State of Washington v. Christopher Douglas Remington ( 2015 )

FILED
AUGUST 18, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32664-1-III
Respondent, ) (Consolidated with
) No. 32674-8-III)
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER REMINGTON, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Christopher Remington was convicted and received concurrent
prison sentences in a consolidated proceeding for two cases involving separate
informations filed under different cause numbers. The court imposed separate legal
financial obligations (LFOs) in each judgment and sentence. Mr. Remington appeals,
contending the trial court lacked authority to impose LFOs in each case when he was
concurrently sentenced in a single proceeding. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On August 19,2013, Mr. Remington was charged by information with two counts
of residential burglary and one count of attempted residential burglary under Spokane
County cause number 13-1-02920-1. On August 21,2013, he was charged by separate
information with five counts of residential burglary under Spokane County cause number
No. 32664-1-III; 32674-8-III
State v. Remington
13-1-02991-1. He entered into a drug court agreement encompassing each case in
December 2013, but repeatedly failed to comply with program requirements. In June
2014, the court entered orders terminating him from drug court. At a consolidated bench
trial/sentencing proceeding, the court convicted him as charged in each case and imposed
concurrent prison-based Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOS A) sentences. In
each judgment and sentence, the court imposed $800 in LFOs consisting of a $500 victim
assessment, $200 in court costs, and a $100 DNA collection fee. The LFOs thus total
$1600. Mr. Remington appeals.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue is whether the court lacked authority to impose separate LFOs in
each judgment and sentence when the convictions for the two cases were obtained in a
single proceeding and concurrently sentenced on the same date.
Mr. Remington contends that imposing separate LFOs in each cause number
violates the requirement in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for concurrent sentences when
convictions are obtained in a single or consolidated proceeding. He relies on Bates,
which came to that conclusion with regard to incarceration in construing former RCW
9.94AAOO(1)(a) (now recodified as RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a)). State v. Bates, 51 Wn. App.
251,253-54,752 P.2d 1360 (1988). Mr. Remington thus claims he should only be
singularly liable for $800 in LFOs. The argument fails.
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No. 32664-I-III; 32674-8-II1
State v. Remington
RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) provides in relevant part:
[W]henever a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses,
the sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using all
other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions for the
purpose of the offender score .... Sentences imposed under this subsection
shall be served concurrently. Consecutive sentences may only be imposed
under the exceptional sentence provisions ofRCW 9.94A.535.
As the State explains, this statute addresses determination of the offender score
and sentencing range for current offenses and when confinement is to be served
concurrently or consecutively. LFOs are not mentioned in subsection (l)(a), or in any
other part of the statute. See RCW 9.94A.589(1)-(5).
Bates and the cases upon which it relied-State v. Stark, 48 Wash. App. 245, 738
P.2d 684 (1987), and State v. Huntley, 45 Wash. App. 658, 726 P.2d 1254 (1986)-are
consistent with the State's observations. Those cases all required concurrent confinement
for multiple sentences under RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a), but none addressed LFOs. See
Bates, 51 Wash. App. at 252-54; Stark, at 254-55; Huntley, at 660-62. Mr. Remington
received concurrent confinement in accordance with those cases, but they do not
otherwise support his argument. His reliance on RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for his LFO
challenge is misplaced.
Mr. Remington makes no further argument that the court was not otherwise
authorized to separately impose the LFOs that it did in each of his cases. Reviewing the
applicable statutes, we find no error.
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No. 32664-I-III; 32674-8-III
State v. Remington
Our goal when interpreting a statute is to carry out the legislature's intent. See State
v. Gonzalez, 168 Wash. 2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). We must give effect to the plain
language of an unambiguous statute. Id. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous,
our inquiry ends and we enforce the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning." State
v. Armendariz, 160 Wash. 2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). Such is the case here.
First, the $500 victim assessment is found in RCW 7.68.035. The statute provides
in relevant part:
(l)(a) When any person is found guilty in any superior court of having
committed a crime ... there shall be imposed by the court upon such
convicted person a penalty assessment. The assessment shall be in addition
to any other penalty or fine imposed by law and shall be five hundred
dollars for each case or cause ofaction that includes one or more
convictions ofa felony or gross misdemeanor and two hundred fifty dollars
for any case or cause of action that includes convictions of only one or
more misdemeanors.
(Emphasis added)
The plain language of this statute unambiguously requires that a $500 penalty
assessment be imposed for each case or cause of action that includes one or more felony
convictions. Both of Mr. Remington's cases involved felony convictions. Therefore, the
$500 penalty assessment was properly ordered under each cause number.
Next, the court imposed $200 in court costs in each case. The face of each
judgment and sentence document specifies that the $200 cost is for the criminal filing fee.
The applicable statute is RCW 36.18.020(2)(h), which provides in relevant part:
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No. 32664-1-III; 32674-8-III
State v. Remington
(2) Clerks of superior courts shall collect the following fees· for their
official services:
(h) Upon conviction or plea of guilty ... upon failure to prosecute an
appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction as provided by law, or upon
affirmance of a conviction by a court of limited jurisdiction, a defendant in
a criminal case shall be liable for a fee of two hundred dollars.
(Emphasis added).
Mr. Remington was a defendant in two separate criminal cases and was convicted
in each case. Under the statute's plain language, he is liable for the $200 filing fee in
each case. The court thus properly imposed that cost in each judgment and sentence.
Finally, the court imposed a $100 DNA collection fee in each case. This fee is
governed by RCW 43.43.7541. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every sentence imposed for a crime specified in RCW 43.43.754
must include a fee of one hundred dollars. The fee is a court-ordered legal
financial obligation as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 and other applicable
law. For a sentence imposed under chapter 9.94A RCW, the fee is payable
by the offender after payment of all other legal financial obligations
included in the sentence has been completed.
(Emphasis added). The crimes specified in RCW 43.43.754 include all adult felonies.
RCW 43.43.754(1)(a).
Recently, in State v. Thornton, No. 32478-8-III, slip op. at 4 (June 16,2015), we
held that RCW 43.43.7541 's language "[e]very sentence imposed for a crime specified in
RCW 43.43.754 must include a fee of one hundred dollars" plainly and unambiguously
provides that the $100 DNA database fee is mandatory for all such sentences. See also
5
No. 32664-1-III; 32674-8-II1
State v. Remington
State v. Thompson, 153 Wash. App. 325, 338, 223 P.3d 1165 (2009) (phrase "every
sentence" unambiguously indicates that sentencing is the precipitating event for
imposition of the mandatory fee required by RCW 43.43.7541). Mr. Remington received
two sentences, albeit with concurrent confinement. The court correctly imposed the $100
DNA collection fee in each judgment and sentence.
The court was authorized to impose the LFOs that it did in each of Mr. . ,
Remington's judgment and sentences. The fact that his confinement time in the two
cases was ordered to run concurrently does not remove him from the plain language of
the statutes discussed.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, J.
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