State of Washington v. Salvador S. Nava ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    JUNE 25,2015
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            )         No. 32842-2-III
    )
    Respondent,               )
    )
    v.                               )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    SALVADOR S. NAVA,                               )
    )
    Appellant.                )
    FEARING, J.     A jury convicted Salvador N ava of one count of first degree murder, four
    counts of frrst degree assault, and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.
    The trial court imposed a sentence of seventy-eight years and seven months, a sentence within
    the standard range. He challenges this sentence by contending that the sentence in practical
    effect exceeds the maximum sentence of life allowable for a class A felony conviction, since he
    is not entitled to early release credits until after his life expectancy. Nava seeks a term of life
    with the possibility of release. We hold that the sentence imposed is lawful and affrrm.
    FACTS
    In May 2001, in Yakima, Salvador Nava fired several shots into a car ferrying five men.
    The shots killed one of the men. Texas authorities apprehended Nava years after the shooting
    No. 32842-2·III
    State v. N ava
    and extradited Nava to Yakima. The State of Washington charged Nava with one count of first
    degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and one count of second degree unlawful
    possession of a firearm. The murder and assault charges alleged he was armed with a firearm.
    The jury found him guilty on all charges.
    The trial court first sentenced Salvador Nava to two hundred and twenty months for the
    murder conviction and ran that sentence concurrently with the remaining counts. This sentence
    was five hundred and twenty months below the standard range sentence. On appeal, this court
    affirmed his convictions, but remanded for resentencing to a term that included a standard
    enhanced sentence on the murder count to run consecutively with standard enhanced sentences
    on the assault convictions. State v. Nava, 
    177 Wn. App. 272
    , 298, 
    311 P.3d 83
     (2013), review
    denied, 
    179 Wn.2d 10
     19 (2014).
    Upon resentencing, the Yakima County Superior Court sentenced Salvador Nava to the
    low end of the standard range on the murder and assault convictions, added sixty month firearm
    enhancements to each murder and assault conviction, and decreed that all of these convictions
    run consecutively for a total of nine hundred and forty three months. The court also imposed the
    high end of the sentence range for the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm
    conviction, to run concurrently with the other sentences.
    2
    No. 32842-2-III
    State v. Nava
    ANALYSIS
    Salvador Nava was twenty-seven years old at the time of conviction. He contends a 943­
    month sentence exceeds the maximum sentence allowable for a class A felony because he will
    be at least seventy-two years old before he can begin earning early release credits. Thus, he
    asserts he has been sentenced beyond his life expectancy, which he alleges is 71.6 years.
    Generally the length of a criminal sentence is not subject to review if the punishment falls
    within the standard sentencing range established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA)
    ch. 9.94A RCW. State v. Williams, 
    149 Wn.2d 143
    , 146,
    65 P.3d 1214
     (2003); RCW
    9.94A.585(1). We will review, however, a trial court's underlying legal conclusions and
    determinations in order to correct legal errors or abuses of discretion. State v. Williams, 
    149 Wn.2d at 147
    ; State v. Mail, 
    121 Wn.2d 707
    , 712, 
    854 P.2d 1042
     (1993). Consequently, we
    examine whether the trial court imposed a standard range sentence using the correct legal
    standards and considerations.
    Under former RCW 9.94A.400(1)(b) (1999) (now RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b)), whenever a
    person is convicted of two or more serious violent offenses arising from separate and distinct
    criminal conduct, the sentences imposed under this subsection are served consecutively to each
    other and concurrently with other sentences. Both first degree murder and first degree assault,
    class A felonies, are serious violent offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030(34)(a) (1999). For each
    3
    No. 32842-2-111
    State v. Nava
    class A felony committed while armed with a firearm, a five year firearm enhancement is added
    to the standard range. RCW 9.94A.S33(3). The firearm enhancements run consecutively to all
    other sentencing provisions, and the offender is not eligible for earned release credits during the
    time served for the firearm enhancements. Former RCW 9.94A.lSO(1) (1999); RCW
    9.94A.S33(3)(e). For first degree murder and first degree assault, the statutory maximum
    sentence is life. RCW 9A.20.021(l)(a). Salvador Nava's trial court imposed standard range
    sentences on all counts, properly enhanced each murder and assault sentence by five years for
    committing the crimes with a firearm, and ran each firearm enhancement and the murder and
    assault sentences consecutively as directed by RCW 9.94A.S33(3)(e) and former RCW
    9.94A.400(1 )(b).
    Salvador Nava admits that the trial court followed the SRA when it imposed the sentence,
    and he agrees that the firearm enhancements do not exceed the statutory maximum for each
    separate offense. But he argues that the overall sentence exceeds the trial court's authority
    because it effectively extends incarceration beyond the statutory maximum of life. Such a
    sentence is unfair and illogical, he contends.
    Our state high court considered and rejected an analogous contention in State v. Thomas,
    ISO Wn.2d 666,
    80 P.3d 168
     (2003). Gregory Thomas was convicted of two counts of second
    degree robbery, a class B felony, and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a
    4
    No. 32842-2-111
    State v. Nava
    firearm, a class C felony. The statutory maximum sentence for each robbery was one hundred
    twenty months and for the unlawful possession was sixty months. With the appropriate thirty
    six-month firearm enhancement added to each robbery sentence, the standard range for each
    robbery count was ninety nine to one hundred twenty months. The trial court imposed
    concurrent standard range sentences on each count, and the two firearm enhancements
    consecutive to each other and to the longest concurrent base sentence, for a total confinement of
    thirteen years. Each of the sentences was at the statutory maximum. Thomas argued that his
    total enhanced sentence unlawfully exceeded the statutory maximum for the highest level
    offense, which was ten years for the second degree robberies.
    The Thomas court held that the maximum sentence for each count is evaluated separately.
    This conclusion comports with the "plain, unambiguous language" of the SRA's sentencing
    statutes. Id. at 670-71. When a defendant is sentenced for mUltiple offenses and the individual
    sentences do not exceed the applicable statutory maximums for each count, the resulting total
    period of confinement is valid under the SRA.
    None of Salvador Nava's enhanced standard range sentences exceed their statutory
    maximums. Accordingly, the trial court committed no sentencing error.
    Salvador Nava also contends his overall sentence violates the purpose of the SRA as
    expressed in RCW 9.94A.OIO. He neglects, however, to explain how his sentence violates any
    5
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    !
    No. 32842-2-III
    State v. Nava
    portion ofRCW 9.94A.010. Therefore, we reject this contention.
    Salvador Nava finally argues that he must serve a mandatory twenty years without
    earning early release credits for the murder conviction. In support of this argument, he cites
    RCW 9.94A.540(1)(a), (2). This statute, formerly RCW 9.94A.590, was effective July 1,2001,
    after Nava committed his crimes. Under RCW 9.94A.345, the trial court imposes sentences in
    accordance with law in effect when the offense was committed. Therefore, Nava's argument is
    misplaced.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the resentencing of Salvador Nava.
    A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
    WE CONCUR:
    Lawrence-Berrey, 1.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 32842-2

Filed Date: 6/25/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021