George E. Failing Company v. Cascade Drilling, Inc. ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY, dba
GEFCO, a division of Blue Tee Corp., No. 73017-7-1
C3
a Delaware corporation, p";
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
v.
CASCADE DRILLING, INC., a UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Washington corporation, and BRUCE
NIERMEYER, FILED: December 27, 2016
Appellants,
HUB CITY, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Third-Party
Defendant.
Becker, J. — Exercising its inherent power, the trial court imposed
sanctions of more than $1.6 million for the appellant's bad faith in using
fabricated evidence to carry on three years of litigation. Substantial evidence
supports the finding of bad faith, and we conclude the court did not abuse its
inherent power.
No. 73017-7-1/2
FACTS
The order of sanctions at issue in this appeal was entered against
appellant Cascade Drilling Inc. in favor of respondent George E. Failing
Company. The respondent company, also known as Gefco, manufactures and
sells large drilling machinery.
The source of their dispute is a project that began in 2008. Cascade was
hired to drill a water well at a housing development in Wheeler Canyon,
California. Cascade used a 50k drilling rig purchased from Gefco. Between
March and June 2008, the pump drive shafts on the drilling rig failed four times.
After each failure, Cascade ordered a replacement pump drive shaft from Gefco.
In September 2008, Cascade ordered drilling equipment for an unrelated
drilling rig from Gefco but did not pay. In July 2009, Gefco sued to collect.
Cascade admitted not paying and asserted counterclaims alleging that Gefco
was indebted to Cascade for nonconforming and defective goods, including the
replacement pump drive shafts purchased for the Wheeler Canyon project.
For the next three years, the parties litigated extensively. Cascade
produced three pump drive shafts, representing them to be the second, third, and
fourth pump drive shafts that failed on the Wheeler Canyon job.
In August 2012, Cascade voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims with
prejudice and paid Gefco the amount due on the disputed invoice. This resolved
the merits of the original claim and counterclaim.
Gefco moved for sanctions against Cascade. Based on information that
came to light late in the litigation, Gefco alleged that the three pump drive shafts
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produced by Cascade did not come from the rig used on the Wheeler Canyon job
and that Cascade had fabricated evidence to the contrary. In October 2012, the
court held a hearing on the motion.
Over a year later, on November 27, 2013, the trial court issued a letter
ruling, accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law, that Cascade
engaged in bad faith litigation and fabricated the pump drive shaft evidence. The
court ordered Cascade and Bruce Niermeyer, Cascade's president, to pay
Gefco's "reasonable" attorney fees and costs.
For the next year, the parties litigated the amount of "reasonable" attorney
fees and costs. On December 29, 2014, the trial court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law, ordering Cascade and Niermeyer to pay Gefco attorney fees
and costs of $1,394,435 and expert fees of $247,286 in partial reimbursement of
the fees and costs incurred in the litigation. On January 26, 2015, Cascade filed
a notice of appeal from the order of December 29, 2014.
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
Cascade assigns error to the order of November 27, 2013, in which the
court set forth its decision that sanctions would be ordered, as well as to the
order of December 29, 2014, which quantified the amount of the sanctions
ordered. Gefco, relying on RAP 2.4(b), contends that because the notice of
appeal referred only to the second order, it is timely only as to that order, such
that the only issues properly before this court are those related to the amount of
the sanction and the interest rate. Gefco is mistaken. The appeal of the second
order brings the first order up for review.
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We have held that under RAP 2.4(b), an appeal from an award of attorney
fees does not bring up for review the merits of the underlying summary judgment
decision. Bushonq v. Wilsbach. 151 Wash. App. 373, 376, 213 P.3d 42 (2009). A
litigant must appeal from the judgment "establishing the legal basis for an
attorney fee award" within 30 days of the entry of that judgment. Bushonq, 151
Wash. App. at 377. Unlike in Bushonq. here the legal basis for the attorney fee
award was not established by a judgment on the merits of the underlying case.
Gefco was already awarded contractual attorney fees for its debt collection action
when the merits of that claim were resolved in 2012. George E. Failing Co. v.
Cascade Drilling. Inc.. No. 69627-1-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014)
(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/696271.pdf (affirming
award).
The present appeal concerns an order of attorney fees awarded on a
motion for sanctions that was litigated and decided after and separately from the
merits of the underlying claims. The order of November 27, 2013, did not inhere
in the outcome of the underlying case and was not itself a final judgment.
Rather, it was analogous to a preliminary decision on liability. In that sense, it did
not become "final" and appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(13) until the court
determined the amount for which the defendant was liable. See Miller v. City of
Port Angeles. 38 Wash. App. 904, 907 n.2, 691 P.2d 229 (1984) ("A judgment of
liability is not ordinarily appealable until damages have been awarded"), review
denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1024 (1985); Zimmerman v. W8LESS Prods.. LLC. 160 Wn.
App. 678, 691, 248 P.3d 601 (2011) (summary judgment order on liability not
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appealable until after determination of damages). Cascade's timely appeal of the
December 2014 order setting the amount of sanctions serves as a timely appeal
of the November 2013 order holding that sanctions would be awarded.
EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "certain implied
powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others." United States v. Hudson. 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L. Ed. 259 (1812).
In general, a court may resort to its inherent powers only to protect the
judicial branch in the performance of its constitutional duties when reasonably
necessary for the efficient administration of justice. State v. Wadsworth. 139
Wash. 2d 724, 740-41, 991 P.2d 80 (2000); In re Salary of Juvenile Director. 87
Wash. 2d 232, 245, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). Inherent powers must be exercised with
restraint and discretion because they are "shielded from direct democratic
controls," and therefore, the inherent power to assess attorney fees exists only in
"narrowly defined circumstances." Roadway Exp.. Inc. v. Piper. 447 U.S. 752,
764-65, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1980). For example, if a court finds
'"that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been
defiled,'" it may assess attorney fees against the responsible party. Chambers v.
NASCO. Inc.. 501 U.S. 32, 46, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L Ed. 2d 27 (1991), quoting
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co.. 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S. Ct. 1176,
90 L. Ed. 1447 (1946). A court may assess attorney fees where a party has
No. 73017-7-1/6
"'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'"
Chambers. 501 U.S. at 45-46, quoting Alveska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'v. 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975).
Washington courts follow the federal cases in holding that a trial court's
inherent authority to sanction litigation conduct by assessing attorney fees and
costs is properly invoked upon a finding of bad faith. State v. S.H.. 102 Wash. App.
468, 475, 8 P.3d 1058 (2000); see also In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek. 136
Wash. 2d 255, 265, 961 P.2d 343 (1998). Generally, a decision to impose
sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch.
&Ass'nv.FisonsCorp.. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 338, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). A trial
court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds. Fisons. 122 Wash. 2d at 339.
Here, the trial court made an explicit finding that Cascade engaged in bad
faith litigation. Finding of Fact 55. While the cases cited above establish that a
sanction imposed for bad faith litigation will be reversed absent a finding of bad
faith, they provide little guidance on how to review a sanction when the trial court
does make a finding of bad faith. Fortunately, in this complex and technical
case, the trial court not only made the required finding of bad faith, but also made
its reasoning clear in additional findings of fact setting forth the evidence of bad
faith.1
1 The additional findings provide a safeguard against the concern that
requiring no more than "the talismanic recitation of the phrase 'bad faith'"
forecloses meaningful review of sanctions based on inherent authority.
Chambers. 501 U.S. at 69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
No. 73017-7-1/7
Cascade contends the additional findings are contradictory and show that
the court was confused about fundamental facts and relied on abandoned or
equivocal expert testimony. To evaluate Cascade's position, we employ the
usual standard of review for factual matters. We defer to the trier of fact for
purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of
the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. State v. Merrill. 183 Wash. App. 749,
755, 335 P.3d 444 (2014). There is a presumption in favor of the trial court's
findings, and the party claiming error has the burden of showing that a finding of
fact is not supported by substantial evidence. Merrill. 183 Wash. App. at 755.
First, the trial court found that Cascade failed to disclose repairs that were
made to the drilling rig used at Wheeler Canyon before the Wheeler Canyon job.
Finding of Fact 49. The trial court did not credit Niermeyer's explanation for this
omission.
Second, the court found that Cascade failed to admit candidly that there
was no way to be sure which of the three shafts Cascade produced came from
which failure. Finding of Fact 50. This finding is related to the court's
observation that Niermeyer and Chuck Rider, Cascade's chief mechanic,
presented contradictory accounts of how the shafts come to be labeled and that,
in the end, Rider changed his account to align with Niermeyer's. The court did
not find Niermeyer to be a credible witness. Finding of Fact 19-22, 51. The court
noticed that Rider became visibly uncomfortable on the witness stand when
questioned about how and when he was asked to collect maintenance records
for the 50k rig. Finding of Fact 26. These findings are supported by substantial
No. 73017-7-1/8
evidence in the record and by the trial court's determinations of witness
credibility, to which we defer. The court found that "had Cascade acknowledged
that it could not associate specific shafts with related failures, its counterclaims
either would never have been filed, would have been dismissed or, at best, would
have led to a jury instruction on spoliation." Finding of Fact 52.
Third, the trial court relied on testimony of expert witness Dr. David Howitt
to find that the failed shafts presented by Cascade as evidence actually came
from rigs other than the 50k rig used at Wheeler Canyon. "Clearly, counsel for
Cascade never would have filed the counterclaims had they been aware that the
evidence was gathered from other rigs." Finding of Fact 53. This finding, and
the inference the court drew from it, is supported by Dr. Howitt's testimony,
discussed further below.
Fourth, the trial court found that Cascade, as a matter of litigation strategy,
tried to deflect attention from the particular failures at Wheeler Canyon by
expanding its lawsuit to include all 50k rigs manufactured by Gefco. "Had the
Court permitted Cascade to have done so, Gefco would have faced a great deal
of pressure to settle in order to protect its business. Cascade could have
prevailed without ever having to establish the cause of the failures at Wheeler
Canyon." Finding of Fact 54. While there was no direct evidence of Cascade's
litigation strategy, this finding was a reasonable inference from the trial court's
long experience with the litigation.
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No. 73017-7-1/9
These findings alone constitute substantial evidence supporting the trial
court's finding that Cascade engaged in bad faith litigation. To these findings,
the trial court added another critical finding that Cascade vigorously contests:
that Cascade and Niermeyer "fabricated the evidence upon which Cascade's
counterclaims were based." Conclusion of Law 1. Although this is denominated
as a conclusion of law, we will review it as a finding. See, e.g., City of Redmond
v. Kezner. 10 Wash. App. 332, 343, 517 P.2d 625 (1973) (a statement of fact
included within the conclusions of law will be treated as a finding of fact); Ferree
v. Doric Co.. 62 Wash. 2d 561, 567, 383 P.2d 900 (1963) ("Since this conclusion of
law partakes of the nature of a finding of fact, it may be treated as such.")
Cascade contends that fabrication of evidence must be proven by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence because it is tantamount to a fraud on the
court. As authority for this argument, Cascade cites In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions. 538 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied. 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
Fraud on the court, though not easily defined, can be
characterized as a scheme to interfere with the judicial machinery
performing the task of impartial adjudication, as by preventing the
opposing party from fairly presenting his case or defense.... A
finding of fraud on the court is justified only by the most egregious
misconduct directed to the court itself, such as bribery of a judge or
jury or fabrication of evidence by counsel,... and must be
supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions. 538 F.2d at 195 (citations omitted). In that case, the
lower court refused to enforce a patent as a sanction for conduct that impeded
discovery. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the misconduct, a
failure to disclose certain files in discovery, was not egregious misconduct
No. 73017-7-1/10
characterizable as fraud on the court. Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d at
195. The court accepted the argument that the misconduct was an error.
In the trial court, Cascade did not argue for application of the clear,
cogent, and convincing standard for proof of fabrication of evidence until after the
court found fabrication. The question before the trial court was whether to find
Cascade had acted in bad faith. The sufficiency of that ultimate finding is the
question before this court. No Washington case has suggested that the standard
of review for a finding of bad faith is more exacting than substantial evidence.
Assuming without deciding that the clear, cogent, and convincing standard
is applicable to the allegation that Cascade fabricated evidence, we conclude the
trial court would have made the same finding under that standard and that the
finding is affirmable under that standard.
Cascade produced three pump drive shafts, which Cascade represented
were the second, third, and fourth pump drive shafts to fail at Wheeler Canyon.
Cascade represented that two of the shafts failed at the mud pump location and
one at the pull-down pump location. But Gefco's expert, Dr. Howitt, opined that
all three pump drive shafts produced by Cascade came from a pull-down pump
location.
What the trial court found most persuasive was Dr. Howitt's demonstration
in court how the three pump drive shafts produced by Cascade fit into the pull
down pump input shaft, and not the mud pump input shaft. During his testimony,
Dr. Howitt put the three shafts produced by Cascade into the pull-down pump
input shaft and showed how all three pump drive shafts fit. The trial judge
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No. 73017-7-1/11
remarked that they fit right in together. Dr. Howitt then demonstrated how none
of the shafts produced by Cascade fit into the mud pump input shaft, and the trial
judge observed and agreed that it did not fit.2
Dr. Howitt testified that he would expect to see "blueing" oxidation on the
pump drive shafts if Rider installed them with zero clearance as he said. None of
the pump drive shafts produced by Cascade had blueing. Dr. Howitt testified that
the chamfer impression or wear evidence on the shafts that Cascade presented
as evidence was consistent with the pull-down pump location, not mud pump.
He believed the shafts he was given to examine "most likely came from another
rig entirely." Finding of Fact 35. He testified, "That was the only Foote Jones
spline that was ever provided to Cascade Drilling so that Foote Jones spline had
to have come from a different company because Cascade Drilling only ever
bought one 50K rig, and therefore they would never have a second Foote Jones
pump. So that leads me to believe that this evidence was in fact falsified."
Report of Proceedings (Oct. 29, 2015) at 159. He also testified, "You could
deduce that straightforwardly that since they lost the original equipment pull
down pump spline at that first repair, they would have no access to another
Foote Jones pump, so they must have got it from another PTO box, which means
2 Gefco has repeatedly requested that this court recreate Dr. Howitt's
demonstration using the trial exhibits. The requests are unfounded,
unnecessary, and distracting. Attempting to recreate a physical demonstration
that occurred in the trial court would violate the principle that appellate courts do
not hear or weigh evidence or find facts. We do not make findings or recreate
trial court demonstrations. See, e.g., Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza. Inc.. 153
Wash. App. 710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009), review denied, 168Wn.2d 1041
(2010). All motions and requests by Gefco on this issue are denied.
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No. 73017-7-1/12
they got it from some other drilling company. Looks very straightforward to me.
This evidence was falsified. . . This evidence was falsified, clearly falsified."
Report of Proceedings (Oct. 30, 2015) at 207.
The trial court found Dr. Howitt "candid" and with "impeccable" academic
credentials, findings of fact 29-30, in contrast to other expert witnesses whose
testimony the court found less reliable. Dr. Howitt's opinion that the pump drive
shafts Cascade submitted into evidence actually came from other rigs provides
clear, cogent, and convincing support for the trial court's conclusion that Cascade
fabricated evidence.
To undermine the finding of fabrication, Cascade attempts to show that
the court's reasoning was confused or illogical. These attacks are not
persuasive. To begin, Cascade contends that the trial court inaccurately stated
in findings 16 and 17 that a "shaft" on the PTO box had failed before Wheeler
Canyon. The record shows that both parties and the court were clear that a
pump had been replaced, not a shaft. An occasional lack of precision as to
terminology does not demonstrate that the court had a material
misunderstanding of the evidence.
Next, Cascade contends that the finding of fabrication was inconsistent
with the court's recognition that Niemeyer had no motive to go to the trouble of
obtaining shafts from somewhere else. The relevant finding states, "Given Mr.
Niermeyer's contention that the shafts failed because they were too soft, where
the shafts came from was immaterial to him." Finding of Fact 53. This finding is
not inconsistent with the court's perception that other shafts were switched with
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No. 73017-7-1/13
the shafts from Wheeler Canyon. An unchallenged finding recounts testimony
that the marking of shafts was altered "'to make the story come out right.'"
Finding of Fact 43. Niermeyer's motive is the subject of a finding that Niermeyer
"appears to have embarked on some sort of vendetta against Gefco and his
antipathy toward Gefco gave him a motive to falsify evidence." Finding of Fact
51. This finding is supported by the court's observations of Niermeyer in court
and other evidence. See Finding of Fact 19.
Cascade contends the court's reliance on the absence of "blueing" in the
shafts is unsupported by the evidence. There was conflicting testimony on this
topic. As discussed above, the court accepted Dr. Howitt's opinion that the failed
drive shafts would have exhibited blueing ifthey had been from the 50k rig.
Cascade's witnesses disagreed with Dr. Howitt but did not decisively controvert
his testimony.
Cascade further contends that the "miniscule differences" in chamfer
impressions on the pump drive shafts are not clear and convincing evidence of
fraud. As with the blueing issue, there was conflicting testimony on this topic and
the court accepted Dr. Howitt's opinion. And the court did not rely solely on this
evidence to find that Cascade fabricated evidence, but rather on all the evidence
detailed above taken together. Cascade points out that Dr. Howitt had changed
his opinion on this issue, but as discussed above, the trial court found him
credible, partly because he readily admitted this error. See Finding of Fact 30.
Cascade alleges that the court demonstrated a "fundamental misunderstanding"
of the chamfer impression evidence in finding of fact 13. But the court's
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No. 73017-7-1/14
discussion of the impression evidence in findings of fact 33 and 34 sufficiently
demonstrates the court's understanding.
Cascade also claims the evidence is insufficient to support that part of the
court's letter ruling where the court states that Cascade dismissed its claims
when it realized it had been "found out." The written finding states that Cascade
"abruptly" settled, which is not inaccurate. In any event, the court did not rely on
the so-called abrupt settlement as evidence that Cascade fabricated evidence.
Taken as a whole, the findings show the court was appalled to learn that
Cascade filed a lawsuit alleging the shafts from the 50k rig were defective and
carried on litigation for three years without disclosing there was no way to know
which shafts were which. According to the letter ruling, the court was "unmoved"
by Cascade's defense that its mechanic merely made errors. The court thought
it "very likely" that the shafts in evidence had been gathered from other rigs.
We conclude that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the
court's determination that Cascade fabricated evidence and that the fabrication
supported the finding of bad faith.
UNCLEAN HANDS
Cascade argues that the trial court's award of attorney fees to Gefco is
barred by the doctrine of unclean hands because the trial court sanctioned Gefco
$10,000 for Gefco's own bad faith discovery violations.
Unclean hands is an equitable defense. See, e.g.. J.L Cooper &Co. v.
Anchor Sec. Co.. 9 Wash. 2d 45, 113 P.2d 845 (1941). In Chambers, the Supreme
Court stated that imposition of sanctions in instances such as bad faith litigation
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No. 73017-7-1/15
"transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between the parties
and reaches a court's inherent power to police itself," serving the "dual purpose"
of vindicating judicial authority and making the prevailing party whole.
Chambers. 501 U.S. at 46.
Cascade objects to what it perceives as unfairness—Cascade received a
much larger sanction than Gefco despite what Cascade views as less culpable
behavior. But this objection is a matter of proportionality, not equity or unclean
hands. The trial court imposed sanctions that were proportional to each party's
bad behavior as the court saw it. We reject the argument that the award of
attorney fees to Gefco is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
INTEREST RATE
Cascade contends that the trial court applied the wrong interest rate to the
judgment. The interest rate applicable to a money judgment is governed by
RCW 4.56.110. The trial court set the judgment interest rate at 12 percent under
subsection (4), the catch-all subsection setting the interest rate for all judgments
not covered by subsections 1-3. Cascade argues that the interest rate should
instead be 5.25 percent under subsection (3)(b), which sets the interest rate for
"judgments founded on the tortious conduct of individuals or other entities,
whether acting in their personal or representative capacities."
Cascade points out that insurers have a duty to act in good faith, and their
failure to do so sounds in tort, triggering the interest rate for tort cases. Miller v.
Kenny. 180 Wash. App. 772, 798, 325 P.3d 278 (2014). But Cascade presents no
authority or persuasive argument for analogizing bad faith litigation to the tort of
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No. 73017-7-1/16
insurance bad faith. We find no error in the court's decision to apply the
judgment interest rate under RCW 4.56.110(4).
PERSONAL LIABILITY
The trial court held Niermeyer, Cascade's president, personally liable for
the award of attorney fees, although he was not a party at trial. Niermeyer joined
Cascade's appeal as an aggrieved nonparty and argues that the trial court erred
in holding him personally liable without finding a piercing of the corporate veil.
If a corporate officer participates in wrongful conduct or with knowledge
approves of the conduct, then the officer, as well as the corporation, is liable for
the penalties. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co.. 92 Wash. 2d 548, 554, 599 P.2d 1271
(1979).
The court found the following regarding Niermeyer:
19. Mr. Niermeyer played a central role in this case. By his own
admission, Mr. Niermeyer became extremely angry with Gefco
because he believed they knew there was a problem with their
50k rigs and they refused to acknowledge or fix it....
20. During the sanctions hearing, he was very involved with his
attorney's cross-examination of Gefco's metallurgical expert,
passing notes and engaging in frequent conferences. On the
stand, he appeared to seethe with anger at Gefco and had
great difficulty controlling narrative testimony.
Finding of Fact 19-20. The court concluded that the fabrication of the evidence
upon which Cascade's counterclaims were based was attributable to Niermeyer
as to well as to Cascade. Conclusion of Law 1.
These findings support the conclusion that Niermeyer is personally liable
for the sanctions under the test set forth in Grayson.
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No. 73017-7-1/17
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES
The trial court concluded that it was appropriate to sanction Cascade by
awarding attorney fees and costs to Gefco, but not in the total amount requested
by Gefco. The court asked Gefco to remove from its application for attorney fees
the work related to Gefco's own bad faith discovery violations. Cascade objected
that Gefco did not fully comply with this request. In response, the trial court
entered a finding of fact that "Cascade contends that it is impossible to determine
how much time was related to discovery issues that included thwarting some of
Cascade's discovery demands. Gefco asserts that it has removed those items,
pursuant to the Court's request. Given that much of the litigation in this case was
about discovery, the Court finds that it is reasonable to include the items related
to discovery on the basis of [Gefco's counsel's] statement that Gefco complied
with the Court's request."
The trial court concluded it was appropriate to place on Gefco the burden
of establishing the reasonableness of its request for fees and costs. Cascade
contends the trial court shifted the burden to Cascade to disprove the
reasonableness of Gefco's fees, quoting comments expressing the court's
unwillingness to search through the spreadsheets for possible instances of
inappropriate billing by Gefco.
The standard of review of an award of attorney fees is abuse of discretion.
Pearsall-Stipek. 136 Wash. 2d at 265. We find no abuse of discretion.
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No. 73017-7-1/18
Affirmed. Each party will bear its own attorney fees and costs for this
appeal.
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WE CONCUR:
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18