State Of Washington v. Jose Rene Gomez ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 77561-8-I
Respondent, )
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOSE RENE RENE-GOMEZ, )
Appellant ) FILED: October 7, 2019
SCHINDLER, J. — A jury convicted Jose Rene Rene-Gomez of two counts of child
molestation in the second degree and communication with a minor for immoral
purposes. Rene-Gomez seeks reversal, arguing (1) the information omitted an
essential element of the crime of communication with a minor for immoral purposes, (2)
the court erred in admitting a text message into evidence, and (3) prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument and cumulative error violated his right to a fair trial.
Rene-Gomez also challenges imposition of a number of community custody conditions.
We affirm the jury convictions and the judgment and sentence.
FACTS
Y.O.-G. and A.D.G. are the parents of D.D.-O. and her younger sister B.D. Y.O.
G. and A.D.G. separated in 2010 when D.D.-O. was in the third grade. D.D.-O. “loved
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her dad very much” and was very upset and “sad” when her parents separated. D.D.-O.
spent time with A.D.G. every month.
In 2011, Y.O.-G. and her two daughters moved into an apartment with her
boyfriend Jose Rene Rene-Gomez. Rene-Gomez assumed a parenting role with D.D.
0. and B.D. and insisted they “call him Dad.”
Rene-Gomez would often wrestle or “play fight[ ]“ with the girls and tickle them on
the stomach. After D.D.-O. turned 11, when Rene-Gomez wrestled with her, he ‘started
touching other places” such as her breasts, buttocks, and vagina. D.D.-O. “didn’t like it”
and “tried to stop playing around like that with him.” D.D.-O. would get away from
Rene-Gomez “[a]s fast as [she] could” or avoid him by locking herself in the bathroom.
Sometimes, Rene-Gomez would hold down D.D.-O.’s arms to prevent her from getting
away.
D.D.-O. said that “whenever my mom wasn’t around,” Rene-Gomez would try to
touch her breasts with his hands over her clothes. One time, Rene-Gomez tried to put
his hands down D.D.-O.’s shorts to touch her vagina. Another time while on a camping
trip, Rene-Gomez kissed D.D.-O. on the lips, not “like a dad kissing a daughter.” D.D.
0. tried to avoid Rene-Gomez at home by spending most of the time in her bedroom.
When D.D.-O. was approximately 13 years old, Y.O.-G. asked Rene-Gomez to
help her enforce the rules with D.D.-O. D.D.-O. had to ask Rene-Gomez for permission
to do certain things. D.D.-O. and Rene-Gomez often exchanged text messages in
Spanish and in English when she asked for permission to do “something or go[]
somewhere.”
In April 2015, Y.O.-G. purchased underwear for 13-year-old D.D.-O., including a
pair of white “boy cut” underpants. On April 20, D.D.-O. sent a text message to Rene
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No. 77561-8-1/3
Gomez saying she was delayed but was on her way home. In response, Rene-Gomez
said, “[IJs ok I want you to send me a pic of you.” D.D.-O. sent Rene-Gomez a
photograph of her face. Rene-Gomez responded, “Thank u for the pic” with three ‘kissy
face” emojis.1
The next day on April 21, Rene-Gomez sent D.D.-O. a text at 4:57 p.m. asking,
“Are you there??” D.D.-O. responded, “I was fixing my room why.” Rene-Gomez
responds, “Ahhh Ok good. Are you in your room?” D.D.-O. said, “No,” she was in the
bathroom. Rene-Gomez sent a text message asking D.D.-O. to send him a picture of
her in the white boy-cut underpants—”[Take] a pic of you with the white short and send
to me please.” D.D.-O. asked, “Why.” Rene-Gomez responded, “Cause I want tha
pic[ jplease. . . . Send to me!! Please.” D.D.-O. said, “I can’t.” Rene-Gomez insisted,
“Yes you can!!” Rene-Gomez then sent a text message telling her, “Ok. [Ljet make a
deal! If you send the pic [I] will let you sleep over in joselin house and will give you
money for tha night, this weekend!!” D.D.-O. responded, “I want to sleep atjosselins
but I’m not sending no plc.” Rene-Gomez sent a text message saying, “Just think about
it! Is your choi[c]e.”
At 10:00 am. on April 24, D.D.-O. sent Rene-Gomez a text message asking for
permission to go to a movie: “Dad can I go see a movie today with josselin?” Rene
Gomez responded, “Remember what you has to do if you want to go!! If you answer is
not! [MJy is not too.” D.D.-O. replied, “No because I can tell my mom what you want
because that’s not a good thing.” Rene-Gomez then texted, “Is ok you can tell your
mom . . . [a]nd I will tell her what [I] [k]now about you.” D.D.-O. replied, “I will tell her
An “emoji” is a small symbol or image used in electronic communication, including text
1
message, to convey information or the writer’s emotions.
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No. 77561-8-1/4
everything.” Rene-Gomez asked, “Are you sure you want to do this?? Just for one
pic?” D.D.-O. replied, “I don’t want to send a pic and you keep touching me when I told
you to stop and you don’t stop and you get mad because I don’t like it and take it out on
me even though I [b]ehave well.” D.D.-O. did not tell Y.O.-G. that day about Rene
Gomez touching her because she was “scared” he would kick them out of the
apartment.
On April 25, Rene-Gomez asked D.D.-O. again to send the photograph—”I want
a pic of you!! Please . . . . Please!!!”—followed by more text messages that said,
“Please please please” with four “[c]rying” emojis and, “Some day you gonna need
something from me.” D.D.-O. refused the repeated requests to take a photograph of
herself in the white underpants.
On May 20, D.D.-O. sent a text message to Rene-Gomez asking for permission
to go to the park with a friend. Rene-Gomez responded, “You know my answer!!
When I asked you to send me a pic and you said no. . . . My answer will be no
whenever you want to go out, do you remember??” D.D.-O. responded, “Please[] dad
Or I will tell mom everything because what you do is not right.” Rene-Gomez
responded, “Ok tell her, and you will have to get out of my house . . Good luck!!”
In mid- to late-June, D.D.-O. told her mother about Rene-Gomez inappropriately
touching her. Y.O.-G. did not believe D.D.-O. Y.O.-G. planned to talk to Rene-Gomez
about whether D.D.-O. was telling the truth.
On June 30, D.D.-O. told her father that Rene-Gomez was inappropriately
touching her. A.D.G. called Y.O.-G. and Rene-Gomez before reporting the sexual
abuse to Kent Police Officer Samuel Steiner. Officer Steiner and Detective Tami Honda
went to the apartment to interview Y.O.-G. and D.D.-O. on June 30. Detective Honda
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No. 77561-8-1/5
and Officer Steiner interviewed D.D.-O. and Y.O.-G. separately. Detective Honda took
D.D.-O. and B.D. into protective custody. Child Protective Services placed D.D.-O. and
B.D. with their father A.D.G.
On July 9, Detective Honda and the prosecutor interviewed D.D.-O. for
approximately an hour. During the interview, D.D.-O. talked about the “inappropriate
text messages” Rene-Gomez sent her but said she deleted the messages. Detective
Honda asked D.D.-O. to bring her cell phone to the police station so a computer
forensic detective could examine the phone and retrieve the messages. A.D.G. and
D.D.-O. later delivered the cell phone to Detective Honda. A.D.G. gave the police
permission to search the cell phone.
The police were able to retrieve and take “screenshots” of the text messages
between D.D.-O. and Rene-Gomez from April 2, 2015 through June 3, 2015. After
reviewing the screenshots, on August 11, Detective Honda went to the apartment to
interview Rene-Gomez.
By amended information, the State charged Rene-Gomez with two counts of
child molestation in the second degree in violation of RCW 9A.44.086 and
communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of RCW 9.68A.090(2)
between October 7, 2013 and June 1, 2015. Rene-Gomez pleaded not guilty.
The seven-day jury trial began August 8, 2017. The defense theory was D.D.-O.
was not credible and her allegation of sexual abuse was “a lie.” The State called
A.D.G., Officer Steiner, Y.O.-G., D.D.-O., Detective Honda, and Detective Eric Moore to
testify. The court admitted a number of exhibits into evidence, including the white boy
cut underpants; screenshots of the text messages retrieved from D.D.-O.’s cell phone,
exhibit 6; and exhibit 15, a spreadsheet of 309 text messages between D.D.-O. and
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No. 77561-8-1/6
Rene-Gomez from April 2, 2015 until June 3, 2015. Exhibit 15 includes the date, the
time sent and received, and the content of the messages. Certified Spanish interpreter
Claudia A’Zar testified that she translated the text messages that were in Spanish into
English. The court admitted the screenshots with the translated text messages as
exhibit 12.
A.D.G. testified that he and Y.O.-G. were together for 10 1/2 years. A.D.G. said
that after he and Y.O.-G. separated, A.D.G. spent time with his daughters on the
weekends.
A.D.G. testified that on June 30, 2015, D.D.-O. called and asked him to come
meet her outside the apartment building where she lived. A.D.G. said D.D.-O. was
“worried, crying. And, well, that’s what concerned me quite a bit to see her like that”
because “I’ve seen her cry very few times.” D.D.-O. told A.D.G. that “her mom’s
boyfriend” was inappropriately touching her. A.D.G. did not ask about “specific details.”
A.D.G. called Y.O.-G. because “I wanted to know why she hadn’t done anything if she
knew about it before I did.” A.D.G. contacted Rene-Gomez and told him that he “would
pay for it. . . . I had to do the right thing as a father” and planned to “go to the police.”
A.D.G. testified that the police contacted him later that same day to come get the
two girls. A.D.G. said D.D.-O. “was like broken down. You could see her eyes were all
watery from crying,” and B.D. “didn’t know what was going on.”
A.D.G. noticed a “drastic change” in D.D.-O.’s behavior:
For example, that she was always late to some classes, and the other
thing is, that at my house, she didn’t want to eat, and she was showing
that she wasn’t happy. [H]er personality changed, or her character
. . .
changed way too much, and she no longer wanted to spend time sharing
with my family.
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No. 77561-8-1/7
After approximately a year, B.D. returned to live with Y.O.-G. A.D.G. testified
that “a few months ago,” D.D.-O. decided to live with Y.O.-G. A.D.G. testified that D.D.
0. sometimes followed the rules and sometimes she did not. A.D.G. denied he and
D.D.-O. “c{a]me up with this idea to accuse” Rene-Gomez.
On cross-examination, A.D.G. testified that he was angry with Rene-Gomez
about the separation from Y.O.-G. and his daughters. A.D.G. admitted telling Rene
Gomez more than one time that “he was going to regret being with” Y.O.-G. A.D.G.
admitted he told Rene-Gomez that “if he were to touch one of my daughters, was
going to kill him.”
A.D.G. testified that when he called Y.O.-G. on June 30, 2015, he told her that if
the children came to live with him to keep them “safe,” Y.O.-G. and Rene-Gomez “could
go on with their lives.” Y.O.-G. would not agree. A.D.G. admitted that when he talked
to Rene-Gomez on June 30, he threatened to kill him.
Officer Steiner testified he met with A.D.G. at the Kent police station on June 30,
2015. Based on A.D.G.’s report of sexual abuse, Officer Steiner contacted Detective
Honda to conduct a “welfare check” at the apartment. Officer Steiner testified Rene
Gomez, Y.O-G., D.D.-O., and B.D. were at the apartment. Officer Steiner briefly
interviewed Y.O.-G. while Detective Honda interviewed D.D.-O. After the interviews,
Officer Steiner and Detective Honda agreed “there was a safety concern and we
needed to do an emergency removal of the children.” Officer Steiner testified D.D.-O.
and B.D. “seemed happy” to stay with A.D.G. On cross-examination, Officer Steiner
testified he and Detective Honda did not “refer {D.D.-O.] to a hospital” or “gather any
physical evidence regarding a sexual assault.”
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No. 77561-8-1/8
Y.O.-G. testified that in June 2015, D.D.-O. ‘was very rebellious, staying quite
away from the family.” Y.O.-G. said D.D.-O. “didn’t want to eat with all of us, she didn’t
want to go out with us. On weekends, it wasn’t too often, but she would rather spend
time at her girlfriends’ houses, or sometimes she would like to go to her dad’s.” Y.O.-G.
said that “sometimes” D.D.-O. was “a little disrespectful” and was not “nice” to Rene
Gomez.
Y.O.-G. testified that when D.D.-O. told her that Rene-Gomez inappropriately
touched her, D.D.-O. “was crying” and “I had not seen her cry before.” Y.O.-G. testified,
“I got angry and I told her that I could not believe it; that I would have to talk to him and
ask him whether she was saying the truth.” Y.O.-G. said, “I did not believe her because
she was very mad.” Y.O.-G. asked D.D.-O. to “provide . . . proof.” D.D.-O. told Y.O.-G.
that she wanted to move out and live with her father.
Y.O.-G. testified that D.D.-O. was currently living with her. Y.O.-G. described her
behavior as “[v]ery good” and said D.D.-O. was doing well at school.
On cross-examination, Y.O.-G. testified that while living with Rene-Gomez, she
did not work outside the home and was “pretty much in the apartment all the time.”
Y.O.-G. said that during the five years she was with Rene-Gomez, she never saw him
inappropriately touch D.D.-O. Y.O.-G. testified that “right before” D.D.-O. told her about
the inappropriate touching, “there was an argument between” D.D.-O. and Rene-Gomez
about not letting her go out.
Y.O.-G. testified that on the weekends, D.D.-O. “wanted to spend time at her
girlfriends’ homes, or with her dad.” Y.O.-G. said that during the week, D.D.-O. spent
most of the time in her room or asking to go out with friends. Y.O.-G. testified that
A.D.G. “spoiled” D.D.-O. and “pretty much let her do what she wanted.”
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No. 77561-8-1/9
D.D.-O. testified that “at first,” she liked Rene-Gomez. D.D.-O. thought “he was
nice” and “called him by his name.” But then “he started making us call him Dad.” D.D.
0. testified Rene-Gomez “said if we ever ask him for something and we don’t call him
Dad that we don’t get it,” and that made her “mad” because “he was trying to act like our
dad when he wasn’t.” D.D.-0. said Y.0.-G. told her that she had to ask Rene-Gomez
for “permission to go do something.”
D.D.-0. testified that when they first started living with Rene-Gomez in 2011, she
and Rene-Gomez would often engage in “wrestling or tickling fights.” D.D.-0. testified
that beginning in 2012, Rene-Gomez started touching her on her breasts, buttocks, and
vagina. D.D.-0. testified that Rene-Gomez inappropriately touched her more than 100
times between the age of 11 and 1 3.
D.D.-0. testified about the text messages with Rene-Gomez from April 2, 2015
through June 3, 2015. D.D.-0. said that in April 2015, her mother bought her
underwear, including a white pair of underpants. D.D.-0. testified Rene-Gomez sent
her a text message asking her to take a photograph “of you with the white short and
send to me please.” D.D.-0. stated she never showed Rene-Gomez the white
underpants. D.D.-0. testified she never talked to Rene-Gomez about her “underwear
not fitting” and Rene-Gomez “brought up the underwear first.” D.D.-0. testified that
Rene-Gomez repeatedly asked and she refused to send him a photograph of her in the
white underpants.
When D.D.-0. asked Rene-Gomez on April 24, 2015 if she could go to a movie
with her friend, he again requested a photograph of D.D.-0. in the white underpants.
D.D.-0. told him, “I can tell my mom what you want because that’s not a good thing.”
Rene-Gomez replied, “And I will tell [your mom] what I [k]now about you.” D.D.-0.
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No. 77561-8-1/10
testified that Rene-Gomez was referring to the boyfriend her mother did not know about
at the time.
D.D.-O. said she did not tell Y.O.-G. about the sexual abuse in April because “I
was scared of what he was gonna do” because “he threatened to take us out of the
apartment.”
Q: How come you didn’t already tell your mom in April what [Rene
Gomez] was doing to you?
A: I was scared of what he was gonna do.
Q: Whatdoyou mean?
A: Because he threatened to take us out of the apartment and all that.
Q: Was your mom working at this time, or working consistently?
A: No.
Q: Did she do occasional jobs?
A: No, not at that time.
Q: Who was really bringing the money into the house?
A: Both.
Q: Both who?
A: Him and my mom.
Q: How was your mom bringing money into the house?
A: She used the money my dad would give her to pay bills and food.
D.D.-O. testified that after she disclosed the sexual abuse to Y.O.-G. and Y.O.-G. did
not believe her, she told her dad.
On cross-examination, D.D.-O. admitted, “I just didn’t like [Rene-Gomezj
because he wanted us to call him Dad when he wasn’t our dad” and he “tried to act like”
her dad. D.D.-O. testified she was “mad” at Rene-Gomez because he “wouldn’t let” her
“go out with” friends. D.D.-O. said she wanted to live with her father A.D.G. D.D.-O.
said her dad would let her go out and do whatever she wanted and she “would be able
to go out all day.” D.D.-O. testified that during the five years Rene-Gomez and Y.O.-G.
were together, she “wanted to move back in with” A.D.G. for approximately four years.
Defense counsel asked D.D.-O. how she was able to fend off Rene-Gomez.
D.D.-O. answered, “I would try to kick and move my arms to get him to let go of me.”
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No. 77561-8-I/il
D.D.-O. said she and Rene-Gomez argued in June 2015 because he would not
let her go out with friends. But D.D.-O. testified that she was not ‘mad.” D.D.-O. said
she “felt bothered. . . . {J]ust because I didn’t send him a picture, he was taking it out on
me and [not] letting me go out, and then he was threatening me to do things too.”
D.D.-O. admitted that when she told Y.O.-G. about Rene-Gomez, she had
already packed a bag to move in with A.D.G.
Detective Honda testified about the interviews she conducted with D.D.-O., Y.O.
G., and Rene-Gomez. Detective Honda testified that when she interviewed D.D.-O. at
the apartment on June 30, D.D.-O. “was really upset. She was sobbing, just shaking,
nervous.” Detective Honda said, “I was sitting with her. I just kinda let her talk through
the crying.” When Detective Honda told D.D.-O. that she and B.D. would be placed in
the custody of their father, D.D.-O. was “upset to be leaving her mom, but she also was
happy to be leaving the apartment.” Detective Honda said D.D.-O. “was already
packed” and helped Detective Honda “pack up her sister to leave.”
Detective Honda said that during the hour-long second interview on July 9, D.D.
0. “was quiet” and “seemed a little bit scared.” But D.D.-0. provided more specific
information about the touching and the underpants and talked about the text messages.
After reviewing screenshots of the text messages from D.D.-0.’s cell phone,
Detective Honda interviewed Rene-Gomez at the apartment on August 11. When
Detective Honda asked whether he inappropriately touched D.D.-0., Rene-Gomez “said
no, that he wouldn’t do anything on purpose to hurt her.” Rene-Gomez admitted that “a
couple months prior to when we were talking to him that he had been tickling, wrestling,
play fighting with [D.D.-0.] on the couch and had accidently touched her breast.”
Detective Honda asked Rene-Gomez about the white underpants. Rene-Gomez said
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No. 77561-8-1/12
Y.O.-G. “asked him if she could buy” some underpants for D.D.-O. “and he said yes.”
Rene-Gomez told Detective Honda that the white underpants “looked like shorts.”
Rene-Gomez said that he sent D.D.-O. a text message asking for a photograph of her
wearing the white underpants because D.D.-O. “told him that her underwear and bras
were too small and he needed proof to see that they were too small.” Rene-Gomez told
Detective Honda that he “barely texted” with D.D.-O. Rene-Gomez said D.D.-O. “would
ask about doing something or going somewhere via text, but other than that he did not
text her much.”
Detective Eric Moore is trained in digital forensics. Detective Moore testified he
conducted a forensic search of D.D.-O.’s cell phone “to recover text messages,
including deleted text messages.” Detective Moore created a spreadsheet of the text
messages he retrieved from April 2, 2015 to June 3, 2015, exhibit 15. The spreadsheet
identifies the date the text message is sent and received as well as the content of the
text message.
The jury found Rene-Gomez guilty of two counts of child molestation in the
second degree and communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The court
imposed a low-range concurrent sentence of 57 months, community custody conditions,
and no contact with D.D.-O. for 10 years.
ANALYSIS
Rene-Gomez seeks reversal. Rene-Gomez argues the information omitted an
essential element of the crime of communication with a minor for immoral purposes, the
court erred in admitting a text message into evidence, prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument, and cumulative error violated his right to a fair trial. Rene-Gomez
also challenges imposition of a number of community custody conditions.
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Sufficiency of the Charging Document
For the first time on appeal, Rene-Gomez claims the amended information
omitted an essential element of communication with a minor for immoral purposes in
violation of ROW 9.68A.090(2). A defendant may raise a challenge to the constitutional
sufficiency of a charging document for the first time on appeal. State v. Kjorsvik, 117
Wash. 2d 93, 102, 812 P.2d 86(1991). We review the adequacy of a charging document
de novo. State v. Johnson, 180 Wash. 2d 295, 300, 325 P.3d 135 (2014).
The accused has the constitutional right to know the charges alleged against
him. Johnson, 180 Wash. 2d at 300 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
22). Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
22 of the Washington State Constitution, “{a]ll essential elements of a crime, statutory or
otherwise, must be included in a charging document in order to afford notice to an
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at
97. “The information is constitutionally sufficient ‘only if all essential elements of a
crime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document.’” Johnson, 180 Wash. 2d
at 300 (quoting State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash. 2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)).
The “essential elements rule exists ‘to apprise the accused of the charges
against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense.’” Johnson, 180
Wash. 2d at 300 (quoting Vangerpen, 125 Wash. 2d at 787). “If the State fails to allege every
essential element, then the information is insufficient and the charge must be dismissed
without prejudice.” Johnson, 180 Wash. 2d at 300-01. “‘An essential element is one
whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior
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No. 77561-8-1/14
charged’” Statev. Zillyette, 178 Wash. 2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013)2 (quoting State
v. Ward, 148 Wn2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003)); Johnson, 180 Wash. 2d at 300.
Where the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the information for the first
time on appeal, we “liberally construe the language of the charging document in favor of
validity.” Zillyette, 178 Wash. 2d at 161. Liberal construction requires determining whether
“the necessary elements appear in any form, or by fair construction, on the face of the
document and, if so,” whether “the defendant [can] show he or she was actually
prejudiced by the unartful language.” Zillyette, 178 Wash. 2d at 162 (citing Kjorsvik, 117
Wash. 2d at 105-06). “Under this rule of liberal construction, even if there is an apparently
missing element, it may be able to be fairly implied from language within the charging
document.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 104. We read the language of a charging document
as a whole and include facts which are necessarily implied. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 109.
Definitions of terms that establish the elements of a crime are not essential elements.
State v. Smith, 159 Wash. 2d 778, 787-88, 154 P.3d 873 (2007); State v. Lorenz, 152
Wash. 2d 22, 34-35, 93 P.3d 133 (2004).
The information alleged Rene-Gomez committed the crime of communication
with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of RCW 9.68A.090(2). RCW
9.68A.090(2) states, in pertinent part:
A person who communicates with a minor for immoral purposes is guilty of
a class C felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW if. the . .
person communicates with a minor for immoral purposes
. . . through
. . .
the sending of an electronic communication.
RCW 9.68A.090(3) expressly provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section, ‘electronic
communication’ has the same meaning as defined in RCW 9.61 .260.” RCW
2 Internal quotation marks omitted.
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No. 77561-8-1/15
961.260(5) defines “electronic communication” to mean “the transmission of information
by . . . electronic text messaging.”3 ROW 9.68A.01 1(5) defines “minor” as “any person
under eighteen years of age.” “Immoral purposes” refers to “sexual misconduct.” State
v. McNallie, 120 Wash. 2d 925, 932-33, 846 P.2d 1358 (1993) (citing State v.
Schimmelpfennig, 92 Wash. 2d 95, 102-03, 594 P.2d 442 (1979)).
In McNallie, the Washington Supreme Court held ROW 9.68A.090 “prohibits
communication with children for the predatory purpose of promoting their exposure to
and involvement in sexual misconduct.” McNallie, 120 Wash. 2d at 933. In State v.
Hosier, 157 Wash. 2d 1, 8-9, 133 P.3d 936 (2006), the court defined “communicate” to
mean both the transmission of the defendant’s message and the receipt by the minor of
an inappropriate message. “[A] defendant communicates with a minor under ROW
9.68A.090 if he or she invites or induces the minor to engage in prohibited conduct.”
State v. Jackman, 156 Wash. 2d 736, 748, 132 P.3d 136 (2006).~
The amended information charging Rene-Gomez with communication with a
minor for immoral purposes in violation of ROW 9.68A.090(2) tracks the language of the
statute and case law. The amended information alleged:
That the defendant Jose Rene Rene-Gomez in King County,
Washington, between October 7, 2013 and June 1,2015, did
communicate with D.D.-O. (10/7/01), a person he believed to be a minor,
for immoral purposes of a sexual nature and such communication
occurred through the sending of an electronic communication;
Contrary to ROW 9.68A.090(2).
Rene-Gomez contends the language of the amended information does not
include the nonstatutory element of intent to communicate with a minor. Specifically,
that the amended information did not allege that he intended the communication to
~ Emphasis added.
~ Emphasis in original.
15
No. 77561-8-1/16
reach D.D.-O. Rene-Gomez cites Hosier to argue alleging intent that the
communication reached the minor is an essential element of the crime. The Supreme
Court in Hosier held, “Foreseeability is not an element of the crime of communicating
with a minor for immoral purposes. Rather, the State must prove that the defendant
intended that the communication reach the child.” Hosier, 157 Wash. 2d at 15.
The question is whether all of the words used in the information charging Rene
Gomez with communication with a minor for immoral purposes would reasonably
apprise him of the elements of the crime charged. Klorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 109. “Words
in a charging document are read as a whole, construed according to common sense,
and include facts which are necessarily implied.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 109. Liberally
construed, the language of the amended information fairly implies that Rene-Gomez
intended the communication to reach D.D.-O. The amended information alleged Rene
Gomez communicated with D.D.-O., a minor, for immoral purposes of a sexual nature
by sending D.D.-O. an electronic communication. The language “through the sending of
an electronic communication” to D.D.-O., “a person he believed to be a minor,” for
immoral purposes of a sexual nature fairly implies that Rene-Gomez intended the
communication to reach D.D.-O.
Kiorsvik is analogous. In Kjorsvik, a defendant challenged the robbery conviction
because the charging document omitted the implied essential element of “intent to
steal.” Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at 96, 98. The court held it would be “hard to perceive how
the defendant” could have forcefully taken money from the shopkeeper while
brandishing a weapon but did not intend to steal the money. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at
110. Likewise, here, because the charging document alleges Rene-Gomez sent
16
No. 77561-8-1117
electronic communication to D.D.-O., a person he believed to be a minor, a fair reading
is that through that volitional act, he intended the text message to reach D.D.-O.
Liberally construed, the language of the charging document contained all the
necessary facts to apprise Rene-Gomez of the elements of communication with a minor
for immoral purposes in violation of RCW 9.68A.090(2).5
Text Message
Rene-Gomez contends the court erred in admitting a portion of the text message
response from D.D.-O. to Rene-Gomez on April 24, 2015. In the days leading up to
April 24, Rene-Gomez repeatedly asked D.D.-O. to send him a photograph of her
wearing the white underpants and D.D.-O. repeatedly refused to do so. On April 24,
D.D.-O. sent a text to Rene-Gomez asking if she could go to a movie with a friend. In
response, Rene-Gomez states, “Remember what you has to do if you want to go!! If
you answer is not! {MJy is not too.” In response, D.D.-O. told Rene-Gomez, “I don’t
want to send a pic and you keep touching me when I told you to stop and you don’t stop
and you get mad because I don’t like it and take it out on me even though I {b]ehave
well.”
Pretrial, the defense moved to exclude the portion of the April 24 text message
that states, “I don’t want to send a pic and you keep touching me when I told you to stop
and you don’t stop and you get mad because I don’t like it and take it out on me even
though I [b]ehave well.” Defense counsel argued the text message was inadmissible
hearsay and unfairly prejudicial.
~ We note Rene-Gomez does not argue that he was actually prejudiced by the charging
language. See State v. Nonog, 169 Wash. 2d 220, 231 237 P.3d 250 (2010) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d at
106).
17
No. 77561-8-1/18
The prosecutor argued the text message was admissible under the rule of
completeness under ER 1 06, as an expression of “her then existing state of mind and
intent” under ER 803(a)(3), and as a prior consistent statement under ER 801(d)(1)(ii)
“to rebut the defense’s claim” that D.D.-O. “made this up.” The trial court ruled the text
message was admissible “as an expression of the young woman’s then existing state of
mind” and under the rule of completeness.
Rene-Gomez argues the trial court erred by ruling the text message was
admissible under the state of mind exception to hearsay and the rule of completeness.
The State argues the text message is admissible as an expression of D.D.-O.’s
existing state of mind under ER 803(a)(3) and as a prior consistent statement to rebut a
claim of fabrication under ER 801(d)(1)(ii). The State concedes the rule of completeness
does not apply. We accept the concession.
We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Peralta v. State, 187
Wash. 2d 888, 894, 389 P.3d 596 (2017); State v. Brush, 183 Wash. 2d 550, 560, 353 P.3d
213 (2015). A trial court’s determination that a statement is admissible pursuant to a
hearsay exception is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard.”
State v. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 595, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001). A court abuses its
discretion if the decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State v.
Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 375-76, 158 P.3d 27(2007). We can affirm an evidentiary ruling
on any ground supported by the record. Statev. Powell, 126 Wash. 2d 244, 259, 893 P.2d
615 (1995).
The record supports the admission of the text message under ER 801(d)(1)(ii) as
a prior consistent statement that is offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. ER
18
No. 77561-8-1/19
801 (d)(1)(ii) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if. {t]he declarant testifies at the trial or
.
hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
.
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
“The prior statement must have been made before the motive to falsify has arisen.”
State v. Bargas, 52 Wash. App. 700, 703, 763 P.2d 470 (1988).6
The defense theory at trial was that D.D.-O. was not credible and lied about the
allegations of sexual abuse. The record shows D.D.-O. and Rene-Gomez argued about
her request to send a photograph of her in the underpants in April 2015, well before she
told her mother in June 2015 that Rene-Gomez sexually abused her. Because her
mother did not believe her, D.D.-O. told her father on June 30 that Rene-Gomez
sexually abused her. We also note that during closing argument, defense counsel
focused on the timing of the argument and the disclosure to argue D.D.-O. was not
credible:
We know that {D.D.-O.] wanted to get out of the apartment. We knew that
[D.D.-O.] didn’t like Mr. [Rene-JGomez. We know that [D.D.-O.] was
acting out, that she was rebellious. She wanted to be out with her friends
on the weekdays. [W]e know that there is an argument between [D.D.
. . .
0.] and Mr. {Rene-]Gomez because he wouldn’t let her go out with her
friends right before the allegation. [lIt is undisputed that this argument
. . .
happened right before the allegation. . .
[D.D.-0.] begins packing before police are even involved. Then
this allegation comes out. What a coincidence.
The April 24, 2015 text message was admissible as a prior consistent statement under
ER 801 (d)(1)(ii) to rebut the claim of recent fabrication.
6 Emphasis in original.
19
No. 77561-8-1/20
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Rene-Gomez contends prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument
violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. In the alternative, Rene-Gomez asserts his
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object.
“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington State Constitution.” In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d 696,
703, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). Prosecutorial misconduct may deprive a defendant of his
constitutional right to a fair trial. Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d at 703-04.
We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument for
abuse of discretion, State v. Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d 423, 430, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). To
prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must ‘show that in the
context of the record and all of the circumstances of the trial, the prosecutor’s conduct
was both improper and prejudicial.” Glasmann, 175 Wash. 2d at 704; State v. Emery, 161
Wash. App. 172, 192, 253 P.3d 413 (2011). If the conduct was improper, we determine
whether the prosecutor’s improper conduct resulted in prejudice. State v. Emery, 174
Wash. 2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). Prejudice is established by showing a
substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the verdict. Emery, 161 Wash. App. at 192.
A prosecutor has wide latitude during closing argument to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence. State v. Maqers, 164 Wash. 2d 174, 192, 189 P.3d 126
(2008). We review a prosecutor’s comments in “the context of the total argument, the
issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury instructions.”
Emery, 161 Wash. App. at 192. “In analyzing prejudice, we do not look at the comments
in isolation, but in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the
20
No. 77561-8-1/21
evidence, and the instructions given to the jury.” State v. Warren, 165 Wash. 2d 17, 28,
195 P.3d 940 (2008).
Where, as here, a defendant does not object at trial, any error is waived unless
the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could
not have cured any resulting prejudice. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760-61. Under this
heightened standard of review, the defendant must show that “(1) ‘no curative
instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury’ and (2) the misconduct
resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict.’
Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 761 (quoting State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d
43 (2011)). In making that determination, we “focus less on whether the prosecutor’s
misconduct was flagrant or ill intentioned and more on whether the resulting prejudice
could have been cured.” Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 762.
“[A] prosecutor must not impugn the role or integrity of defense counsel.”
Lindsay, 180 Wash. 2d at 431-32. However, it is not misconduct for the prosecutor to
argue that evidence does not support the defense theory or is a fair response to the
argument of the defense. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 448. Nor is it improper for a
prosecutor to express indignation when the circumstances justify it. State v. Borboa,
157 Wash. 2d 108, 123, 135 P.3d 469 (2006).
Rene-Gomez cites two remarks to argue the prosecutor improperly disparaged
defense counsel during closing argument.
During cross-examination, the defense attorney questioned D.D.-O. about her
testimony about “fending [Rene-Gomez] off”:
Q: How tall do you think you are?
A: I’m four, eight.
21
No. 77561-8-1/22
Q: What about Mr. [Rene-]Gomez, based on your recollection, how tall
do you think he is?
A: Five something.
Q: And how much do you weigh, if you don’t mind me asking.
A: Right now I weight ninety-two.
Q: Is it fair to say that Mr. [Rene-]Gomez is bigger than you?
A: Yes.
Q: Stronger than you?
A: Yes.
Q: You were talking earlier about fending him off?
A: Yes.
Q: How were you able to do that?
A: I would try to kick and move my arms to get him to let go of me.
Q: And that would work?
A: No.
Q: You spoke earlier about times when he tried to touch you and you
fought him and you got away.
A: Because he will let go of me.
In closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the cross-examination of D.D.-O.
about her testimony that she fended off Rene-Gomez and the defense theory that D.D.
0. was not credible:
[I]f you remember [defense counsel] asked [D.D.-0.] about her size, she
said she was about four feet, I believe, and under a hundred pounds. She
agreed that Mr. [Rene-]Gomez was much bigger than her. And [defense
counsel]’s questions sounded surprised that this small girl was able to
fight off such a larger attacker.
First, it is fairly disgusting, disrespectful, and offensive to say that a
sexual assault victim should not be believed because she was able to stop
her attacker from further harming her. Remember, many of these
incidents, they occurred in the house, and t would be logical for Mr.
[Rene-]Gomez not to put up much of a fight when he knows that all it
takes is [Y.0.-G.] to round the corner at the wrong time, and then his
cover is blown. This would have been a terrifying, horrifying experience
for a young girl, and perhaps [D.D.-0.] even acted stronger than she knew
possible when she started kicking at and flailing her limbs when Mr.
[Rene-]Gomez grabbed her. So, it is possible that she was able to fight
him off. And I want you to think about the opposite for a second. If
[defense counsel] asked her that question and [D.D.-0.] stated that she
did not fight off Mr. [Rene-]Gomez, then the argument would likely be to
you, “Well, she’s lying because of course a victim would try to fight off her
attacker.” The fact is is that none of us are in a position to opine how
22
No. 77561-8-1/23
[D.D.-O.J, a sexual assault victim, should have behaved during that attack.
She’s the victim. The onerous is not on her to act in any certain way.~7~
Rene-Gomez did not object. Rene-Gomez cites Thorgerson to argue the
prosecutor disparaged or impugned the role of his defense counsel by stating it was
“fairly disgusting, disrespectful, and offensive” to suggest D.D.-O. should not be
believed because she was able to fend off Rene-Gomez. In Thorgerson, the court
concluded the prosecutor impugned defense counsel’s integrity by referring to his
presentation of his case as “‘bogus’” and involving “‘sleight of hand.’ “ Thorgerson,
172 Wash. 2d at 451-52. The court concluded the “sleight of hand” argument was ill-
intentioned misconduct. Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 452. However, because “the
victim’s testimony was consistent throughout the trial and was consistent with what the
witnesses testified she had told them before the trial,” the court concluded the
misconduct “cannot fairly be said to have had a substantial likelihood of altering the
jury’s determination that relevant evidence showed the defendant committed these
crimes.” Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 452. The court also concluded a curative
instruction would have “alleviated any prejudicial effect of this poorly thought out attack
on defense counsel’s strategy.” Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at 452.
Here, the remark that “it is fairly disgusting, disrespectful, and offensive to say
that a sexual assault victim should not be believed” is improper. But when viewed in
context, after making the remark, the prosecutor focused on the evidence and testimony
to argue why D.D.-O.’s testimony that she was able to fend off Rene-Gomez was
credible. In context, we conclude the misconduct “cannot fairly be said to have had a
~ Emphasis added.
23
No. 77561-8-1/24
substantial likelihood of altering the jury’s determination.” Thorgerson, 172 Wash. 2d at
452. We also note that a curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect.
The second remark Rene-Gomez contends disparaged defense counsel is the
argument that the ‘sole purpose” of some of the information presented at trial is to
“muddy the waters or to distract.”
So, what exactly is the State’s burden? During the course of any
trial, you’re going to receive a lot of information, a lot of facts, and much of
that information will be useful in order to decide whether the defendant is
guilty. But some of that information, its sole purpose is to muddy the
waters or to distract, and I want to give you a visual example because
some people are more visual, of what I am required to prove and what I
am not require{d] to prove. Now, I want to be clear, hold me to my burden,
hold the State to its burden. It’s one the State fully embraces. But I
anticipate later you will hear about many facts of which I am not required
to prove or disprove. So, there’s a world of what I’m required to prove, a
world of what I’m not required to prove, and there’s a level of proof
required for each of those categories. The things I am required to prove I
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. It still leaves some room, but it’s
beyond a reasonable doubt, not an unreasonable doubt. It doesn’t mean
disproving every theory. Things that I’m not required to prove, I have no
burden whatsoever. So, I must prove that there was sexual contact
between the defendant and [D.D.-O.J, and I must prove that he
communicated with her for immoral purposes of a sexual nature. What
am I not required to prove? I’m not required to prove that there was or
was not DNA.~8~ I’m not required to prove that there was a sexual assault
kit, that there was any injury to [D.D.-O.], that there were additional
eyewitnesses, her story does not need to be corroborated, that there was
a confession, that Mr. {Rene-]Gomez even had a motive. That’s not
something the State’s required to prove, but in a sexual assault case, it’s
pretty clear why. He had a sexual desire for her. I don’t have to prove or
disprove that she was or was not an angry child, that she was a typical
victim, or that these messages were deleted or were not deleted.19~
Rene-Gomez did not object to the remark. The statement that the “sole purpose”
of some of the information presented at trial is to “muddy the waters or to distract” was
8 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
~ Emphasis added.
24
No. 77561-8-1/25
made in the context of addressing the State’s burden of proof and did not improperly
disparage defense counsel.
In the alternative, Rene-Gomez contends his attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by not objecting to the two remarks during closing argument. We
review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Sutherby, 165
Wash. 2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Rene-Gomez must show both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v.
Grier, 171 Wash. 2d 17, 32-33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011); Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 754-55.
Rene-Gomez cannot show defense counsel’s representation “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” based on consideration of “all the circumstances”
and that defense counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687-88. There is a strong presumption that the representation was effective.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; In re Pers. Restraint of Hutchinson, 147 Wash. 2d 197, 206, 53
P.3d 17 (2002). The lack of objection from defense counsel “‘strongly suggests to a
court that the argument or event in question did not appear critically prejudicial’ “in
context. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 2d 44, 53 n.2, 134 P.3d 221 (2006)10 (quoting
Statev. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d 613, 661,790 P.2d 610 (1990)).
In addition to overcoming the strong presumption of competence, Rene-Gomez
must affirmatively show prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Rene-Gomez must
show that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “The likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
10 Emphasis added.
25
No. 77561-8-1/26
112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011). Rene-Gomez cannot show that but for
defense counsel’s failure to object to the two remarks, the result of the trial would have
been different.
Cumulative Error
Rene-Gomez contends cumulative error denied him a fair trial. The cumulative
error doctrine applies if there are “several trial errors that standing alone may not be
sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may deny a defendant a fair trial.” State
v. Greiff, 141 Wash. 2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000); In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180
Wash. 2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Gregory,
192 Wn.2d 1,427 P.3d 621 (2018). Where, as here, any error had little or no effect on
the outcome of the trial, reversal is not required. Cross, 180 Wash. 2d at 690-91; State v.
Weber, 159 Wash. 2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006).
Community Custody Conditions
In his opening brief, Rene-Gomez challenges the following community custody
conditions the court imposed at sentencing, arguing the conditions are not crime related
or vague and overbroad:
5. Inform the supervising CCO[11] and sexual deviancy treatment
provider of any dating relationship. Disclose sex offender status
prior to any sexual contact. Sexual contact in a relationship is
prohibited until the treatment provider approves of such.
9. Do not enter sex-related businesses, including: x-rated movies,
adult bookstores, strip clubs, and any location where the primary
source of business is related to sexually explicit material.
10. Do not possess, use, access or view any sexually explicit material
as defined by RCW 9.68.130 or erotic materials as defined by RCW
9.68.050 or any material depicting any person engaged in sexually
explicit conduct as defined by RCW 9.68A.01 1(4) unless given prior
approval by your sexual deviancy provider.
11. Do not use or consume alcohol.
11 Community corrections officer.
26
No. 77561-8-1/27
1 8. . Stay out of areas where children’s activities regularly occur or
. .
are occurring. This includes parks used for youth activities,
schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, wading pools, swimming
pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or outdoor),
sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades, and any specific
location identified in advance by [the Department of Corrections] or
COO.
After filing the opening brief, the Washington Supreme Court issued its decision
in State v. Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d 671, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). In Nguyen, the court
considered many of the same conditions Rene-Gomez challenges and held the
conditions were crime related and not unconstitutionally vague. Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at
675. We adhere to the decision in Nguyen and conclude conditions 5, 9, 10, and 18 are
crime related and are not unconstitutionally vague.
We review community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion and reverse
the conditions only if the conditions are manifestly unreasonable. Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d
at 678. A “crime-related prohibition” is defined as “an order of a court prohibiting
conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has
been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10). A court does not abuse its discretion if there is
a “reasonable relationship” between the crime of conviction and community custody
condition. Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at 684 (citing State v. Irwin, 191 Wash. App. 644, 658-59,
364 P.3d 830 (2015)). The record supports imposition of condition 11, do not use or
consume alcohol, as a crime-related condition. Below, the defense attorney conceded
that alcohol use is a risk factor.
In his reply brief, Rene-Gomez challenges condition 10, arguing it is overbroad.
In Nguyen, the court addressed the exact same condition:
“Do not possess, use, access or view any sexually explicit material as
defined by RCW 9.68.130 or erotic materials as defined by RCW 9.68.050
or any material depicting any person engaged in sexually explicit conduct
27
No. 77561-8-1/28
as defined by ROW 9.68A.01 1(4) unless given prior approval by your
sexual deviancy provider.”
Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at 679. The court cited the decision in State v. BahI, 164 Wash. 2d
739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008), in concluding the condition was not unconstitutionally vague.
Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at 680-81.
Rene-Gomez concedes the court in Nguyen held that the exact same condition
was not unconstitutionally vague but argues the court in Nguyen did not address
whether the condition was overbroad. See Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at 679-81. Rene
Gomez argues the condition that prohibits sexually explicit material is constitutionally
overbroad because it includes protected speech. “A trial court’s imposition of an
unconstitutional condition is manifestly unreasonable.” Nguyen, 191 Wash. 2d at 678.
Whether the condition is overbroad is a question of law we review de novo.
Statev. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1,6,267 P.3d 305 (2011). Underthe FirstAmendmentto
the United States Constitution, a condition is unconstitutionally overbroad “if it prohibits
a substantial amount of protected speech.” State v. Gray, 189 Wash. 2d 334, 345, 402
P.3d 254 (2017). However, “{a]n offender’s usual constitutional rights during community
placement are subject to SRA[12]-authorized infringements.” State v. Hearn, 131 Wn.
App. 601, 607, 128 P.3d 139 (2006). A sentencing court may significantly restrict an
offender’s constitutional rights during community placement by imposing crime-related
conditions. State v. Ross, 129 Wash. 2d 279, 286-87, 916 P.2d 405 (1996); State v. Riles,
135 Wash. 2d 326, 347, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d 782, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). Because condition 10 is an
12 Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A ROW.
28
No. 77561-8-1/29
SRA crime-related condition, we reject Rene-Gomezs challenge to imposition of the
condition as unconstitutionally overbroad.
We affirm the jury conviction of two counts of child molestation in the second
degree and communication with a minor for immoral purposes, the judgment and
sentence, and imposition of the community custody conditions.
WE CONCUR:
9/
29