Marriage Of Sandra M Ramires, V Tomas Ramirez Penaloza ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    --i
    *p.
    In the Matter of the Marriage of         )                                          C--         rn
    )      No. 76039-4-1
    SANDRA RAMIREZ,                          )                                          r•,)
    )      DIVISION ONE                                          "*"(-7
    7.*
    Respondent,        )
    )                                                41,
    and                       )
    )      UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    TOMAS RAMIREZ PENALOZA,                  )
    )      FILED: January 23, 2017
    Appellant,         )
    )
    MARK D. WALDRON,                         )
    )
    Real Party in      )
    Interest.          )
    )
    BECKER, J. — Sandra Ramirez and Tomas Ramirez Penaloza divorced
    after a 33 year marriage. Tomas challenges the property distribution and
    maintenance award. We affirm.
    Sandra and Tomas were married in 1981. They have four children. Only
    one child remains dependent; he was 13 at the time of the decree. Throughout
    the marriage, Tomas's income was the family's primary source of support. He
    has owned and operated a reforestation business since 1989. Sandra has not
    worked outside of the home for over a decade.
    Sandra filed for divorce in 2014. Tomas later removed $667,213 from the
    reforestation business and deposited these funds into personal accounts. Tomas
    transferred the funds to an attorney trust account after the court ordered him to
    do so.
    No. 76039-4-1/2
    The parties agreed to the values of their property by written stipulation
    dated June 2, 2015. Their assets totaled over $3 million. The agreed-upon
    value of the reforestation business was $1,619,500.
    After a nine day bench trial, the court issued findings of fact and
    conclusions of law and a decree of dissolution on July 22, 2015. The court
    determined a roughly 50/50 property distribution was fair and equitable. Tomas's
    property award included 100 percent ownership of the reforestation business.
    Sandra's property award included the funds held in trust, including the $667,213
    Tomas withdrew from business accounts.
    Maintenance was awarded to Sandra at a rate of $10,000 per month for a
    minimum of 5 years and maximum of 11 years. The decree stated the court
    would review the maintenance obligation in 5 years to determine whether it
    should be modified.
    Tomas moved for reconsideration. He requested that the court amend the
    final judgment and grant a new trial on the issues of property distribution and
    maintenance. He argued, in part, there was insufficient evidence to support the
    property and maintenance awards to Sandra because the court had not found
    that the reforestation business "would be left with efficient operating capital" to
    continue operations. The court denied Tomas's motion, stating, "The division of
    property decided at the conclusion of trial is fair to both parties." Tomas appeals.
    Tomas argues the property distribution was not fair and equitable, as
    required under RCW 26.09.080, because the court failed to consider his
    economic circumstances. He contends the court erred by awarding nearly all of
    2
    No. 76039-4-1/3
    the parties' liquid assets to Sandra, including the $667,213 that Tomas withdrew
    from the reforestation business.
    We review property distributions for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage
    of Crosetto, 
    82 Wn. App. 545
    , 556, 
    918 P.2d 954
     (1996), citing In re Marriage of
    Wright, 
    78 Wn. App. 230
    , 234, 
    896 P.2d 735
     (1995); see also Davis v. Davis, 
    13 Wn. App. 812
    , 813, 
    537 P.2d 1048
     (1975) ("Wide discretion and latitude rests
    with the trial court" in distributing property).
    Courts are required to make a just and equitable property distribution,
    considering all relevant factors. RCW 26.09.080. One relevant factor is the
    economic circumstances of each spouse when the distribution is to become
    effective. RCW 26.09.080. Other factors include the duration of the marriage,
    nature and extent of the community property, and each party's relative health,
    age, education and employability. RCW 26.09.080; Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. at
    556. "An equitable division of property does not require mathematical precision,
    but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the
    marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the future needs of
    parties." 'Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. at 556.
    The court made findings regarding the parties' ages, health, and earning
    capacities. The court considered the parties' economic circumstances. The
    court determined that Tomas operated a "quite successful" business and earned
    an average yearly income exceeding $300,000 from 2011 to 2013. Sandra, on
    the other hand, had been out of the workforce since 2003, when the parties
    decided she should stay home to care for their youngest child. She has obtained
    3
    No. 76039-4-1/4
    no training or education since earning an associate's degree in the early 1990s.
    Tomas does not assign error to these findings. It is a reasonable inference, from
    these findings, that a just and equitable property award would confer greater
    liquid assets to Sandra—the party whose earning capacity is limited at present.
    Tomas takes issue with the fact that Sandra received $667,213 in funds
    which he characterizes as "financial assets" or "working capital" of the
    reforestation business. He argues that "the division of assets by the Court did
    not include consideration of the amount by which the removal of $667,213.46"
    from the business "reduced the value of that company."
    This argument is unpersuasive. Tomas withdrew the funds and placed
    them in personal accounts; the funds no longer constituted company assets
    when the court made its property distribution. Even assuming the funds
    constituted company assets, Tomas fails to explain why the court was not
    entitled to award them to either party, pursuant to the court's broad discretion to
    distribute property in a dissolution. In re Marriage of Wright, 
    179 Wn. App. 257
    ,
    261, 
    319 P.3d 45
     (2013), review denied, 
    186 Wn.2d 1017
     (2014).
    Tomas stipulated to the value of the reforestation business prior to trial.
    The court relied on the stipulated value. When Tomas argued during posttrial
    proceedings that he should not be bound by the stipulated value because he did
    not foresee that the company would lose $667,213 to Sandra, the court rejected
    this argument:
    We were in trial on this case for a substantial amount of
    time. If Mr. Ramirez didn't agree with what Ramirez Reforestation
    was worth, the amount that was stipulated to, then why did he
    4
    No. 76039-4-1/5
    stipulate to it? Why weren't we in court litigating it? Because it was
    not a situation where the Court decided the value of the company.
    Tomas argues he should have been relieved from the stipulation, citing
    the principle that a trial court has discretion to relieve a party from a stipulation
    when it is shown that relief is necessary to prevent injustice. Stevenson v.
    Hazard, 
    152 Wash. 104
    , 110, 
    277 P. 450
     (1929). Tomas fails to demonstrate
    relief is necessary to prevent injustice. It was foreseeable that the court might
    exercise its discretion to award funds to Sandra that Tomas had withdrawn from
    the business.
    The court ordered Tomas to "claim as dividends" on his tax return the
    funds he removed from the reforestation business in 2014, including the
    $667,213 awarded to Sandra. Tomas argues the court further burdened him by
    requiring that the transfer of funds awarded to Sandra be treated as a dividend,
    thereby making Tomas and his business liable for substantial additional tax
    liabilities.
    Tomas fails to support his claim regarding tax consequences with any
    citations to the record or relevant authority. His expert testified that there would
    be no tax consequences for the business associated with transferring money to
    the marital community. Regarding the impact of the court's decision on Tomas's
    personal tax obligations, he fails to demonstrate the court abused its discretion
    by requiring that he incur a liability of the marital community. A trial court in a
    dissolution proceeding may exercise discretion when apportioning liabilities.
    RCW 26.09.080.
    5
    No. 76039-4-1/6
    Tomas contends the court relied on improper considerations when making
    the property distribution. He refers to the court's remark, at the hearing on
    reconsideration, that Tomas was determined to resist any distribution of property
    to Sandra. This remark does not reflect reliance on an improper consideration; it
    was merely an observation. And in any event, the written findings control our
    analysis. In re Marriage of Raskob, 
    183 Wn. App. 503
    , 519-20, 
    334 P.3d 30
    (2014). The written findings support the property distribution. In sum, we find no
    abuse of discretion with respect to the property distribution.
    Tomas challenges the award of spousal maintenance. We will not reverse
    absent an abuse of discretion. Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. at 558, citing In re
    Marriacie of Mathews, 
    70 Wn. App. 116
    , 123, 
    853 P.2d 462
    , review denied, 
    122 Wn.2d 1021
     (1993).
    A trial court has direction in a dissolution to award maintenance in an
    amount and for a period of time "as the court deems just," considering all relevant
    factors. RCW 26.09.090(1). Relevant factors include the financial need of the
    party seeking maintenance and the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance
    is sought "to meet his or her needs and financial obligations while meeting those of
    the spouse or domestic partner seeking maintenance." RCW 26.09.090(1)(a), (f).
    Other factors include: the time necessary for the party seeking maintenance to
    find appropriate employment; the standard of living established during the
    marriage; the duration of the marriage; and the age, physical and emotional
    condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance. RCW
    26.09.090(1)(b)-(e).
    No. 76039-4-1/7
    The findings entered by the trial court reflect consideration of relevant
    factors. The court determined Sandra had been out of the workforce for several
    years and could not "maintain her lifestyle or become self-supporting without
    assistance" from Tomas. The court concluded, "The wife has an ongoing need
    for spousal maintenance for 11 years and the husband has the ability to pay
    spousal maintenance for 11 years as he is being awarded the parties' business,
    which has historically afforded the parties a very high standard of living for the
    community in which they live."
    Tomas contends the court failed to adequately consider whether he could
    afford the maintenance obligation while also meeting his own financial needs.
    Specifically, he argues the maintenance award was improper because the court
    did not find that his reforestation business "could continue to operate into the
    future after $667,213.46 had been removed from its operating capital funds." He
    contends the business has struggled to continue operating since the divorce
    proceedings began. This argument does not demonstrate error. The property
    distribution left Tomas with substantial assets.
    Tomas fails to substantiate his claim that the business is failing. The only
    evidence he points to is a declaration submitted prior to trial by the accountant for
    the business, stating that the company needed greater working capital on deposit
    than it currently had. The record reflects that Tomas earns substantial income
    through his business.
    Tomas contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court's
    finding of an ongoing need by Sandra of maintenance of $10,000 per month for
    7
    No. 76039-4-1/8
    11 years. We disagree. The award is supported by findings that Sandra lacks
    current experience in the workforce; she last worked at part-time jobs many
    years ago, with top pay of $15.00 per hour; and the parties during the marriage
    become accustomed to a very high standard of living.
    We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the property or maintenance
    awards. We also find no error in the order denying reconsideration.
    Sandra requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW 26.09.140.
    Our discretion to award fees is guided by the relative resources of the parties and
    the merits of their positions on appeal. RCW 26.09.140. Sandra asserts that she
    has financial need, Tomas has the ability to pay, and that Tomas's decision to file
    an appeal is part of his "ongoing intransigence."
    Sandra has substantial wealth. Tomas's decision to file an appeal, alone,
    does not demonstrate intransigence. His intransigence during the trial phase of
    this proceeding will not support an award of attorney fees on appeal. His claims
    on appeal are not meritless. We decline to grant Sandra's request for fees.
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
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