State of Washington v. Stevens County District Court Judge , 436 P.3d 430 ( 2019 )

FILED
MARCH 12, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 35966-2-III
)
Appellant, )
)
v. )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
STEVENS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT )
JUDGE, )
)
Respondent. )
PENNELL, J. — Washington’s superior and district courts share a limited amount
of concurrent criminal jurisdiction. When one court exercises its jurisdiction in a specific
case, the priority of action doctrine prohibits another court from interfering. But what
constitutes the same case for purposes of the priority of action doctrine is not always
clear. Our case law establishes that a search warrant proceeding is not part of the same
case for purposes of the doctrine because one proceeding does not have a preclusive
effect on the other. We now hold that the same is true for a preliminary appearance
hearing. A court’s authority to hold a preliminary appearance hearing is separate from
the authority to adjudicate a criminal trial, and the preliminary appearance hearing has
no preclusive effect on the criminal trial process.
No. 35966-2-III
State v. Stevens County Dist. Court Judge
Because a preliminary appearance hearing is distinct from the criminal trial
process, a district court’s exercise of authority over a substantive criminal charge
does not preclude the superior court from holding a preliminary appearance hearing.
This matter is therefore reversed, with instructions that the State be granted a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to recognize the validity of preliminary appearance
orders issued by the superior court.
FACTS
This case arises from a dispute between judges of the superior and district courts
of Stevens County regarding how to handle preliminary appearances for individuals
arrested and detained in the county jail. The conflict began on January 29, 2018, when
the administrator for the Stevens County Superior Court sent an e-mail to the superior
and district court judges, prosecutors, and others notifying them that all in-custody first
appearances for both courts were to be heard by the superior court at noon on Mondays
through Fridays.
The superior court administrator’s e-mail was not well-received by the district
court. On February 2, 2018, Stevens County District Court Judge Gina Tveit e-mailed the
district court staff directing that no orders be filed in a district court case unless signed by
a district court judge or district court judge pro tem. This e-mail was copied to the
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superior court judges, the county clerk, the county’s chief corrections officer, and the
superior court administrator (who then forwarded it to the prosecutor’s office).
On February 5, 2018, the Stevens County Superior Court judges jointly signed an
administrative order requiring all preliminary appearances be heard by the superior court
judges or a court commissioner. The order identified the reasons for instituting the
policy, including: scheduling conflicts between the courts, the clerks, the jail, and
attorneys; the hardship to the jail to accommodate different first appearances held in both
courts; the frequent interruptions and excessive delays caused by the current procedure;
and the superior court’s ability to remedy the situation by conducting all first appearances
during the noon hour via video to the jail.
The Stevens County prosecuting attorney subsequently filed a petition for writ of
mandamus, seeking to require Judge Tveit to rescind her February 2, 2018, directive and
to recognize the validity of superior court preliminary appearance orders. According to
the affidavit in support of the petition, a Stevens County Superior Court judge presided
over an in-custody first appearance for an individual named Edwin Maestas concerning
two gross misdemeanors. The superior court judge entered a CrR 3.2 hearing order and
set the matter over to the district court for 1:30 p.m. that day. The district court staff did
not file the order or set the matter on the district court’s docket. The State’s affidavit also
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referenced two other criminal cases where Judge Tveit disregarded the administrative
order and presided over the preliminary appearances.
The State’s petition for mandamus was heard by a visiting superior court judge,
appointed pursuant to RCW 4.12.040. Citing the priority of action rule, the visiting judge
denied the State’s petition. In his memorandum opinion dated March 7, 2018, the judge
reasoned that a preliminary appearance is part of a criminal case and once the district
court assumes jurisdiction of a case through a filed criminal charge, the superior court is
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction.
The State timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
A statutory writ of mandamus may be issued “to compel the performance of an
act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.”
RCW 7.16.160. Our case law recognizes the availability of a statutory writ when a judge
of a court of limited jurisdiction takes action that is legally erroneous and not correctable
on appeal. City of Kirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wn. App. 819, 827-28, 920 P.2d 206 (1996).
Legal issues regarding the propriety of a writ are reviewed de novo. Burd v. Clarke,
152 Wn. App. 970, 972, 219 P.3d 950 (2009).
The State filed a mandamus petition in order to compel the Stevens County District
Court to recognize and file preliminary hearing orders issued by the superior court in
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district court cases. Because district court clerks act at the direction of district court
judges, RCW 3.54.020, the mandamus petition was directed at Stevens County District
Court Judge Tveit. According to the State, mandamus should issue because Judge Tveit’s
instruction that the district court staff not accept preliminary hearing orders from superior
court is based on a mistake of law. According to the State, the superior court retains
authority to hold a preliminary hearing and enter related orders, even after a district court
case has been filed and the district court has assumed exclusive original jurisdiction over
the trial process.
Our assessment of the State’s position requires an analysis of superior court
jurisdiction and how that jurisdiction is, or is not, limited by a district court’s exercise
of jurisdiction over a particular criminal case. In this context, the term “jurisdiction”
refers to a court’s power to act. ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm’n,
173 Wn.2d 608, 616, 268 P.3d 929 (2012).
Superior and district courts are separate courts, but they enjoy a significant amount
of concurrent criminal authority. The superior court’s authority is derived directly from
the state constitution. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 5. A superior court has broad criminal
jurisdiction over felonies and misdemeanors “not otherwise provided for by law.” Id. at
§ 6. In contrast to superior courts, a district court’s powers are limited to what is
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prescribed by statute. Id. at §§ 10, 12. 1 The statute setting forth a district court’s criminal
jurisdiction is RCW 3.66.060. Among other things, this statute grants a district court
jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors. This conferral of authority
is explicitly concurrent with the jurisdiction of the superior court. RCW 3.66.060.
Concurrent jurisdiction carries a risk of misuse. Left unchecked, a prosecutor
might abuse his or her access to concurrent courts by filing “‘successive prosecutions
based upon essentially the same conduct’” in order to “‘hedge against the risk of an
unsympathetic jury,’” place an unwarranted “‘hold upon a person after he [or she] has
been sentenced to imprisonment,’” or might simply “‘harass’” an accused person “‘by
multiplicity of trials.’” State v. McNeil, 20 Wn. App. 527, 532, 582 P.2d 524 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting COMMENTARY TO ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE, § 1.3 at 19 (Approved Draft, 1968)).
To guard against misuse of concurrent jurisdiction, our case law has developed the
doctrine of priority of action. Also known as the first-in-time rule, the priority of action
doctrine holds that “the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive
authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved.” Sherwin v. Arveson,
96 Wn.2d 77, 80, 633 P.2d 1335 (1981); see also State ex. rel. Harger v. Chapman,
1
The state constitution refers to district court judges as “justices of the peace.” Id.6
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131 Wash. 581, 584-85, 230 P. 833 (1924). The priority of action doctrine is reflected
in the procedural rules governing district court, which provide that “[i]f two or more
charging documents are filed against the same defendant for the same offense in different
courts, and if each court has jurisdiction, the court in which the first charging document
was filed shall try the case.” CrRLJ 5.3.
Whether the priority of action doctrine applies in a given case turns on principles
of res judicata. In order for the priority of action doctrine to apply, “there must be
identity of [(1)] subject matter, [(2)] relief, and [(3)] parties.” Am. Mobile Homes of
Wash. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990). If these
criteria are not met, the doctrine does not apply and a court retains authority to act
according to its concurrent jurisdiction. In re Search Warrant for 13811 Highway 99,
194 Wn. App. 365, 374, 378 P.3d 568 (2016).
We have previously held that the priority of action doctrine does not apply in the
search warrant context. See, e.g., id. at 374-75; State v. Stock, 44 Wn. App. 467, 474,
722 P.2d 1330 (1986). Although superior courts share authority to issue search warrants
with courts of limited jurisdiction, see RCW 10.79.035 and RCW 2.20.030, a search
warrant proceeding is distinct from a criminal trial and has no preclusive effect on the
trial process. Stock, 44 Wn. App. at 474-75. Looking at the priority of action test, none
of the three elements of identity—parties, subject matter, and requested relief—are
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present. Search Warrant for 13811 Highway 99, 194 Wn. App. at 374. Thus, the
existence of a criminal charge in one court does not preclude another court from
addressing a search warrant application.
The priority of action analysis yields the same result for preliminary appearance
hearings as it does for search warrant proceedings. There is no shared identity between a
preliminary appearance hearing and a criminal trial. A preliminary appearance hearing is
a special proceeding that is not considered a “critical stage” of a criminal prosecution.
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-23, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975); State
v. Jackson, 66 Wn.2d 24, 28-29, 400 P.2d 774 (1965); see also RCW 3.66.060(1), (2)
(differentiating between the power over a criminal trial and the power to conduct
preliminary hearings). The subject matter of a preliminary appearance hearing is limited
to a nonadversarial determination of probable cause, appointment of counsel, custody,
and an advisement of rights. CrR 3.2.1; CrRLJ 3.2.1. Nothing decided at a preliminary
hearing has any preclusive effect at a subsequent trial. Indeed, because a preliminary
appearance hearing is not a critical stage of a criminal prosecution, the topics of trial—
guilt and punishment—are not available for resolution. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122;
Jackson, 66 Wn.2d at 28-29; In re Pers. Restraint of Sanchez, 197 Wn. App. 686, 702,
391 P.3d 517 (2017).
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The motivating purposes of the priority of action rule would not be served by
applying it in the current circumstances. Permitting different courts to handle a
preliminary hearing and criminal trial does not create a risk of prosecutorial mischief.
To the contrary, broadening the number of courts empowered to handle a preliminary
hearing helps protect a defendant’s right to be free of unwarranted detention.
As is true in the search warrant context, a court’s authority to conduct a
preliminary hearing is separate from the authority to adjudicate a criminal trial. The
criminal trial process commences with the filing of formal charges and subsequent
arraignment. CrR 2.1, 3.3(c)(1), 4.1; CrRLJ 2.1, 3.3(c)(1), 4.1. In this context, a court’s
role is reactive; it has no authority to proceed without receiving some sort of formal
charge. But a preliminary hearing is different. A court has a constitutional duty to take
proactive measures to protect the rights of detained persons. County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52-53, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991). This duty
persists regardless of whether the prosecutor’s office has filed formal charges. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116-17. Our court rules recognize this unique duty and specify that
district and superior courts have a shared responsibility for ensuring that “any” person
detained is afforded a prompt preliminary hearing, regardless of whether charges have
been filed or in which court. CrR 3.2.1(d)(1); CrRLJ 3.2.1(d)(1).
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Because a preliminary hearing is a proceeding separate from the process of a
criminal trial, Judge Tveit's directive that the Stevens County District Court not accept
preliminary appearance orders from superior court was legally erroneous. Unless a
preliminary appearance hearing has already been held, the superior court retains the
power and duty to promptly hold a preliminary appearance hearing for a detained person,
even if a charge has been filed in district court. The State is therefore entitled to
mandamus, directing Judge Tveit to recognize the legal validity of superior court orders
in this context.
CONCLUSION
This matter is reversed and remanded to superior court with instructions to grant
the State's petition for writ of mandamus.
Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.~
(,.~
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