State v. Siltman
unclassified psychosis, was competent to stand trial. The report noted that jail records
had described Mr. Siltman as “agitated” and “delusional” during his first two months in
jail.
As a result, a plea agreement was reached in 2015. A stipulated order of
continuance (SOC) was entered requiring Mr. Siltman to comply with various conditions
over the next two years. In the event that the conditions were violated, Mr. Siltman
agreed that his guilt or innocence would be determined in a stipulated trial at which the
court would consider the reports disclosed in discovery.
In late 2016, Mr. Siltman was charged with second degree rape and fourth degree
assault—domestic violence. The assault was observed by two men who eventually
testified at trial. The prosecution lost contact with the victim, Ms. M-S, who did not
appear at trial. Because of her disappearance, the rape charge was dismissed prior to
trial, but the case went forward on the assault charge without M-S. The jury convicted on
the assault charge and the matter was set over for sentencing. M-S unexpectedly
appeared at the sentencing hearing and the defense obtained a continuance in order to
interview her.
M-S told defense counsel that she did not remember the assault, but believed it did
not occur because she would have suffered bruising or other injuries from the attack
described by the other witnesses. Mr. Siltman moved for a new trial based on her
statements. The trial court denied the motion, deciding that M-S did not have any
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No. 35507-1-III (Consolidated with No. 35655-8-III)
State v. Siltman
credible evidence about the incident because she did not recall it. The absence of
bruising was also known by the sexual assault nurse who had examined M-S. The nurse
had been scheduled to be a defense witness at trial, but the defense ultimately decided not
to call her to testify. After sentence was imposed, Mr. Siltman appealed to this court.
The court then conducted a stipulated trial on the 2013 charges. The defense
sought to admit the report of Dr. Lord-Flynn in support of a diminished capacity defense.
The court concluded that the report did not constitute discovery and was not admissible.
After reviewing the police reports and hearing argument, the court dismissed three of the
no-contact charges, but convicted on the fourth, as well as on the resisting arrest charge.
Mr. Siltman also appealed that file. The two cases were consolidated in this court.
A panel heard oral argument of the cases.
ANALYSIS
This appeal presents one issue for each of the two cases. First, we consider his
contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial. We then
consider his argument that the trial court wrongly excluded the report of Dr. Lord-Flynn.
New Trial
Mr. Siltman contends that the testimony of M-S constituted newly discovered
evidence entitling him to a new trial. The trial court did not err in its assessment of the
evidence.
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No. 35507-1-III (Consolidated with No. 35655-8-III)
State v. Siltman
A new trial may be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence if the
proponent can establish that the new evidence “(1) will probably change the result of the
trial; (2) was discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial by
the exercise of due diligence; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or
impeaching.” State v. Williams, 96 Wash. 2d 215, 223, 634 P.2d 868 (1981). The absence
of any one of these five factors is grounds to deny a new trial. Id.; State v. Larson, 160
Wash. App. 577, 586, 249 P.3d 669 (2011).
The trial court denied the motion after concluding that the evidence was not
material to the fourth degree assault charge, was not credible, and would not have
changed the outcome. It also was similar to evidence known to the defense, but not
pursued at trial. These conclusions indicate that the trial court found that the first, fourth,
and possibly the fifth Williams factors were lacking.1
The trial court correctly recognized that the evidence was not material. Ms. M-S
had no memory of the incident; all she had was someone else’s recounting of the trial
testimony. She had no evidence to contribute. The trial court also correctly recognized
that under those facts, the outcome of the trial would not have been different. Two
disinterested bystanders observed the incident and testified to what happened. The
1
The fact that the absence of bruising on the victim was known before trial due to
the sexual assault examination, also suggests that the evidence was not newly discovered.
The court’s ruling does not expressly state that point. We need not discuss it in light of
the other deficiencies in Mr. Siltman’s motion.
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State v. Siltman
speculative conclusion that the assault could not have occurred as the witnesses described
served, at most, to impeach their testimony. Thus, the proposed new evidence amounted
to nothing more than potential impeachment evidence.
For all of those reasons, the new evidence did not justify a new trial. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion.
Competency Evaluation
Mr. Siltman also argues that the trial court erred by excluding the competency
evaluation from the stipulated trial. The court correctly construed the stipulation. The
evidence also was irrelevant and without foundation.
The SOC included a stipulation that any trial would include “the police reports and
documents that were provided in discovery” along with any physical evidence and expert
analysis of that evidence. 2013 Clerk’s Papers at 21. Although Mr. Siltman argues that
Dr. Lord-Flynn’s evaluation constituted “discovery” materials, the trial court correctly
concluded otherwise.
CrR 4.7 provides for discovery in criminal cases. Expert reports, including mental
evaluations “made in connection with the particular case,” are discoverable. CrR
4.7(a)(1)(iv). The evaluation by Dr. Lord-Flynn would have been discoverable.
However, the evaluation was ordered by the trial court, on defense counsel’s motion, and
reported to the parties in the normal course. See RCW 10.77.060(3). The evaluation was
not a piece of discovery; it was conducted after charging and the disclosure of discovery.
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No. 35507-1-III (Consolidated with No. 35655-8-III)
State v. Siltman
The stipulation only directed that “police reports and documents” that had been
“provided in discovery” were admissible. Even if the evaluation was an other
“document,” there is no evidence that it was provided in discovery. This was a court-
ordered document that was shared with the parties and the court upon completion. The
trial court did not err in concluding that it was not provided in discovery.
There is a second reason that the evaluation was properly rejected. Mr. Siltman
wanted to argue that he had diminished capacity and could not have committed the no-
contact order violation. However, the report does not establish diminished capacity.
Diminished capacity is a common law defense in Washington. It can be raised
“whenever there is substantial evidence of such a condition and such evidence logically
and reasonably connects the defendant’s alleged mental condition with the inability to
possess the required level of culpability to commit the crime charged.” State v. Griffin,
100 Wash. 2d 417, 419, 670 P.2d 265 (1983). A defendant is entitled to a diminished
capacity instruction if (1) the crime charged includes a particular mental state as an
element, (2) the defendant presents evidence of a mental disorder, and (3) expert
testimony logically and reasonably connects the defendant’s alleged mental condition
with the asserted inability to form the mental state required for the crime charged. State
v. Atsbeha, 142 Wash. 2d 904, 914, 921, 16 P.3d 626 (2001). The testimony of an expert
witness is necessary to present a diminished capacity defense. State v. Stumpf, 64 Wn.
App. 522, 526, 827 P.2d 294 (1992).
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No. 35507-1-III (Consolidated with No. 35655-8-III)
State v. Siltman
Here, there was no expert evaluation opining that Mr. Siltman, due to a mental
disorder, was unable to formulate the mental state required to commit a violation of a no­
contact order. That is unsurprising since Dr. Lord-Flynn was asked only to evaluate Mr.
Siltman's ability to stand trial. Accordingly, his report focused on the defendant's
current condition. It was not a report designed to look back to the time of the offense and
assess Mr. Siltman's ability to have committed the crime. While the competency
evaluation's conclusion that Mr. Siltman had suffered from a mental disability would be a
useful first step in a diminished capacity evaluation, that is all that it was. The rest of the
necessary analysis was missing.
The evaluation did not establish diminished capacity and therefore was irrelevant.
For that reason, also, the evaluation was properly excluded.
Neither assignment of error has merit. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey,
7