Personal Restraint Petition Of Martin Pang , 197 Wash. App. 576 ( 2017 )


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  •        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    PERSONAL RESTRAINT OF                               No. 73994-8-1
    DIVISION ONE
    MARTIN SHAW PANG,
    PUBLISHED OPINION
    Petitioner.
    FILED: January 17, 2017
    PER CURIAM - Following Martin Pang's 1998 convictions for four counts
    of manslaughter, the court imposed a sentence that included discretionary legal
    financial obligations (LFOs). In 2015, Pang filed a motion in superior court for an
    "individualized inquiry" into his ability to pay his discretionary LFOs. Citing RCW
    10.01.160(3) and State v. Blazina,1 Pang argued that he never received the
    requisite inquiry into his ability to pay and that the court should perform that
    inquiry and waive his discretionary financial obligations. The court ruled the
    motion was untimely and transferred it to this court under CrR 7.8(c)(2) for
    resolution as a personal restraint petition.
    While the petition was pending, the State Supreme Court decided In re
    Flippo,        Wn.2d      , 
    385 P.3d 128
    (2016). The Flippo court held that the
    failure to inquire into Flippo's ability to pay discretionary LFOs did not render his
    judgment and sentence invalid, and that Blazina's holding requiring such
    inquiries was not a significant change in the law requiring retroactive application.
    1 
    182 Wash. 2d 827
    , 
    344 P.3d 680
    (2015)(holding that under RCW 10.01.160(3), courts
    must determine, on the record, the defendant's current and future ability to pay before
    imposing discretionary financial obligations).
    No. 73994-8-1 / 2
    Accordingly, the court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed
    Flippo's personal restraint petition as untimely. The parties here agree, and we
    concur, that Flippo controls Pang's arguments under Blazina and RCW
    10.01.160(3). Accordingly, his petition/motion is untimely under RCW 10.73.090.
    Pang argues in the alternative that this court should "construe Mr. Pang's
    motion as a motion to remit costs [under RCW 10.01.160(4)], and . . . remand for
    a hearing on the motion." Petitioner's Supp. Br. at 7. We decline to do so.
    Pang's motion below rested on RCW 10.01.160(3), not the remittance statute,
    RCW 10.01.160(4). If Pang seeks to remit his discretionary financial obligations,
    the appropriate procedure is to file a motion for remittance under RCW
    10.01.160(4) with "the sentencing court." RCW 10.01.160(4). The sentencing
    court, not this court, will then determine whether he is entitled to remittance or
    modification of the method of payment. RCW 10.01.160(4).
    The petition is denied.
    For the Court:
    c_
    K\oUe sj Q
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 73994-8

Citation Numbers: 197 Wash. App. 576

Filed Date: 1/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023