State Of Washington v. William D. Thompson ( 2017 )

-U I / w'cV i i t r:l t iO' L.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 74747-9-1
W.T.,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
W.T. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: January 17, 2017
Mann, J. — The State moved to involuntarily commit W.T. W.T. believed his
family was trying to kill him and that his children were being held captive. A
psychologist who evaluated W.T. found that he was currently psychotic and
unpredictable and should be committed for his safety and the safety of his family. The
trial court granted the order without entering a written finding that no other alternative
was in his best interest or in the best interest of others. Because the trial court's ruling
adequately described why a less restrictive alternative was not the recommended
course of action, we affirm.
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FACTS
The State filed a petition brought by Harborview Medical Center (Harborview) to
commit W.T. for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. The initial detainment petition
and order included statements by G. H. Glade, the nurse who evaluated W.T., and by
Dr. Joyce Shaffer, the psychologist who evaluated W.T. Both health care professionals
stated they believed W.T. to be gravely disabled and that they could not recommend the
less restrictive alternative.
On January 21, 2016, the Honorable Suzanne Parisien presided over a probable
cause hearing. W.T. appeared in person. At the hearing, the State presented the
expert testimony of Dr. Shaffer. Dr. Shaffer testified that W.T. was "currently psychotic
and also has a manic component," and that this mental disorder caused him to present
a risk of harm to others and made him gravely disabled. Dr. Shaffer testified that W.T.
feared his family was trying to kill him and W.T. did not always comply with his
treatment. Finally, Dr. Shaffer testified that she did not recommend a less restrictive
treatment as W.T. "is unpredictable, because his judgment and his impulse control are
profoundly impaired by the paranoid psychosis." Dr. Shaffer continued to recommend
that W.T. remain at Harborview for further inpatient treatment.
W.T. testified on his own behalf at the hearing. W.T. reiterated his fear of his
family, and stated that he would continue to run from them. W.T. further testified that he
believed he was in the hospital because people were threatening to shoot him at the
convention center. Finally, W.T. testified that his family wanted to get rid of him
because they wanted to silence him as he was on every news station in the country.
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After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court ruled "based upon the
information that has been given to me and that I've heard here today, I do find—
although I do think it's somewhat of a close case—but I do find on balance that the
Petitioner has met its burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
Thompson does meet the necessary standards of RCW 71.05." The trial court found
that a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that W.T. has a grave disability
and that W.T. poses a substantial risk of harm to others and to himself. The court
based its opinion on Dr. Shaffer's expert opinion, Dr. Shaffer's interactions with W.T.,
and W.T.'s own statements that he was being chased due to threats from his family
members. The trial court was also concerned about W.T.'s report to Dr. Shaffer that he
had totaled his vehicle because he was driving so fast to avoid being captured.
The trial court ordered that W.T. be involuntarily committed. The court did not
rule, orally or in writing, whether a less restrictive alternative was in W.T.'s best interest
or the best interest of others. W.T. appealed.
ANALYSIS
Involuntary commitment for mental disorders is a significant deprivation of liberty
that the State cannot accomplish without due process of law. In re Pet, of LaBelle, 107
Wash. 2d 196, 201.728P.2d 138 (1986): Dunnerv. McLaughlin. 100 Wash. 2d 832, 676 P.2d
444 (1984). The State has a legitimate interest under its police and parens patriae
powers in protecting the community from the dangerously mentally ill and in providing
care to those who are unable to care for themselves. LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 201.
However, mental illness alone is not a constitutionally adequate basis for involuntary
commitment. LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 201.
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RCW 71.05.240 sets forth the alternative basis for involuntary commitment. The
issue in this case concerns RCW 71.05.240(3)(a), which requires the trial court find that
less restrictive treatment is not in the best interests of the individual or others before
ordering involuntary commitment. Specifically, the statute states:
(3) At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing:
(a) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that such
person, as the result of mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious
harm, or is gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive
alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no such
alternatives are in the best interests of such person or others, the court
shall order that such person be detained for involuntary treatment not to
exceed fourteen days in a facility certified to provide treatment by the
department.
RCW 71.05.240(3)(a) (emphasis added). "Gravely disabled," is defined as "a condition
in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or
safety." RCW 71.05.020(17).
In this case, the court found that W.T. was gravely disabled but made no express
ruling concerning less restrictive alternatives. W.T. argues that the trial court's failure to
enter specific findings that it had considered less restrictive alternatives to involuntary
detention requires reversal. The State argues that the written findings incorporated the
oral decision and statements on the record and therefore are not so deficient to require
reversal.
Findings and conclusions, when required, must be sufficiently specific to permit
meaningful review. LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 218. The purpose of the requirement of
findings and conclusions is to insure the trial judge "'has dealt fully and properly with all
the issues in the case before he decides it and so that the parties involved and this
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court on appeal may be fully informed as to the bases of his decision when it is made.'"
State v. Aqee, 89 Wash. 2d 416, 421, 573 P.2d 355 (1977) (quoting Roberts v. Ross, 344
F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir.1965)). Although the degree of particularity required for findings
of fact depends on the circumstances of each particular case, they should at least be
sufficient to indicate the factual bases for the ultimate conclusions. Groff v. Dep't of
Labor& Indus., 65 Wash. 2d 35, 40, 395 P.2d 633 (1964); State v. Russell, 68 Wash. 2d 748,
415 P.2d 503 (1966).
Both parties cite to LaBelle to argue that the findings in this case were either
adequate or inadequate. 107 Wash. 2d at 219. In LaBelle, our Supreme Court considered
several cases regarding involuntary commitment and determined their review of the
cases was "hampered by the trial court's mostly conclusory and general findings, both
oral and written," which consisted solely "of a preprinted standardized form reciting
generally the statutory grounds for involuntary commitment." LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at
218, 220. While "not fatal" in those cases, the court ruled that future cases of
involuntary commitment must include "[wjritten findings indicating that the court
considered the applicable statutory criteria," and "[a]t the very least, the findings should
indicate the factual basis underlying the court's conclusion that a person is 'gravely
disabled' and would not benefit from less restrictive treatment." LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at
220.
In this case, the written findings included the trial court selecting preprinted boxes
designating which facts under RCW 71.05.240 the petitioner had proven by a
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preponderance of the evidence.1 While this form may be sufficient to demonstrate "that
the court considered the applicable statutory criteria," it does not "indicate the factual
basis underlying the court's conclusion." Therefore, as in LaBelle, these written findings
are inadequate.
Even though the preprinted form is inadequate under LaBelle, the Court in
LaBelle went on to say "written findings may be supplemented by the trial court's oral
decision or statements in the record." LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 219. In this case, the trial
court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law explicitly incorporated by reference
the trial courts oral ruling,2 and upon reviewing the record we can determine the factual
basis behind the trial court's decision not to impose a less restrictive alternative in
rendering its decision.
In the declarations accompanying the initial detainment order, Glade and Dr.
Shaffer both stated they could not recommend a less restrictive alternative. In Glade's
declaration, he recommended involuntary commitment over other voluntary options
because in his opinion, W.T.'s psychosis would keep him from being able to "fully and
consistently appreciate the nature of a voluntary hospitalization." Dr. Shaffer stated in
her declaration that W.T.'s psychosis causes him to be unable to manage his own
health and safety. Further, at trial Dr. Shaffer was asked why she did not recommend a
less restrictive alternative, to which she replied that she did not recommend a less
1The court checked the box indicating it had found the petitioner had proven "[t]he Respondent,
as a result of a mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm," and "[tjhe Respondent, as a result
of a mental disorder, is gravely disabled under: Prong A." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 15. The trial court did
not select the box finding that a "[treatment in a less restrictive alternative setting than detention" is or is
not "in the best interest of the Respondent or others." CP at 15.
2 The trial court's order states, "In addition to the above written findings and conclusions, the
Court incorporates by reference the oral findings of fact and conclusions of law." CP at 17.
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restrictive alternative because "[W.T.] is unpredictable, because his judgment and his
impulse control are profoundly impaired by the paranoid psychosis."
While the trial court never specifically used the term "less restrictive alternative"
in reaching its decision, the trial court clearly found the health professionals' evidence to
be credible. In the final ruling the trial court reiterated Dr. Shaffer's testimony that W.T.
has "a psychosis with manic components, and also perhaps most importantly, that
[W.T.] is not always complying with his treatment." The court further relied on Dr.
Shaffer's evidence and W.T.'s own testimony, to find that "[W.T.] is currently suffering
from some type of hallucinogenic and/or delusional disorder and that because of this, he
poses a substantial risk of harm to others and perhaps to himself."
The trial court's ruling adequately describes the facts and evidence relied upon in
deciding that W.T. was gravely disabled and posed a risk of harm to himself and others.
Therefore, the inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law do not require reversal
in this case.
This ruling should not be construed to allow such limited findings in future cases.
In the future, the trial court should heed the rule set out in LaBelle and include an
express written or oral finding that a less restrictive treatment is not in the best interests
of such person or others. LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d at 220; RCW 71.05.240(3)(a).
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We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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