State Of Washington, V E.A.S. ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                                  Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    September 27, 2016
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                              No. 47973-7-II
    Respondent,
    v.
    E.A.S.†                                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    LEE, J. — E.A.S. appeals the trial court’s order imposing restitution against E.A.S. for the
    victim’s substantial injuries after E.A.S. was convicted of fourth degree assault. We hold that the
    trial court abused its discretion by imposing restitution for the victim’s injuries in the absence of a
    causal connection between E.A.S.’s conviction and the victim’s injuries, and reverse the trial
    court’s restitution order.
    †
    Because the appellant was adjudicated as a juvenile, we find it appropriate to provide some
    confidentiality in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that initials shall be used in the case
    caption and in the body of the opinion when identifying the appellant and any juvenile witnesses.
    RAP 3.4.
    No. 47973-7-II
    FACTS
    This case stems from two fights between high school students. The victim, T.O., agreed
    to the first fight with Q.R.1 at T.O.’s home. E.A.S. and other high school students were present
    during that fight. Q.R. repeatedly punched T.O. in the face and knocked T.O. down at least twice.
    After the last knock down, Q.R. walked away with the other students, including E.A.S.
    T.O. stood up and told Q.R. to come back so that T.O. could talk to him. At that point,
    E.A.S. approached T.O. T.O. told E.A.S. that he did not want to fight, but E.A.S. began hitting
    him. 2 VRP at 197. T.O. was “groggy” and “dizzy” from his fight with Q.R., and struggled to
    defend himself against E.A.S.’s punches. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 197. After
    that fight, Q.R., E.A.S., and the other students left T.O.’s house. T.O.’s mother returned home
    soon after and called the police.
    The State charged E.A.S. with second degree assault.2 At the bench trial, T.O. testified
    that E.A.S. punched him and he hit his head on a brick wall. T.O. also testified that he was unable
    to see, but he felt his body being punched and kicked. He blacked out and lost consciousness. He
    testified that he suffered a concussion and a “through-and-through cut to his lip” as a result of
    being assaulted by E.A.S. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 11.
    The trial court found that T.O.’s testimony was not supported by the evidence and was not
    credible. The trial court also found that “[n]o testimony was presented that proved [E.A.S.]
    inflicted [T.O.’s] injur[ies]” and that the State “failed to prove that the reckless infliction of
    1
    Q.R. is neither a party to this appeal nor was he charged as a co-defendant.
    2
    RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a).
    2
    No. 47973-7-II
    substantial bodily harm was caused by [E.A.S.] and not [T.O.] himself.” CP at 12. As a result,
    the trial court found E.A.S. guilty of fourth degree assault.3
    The trial court sentenced E.A.S. to six months’ community supervision. The trial court
    reminded the parties that the State did not prove that E.A.S. “caused the Assault 2 level of injuries.”
    4 VRP at 426. But the trial court found that “injuries are injuries” and imposed “[j]oint and
    several” restitution in the full amount of T.O.’s medical expenses relating to his injuries.4 E.A.S.
    appeals the restitution order.
    ANALYSIS
    E.A.S. argues that the trial court lacked the authority to impose restitution because the State
    failed to establish a causal relationship between E.A.S.’s crime and T.O.’s injuries. We agree.
    A.        LEGAL PRINCIPLES
    An order of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. S.T., 
    139 Wash. App. 915
    ,
    918, 
    163 P.3d 796
    (2007).          An abuse of discretion occurs when the order is manifestly
    unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. 
    S.T., 139 Wash. App. at 918
    . The court has discretion to determine the amount, terms, and conditions of restitution. RCW
    13.40.190(1)(d).
    Restitution is allowed only for losses that are causally connected to the crime. State v.
    Kinneman, 
    155 Wash. 2d 272
    , 286, 
    119 P.3d 350
    (2005). “Restitution may not be based on acts
    connected with the crime charged, when those acts are not part of the charge.” State v. Harrington,
    3
    E.A.S. was charged with a co-defendant, but the trial court acquitted the co-defendant.
    4
    The trial court imposed restitution in the amount of $4,183.93. The record does not show with
    whom E.A.S. was held joint and severally liable for the restitution imposed.
    3
    No. 47973-7-II
    
    56 Wash. App. 176
    , 179, 
    782 P.2d 1101
    (1989); see State v. Woods, 
    90 Wash. App. 904
    , 907, 
    953 P.2d 834
    (quoting State v. Blair, 
    56 Wash. App. 209
    , 214-15, 
    783 P.2d 102
    (1989)) (“A restitution order
    must be based on the existence of a causal relationship between the crime charged and proven and
    the victim’s damages.”), review denied, 
    136 Wash. 2d 1021
    (1998); State v. Ashley, 
    40 Wash. App. 877
    , 879, 
    700 P.2d 1207
    (1985) (“Since there was no injury or loss as a result of the crime for
    which Ashley was charged and convicted, there can be no restitution.”). “A sufficient causal
    connection exists if, ‘but for the criminal acts of the defendant, the victim would not have suffered
    the damages for which restitution is sought.’”       
    S.T., 139 Wash. App. at 919
    (quoting State v.
    Landrum, 
    66 Wash. App. 791
    , 799, 
    832 P.2d 1359
    (1992)).
    B.     NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN CONVICTION AND INJURIES ESTABLISHED
    The State argues that E.A.S. was an active participant in the assault that caused T.O.’s
    injuries, and therefore, E.A.S. is liable for related restitution. However, the trial court expressly
    found that the State failed to prove that T.O.’s injuries were caused by E.A.S. Thus, because the
    State did not prove that E.A.S. inflicted T.O.’s injuries, as necessary to support second degree
    assault, the trial court found E.A.S. not guilty of second degree assault. Instead, the trial court
    found E.A.S. guilty of fourth degree assault, which does not require the State to prove that E.A.S.
    caused any physical injury.
    Despite expressly finding that the State failed to prove E.A.S. inflicted T.O.’s injuries, the
    trial court imposed restitution against E.A.S. to compensate T.O. for his injuries. In doing so, the
    trial court abused its discretion because T.O.’s injuries were not causally connected to E.A.S.’s
    4
    No. 47973-7-II
    conviction. 
    Kinneman, 155 Wash. 2d at 286
    . Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s restitution
    order.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
    it is so ordered.
    Lee, J.
    We concur:
    Johanson, J.
    Bjorgen, C.J.
    5