State Of Washington v. Damien Andrew Daniels , 437 P.3d 723 ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No.78154-5-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
V. PUBLISHED OPINION
DAMIEN ANDREW DANIELS,
Appellant. FILED: March 25, 2019
CHUN,J. — The State charged Damien Daniels with five felonies. Daniels
sought Drug Diversion Court(DDC)to address his substance abuse issues, but
certain factors rendered him ineligible under the established criteria. During a
hearing to address his eligibility, the trial court ruled that RCW 2.30.030 did not
authorize it to admit a case to DDC without the prosecutor's consent. We agree
with the trial court. With respect to therapeutic courts, the plain language of
RCW 2.30.030 requires prosecutor consent in all criminal cases but gives those
courts discretion to establish eligibility criteria and to decline to accept cases.
BACKGROUND
The State initially charged Daniels with one count of attempting to elude a
pursuing police vehicle, and subsequently amended the information to include
second degree burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, assault in the third
degree of a law enforcement officer, and Violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act(VUCSA).
No78154-5-I/2
To address his substance abuse problems, Daniels sought DDC at King
County Superior Court as a means to resolve his criminal case. However, under
the Drug Court Eligibility Criteria in the manual for the King County Adult
Diversion Court (the Manual), felony assault and attempt to elude do not qualify
as crimes eligible for DDC. Daniels's criminal history also included convictions
rendering him ineligible for DDC.
Daniels does not dispute his ineligibility. Nevertheless, he wanted
admission to DDC. The State objected. Daniels requested a motion hearing to
address his eligibility for DDC. As an initial step, Daniels asked the court to
resolve whether the court retains discretion under RCW 2.30.030 to admit a
defendant to DDC over the prosecutor's objection. The trial court ruled that RCW
2.30.030 does not grant authority to the court to accept a criminal case into DDC
if a prosecutor objects.
Daniels requested discretionary review in this court. A commissioner
granted review on the grounds that the interpretation and application of
RCW 2.30.030 involve a recurring issue warranting an appellate decision.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue in this case involves the interpretation of RCW 2.30.030.
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Ass'n of Wash. Spirits &
Wine Distribs. v. Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wn.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015).
"The court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's
intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give
2
No78154-5-I/3
effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Dep't of
Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn. 2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
The court must interpret the language in a manner rendering no portion of the
statute meaningless or superfluous. Rivard v. State, 168 Wn.2d 775, 783, 231
P.3d 186 (2010).
If a statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, we
deem it ambiguous and look to principles of statutory construction, legislative
history, and relevant case law to discern intent. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor &
Indust., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583(2001). Simply because one can
conceive of differing interpretations does not render a statute ambiguous.
Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006). For
unambiguous statutes, we engage in plain language analysis. Cerrillo, 158
Wn.2d at 201.
In 1999, the legislature first authorized jurisdictions to establish and
operate drug courts under RCW 2.28.170. The statute required jurisdictions to
"establish minimum requirements for the participation of offenders in the
program." RCW 2.28.170(b). It allowed drug courts "to adopt local requirements
that are more stringent than the minimum." RCW 2.28.170(b). When forming its
DDC, King County relied on this provision to establish the more stringent
requirements outlined in the Manual.
In 2015, the Legislature repealed and replaced the original drug court
statute with RCW 2.30.030, authorizing courts to establish therapeutic courts to
provide treatment or address issues contributing to the conduct leading to arrest.
3
No78154-5-1/4
In establishing the new statute the legislature specified, "In criminal cases, the
consent of the prosecutor is required. Therapeutic courts retain the discretion to
establish processes for eligibility and admission, and therapeutic court judges
retain the discretion to decline to accept a particular case into the court." S.B.
REP. ON S.B. 5107, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2015). The statute
subsequently codified this structure as follows:
(1) Every trial and juvenile court in the state of Washington is
authorized and encouraged to establish and operate therapeutic
courts. Therapeutic courts, in conjunction with the government
authority and subject matter experts specific to the focus of the
therapeutic court, develop and process cases in ways that depart
from traditional judicial processes to allow defendants or
respondents the opportunity to obtain treatment services to address
particular issues that may have contributed to the conduct that led to
their arrest or involvement in the child welfare system in exchange
for resolution of the case or charges. In criminal cases, the consent
of the prosecutor is required.
(2) While a therapeutic court iudge retains the discretion to decline
to accept a case into the therapeutic court, and while a therapeutic
court retains discretion to establish processes and determine
eligibility for admission to the therapeutic court process unique to
their community and jurisdiction, the effectiveness and credibility of
any therapeutic court will be enhanced when the court implements
evidence-based practices, research-based practices, emerging best
practices, or promising practices that have been identified and
accepted at the state and national levels. Promising practices,
emerging best practices, and/or research-based programs are
authorized where determined by the court to be appropriate. As
practices evolve, the trial court shall regularly assess the
effectiveness of its program and the methods by which it implements
and adopts new best practices.
RCW 2.30.030(1)(emphasis added).
Daniels contends the language of RCW 2.30.030 grants the trial court
ultimate discretion over admission to DDC, with the ability to override a
4
No78154-5-I/5
prosecutor's objection. He interprets the requirement of prosecutor consent as
applicable only to the general creation of therapeutic courts for criminal cases in
a jurisdiction, rather than the approval of individual cases. The State argues the
plain language necessitates prosecutor approval of admission to therapeutic
courts for criminal cases on a case by case basis. We agree with the State.
RCW 2.30.030(1) opens with general language authorizing and
encouraging courts to establish and operate therapeutic courts. In the next
sentence, however, the statute focuses on case-specific application: it requires
therapeutic courts, governmental authorities, and subject matter experts to
develop ways "to allow defendants or respondents the opportunity to obtain
treatment services to address particular issues that may have contributed to the
conduct that led to their arrest or involvement in the child welfare system in
exchange for resolution of the case or charges." RCW 2.30.030(1). The third
sentence mandates prosecutor consent in criminal cases. This indicates the
legislature intended for prosecutors to consent to admission of criminal cases to
therapeutic courts on a case by case basis.
Daniels claims ambiguity because RCW 2.30.030(1) requires prosecutor
consent but RCW 2.30.030(2) invests therapeutic court judges with discretion to
decline to accept cases and to define process and eligibility criteria for
therapeutic courts. RCW 2.30.030(2). Contrary to Daniels's claim of ambiguity,
one can easily harmonize these provisions.
The plain language of the statute reflects that both prosecutors and
therapeutic courts have roles in admission to DDC. The therapeutic court has
5
No78154-5-I/6
the discretion to establish general process and eligibility criteria against which the
prosecutor evaluates individual criminal cases and consents to admission. The
therapeutic court then has discretion to decline a case otherwise approved by the
prosecutor. Unlike Daniels's construction of the statute, which effectively renders
the prosecutor consent language meaningless except as to the general approval
of therapeutic courts, this interpretation gives effect to both provisions. The
interpretation provides the prosecutor's required consent while giving the
requisite discretion to the courts.
Furthermore, this interpretation ensures other provisions of the statute do
not become superfluous. For example, RCW 2.30.030(8) specifies, "Nothing in
this section prohibits a district or municipal court from ordering treatment or other
conditions of sentence or probation following a conviction, without the consent of
either the prosecutor or defendant." This provision clearly serves to mitigate
against the risk of misinterpreting the statute to require prosecutor consent for
treatment outside the therapeutic court context. The legislature would not have
included Subsection (8) to differentiate these treatment options if prosecutor
consent did not remain mandatory for admission to therapeutic courts in all
criminal cases.
While the courts have ultimate discretion to establish criteria for admission
and to decline to accept a case, RCW 2.30.030 requires initial consent by the
prosecutor for each case. This construction of the statute tracks the plain
language and harmonizes and effectuates the various provisions. The trial court
6
No78154-5-1/7
did not err in ruling that it cannot accept a defendant into therapeutic court over
the objection of the prosecutor.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
OAAA, 9/
7