In Re Perry D Sipe, V Melissa L. Sipe ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                               Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    February 7, 2017
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    PERRY DALE SIPE,                                                No. 48499-4-II
    Appellant,
    v.
    MELISSA LYNN SIPE,                                       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Respondent,
    WORSWICK, P.J. — Perry Sipe appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition for
    postsecondary support. He argues that the superior court erred by ruling that the petition for
    postsecondary support was untimely because it was filed after the Sipes’ daughter turned 18, as
    required by the child support order. Perry1 argues that the petition for postsecondary support was
    timely filed because child support continued until the child graduated high school. We disagree
    and affirm.
    1
    Because both parties have the same last name, we refer to the parties by their first names. No
    disrespect is intended.
    No. 48499-4-II
    FACTS
    Perry and Melissa divorced in 2013. As part of the dissolution proceedings, the superior
    court entered an order of child support for their two minor children. The order addressed the
    termination of child support and conditional postsecondary educational support as follows:
    3.13 TERMINATION OF SUPPORT.
    Support shall be paid until each child reaches age 18 or graduates from high school,
    whichever is later, but not after age 19, except as otherwise provided below in
    Paragraph 3.14.
    3.14 POST SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT.
    The right to petition for post-secondary educational support is reserved so long as
    the right is exercised prior to the child turning age 18.
    Clerk’s Papers at 151.
    On May 5, 2015, Perry filed a petition for postsecondary educational support for the
    Sipes’ eldest daughter, S.S. S.S. was 18 at the time but had not yet graduated high school.
    The superior court dismissed Perry’s petition for postsecondary support as untimely
    because it was filed after S.S. had turned 18. Perry appeals dismissal of his petition.
    ANALYSIS
    I.      PETITION FOR POSTSECONDARY SUPPORT
    Perry argues that because section 3.13 of the order for child support extended child
    support until the child reached 18 or graduated high school, whichever was later, and the petition
    for postsecondary support was filed before S.S. graduated high school, the petition was timely
    filed. We disagree.
    2
    No. 48499-4-II
    Interpreting a parenting plan or a child support order is a question of law that we review
    de novo. In re Marriage of Cota, 
    177 Wn. App. 527
    , 534, 
    312 P.3d 695
     (2013). “In determining
    whether the child support order authorizes an award of postsecondary educational support, we
    look to whether ‘the support-paying parent has notice that the support obligation will extend past
    the age of majority.’” Cota, 177 Wn. App. at 534 (quoting Rains v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
    Servs., 
    98 Wn. App. 127
    , 137, 
    989 P.2d 558
     (1999)). Where the terms of a dissolution decree
    clearly state that support terminates upon the occurrence of specific events, the superior court
    lacks authority to consider a postsecondary educational support award after the occurrence of
    those events. Cota, 177 Wn. App. at 534.
    Here, paragraph 3.13 of the child support order required Melissa to pay child support
    until S.S. graduated from high school. Perry argues that because child support had not
    terminated prior to his petition for postsecondary support, his petition was not untimely. In
    effect, Perry is arguing that paragraph 3.13 essentially nullifies paragraph 3.14 which expressly
    states that a petition for postsecondary support must be exercised prior to the child reaching the
    age of 18.
    Perry relies exclusively on our opinion in Cota, 177 Wn. App at 527. However, Cota is
    factually distinguishable.
    In Cota, the order of child support expressly provided for postsecondary support and
    required the parties to pay their shares of any postsecondary expenses. Cota, 177 Wn. App. at
    535. There, we held that because the order expressly provided that the postsecondary support
    obligation would not terminate when the child turned 18, the petition for postsecondary support
    3
    No. 48499-4-II
    was timely. Cota, 177 Wn. App. at 535. In contrast, the order of child support here expressly
    terminated the potential for postsecondary support at the age of 18.
    The order of child support at issue was explicit as to when a petition for postsecondary
    support must be filed. Because paragraph 3.14 expressly provided that a petition for
    postsecondary support must be filed prior to the child turning 18, the superior court had no
    authority to award postsecondary support because the petition was filed after S.S. had turned 18.
    Paragraph 3.13 did not create an exception for Perry to file the petition for postsecondary support
    after S.S. turned 18.
    Consequently, we hold that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition for
    postsecondary support as untimely.
    II.     ATTORNEY FEES
    Melissa requests attorney fees under RAP 18.9, arguing that Perry’s appeal was frivolous.
    We agree.
    “An appeal is frivolous if, considering the entire record, the court is convinced that the
    appeal presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and that the
    appeal is so devoid of merit that there is no possibility of reversal.” Advocates for Responsible
    Dev. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 
    170 Wn.2d 577
    , 580, 
    245 P.3d 764
     (2010). An
    appeal is not frivolous where the appellant raises even one debatable issue. Advocates, 
    170 Wn.2d at 580
    .
    4
    No. 48499-4-II
    Here, Perry’s appeal presented no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might
    differ. Because Perry’s appeal was frivolous, we grant Melissa’s request for attorney fees and
    costs in an amount to be determined by the commissioner of this court pursuant to RAP 18.1(d).
    We affirm.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
    2.06.040, it is so ordered.
    Worswick, P.J.
    We concur:
    Johanson, J.
    Sutton, J.
    5