State Of Washington v. David Allen Moore ( 2017 )


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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                               CO
    No. 73921-2-1
    Respondent,
    GO
    DIVISION ONE
    DAVID MOORE,                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                   FILED: January 23. 2017
    Spearman, J. — Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction
    where a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. David Moore challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting his conviction for assault in the fourth degree. He
    specifically asserts that the State failed to disprove his claim of self-defense. But
    because the evidence in the record is sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to find
    the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
    FACTS
    Early one Sunday morning, Moore was sitting in an entrance to the Metro
    transit tunnel smoking a cigarette. Jessica Branson, a Metro security guard,
    informed Moore that smoking is prohibited on Metro property. In the ensuing
    altercation, Moore struck Branson twice. Branson suffered an injury that required
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    several stitches. The incident was recorded by surveillance video. Moore was
    charged with second degree assault.
    At trial, Branson and Moore each recounted the incident. According to
    Branson, she noticed Moore from about 20 feet away and called to him to take
    his cigarette outside. She continued on her rounds but stopped as she passed a
    few feet from Moore because he had not complied with her request. Branson
    advised Moore that the tunnel is a non-smoking area. Moore flicked his cigarette
    onto the floor.
    Branson objected to the action as littering and told Moore to pick up the
    cigarette. Moore replied "make me." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP)
    (7/16/15) at 64. Branson advised him that he had to comply with Metro policies or
    leave the tunnel. As Branson was advising him about Metro policies, Moore
    continued talking. Branson could not understand what he was saying so she
    moved closer to Moore and faced him. Moore calmly said he was going to "knock
    [Branson] out." ]a\ at 66. Branson did not take him seriously, but she called her
    supervisor, reported the threat, and asked for assistance.
    Moore raised his phone to take Branson's photo. According to Branson,
    she raised her hand so that it was in front of the phone's camera but not touching
    the phone or any part of Moore's body. In one fluid motion, Moore stood and hit
    Branson in the face. Branson swung around and stumbled in a daze. Id. When
    she looked up, Moore was approaching herwith his fist raised. Branson backed
    away to the far end of the tunnel entrance. Moore moved with her and struck her
    again, this time causing her to fall. As Branson was getting up, she sawthat
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    blood was pooling on the floor. She realized that the first blow had split her lip
    and she was bleeding profusely. She again called for assistance and other
    security officers soon arrived.
    Moore argued that he acted in self-defense. According to Moore, he
    suffers from numerous old injuries, including a gunshot wound to his head and a
    crushed leg. He keeps a distance from people to avoid painful contact with these
    old injuries. Moore stated that a bullet remains lodged in his head and contact
    with his head could be fatal.
    Moore testified that he was sitting peacefully in the tunnel when Branson
    yelled at him to put out his cigarette. He complied immediately but Branson
    continued to yell at him and stood so close that he could feel her spit. Moore told
    Branson that he was going to report her and held up his phone to take her
    picture. Branson moved even closer and touched his injured leg with her knee.
    When he tried to take her picture again, Branson grabbed Moore's phone. Moore
    testified that he begged Branson not to touch his head but she ignored his pleas
    and shoved the phone into his forehead.
    Moore stated that when he saw Branson was going to touch his head he
    knew the motion could kill him. He was in fear for his life and automatically
    stopped Branson by striking her. Moore testified that he followed Branson across
    the entrance and struck her a second time because he did not know what she
    was capable of doing.
    On cross examination, Moore was unable to identify on the surveillance
    video a point at which Branson touched him with her knee. He stated that, even if
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    there was no contact, she got too close to his injured leg. Moore disowned a
    signed statement in which he stated that Branson kneed him in the ribs. He
    stated that he did not leave before the incident escalated because Branson had
    already called her supervisor and transit security could invent a reason to arrest
    him.
    The court instructed the jury in the charge of assault in the second degree
    and the lesser included offense of assault in the fourth degree. The court also
    instructed the jury that the State had the burden of disproving Moore's claim of
    self-defense.
    In closing, the State argued that Moore did not reasonably believe that he
    was about to be injured because the evidence established that Branson never
    touched him. The State further argued that, even if Moore subjectively believed
    that Branson was about to assault him, he had options other than force available
    to him. And even if Moore reasonably believed that force was his only option in
    the first instance, it was not reasonable for him to hit Branson a second time after
    she backed away from him.
    Moore argued in closing that he struck Branson after she slammed the
    phone into his head. He argued that he reasonably believed he was about to be
    injured and reacted accordingly. As to the second blow, Moore argued that even
    if the jury did not believe he struck that blow in self-defense, it did not constitute
    second-degree assault because it did not result in injury.
    The jury convicted Moore of assault in the fourth degree. He appeals.
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    DISCUSSION
    Moore argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
    disprove his claim of self-defense. In reviewing whether sufficient evidence
    supports a criminal conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the State. State v. Drum, 
    168 Wn.2d 23
    , 34, 
    225 P.3d 237
     (2010) (citing State
    v. Wentz, 
    149 Wn.2d 342
    , 347, 
    68 P.3d 282
     (2003)). We defer to the fact finder
    on issues of credibility, id (citing State v. Camarillo, 
    115 Wn.2d 60
    , 71, 
    794 P.2d 850
     (1990)). The question is whether, viewing the evidence in that light, "'any
    rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.'" jdL (quoting State v. Green, 
    94 Wn.2d 216
    , 221, 
    616 P.2d 628
    (1980)).
    Where a defendant properly raises a claim of self-defense, the State has
    the burden to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    State v. Walden, 
    131 Wn.2d 469
    , 473, 
    932 P.2d 1237
     (1997) (citing State v.
    Janes, 
    121 Wn.2d 220
    , 237, 
    850 P.2d 495
     (1993)). Evidence of self-defense is
    evaluated under both a subjective and an objective prong. Id. at 474. Under the
    subjective prong, the jury considers the apparent threat from the defendant's
    point of view. Id. Under the objective prong, the jury considers what "a
    reasonably prudent person similarly situated would have done." fcL Self-defense
    justifies only the degree of force that "a reasonably prudent person would find
    necessary under the conditions as they appeared to the defendant." \jL (citing
    State v. Bailey, 
    22 Wn. App. 646
    , 650, 
    591 P.2d 1212
     (1979)).
    No. 73921-2-1/6
    Moore contends the State failed to disprove self-defense because his
    testimony established that he believed Branson was about to assault him,
    satisfying the subjective prong. And, he asserts, the record gives evidence that
    he used only the degree of force that a reasonably prudent person in his
    circumstances would have used.
    We disagree. The record contains conflicting evidence as to the first blow.
    But viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could conclude
    that Moore used more force than reasonably necessary in striking a first blow
    that inflicted an injury requiring several stitches. And even ifwe were to conclude
    otherwise as to the first blow, we would reach the same result because Moore
    struck Branson a second time. The evidence is undisputed that the second blow
    occurred after Branson backed some distance away from him. Even in his own
    testimony, Moore does not suggest that he perceived an imminent threat of harm
    from Branson at that time. Thus, the evidence amply supports the jury's
    determination that Moore was not acting in self-defense when he struck the
    second blow.
    Moore raises three further challenges in a statement of additional grounds
    (SAG). He first asserts that he was sitting peacefully in the tunnel entrance until
    Branson disturbed him. The record supports this assertion. But we reject Moore's
    argument as irrelevant because his behavior prior to Branson's arrival has no
    bearing on whether his use of force was justified.
    Moore next appears to assert that Branson's employer is targeting him by
    using the surveillance video in training. The record supports the assertion that
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    No. 73921-2-1/7
    the company uses the video in training. But as this argument is also irrelevant to
    Moore's conviction, we reject it.
    Finally, Moore contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof that counsel's performance was
    deficient and resulted in prejudice. State v. Humphries. 
    181 Wn.2d 708
    , 719-720,
    
    336 P.3d 1121
     (2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 
    466 U.S. 448
    , 687-88,
    
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984)). Moore asserts that counsel made
    racist comments and attempted a "falsified representation." SAG at 2. Because
    we have found nothing in the record to support these claims, we reject them.
    Affirmed.
    \D&*i<^*- \\
    WE CONCUR:
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