State Of Washington, Res/cross-app. v. Marvin Garry Krona, App/cross-res. ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 71810-0-1
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
ro
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MARVIN GARRY KRONA,
Appellant. FILED: July 27, 2015
Trickey, J. —A jury convicted Marvin Krona of harassment, driving while under
the influence (DUI), and driving while license revoked. The State presented sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that Krona made a true threat and that the law
enforcement officer's fear that Krona would carry out the threat was reasonable. The
trial court did not err in admitting testimony about a law enforcement safety alert
regarding Krona because the evidence was not hearsay and was logically relevant to an
element of the crime. Finally, although the court miscalculated the offender score for
the DUI count, the error did not affect Krona's standard range. We remand for the trial
court to correct the offender score as to the DUI count, but otherwise affirm the
judgment and sentence.
FACTS
On the evening of July 13, 2013, James Grout observed a gray Oldsmobile slide
sideways when turning onto an easement road on the side of his property and hit his
fence. The car did not stop, but continued up the easement road adjacent to the fence.
Grout had seen the car several times before and believed it to be associated with the
No. 71810-0-1/2
Krona family, neighbors who lived at the end of the easement road. Grout saw that the
driver was a man with dark hair but could not identify him.
At around the same time, Grout's neighbor was standing at her window and saw
Marvin Krona drive up the easement road in the gray Oldsmobile. Krona was slumped
over and leaning toward the passenger side. Groutwent to the Krona residence directly
after the incident and told Krona's bother what had happened. Krona's brother noticed
that Krona was sitting in the parked Oldsmobile and was visibly intoxicated. Grout
called the police to report the incident.
Three sheriff's deputies responded to the reported hit and run. They learned
through a law enforcement database about an "officer safety caution" regarding Krona,
who was associated with the address.1 They also learned that the safety caution was
based on prior "threats to kill law enforcement and prior resisting arrest."2
The deputies found the Oldsmobile in a field by the house. As they approached
the vehicle, the officers could see Krona slumped over the steering wheel. The driver's
side door was open, the ignition key was turned on, but the engine was not running.
There were two empty cans and three full cans of beer in the car and the deputies could
hear the radio playing and the door chiming.
The deputies identified themselves and Krona confirmed his identity. Krona
appeared to be highly intoxicated. Krona complied when asked to step out of the car,
but needed assistance and because he was unsteady, the deputies placed him in
handcuffs and had him sit on the ground. The officers arrested Krona and Deputy
1Report of Proceedings (RP) (Mar. 3, 2014) at 112.
2RP(Mar. 3, 2014) at 112.
No. 71810-0-1/3
Jacob Navarro advised him of his Miranda3 rights. Krona interrupted during the
advisement and said that he "kn[e]w better" than to drive because he was "suspended."4
Krona became uncooperative and physically resisted when the deputies
attempted to place him in the patrol car. Once in the car, Krona began acting violently,
angrily screaming "as loud as he could," and trying to hit his head on the partition.5 He
called Deputy Navarro and his field training officer various offensive names and
expletives and stated that he and his friends would find them and "slice [them] up."6
Krona told both deputies that his brother would find them and "slit [their] throats" and kill
their families.7
Because of Krona's obvious intoxication, the deputies decided that he should be
cleared by medical personnel before being booked in jail. Krona made numerous
offensive comments and threats to medical staff while in transit to the hospital and at
the hospital, telling staff he would "find them, beat their ass, [and] kill them."8 Hospital
staff placed Krona in four-point restraints, but he struggled to break free of the restraints
and attempted to urinate on the hospital floor. At one point, Krona looked directly at
Deputy Navarro and said he would "find [his] Indian ass and kill [him]."9 Hospital staff
drew Krona's blood several hours after his arrest, which revealed a blood alcohol level
of 0.28.
The State charged Krona with driving under the influence, harassment, and
driving while license revoked. At trial, Krona testified that he "drank a fifth of vodka"
3 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
4 RP (Mar. 4, 2014) at 30.
5RP (Mar. 3, 2014) at 123; RP (Mar. 4, 2014) at 43.
6RP(Mar. 3, 2014) at 123.
7RP(Mar. 4, 2014) at 45.
8RP(Mar. 3, 2014) at 125-26.
9RP(Mar. 3, 2014) at 126.
No. 71810-0-1/4
before he was arrested, but only after Grout came to the house to report damage to the
fence.10 He maintained that he was merely sitting in the Oldsmobile when the deputies
arrested him and denied having driven the car. He did not dispute that he "said some
nasty things" to the deputies during the arrest but insisted that he did not mean the
things he said when intoxicated.11 The jury convicted Krona as charged. Krona
appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Krona's harassment conviction was based on the specific threat to find and kill
Deputy Navarro's "Indian ass." Krona contends that the State failed to prove (1) that
this was a "true threat" and (2) that Deputy Navarro's fear that he would carry out the
threat was reasonable under the circumstances.
To convict Krona of harassment as charged here, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) without lawful authority (2) knowingly
threatened (3) to cause bodily harm immediately or in the future (4) to a criminal justice
participant performing official duties at the time the threat was made and (5) the criminal
justice participant reasonably feared that the threat would be carried out. RCW
9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (2)(b)(iii).
Where, as here, a criminal statute implicates speech, the State must prove both
the statutory elements of the offense and that the speech was not protected by the First
Amendment. State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 54, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004). Because a
threat is pure speech, the harassment statute is limited in its reach to "true threats."
i°RP(Mar. 4, 2014) at 105.
11 Clerks Papers at 111, 120.
No. 71810-0-1/5
State v. Allen. 176 Wn.2d 611, 626, 294 P.3d 679 (2013) (interpreting RCW 9A.46.020);
Watts v. United States. 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1969).
A "true threat" is a statement made in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted ... as a serious expression of intention to
inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of another person. A true threat
is a serious threat, not one said in jest, idle talk, or political argument.
Under this standard, whether a true threat has been made is determined
under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker.
Kilburn. 151 Wn.2d at 43-44 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord
Allen, 176 Wn.2d at 626; State v. Schaler. 169 Wn.2d 274, 287, 236 P.3d 858 (2010).
A statement can constitute a true threat even if the speaker has no actual intent
to cause bodily injury. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 46. One reason that a true threat is
unprotected speech is because it arouses fear in the person threatened and that fear
does not depend on the speaker's intent. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 46. Therefore, a
statement will be considered a true threat if a "reasonable speaker would foresee that
the threat would be considered serious."12 Schaler. 169 Wn.2d at 283.
Generally, the test for determining sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of the crime were established
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068(1992). We assume the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. We defer to the trier of fact's
12 In his briefing before this court, Krona noted the United States Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Elonis v. United States, _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), anticipating that the
Court would address the true threat exception to the First Amendment's protection of free
speech. However, the Court resolved the case based on its construction of the federal criminal
statute and it was therefore "not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues." Elonis,
135 S. Ct. at 2012. Accordingly, we rely on the definition of "true threat" established by our
jurisprudence.
No. 71810-0-1/6
resolution of conflicting testimony and evaluation of the persuasiveness of the evidence.
State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). However, because of
the First Amendment implications, we must engage in an independent review of the
"crucial" facts that involve the legal determination of whether the speech is unprotected.
Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 52.
Deputy Navarro testified that Krona was looking directly at him and when he
explicitly threatened to find and kill his "Indian ass." Krona points to evidence of his
obvious intoxication, the fact that he was in handcuffs or otherwise restrained during
virtually the entire encounter, and to the evidence that he made multiple threats directed
at numerous individuals. He claims that under these circumstances, no reasonable
person would foresee that his threat to kill Deputy Navarro would be interpreted as a
serious expression of intention to harm the officer. And Krona claims that in this
context, no reasonable criminal justice participant would fear that Krona would "single
him out of all the people threatened and carry out his threat in the future."13
Certainly, there was ample evidence that Krona was extremely intoxicated and
that, when he made the threat, he did not have the immediate means to carry it out. But
the record also fairly suggests that he was in control of his faculties to the extent that he
was initially able to comply with and respond to the deputies' questions and requests.
And his demeanor when he threatened to kill Deputy Navarro was unmistakably angry
and aggressive. He made the threat in the context of sustained, escalating, and violent
attempts to resist law enforcement and medical staff as they transported and medically
assessed him. A reasonable person in Krona's position, under these circumstances,
would have expected Deputy Navarro to take his threat seriously, not as a joke, idle
13 Appellant's Br. at 10.
No. 71810-0-1/7
talk, or exaggeration. There is sufficient evidence in this record for the trier of fact to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the threat at issue was a true threat.
Deputy Navarro also testified that he feared that Krona would carry out his threat,
and that his concern was sufficient that he notified his spouse. This is ample evidence
of his subjective fear. And again, we consider context in evaluating whether the
deputy's fear was reasonable. Deputy Navorro explained that he was concerned about
the threat because it was not a "common" or blanket threat that could be aimed at any
number of people. It was directed at him in particular. And the context of the threat was
Krona's increasingly belligerent and unpredictable behavior that began as soon as
Deputy Navarro attempted to place him in the patrol vehicle. It is true that he did not
have the immediate means to carry out the threat because he was restrained. But the
threat he made was to harm or to kill the officer in the future. See RCW
9A.46.020(1)(a)(i). Under the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient for the trier of
fact to conclude that Deputy Navarro reasonably feared that Krona would carry out his
threat against him sometime in the future after he was released from jail.
II. Officer Safety Caution
Krona challenges the trial court's admission of the testimony about the officer
safety caution database entry based on previous threats against law enforcement and
incidents of resisting arrest. He contends that the testimony was inadmissible because
it was hearsay, unfairly prejudicial, and improper propensity evidence. He also
contends that admission of the evidence violated his right to confront witnesses. We
review de novo whether a statement was hearsay, and a trial court's admission of
No. 71810-0-1/8
testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Edwards, 131 Wn. App. 611, 614, 128
P.3d 631 (2006); State v. Bourgeois. 133 Wn.2d 389, 399, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997).
Before trial, the State moved to admit the testimony, arguing that it was relevant
to an element of the crime: Deputy Navarro's subjective and reasonable belief as a
criminal justice participant that the threat would be carried out. The court granted the
motion, observing that even if the information in the database was incorrect, it was still
relevant to Deputy Navarro's state of mind.
After Deputy Navarro testified about the officer safety caution and the factual
basis for it, the court provided a limiting instruction, stating that "Deputy Navarro's
testimony about officer safety caution information" was to be considered by the jury
"only as to how it may relate to the deputy's state of mind and for no other purpose."14
An out-of-court statement introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted is
generally inadmissible under the prohibition against hearsay. ER 801(c), 802. On the
other hand, statements are not hearsay if they are not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. State v. Chambers, 134 Wn. App. 853, 859, 142 P.3d 668 (2006). "A
statement is not hearsay if it is used only to show the effect on the listener, without
regard to the truth of the statement." Edwards, 131 Wn. App. at 614.
Krona asserts that the evidence about the officer safety caution was relevant only
if true. But as the trial court observed, it made no difference to the State's case whether
or not the assessment of danger was accurate. The knowledge of the officer safety
caution, even if it was a mistake or based on inaccurate information, contributed to
Deputy Navarro's subjective evaluation of the threat and was logically relevant to the
issue of whether it was reasonable for the deputy to believe that Krona would harm him.
14RP(Mar. 3, 2014) at 113.
8
No. 71810-0-1/9
The trial court did not err in concluding that the evidence was not offered as substantive
proof and was not hearsay.15
The State did not rely on the evidence to show that Krona had previously
threatened law enforcement officers or that he was, in fact, a dangerous person.
Contrary to Krona's argument, the State's closing argument, read as a whole,
demonstrates that State relied on the evidence only for the purpose of arguing that the
deputy's subjective fear was reasonable. And the court specifically directed the jury to
consider the evidence for only this purpose.
For largely the same reason, the evidence did not violate Krona's confrontation
rights. The confrontation clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay statements
when the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has not had an
opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 59,
124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). Testimonial statements include those
created solely for evidentiary purposes and those created for the purpose of
establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to later prosecution. Bullcoming
v. New Mexico, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006). And even
when statements are testimonial, the confrontation clause "does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted." Crawford. 541 U.S. at 60 n.9. The apparent purpose of the database entry
here was to protect officers in the field, not to prove the prior acts in a criminal
15 Krona contends that even if Deputy Navarro's testimony about the officer safety caution was
relevant to his state of mind, it was error to allow the other two deputies to present similar
testimony about the database entry. However, that evidence was not only cumulative but
because each deputy testified about what they collectively learned from the database entry, the
testimony of the other deputies' was also relevant to Deputy Navarro's state of mind.
No. 71810-0-1/10
prosecution. And again, because the statements were not admitted to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, admission of the evidence did not violate Krona's right to confront
witnesses against him.
Finally, for the first time on appeal, Krona claims the testimony about prior threats
against law enforcement was inadmissible propensity evidence under ER 404(b) and
unfairly prejudicial under ER 403. However, because Krona did not object on this basis
below and because evidentiary errors under ER 404(b) and ER 403 are not of
constitutional magnitude, they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 689, 695, 689 P.2d 76 (1984); RAP 2.5(a)(3). And moreover, to
warrant reversal, an evidentiary error must be prejudicial. State v. Benn, 161 Wn.2d
256, 268, 165 P.3d 1232 (2007). Even if the evidence showed his propensity to
threaten law enforcement officers, Krona conceded that he made threats and offensive
comments during the incident. His defense was that the threats were not serious and
that given the circumstances, the deputy in question did not reasonably fear that he
would carry out any of the threats.
III. Offender Score
Krona contends that the trial court miscalculated his offender score for the felony
counts of DUI and harassment. He did not challenge the State's calculation of his
criminal history at sentencing. Nevertheless, a defendant may challenge an offender
score calculation for the first time on appeal. State v. Arndt, 179 Wn. App. 373, 388 n.9,
320 P.3d 104 (2014). We review de novo a trial court's calculation of a defendant's
offender score. State v. Wilson, 113 Wn. App. 122, 136, 52 P.3d 545 (2002).
10
No. 71810-0-1/11
With respect to the DUI conviction, Krona contends that the sentencing court
erred by including in the offender score prior felony convictions for taking a motor
vehicle without permission and attempting to elude, and his current felony conviction of
harassment.
The court calculated Krona's offender score for the DUI as nine. His judgment
and sentence lists nine prior convictions, but does not specify which of those
convictions were included in the score for the DUI conviction. It is clear from the record,
however, that Krona's offender score for the DUI was calculated as follows: two points
for prior felony DUI convictions, five points for prior non-felony convictions for DUI and
reckless driving, one point for his other current DUI felony conviction, and one point for
his community custody status. Therefore, Krona's prior convictions for attempt to elude
and taking a motor vehicle were not included in the DUI offender score and he does not
challenge the inclusion of the felony DUI convictions or any non-felony DUI and other
serious traffic offense as beyond the scope of the governing statute, former RCW
9.94A.525(2)(e)(2011).16
The State admits, however, that harassment is not one of the offenses that may
be included in the offender score for DUI under former RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e).
Therefore, the State concedes that Krona's offender score for DUI should not have
16 At the time of Krona's offense, former RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e) provided as follows:
If the present conviction is felony driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.502(6)) or felony physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.504(6)),
prior convictions of felony driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug, felony physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug, and serious traffic offenses shall be included in
the offender score if: (i) The prior convictions were committed within five years
since the last date of release from confinement (including full-time residential
treatment) or entry of judgment and sentence; or (ii) the prior convictions would
be considered "prior offenses within ten years" as defined in RCW 46.61.5055.
11
No. 71810-0-1/12
included his current conviction for felony harassment and the score should have been
eight, rather than nine. But whether the score was eight or nine, Krona's standard
range sentence was 60 months, the statutory maximum sentence for his class C felony.
RCW 9.94A.510. Thus, the error did not affect Krona's standard range.
With respect to the harassment conviction, Krona contends that the evidence
demonstrates that the same two prior convictions, his 1985 conviction for taking a motor
vehicle and 1995 conviction for attempting to elude, "washed out" and should not have
been included in the offender score.
Krona's offender score for purposes of the harassment conviction was six, based
on the following: four points for prior convictions; one point for his other current felony
DUI conviction; and one point for his community custody status. The four prior
convictions consisted of the 1985 and 1995 felony convictions and two 2009 felony DUI
convictions. Krona does not dispute that the State provided certified copies of the
judgments and sentences for each of the prior convictions included in the offender score
calculation.
Nonetheless, Krona claims the court improperly included the 1985 and 1995
convictions because the State failed to meet its burden to prove the facts or convictions
necessary to establish that these convictions had not washed out under RCW
9.94A.525(2)(c). In other words, Krona maintains that the State was required to prove
by means of certified judgments and sentences each intervening conviction necessary
to demonstrate that the crimes did not wash out. We disagree.
Krona's reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d
472, 479, 973 P.2d 452 (1999) and State v. Hunlev. 175 Wn.2d 901, 910, 287 P.3d 58412
No. 71810-0-1/13
(2012), is misplaced. These cases establish that the State must prove the existence of
prior convictions included in the offender score by a preponderance of the evidence and
that the best evidence for discharging this burden is a certified copy of the judgment and
sentence. See Ford, 137 Wn.2d at 479-80. The State met its burden of proof as set
forth in Ford and Hunlev.
Class C prior felony convictions, other than sex offenses, are not included in the
offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement pursuant to a felony
conviction or entry of judgment and sentence, the offender had spent five consecutive
years in the community without committing any crime that subsequently results in a
conviction. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). The evidence in the record, including the State's
understanding of Krona's criminal history that Krona specifically agreed to when he
pleaded guilty to the felony DUI charges in 2009, establishes that subsequent to his
1985 conviction for taking a motor vehicle without permission, Krona was convicted of
misdemeanors in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1994. Similarly, after his
1995 conviction for attempting to elude, Krona was convicted of misdemeanors in 1996,
1999, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, and 2008. Then, he was sentenced in January 2009 to
60 months of confinement followed by community custody on the two felony DUI counts.
Contrary to Krona's argument, the evidence does not demonstrate that the 1985 and
1995 convictions washed out.
Krona demonstrates no error with respect to his offender score for harassment.
Because Krona's offender score for the DUI count should have calculated as eight, we
direct the trial court to correct the offender score computation on the judgment and
13
No. 71810-0-1/14
sentence. But, as explained, because the change does not affect the standard range,
there is no need to conduct a new sentencing hearing.
IV. Statement of Additional Grounds
In a statement of additional grounds, Krona challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his DUI conviction. While not entirely clear, Krona appears to
suggest various reasons why the jury should have discredited the testimony of the
State's witnesses and argues that the jury should have drawn certain inferences in his
favor. But the jury was not required to accept Krona's testimony or his interpretation of
the evidence. The testimony of the State's witnesses was sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove the Oldsmobile on July 13,
2013, while under the influence of alcohol.
Krona also argues, based on State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 927 P.2d 1129(1996), that his conviction is constitutionally infirm because the burden was placed upon
him to prove the affirmative defense that his blood alcohol level was above the legal
limit because of alcohol consumed after he drove. However, the jury instructions
specifically informed the jury that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not consume alcohol after driving or that the
alcohol he consumed after driving did not cause his blood alcohol level to exceed the
legal limit.17
Finally, Krona contends that the State knowingly presented false evidence in
support of the DUI charge and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and present certain pieces of evidence. Because these claims involve
17 Although we grant Krona's motion to supplement with additional authority, because of the jury
instructions assigned the burden of proof to the State, State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 765,
336 P.3d 1134 (2014), is inapplicable.
14
No. 71810-0-1/15
matters outside the record before us on direct review, the appropriate means of raising
these claims is through a personal restraint petition. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d
322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
We remand and direct the trial court to correct the offender score computation for
the DUI count on the judgment and sentence, and otherwise, affirm.
T/-i'