America's Credit Union v. Charles Shelton, Countrywide Home Loans ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                                      FILED
    COURT OF APPEALS
    ONI SPS 1 i1
    UE 5 JUL 21    AM 9: 28
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    STATNqGTON
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    BY
    NERUXW
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    AMERICA' S CREDIT UNION f/n/ a FORT                                            No. 46200 -1 - II
    LEWIS COMMUNITY FEDERAL CREDIT
    UNION,
    Respondent,
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    V.
    COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.,
    Appellant,
    CHARLES D. SHELTON and KATHRYN E.
    SHELTON, husband and wife; MORTGAGE
    ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
    INC.., as nominee for Countrywide Home
    Loans, Inc.; LIENHOLDERS 1 through 10,
    Defendants.
    BJORGEN, A. C. J. —     In 2012, Charles and Kathryn Shelton defaulted on a loan from
    America'   s   Credit Union (ACU),   formally known as Fort Lewis Community Federal Credit
    Union. The default     prompted   ACU to file   suit   to   foreclose its   mortgage on real   property the
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    Sheltons had pledged as security for the loan. That suit prompted a dispute between ACU and
    Countrywide Home Loans Inc. ( Countrywide)      as to which lending institution had the senior
    secured interest in the Sheltons' property, and the parties filed cross motions for summary
    judgment on the issue. ACU argued it had the senior interest based on Washington' s recording
    statute, RCW 65. 08. 070. Countrywide argued that the doctrine' of equitable subrogation gave it a
    secured interest senior to ACU' s mortgage, because Countrywide had made a refinancing loan to
    the Sheltons; which paid off another, prior loan that was secured by a recorded deed of trust
    senior to ACU' s mortgage. The trial court resolved the cross motions for summary judgment by
    denying Countrywide' s, granting ACU' s, and declaring ACU to have the senior secured interest
    in the Sheltons' property
    Countrywide appeals, contending that the trial court erred by ( 1) refusing to apply the
    doctrine of equitable subrogation and ( 2) refusing to equitably subrogate it to the total value of
    the refinancing loan it made to the Sheltons. We agree with Countrywide that it was entitled to
    equitable subrogation, giving it the senior secured interest on the Sheltons' real property. But we
    disagree that Countrywide was entitled to equitable subrogation on any amount greater than the
    then -existing amount owed on the note secured by the deed of trust originally senior to ACU' s
    mortgage. We therefore reverse the trial court' s grant of summary judgment in favor of ACU to
    the extent it held that Countrywide was not equitably subrogated to the senior deed of trust and
    remand with orders to enter summary judgment for Countrywide declaring it to be equitably
    subrogated to Bank of America' s ( BOA) senior deed of trust on that property securing a debt of
    87, 255. 38.
    2
    No. 462.00 -1 - II
    FACTS
    In 1994, the Sheltons borrowed approximately $98, 000 from Knutson Mortgage
    Corporation. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on property the Sheltons owned in DuPont,
    Washington!          BOA later acquired the note for the loan, as well as the associated deed of trust.
    In 2000, the Sheltons again borrowed, this time from ACU. They opened a home equity
    revolving line of credit secured by a mortgage on their DuPont property. This mortgage secured
    the Sheltons' debt up to $ 40, 000 and noted that ACU' s loan to the Sheltons " will be of a
    revolving nature and may be made, repaid, and remade from time to time" because the parties
    coritemplate[ d] a series of advances to be secured by" the mortgage. Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 11.
    In 2002, the Sheltons refinanced their DuPont property with Countrywide. This
    refinancing loan was also secured by a deed of trust on the DuPont property.
    The Sheltons used money from the refinancing loan to pay BOA the balance of the
    Knutson loan, $ 87, 225. 38. As part of the transaction, BOA reconveyed the deed of trust granted
    by the Sheltons to secure the original Knutson loan to Countrywide.
    The Sheltons            also used    the refinancing loan to pay ACU the $ 38, 934. 93 balance then -
    existing on the home equity line of credit. However, neither the Sheltons nor Countrywide asked
    ACU to close the line of credit, cancel its mortgage, or agree to subordinate its mortgage as part
    of the transaction. Accordingly, the line of credit remained open and the Sheltons continued to
    draw on it, owing at the time of ACU' s complaint over $30, 000 to ACU. The ACU mortgage
    1
    A deed   of   trust "`   is   a   form   of a mortgage."'    Bain   v.   Metro.   Mortg. Grp.,   Inc., 
    175 Wash. 2d 83
    ,
    92, 
    285 P.3d 34
    ( 2012) ( quoting 18 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, WASH.
    PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE: TRANSACTIONS § 17.3, at 260 ( 2d ed. 2004)).
    3
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    also remained and, given the release of BOA' s deed of trust due to the refinancing, ACU had
    become the senior secured interest in the DuPont property.
    In 2012, the Sheltons defaulted on the loan from ACU.2 ACU filed a complaint seeking,
    as relevant    here, ( 1)   a   judgment for the balance      of   the loan to the   Sheltons, ( 2) "   an order
    adjudging [ ACU' s] mortgage to be the first and paramount lien" on the DuPont property and
    extinguishing any other interest, claim, and encumbrance on the property, and ( 3) an order
    allowing   a   foreclosure       sale   to satisfy ACU'   s mortgage.    CP   at   4. The complaint named
    Countrywide as a party with.an interest in the DuPont property junior to ACU' s.
    Countrywide answered, contending that ACU did not have the senior interest in the
    DuPont property. In its later motion for summary judgment, Countrywide contended that, under
    the doctrine of equitable subrogation, it stepped into BOA' s shoes and could enforce the senior
    deed of trust that had secured the Knutson loan. In its motion, Countrywide also contended that
    the trial court should subrogate it to a first position security interest on the entirety of the
    refinancing loan, meaning essentially that it would step into the shoes of both BOA and ACU.
    ACU filed its motion for summary judgment, contending that the trial court should not
    apply the doctrine of equitable subrogation. ACU argued that Washington' s recording statute
    gave it the senior secured interest and that the court should not depart from that result for two
    reasons. First, ACU contended that equitable subrogation existed to prevent unjust enrichment
    and the value of the DuPont property sufficed to pay the first and second position secured
    interests, meaning that no unjust enrichment occurred. Second, ACU contended that equitable
    2 The Sheltons had refinanced again in 2006. Neither party contends that this refinancing
    affected the issues before us, and we do not address that refinancing further.
    3 RCW 65. 08. 070.
    M
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    subrogation, as an equitable doctrine, should not apply because it had not acted inequitably.
    With regard to Countrywide' s request that the trial court equitably subrogate it to the full extent
    of the refinancing loan, ACU contended that Countrywide could not do anything other than step
    into BOA' s shoes, meaning the trial court could only subrogate it to first position on the value of
    the note at the time of the refinancing.
    The trial court granted ACU' s motion for summary judgment and denied Countrywide' s.
    Countrywide appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a trial court' s grant of summary judgment de novo, performing the same
    inquiry   as   the trial court.   Lakey   v.   Puget Sound     Energy,     Inc., 
    176 Wash. 2d 909
    , 922, 
    296 P.3d 860
    2013). "   Summary judgment is appropriate ` if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
    genuine material issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of     law."' Atherton Condo. Apt. -Owners Ass' n Bd. of Dirs.                v.    Blume Dev. Co., 
    115 Wash. 2d 506
    , 516, 
    799 P.2d 250
    ( 1990). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
    drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party for purposes of
    determining whether a material issue of fact exists. 
    Lakey, 176 Wash. 2d at 922
    .
    We review de novo the propriety of equitable relief, such as the application of the
    doctrine    of equitable subrogation.          Bank   ofAm.,   N.A.   v.   Prestance   Corp.,   
    160 Wash. 2d 560
    , 564,
    
    160 P.3d 17
    ( 2007).
    5
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    II. EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
    Washington has       adopted    in full the Restatement ( Third) of Property: Mortgages section
    7. 6 ( 1997).   Columbia Cmty. Bank v. Newman Park, LLC, 
    177 Wash. 2d 566
    , 583, 
    304 P.3d 472
    2013); Prestance     
    Corp., 160 Wash. 2d at 561
    - 62. That section of the Restatement ( Third) of
    Property, which describes equitable subrogation, provides that
    a) One who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage,
    becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent
    necessary to      prevent    unjust     enrichment.               Even though the performance would
    otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage, they are preserved and the
    mortgage retains its priority in the hands of the subrogee.
    b) By way of illustration, subrogation is appropriate to prevent unjust enrichment
    if the person seeking subrogation performs the obligation:
    4) upon a request from the obligor or the obligor' s successor to do so, if the person .
    performing was promised repayment and reasonably expected to receive a security
    interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage being discharged, and if
    subrogation will not materially prejudice the holders of intervening interests in the
    real estate.
    RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF PROPERTY,                 supra, §         7. 6.
    Under Restatement ( Third) ofProperty section 7. 6, equitable subrogation does two things
    when a refinancing lender pays off a note secured by a mortgage in real property. First,
    equitable subrogation preserves the mortgage even though the refinancing pays the note the
    mortgage secures.         RESTATEMENT ( THIRD)                OF   PROPERTY,    supra, §   7. 6( a), ( b). Second, equitable
    subrogation assigns that mortgage to the refinancing lender for enforcement. RESTATEMENT
    THIRD)   of    PROPERTY,    supra, §   7. 6(   a), (   b).    Simply put, equitable subrogation allows a
    refinancing lender to step into the shoes of the original lender, securing the refinancing loan to
    the   same extent   the   original   lender'   s mortgage secured             its loan   and   giving the refinancing
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    lender the same creditor priority the original lender possessed. Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 573
    ;   see   RESTATEMENT ( THIRD)        OF   PROPERTY,   supra, §   7. 6 cmt. a.
    Equitable      subrogation " remains ` an equitable       remedy' ... `    founded in the facts and
    circumstances of each particular case."'          Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 581
    ( quoting
    RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF PROPERTY,              supra, §     7. 6 cmt. a; Credit Bureau Corp. v. Beckstead, 
    63 Wash. 2d 183
    , 186, 
    385 P.2d 864
    ( 1963)).           Nevertheless, Washington' s Supreme Court has twice in
    recent years stated that policy reasons and judicial economy require a liberal application of the
    doctrine of equitable subrogation. Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 580
    - 81; 
    Prestance, 160 Wash. 2d at 580
    - 82.
    A.      Subrogation to Bank of America' s Secured Debt of $87, 225. 38
    We hold that the trial court erred when it denied Countrywide' s motion for summary
    judgment on the issue of equitably subrogating it to BOA' s first position mortgage on the
    87, 225. 38 Countrywide paid BOA in the refinancing.
    No genuine issues of material fact exist on the elements of equitable subrogation as
    defined in Restatement ( Third) ofProperty section 7. 6 and adopted by Washington' s Supreme
    Court. Countrywide performed the Sheltons' obligation to pay BOA, an obligation secured by
    the deed of trust on the DuPont property. Subrogation is appropriate to prevent unjust
    enrichment. Countrywide performed for the Sheltons at their request, Countrywide was
    promised repayment by the Sheltons; and Countrywide reasonably expected to receive a security
    interest in the     real estate with   the priority   of   the BOA   mortgage.    Subrogating Countrywide to
    BOA' s status as the senior secured creditor on the obligation owed at the time of the refinancing
    will not prejudice ACU; it remains the junior secured creditor in the exact position it would have
    been in but for Countrywide' s payment of the loan from BOA. The facts here are exactly the
    7
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    type   where equitable subrogation " should"          apply. 
    Prestance, 160 Wash. 2d at 581
    .   Viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment for
    Countrywide was appropriate, and the trial court erred by refusing to grant it.
    Nevertheless, ACU argues that equitable subrogation remained unavailable to
    Countrywide for two reasons. First, ACU contends that equitable subrogation, as a derogation of
    the recording      statute, should   be limited to "[   e] xtreme [   f]actual   [ c]   ircumstances."      Br. of Resp' t at
    8.   Second, ACU contends that a refusal to apply the doctrine of equitable subrogation would not
    unjustly enrich it, because the DuPont property has sufficient value. to satisfy both the first and
    second position liens. We find both of these arguments unpersuasive.
    ACU' s first argument is at odds with the text of Restatement ( Third) ofProperty section
    7. 6 and statements by our Supreme Court in Prestance and Columbia Community Bank. First,
    while ACU would limit equitable subrogation to cases involving " misrepresentation, mistake,
    duress,   undue    influence   or   deceit,"   Brief of Respondent at 11, Restatement ( Third) ofProperty
    section 7. 6( b)( 4) provides that equitable subrogation is appropriate under the factual
    circumstances of a refinancing transaction and does not condition equitable subrogation on the
    presence of the types of inequities to which ACU would limit it. Second, the Supreme Court has
    rejected ACU' s premise that equitable subrogation runs against Washington' s recording statute.
    The court has adopted the view that equitable subrogation " maintains the proper scheme and the
    original priorities" by ensuring that junior creditors remain junior creditors. 
    Prestance, 160 Wash. 2d at 564
    - 65, 570- 71.    Thus, equitable subrogation acts in conformity with, not in derogation
    of, the   statutory recording       scheme.
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    ACU' s second argument fails, because it misunderstands the nature of the unjust
    enrichment avoided by applying the doctrine of equitable subrogation in mortgage refinancing
    transactions. The refinancing pays off the former senior creditor, which, without subrogation,
    would release its security interest and promote the former junior creditor. This promotion, which'
    the junior creditor did nothing to bring about, is " an unwarranted and unjust windfall."
    RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF PROPERTY,        supra, §   7. 6 cmt. a; Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 575
    . The promotion itself is the unjust enrichment equitable subrogation is intended to avoid,
    not the consequent possibility of financial gain. See RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra,
    7. 6 cmt. a.
    B.      Subrogation to ACU' s Secured Debt of $38, 934. 93
    We disagree, however, with Countrywide' s contention that it is also entitled to equitable
    subrogation to the first position lien on the $ 38, 934. 93 it paid ACU as part of the refinancing
    loan to the Sheltons. The basis for Countrywide' s belief that it is entitled to equitable
    subrogation on this amount is not apparent from its briefing, but Countrywide appears to ask us
    either to expand the amount secured by BOA' s original senior interest or to subrogate
    Countrywide to ACU' s secured interest, displacing ACU. Neither is appropriate.
    To the extent that Countrywide asks us to subrogate it to BOA' s secured interest on an
    amount greater than that secured by the deed of trust, we must reject the request. In the context
    of mortgage refinancing, equitable subrogation allows the refinancing lender to step into the
    shoes of the senior creditor " to the extent of the former lienholder' s interest at th[ e] time" of the
    refinancing. Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 575
    ; RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF PROPERTY,
    supra, §   7. 6 curt. e. Doing otherwise would prejudice the junior creditors, who did not bargain to
    be a junior to anything other than the original senior interest. See RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF
    0
    No. 46200 -1 - II
    PROPERTY,   supra, §   7. 6   cmt. e.   Subrogating Countrywide to any amount greater than the
    87, 225. 38 owed to BOA would impermissibly prejudice ACU. RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF
    PROPERTY,   supra, §   7. 6( e).
    To the extent that Countrywide asks that we equitably subrogate it to ACU' s mortgage,
    we likewise reject the request based on the facts of this case. The Sheltons had a revolving credit
    mortgage with ACU. The terms of the mortgage contemplate that the Sheltons would borrow,
    pay down their balance, borrow again, and so on. Given that state of affairs, Countrywide
    needed to do something to alert ACU to its position that it, Countrywide, was equitably
    subrogated to the full, continuing extent of the refinancing loan from ACU. Without that, ACU
    had no notice that its security for the continuing home equity line of credit was impaired and that
    it should take action to avoid loss to itself.
    The record shows only that Countrywide, in a letter, mentioned a reconveyance fee. The
    evidence also shows that reconveyance fees were irrelevant to the ACU mortgage and that ACU
    received no request to cancel the mortgage. Under those facts, we cannot say that Countrywide
    took the steps necessary to allow ACU to protect itself. Equitably subrogating Countrywide to
    ACU' s secured interest, which would displace ACU from security it believed it had, would be
    inequitable. Cf. Columbia Cmty. 
    Bank, 177 Wash. 2d at 581
    ( quoting RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) OF
    PROPERTY,   supra, §   7. 6 cmt. a; Credit Bureau 
    Corp., 63 Wash. 2d at 186
    ; People' s Say. Bank v.
    Bufford, 
    90 Wash. 2d 204
    , 208, 
    155 P. 1068
    ( 1916)).
    CONCLUSION
    We reverse summary judgment in favor of ACU to the extent the trial court held that
    Countrywide was not equitably subrogated to BOA' s senior deed of trust on the Sheltons'
    DuPont property. We remand with orders to enter summary judgment for Countrywide declaring
    10
    No. 46200- 1- I1
    it to be equitably subrogated to BOA' s senior deed of trust on that property securing a debt of
    87, 255. 38.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040,
    it is so ordered.
    E         TJT
    140- c
    JRGr:
    We concur:
    LrE, J.
    SUTTON, J.
    11