State Of Washington v. Andre Taylor ( 2015 )

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS
II
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
2015 APR 28 Am 8, 86
DIVISION II
STATOF Sf1NGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 45198 -1 - II
BY
Respondent,
v.
ANDRE TAYLOR, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
MELNICK, J. — Andre Taylor appeals his convictions for assault in the second degree and
attempted kidnapping in the second degree, both with sexual motivation. Taylor argues the " to
convict" instruction for assault in the second degree failed to accurately instruct the jury, the trial
court impermissibly commented on the evidence, the State committed prosecutorial misconduct,
the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence, and cumulative errors denied him a
fair trial. We reject Taylor' s claims and affirm.
FACTS
I. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS
At approximately 4: 00 A.M. on February 17, 2012, H.H. left her job as floor supervisor at
McDonald' s. Because of the unavailability of a ride, she decided to walk to her manager' s nearby
house. H.H. noticed a truck following her, and ignored the driver, Taylor, when he gestured to
her. In an attempt to avoid him, H.H. crossed the street. Shortly thereafter, the truck came around
a corner and struck H. H. She " folded" completely underneath the truck. Report of Proceedings
RP) ( May 29, 2013). at 30. Prior to impact, H.H. did not notice Taylor honk the horn, apply the
brakes, or attempt to swerve out of the way. Nothing in the immediate area obstructed Taylor or
prevented him from swerving to avoid H. H.
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After impact, Taylor put the truck in reverse, backed it off H.H., and then stopped. Taylor
exited his truck and picked up H.H. He dropped her when H.H. struggled.
A witness approached the scene and H.H. requested that .someone call 911; however,
neither Taylor nor the witness made any effort to make the call. H.H.' s phone, which she had
taken out of her pocket prior to impact, laid in pieces on the ground. H.H. managed to put her
phone back together and called 911. Taylor left in his vehicle before medical personnel and law
enforcement arrived.
Medical help arrived and transported H.H. to the hospital. As a result of being struck by
the truck, H.H. sustained significant injuries including hemorrhaging in her eyes, three broken ribs,
a bruised lung, a broken clavicle, a complex hip fracture, dislocated hip, broken tailbone, and a
broken pelvis. She underwent two surgeries, remained hospitalized for three weeks, and resided
in a rehabilitation facility for an additional week or two.
Law enforcement investigated and determined Taylor and his truck were involved.
Following his arrest, Taylor told Detectives Ryan Larsen and John Bair that he had followed H.H.
and tried to talk to her. Taylor admitted that he consumed alcohol and smoked crack cocaine prior
to striking H.H., and that he likes " companionship" when he' s high. RP ( June 3, 2013) at 43. He
told the detectives that the brakes on his vehicle weren' t working, but that the emergency brake
does work so he used that as his primary brake. Later in the interview, he said that the mechanical
condition of his vehicle did not cause him to strike H. H., but ‘" [ t] he reason was accidental. "' RP
June 3, 2013) at 57.
The State charged Taylor with assault in the first degree with sexual motivation and
attempted kidnapping in the second degree with sexual motivation.
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II. PRETRIAL
The State sought to admit an interview between Detective Bair and Taylor. Taylor moved
the court in limine to redact the following exchange between Detective Bair and Taylor that
occurred during the interview:
BAIR: And we ask[ ed] you what you think she was thinking and you told us a
response that involved two words. What were those words?
TAYLOR: I don' t want to say that. I just —I feel like bodily harm. I mean, uh,
I —I would —if I was in that .. .
BAIR: Well, Andre, let me ask you this. If I say the words that you said to me,
and you correct me if I' m wrong. Did you say the word ` rape'? And did you say
the word ` kill'? As —as a response, you asked us that y —she' d be thinking two
words. Are those two words that I just said, is that an incorrect representation of
what you said earlier?
TAYLOR: No, that' s not incorrect.
Clerk' s_ Papers ( CP) at 159 -160. Taylor argued that the statement was speculative and a
layperson' s opinion on his guilt or innocence. The. State argued that the statements were Taylor' s
interpretation of his own conduct and were the " statements made by a party- opponent." CP at 207.
The trial court noted that while "[ w]itnesses are generally not permitted to speculate or express
their personal beliefs about the defendant' s guilt or innocence," here Taylor was describing his
own interpretation as to how his own behavior could have been interpreted or perceived." RP
Sept. 24, 2012) at 7. Accordingly, the trial court denied Taylor' s proposed redaction.
III. TRIAL
During direct examination of Detective Larsen, the State elicited testimony regarding
Taylor' s statements to Detectives Larsen and Bair:
STATE]: Was there a discussion about what the victim would have thought based
on his actions?
DETECTIVE LARSEN]: Yes. I specifically asked him, ` What do you think she
would have said if asked about what you were going to do to her ?' And he looked
up and he said ` stalk.'
TAYLOR]: Objection. Speculation.
THE [ TRIAL] COURT: Overruled.
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BY [ STATE]: Go ahead.
DETECTIVE LARSEN] : He said, ` Stalk. She said ` stalk' to me.' And then I said,
What do you think she was going to —what do you think she thought you were
going to do to her ?' And Taylor said, ` Kill, rape.' And I asked him, ` Do you think
she was scared ?' And he said, ` If I was in her shoes alone, I' d be scared.'
RP ( June 3, 2013) at 43 -44.
The jury heard testimony that prior to the incident, Taylor told a friend that he was "` hornier
than [ expletive]." RP ( June 3, 2013) at 159. The jury also heard testimony from two of Taylor' s
cellmates, James Herness and. Curtis Hudson. Herness testified that, following his arrest, Taylor
told Herness that he had mistaken H. H. for a prostitute and that "[ s] omething came over [ him].
He] just couldn' t help [ him] self." RP ( June 4, 2013) at 109. Additionally, Hudson testified Taylor
told him that " he was going to have his way with [ H.H.]" if he could get her back to his friend' s
home. RP ( June 5, 2013) at 68. When he described the incident to Hudson, Taylor used the term
ran her down." RP ( June 5, 2013) at 69. Taylor testified that he hoped to engage in sexual
conduct with H.H. on the night of the incident, that he went to the area of the incident to locate a
prostitute, and that he believed H.H. was a prostitute.
During cross -examination of Taylor, the State concentrated on Taylor' s inconsistencies
between his testimony and his statement to law enforcement, Herness, and Hudson. Outside the
presence of the jury, the State argued to the trial court that the defense changed tactics during the
course of the trial and that the State intended to inquire as to inconsistencies between Taylor' s
testimony, his previous statements, and what his attorney represented during opening statements
and motions in limine. The trial court allowed the State to inquire of Taylor regarding the
inconsistencies.
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During cross -examination, the following exchange took place between the State and
Taylor:
STATE]: In fact, you' ve had a chance to review your taped statement as well;
right?
TAYLOR] : I have.
STATE]: Nowhere in that did you ever once say you were looking for a prostitute;
right?
TAYLOR]: Correct.
STATE]: You wanted to have sex with her that night, or that morning; right?
TAYLOR]: Hopefully.
STATE]: Because that' s what people do with prostitutes after 4 a.m.; right?
TAYLOR]: Yes.
STATE] : And we also know that because your attorney said in her opening
statement you were hoping to have sex with her that morning; right?
TAYLOR] : Correct.
STATE]: Well, how come you told the detectives that you didn' t want to have sex
with her then?
TAYLOR] : I don' t know.
STATE]: What do you mean, you don' t know? You told the detectives that you
didn' t want to have sex with her that morning; right?
TAYLOR]: That' s what I told them.
STATE]: That was a lie, wasn' t it?
TAYLOR]: No.
STATE]: Well ... how do you juxtapose the two? .. .
TAYLOR]: Because there was a point that I wanted to have sex and there was a
point I didn' t. That' s what I was talking about.
STATE]: At what point did that change, Mr. Taylor?
TAYLOR]: I figured out she wasn' t a prostitute.
STATE]: Really? Because your attorney stood up in her opening statement and
said that you contacted her because she was in trouble and that you were hoping
maybe that would lead to sex. Isn' t that what she said?
RP ( June 11, 2013) at 21 -23. Before Taylor answered, his counsel objected on the basis that
opening statements are not evidence. The court removed the jury and, after argument, the trial
court sustained the objection. When the jury returned, the State further inquired, " Mr. Taylor, you
spoke to your attorney about whether or not you wanted to have sex." RP ( June 11, 2013) at 24.
Before Taylor answered, his counsel objected based on a violation of the attorney- client privilege.
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The trial court sustained the objection. The State continued to question Taylor about his prior
inconsistent statements.
IV. CLOSING ARGUMENT
During closing arguments, the State and Taylor focused on the issue of whether Taylor
intended to strike H.H. with his vehicle. The State first argued
He ran her down, and so if you know, based on the evidence, that he intentionally
acted, then the State has met its burden with regard to Count I and Count II because
common sense tells you there' s no other explanation for the other elements, right?
To convict him of [ a] ssault in the [ f]irst [ d] egree on or about the 17th day of
February 2012, he assaulted H.H. and the assault requires the intentional conduct.
RP ( June 12, 2013) at 37. The State then moved on to discuss intent to inflict bodily harm and
stated, " If you intend to run somebody over with a truck, you intend to inflict great bodily harm."
RP ( June 12, 2013) at 37. Additionally, the State argued
Taylor] is going to suggest, `Well, if he was intending to rape her, he couldn' t have
been intending to inflict great bodily harm. That' s inconsistent.' ... You have a
lesser crime of [a] ssault in the [ s] econd [ d] egree with [ s] exual [ m] otivation, right?
The only difference is that you intentionally assaulted, right? That' s the issue that
I think is in this case, and that he recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm as a
result of the assault. Well, if he didn' t intend great bodily harm, he certainly
recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm.
RP ( June 12, 2013) at 38.
During defense closing argument, Taylor' s attorney stated, " Counsel stated to you during
closing [argument] just moments ago that for [a] ssault 2, the State only has to prove that Mr. Taylor
recklessly inflicted. Wrong." RP ( June 12, 2013) at 44.
In response, the State argued
Taylor] suggested that I said [a] ssault in the [ s] econd degree did not require intent.
That was her argument, that I, for some reason, said it didn' t require intent. Well,
I said in my opening statement and I said in my closing statement that that' s the
sole issue in this case. It applies to every assault. She said that her client clearly
committed [ a] sault That' s what she said because he negligently caused injury.
3.
Well, if he committed [ a] ssault 3, then he certainly committed [ a] ssault 2, because
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in order to commit [ a] ssault 2, the only difference is that he has to act recklessly
instead of negligently and reckless simply requires, it' s Instruction No. 18, that the
d] efendant knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur
and that this disregards a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable person
would exercise.
RP ( June 12, 2013) at 93 -94. Taylor did not object.
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND DELIBERATIONS
Taylor did instruction in the degree. Without
not propose a jury on assault second
objection, the trial court submitted following lesser included assault in the second degree to convict
1
instruction to the jury:
To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree, each
of the following two elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1) That on or about the 17th day of February 2012, the defendant:
a) intentionally assaulted H.H. and thereby recklessly inflicted
substantial bodily harm; or
b) assaulted H.H. with a deadly weapon; and
2) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
CP at 450 ( Instr. 16). Additionally, the trial court submitted an instruction defining assault:
An assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person that is
harmful or offensive. A touching or striking is offensive if the touching or striking
would offend an ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive.
CP at 443 ( Instr. 9). The jury also received instructions defining intent and recklessness.
deliberations, the jury the following question to the trial court: " In
During submitted
instruction 16, does the fact that 1a states ` intentionally assaulted' and lb only states ` assaulted'
imply that satisfying lb does not require ` intent' ?" CP at 470. Following discussion with counsel,
the trial court responded: " Regarding your question dated June 13, 2013; at 11: 38 am, please refer
1 The record on appeal does not contain the State' s proposed instructions and it is unclear who
proposed the instruction.
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to your jury instructions." CP at 471. Taylor objected to the trial court not including language
telling the jury it should refer to the specific instruction defining assault.
The jury found Taylor guilty of assault in the second degree and attempted kidnapping in
the second degree. The jury returned special verdicts finding that Taylor committed both crimes
with sexual motivation. The trial court sentenced Taylor to 126 months to life confinement. Taylor
timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Taylor argues that the " to convict" instruction for assault in the second degree failed to
accurately instruct the jury as to the element of intent and that it relieved the State of its burden to
prove every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Law
We review jury instructions for errors of law de novo and consider the challenged
instructions in the context of all of the jury instructions. State v. Hayward, 152 Wash. App. 632,
641 -42, 217 P.3d 354 ( 2009). Generally, a defendant cannot challenge a jury instruction on appeal
if he did not object to the instruction in the trial court. State v. Salas, 127 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 897
P.2d 1246 ( 1995). A defendant can raise such an error for the first time on appeal if the instruction
involves a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Salas, 127 Wash. 2d at 182. Instructing the
jury in a manner that relieves the State of its burden of proof is an error of constitutional magnitude
that a defendant can raise for the first time on appeal. State v. Byrd, 125 Wash. 2d 707, 714, 887 P.2d
396 ( 1995).
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B. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on the Elements of Assault in the
Second Degree
The jury may look to the instructions as a whole for a complete statement of the elements
of the crime charged. See State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 605 -06, 940 P.2d 546 ( 1997). Our
Supreme Court applied this principle in Byrd when it held that " the instructions, taken in their
entirety" must inform the jury that the State had the burden of proving that the defendant acted
with intent to create a reasonable apprehension of harm. 125 Wash. 2d at 714 -16. Similarly, Division
Three of this court looked to the instructions as a whole to determine whether they cured the
deficiency found in a " to convict" instruction for assault in the second degree that omitted the
element of intent. State v. Hall, 104 Wn. App. 56, 63, 14 P.3d 884 ( 2000) ( no error where " to
convict" instruction omitted the intent element because instructions as a whole properly informed
the jury that intent was essential element of assault in the third degree).
Here, the State charged Taylor with alternative means of committing assault in the second
degree. The State alleged Taylor either ( 1) intentionally assaulted H.H. and recklessly inflicted
substantial bodily harm or he ( 2) assaulted H.H. with a deadly weapon. The court instructed the
jury using the standard WPIC language. 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 35. 12, at 465 ( 3d ed. 2008). The first alternative is written to encompass
both of the mens rea required to prove it. The second alternative involves only one mens rea.
Taylor' s argument is that the juxtaposition of these alternatives is error. We disagree. To
prove both alternatives, the State had to prove that an assault occurred. Jury instruction 9 correctly
defined " assault ": "[ a] n assault is an intentional touching or striking of another person that is
harmful or offensive." CP at 443 ( Instr. 9). The first alternative required that the State prove that
Taylor also recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm. We presume that the jury reads and
follows the instructions as a whole. State v. Alford, 25 Wash. App. 661, 670, 611 P.2d 1268 ( 1980),
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affd, State v. Claborn, 95 Wash. 2d 629, 628 P.2d 467 ( 1981). Here, the instructions as a whole
properly informed the jury the State had to prove intent in both alternatives of assault in the second
degree. The trial court did not err.
Taylor further argues that the jury' s question regarding the intent element indicates that it
believed the State did not have to prove intent to convict Taylor of assault in the second degree.
We disagree. A jury question, if properly answered, cannot create an assumption as to the basis
for the jury' s decision. See State v. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d 32, 43, 750 P.2d 632 ( 1988) ( jury's question
does not create an inference that the entire jury was confused, or that any confusion was not
clarified before a final verdict was reached). "` [ questions from the jury are not final
determinations, and the decision of the jury is contained exclusively in the verdict. ' Ng, 110
Wash. 2d at 43 ( quoting State v. Miller, 40 Wn. App. 483, 489, 698 P.2d 1123 ( 1985)). Questions
from the jury cannot be used to impeach a verdict. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d at 43. The jury's question
during deliberations does not establish that the jury convicted Taylor without finding the required
element of intent. Therefore, Taylor' s claim fails and we hold that the trial court properly
instructed the jury.
II. COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE
Taylor argues that the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence when it
the to jury instructions. ' Br.
responded to the jury' s question with statement, "' please refer your
of Appellant at 11 ( quoting CP at 471). Specifically, Taylor argues that the trial court' s response
directing the jury to refer to its instructions lowered the State' s burden of proof and violated due
process. We disagree.
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A. Standard of Review and Law
Article IV, § 16 of the Washington constitution prohibits judges from commenting on
evidence. State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250, 275, 985 P.2d 289 ( 1999). We review constitutional
questions de novo. State v. Cubias, 155 Wash. 2d 549, 552, 120 P.3d 929 ( 2005). " To constitute a
comment on the evidence, it must appear that the [ trial] court's attitude toward the merits of the
State
cause are reasonably inferable from the nature or manner of the [ trial] court's statements."
v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 267, 525 P.2d 731 ( 1974); see also State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263,
283, 751 P.2d 1165 ( 1988) ( " An impermissible comment on the evidence is an indication to the
jury of the judge' s personal attitudes toward the merits of the cause. "). "[ A]ny remark that has the
potential effect of suggesting that the jury need not consider an element of an offense could qualify
as judicial comment." State v. Levy, 156 Wash. 2d 709, 721, 132 P.3d 1076 ( 2006).
B. The Trial Court Did Not Comment on the Evidence
Here, the trial responded to the jury' s question by instructing the jury to " refer to [ its] jury
instructions." CP at 471. As discussed previously, the jury instructions as a whole properly
informed the the intent in the degree. The trial court' s
jury of specific element of assault second
response neither suggested nor had the potential to suggest that the jury need not consider an
element of an offense. Nothing in the trial court' s response indicates the judge' s personal attitudes
towards the merits of the cause. We hold that the trial court' s response was not a judicial comment.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Taylor argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct on two occasions while
cross -examining Taylor. First, the prosecuting attorney asked Taylor about the defense' s opening
statement. Second, the prosecuting attorney asked Taylor if he had discussed with his attorney a
desire to engage in sexual conduct with the victim. Taylor also argues the prosecuting attorney
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committed misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by stating that there is no difference
between the mens rea required for assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree. We
hold that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred.
A. Standard of Review
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant bears the burden to establish both that
1) the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by making inappropriate remarks, and (2) those
remarks had prejudicial effect. See State v. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d 741, 759 -61, 278 P.3d 653 ( 2012).
If the defendant meets that burden, we may reverse the defendant's conviction. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d
at 760 -61. We review whether misconduct prejudiced the defendant under one of two different
standards of review. Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61.
If the defendant objected at trial, then we analyze whether there is a substantial likelihood
that the prosecuting attorney' s misconduct prejudiced the defendant by affecting the jury's verdict.
Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760. But where the defendant failed to object to the prosecuting attorney' s
misconduct at trial, we apply a different, heightened standard of review. See Emery, 174 Wash. 2d
at 761. Under this heightened standard of review, the defendant must show that the prosecuting
attorney' s misconduct " was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured
the resulting prejudice." Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760 -61. This heightened standard of review
requires the defendant to show that "( 1) ` no curative instruction would have obviated any
prejudicial effect on the jury' and ( 2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that ` had a substantial
likelihood of affecting the jury verdict. ' Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 761 ( quoting State v. Thorgerson,
172 Wash. 2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43 ( 2011)). We focus " more on whether the resulting prejudice
could have been cured." Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 762.
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B. No Prosecutorial Misconduct
1. Cross -Examination of Taylor
Taylor' s counsel objected to both instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during
cross -examination of Taylor and the trial court sustained the objections. The trial court instructed
the jury that the evidence it was to consider during deliberations consisted of testimony from
witnesses, stipulations, and exhibits admitted during the trial and that it was to disregard any
inadmissible evidence. There is no misconduct or error.
Here, the prosecuting attorney' s questions, while improper, do not amount to misconduct.
The prosecuting attorney merely asked two objectionable questions on an issue that Taylor testified
to during direct examination. Taylor quickly objected to both questions and the trial court
sustained both objections before Taylor answered. There is no substantial likelihood that the
prosecuting attorney' s questions affected the jury because the trial court instructed the jury to
consider only the evidence, not the statements or remarks from counsel. We presume that the jury
follows the trial court' s instructions. State y. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 861, 822 P.2d 177 ( 1991).
Taylor claims that the prosecuting attorney' s questions affected the entire trial such that
the jury could not render a fair verdict. We disagree because the prosecuting attorney' s questions
had no prejudicial effect. The jury heard from Taylor during direct examination that he hoped to
engage in sexual conduct with H.H. that night. Taylor also testified that he went to the area of the
incident to locate a prostitute and that he believed H.H. was a prostitute. The jury also heard that
prior to the incident, Taylor told a friend that he was "' hornier than [ expletive]." RP ( June 3,
2013) at 159. The jury also heard that prior to striking H.H. with his vehicle, H.H. did not hear
Taylor honk the horn or apply the brakes, or see him swerve out of the way. After impact, Taylor
attempted to pick H.H. up off the ground, she struggled, and Taylor dropped her. The jury heard
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that when asked by law enforcement about whether the mechanical issues of his vehicle were the
reason he struck H. H., Taylor replied that wasn' t the reason. Given this evidence,. there is no
substantial likelihood that the prosecuting attorney' s improper cross -examination prejudiced or
affected the jury' s verdict. See Emery, 174 Wash. 2d at 760. Therefore, we hold that no prosecutorial
misconduct occurred during cross -examination of Taylor.
2. Rebuttal Closing Argument
Taylor next argues that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct during the State' s
rebuttal closing argument by misstating the law and thereby lowering the State' s burden of proof.
Taylor did not object. Therefore, we analyze whether the alleged misconduct was so flagrant and
ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.
We review a prosecuting attorney' s comments during closing argument in the context of
the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury
instructions. State v. Carver, 122 Wn. App. 300, 306, 93 P.3d 947 ( 2004). In addition, a
prosecuting attorney' s improper remarks are not grounds for reversal if the defense counsel invited
or provoked the comments, they are a pertinent reply to defense counsel's arguments, and are not
so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. Carver, 122 Wash. App. at 306.
Here, the prosecuting attorney' s comments during rebuttal closing argument were a
pertinent reply to defense counsel' s arguments. The prosecuting attorney responded to the defense
attorney' s comment that "[ c] ounsel stated to you during closing [ argument] just moments ago that
for [ a] ssault 2, the State only has to prove that Mr. Taylor recklessly inflicted. Wrong." RP ( June
12, 2013) at 44. Furthermore, the statements were not improper because the prosecuting attorney
did not misstate the law. Under RCW 9A.36. 021( 1)( a), a person commits assault in the second
degree if he "[ i] ntentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily
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harm." This crime is comprised of an act, assault, and a result, substantial bodily arm. See State
v. Tunney, 129 Wash. 2d 336, 341, 917 P.2d 95 ( 1996). The mens rea of intentionally relates to the
act of assault and the mens rea of recklessly relates to the result of substantial bodily harm. Read
in context, the prosecuting attorney correctly stated that intent " applies to every assault." RP ( June
12, 2013) at 93. The prosecutor referenced the infliction of substantial bodily injury by stating,
I] f [Taylor] committed [ a] ssault 3, then he certainly committed [ a] ssault 2, because in order to
commit [ a] ssault 2, the only difference is that [ Taylor] has to act recklessly instead of negligently
and reckless simply requires, it' s Instruction No. 18." RP ( June 12, 2013) at 94. The prosecuting
attorney did not argue that intent is not an essential element of assault, did not misstate the law,
and did not lower the State' s burden of proof.
Even if the prosecuting attorney misstated the law during rebuttal closing argument, Taylor
cannot show that the comments were so prejudicial that a curative instruction would have been
ineffective. Here, no prejudice resulted from the State' s closing argument because, as discussed
above, the trial court properly instructed the jury on assault in the second degree with its required
form of intent. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to consider only the evidence, not
the statements or remarks from counsel. Therefore, Taylor' s argument fails and we hold that no
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the State' s rebuttal closing argument.
IV. TAYLOR' S STATEMENTS
Taylor argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted Taylor' s statement regarding what he thought the alleged victim was thinking during the
incident under ER 401 and ER 403. At trial, however, Taylor' s sole objection to the admission of
this evidence was under ER 701. He does not appeal the court' s decision on that basis. Because
Taylor must assign error " only on a specific ground made at trial," and does not allege a manifest
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error affecting a constitutional right, this argument is not proper. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d
918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 ( 2007); RAP 2. 5( a)( 3).
V. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Finally, Taylor argues that we should reverse his convictions under the cumulative error
doctrine. Application of the cumulative error doctrine " is limited to instances when there have
been several trial errors that standing alone may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when
combined may deny a defendant a fair trial." State v. Greiff, 141 Wash. 2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390
2000). Because no errors occurred, no cumulative and enduring prejudice occurred that likely
affected the jury' s verdict. Therefore, no accumulation of error denied Taylor a fair trial. We hold
this claim is without merit.
We affirm Taylor' s convictions.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
Worswick, P. J.
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