State of Washington v. Thomas L. Parker ( 2015 )

FILED
JUNE 2,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 31857-5-111
)
Respondent, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v. )
)
THOMAS L. PARKER, )
)
Appellant. )
BROWN, A.C.J. - Thomas L. Parker appeals his 2013 Franklin County second
degree robbery conviction. He contends: (1) the information omitted an essential element
of the offense of second degree robbery, that he used or threatened to use force to retain
the stolen items, (2) the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included
offense of third degree theft, and (3) the trial court erred by including two prior Arkansas
convictions in his offender score. In his pro se statement of additional grounds for
review, he asserts that he had ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We
affrrm his judgment and sentence.
No. 31857-5-111
State v. Parker
FACTS
The charge here arose in November 2012, when a Rite Aid employee-Zachariah
Briggs~saw Mr. Parker take two bottles of tequila off the store shelf and secrete them in
his pants. After Mr. Parker left the store without paying (setting off the alarm), Mr.
Briggs approached, and Mr. Parker immediately lowered his head and rammed his
shoulder into him. Another Rite Aid employee witnessed Mr. Briggs struggling to subdue
Mr. Parker and went to help. At this point, Mr. Parker threw the bottles of tequila on the
ground and hit Mr. Briggs in the face. The Rite Aid employees eventually subdued Mr.
Parker and callyd police.
The State charged Mr. Parker with one count of second degree robbery, alleging:
That the said Thomas L. Parker in the County of Franklin, State of
Washington, on or about November 27,2012, then and there, with intent to
deprive the owner of property, did unlawfully take such personal property,
to wit: two bottles of tequila which belonged to a person other than the
accused, in the presence of Zak N. Briggs, against such person's will by use
or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to the
person.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 132. The jury found him guilty as charged.
At sentencing, the State recommended an offender score of six, including three
prior Arkansas convictions of residential burglary, theft of property, and theft by
receiving, two Washington convictions of residential burglary and second degree
burglary, and one additional point for committing the current crime while on community
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State v. Parker
custody (RCW 9.94A.525). The standard range with an offender score of6 is 33 to 43
months. RCW 9.94A.510; RCW 9.94A.515; RCW 9A.56.210. Finding that "[r]ecent
changes in the theft statute result[] in an offender score that does not reflect the
legislature's intent," the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence downward of29
months. CP at 23.
A. Sufficiency of the Information
Mr. Parker first contends the information was deficient because it did not include a
necessary element-use of force to retain the property--or specific facts alleging that he
used force to retain the property. He claims that the failure to describe the specific
conduct constituting the crime was legally and factually deficient.
A charging document must contain all the essential elements of a crime to inform a
defendant of the charge and to allow preparation for a defense. State v. KWona-
Garramone, 166 Wn. App. 16,22,267 P.3d 426 (2011), review denied, 174 Wash. 2d 1014
(2012). To determine the essential elements ofa charged crime, we look to the statutory
language and construe it to avoid an absurd result. Id. (citing State v. Tinker, 155 Wn.2d
219,221, 118 P.3d 885 (2005); and State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572,578,210 P.3d 1007
(2009)).
The standard of review for a challenge of the criminal information depends on the
timing of the challenge. KWona-Garramone, 166 Wash. App. at 23. If the defendant
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State v. Parker
challenged the sufficiency of the infonnation before or at trial,. we construe the
infonnation strictly. State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash. 2d 782, 788, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995). "If,
however, a defendant moves to dismiss an allegedly insufficient charging document after
a point when the State can no longer amend the infonnation, such as when the State has
rested its case,'~ the infonnation is construed liberally in favor of validity. Kiliona-
Garramone, 166 Wash. App. at 23.
Because Mr. Parker did not challenge the sufficiency of the infonnation until after
the State rested its case, we liberally construe the language of the charging document in
favor of validity. Id. Under this standard, we detennine whether the necessary facts
appear in any fonn or fair construction of the language in the charging document, and if
so, whether Mr. Parker can show that he was nonetheless actually prejudiced by a lack of
notice. State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash. 2d 93, 105-06, 812 P .2d 86 (1991); Kiliona-
Garramone, 166 Wash. App. at 25.
Here, the infonnation alleged Mr. Parker "with intent to deprive the owner of
property, did unlawfully take such personal property, to wit: two bottles of tequila" in the
presence ofMr: Briggs, and against such person's will by use or threatened use of force.
CP at 132. The essential elements of robbery are defined in RCW 9A.56.l90, partly
stating a person commits robbery "when he or she unlawfully takes personal property
from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or
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No.3l857-5-III
State v. Parker
threatened use of immediate force." This force or fear "must be used to obtain or retain
possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking." RCW
9A.56.l90. The language of the information closely tracks the statutory language and
specifically names the personal property taken (two bottles of tequila), as well as the
person who was present at the taking and against whom force was used to take and retain
the tequila (Mr. Briggs). Consequently, the necessary facts are included and gave Mr.
Parker ample notice of the charge against him.
B. Lesser Included Offense
Mr. Parker next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a jury
instruction on third degree theft as a lesser included offense of second degree robbery. A
defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction when: (1) each element of the
lesser offense is a necessary element of the charged offense, and (2) the evidence supports
an inference that the lesser offense was actually committed. State v. Henderson, _
Wn.2d _,344 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2015) (citing State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443,447-48,
584 P.2d 382 (1978)).
Both Mr. Parker and the State agree the elements of third degree theft-wrongfully
obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over the property of another with intent to
deprive-are necessary elements of second degree robbery. RCW 9A.56.020, .050, .190,
.210. The issue then is whether the evidence supports an inference that only third degree
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No. 31857-5-III
State v. Parker
theft was committed. We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion.
Henderson, 344 PJd at 1212.
Here, the evidence does not support an inference that only third degree theft
occurred. Robbery involves the unlawful taking or retaining of property with the use of
force or fear. State v. Handburgh, 119 Wash. 2d 284, 293, 830 P .2d 641 (1992). Mr. Parker
admitted a struggle occurred here, testifying that the Rite Aid employees grabbed him for
no reason. Accordingly, his own testimony established he used force, and does not
support an inference that he committed solely theft.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The evidence of force shows Mr. Parker's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel lacks merit. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show
his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and this
deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Mr. Parker contends his counsel should have
moved at trial to dismiss the charge (erroneously referred to as "2nd degree assault"
(statement of additional grounds for review at 1)), and should have sought dismissal on
appeal on the basis that the evidence does not show that he used or threatened the use of
force when taking the tequila. Because these challenges would not have been successful
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No. 31857-5-III
State v. Parker
at trial or on appeal, he cannot show prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
D. Offender Score
Mr. Parker assigns error to the trial court's inclusion of two prior Arkansas
convictions in his offender score of 6. He contends the 2005 Arkansas convictions of
residential burglary and theft of property are not legally comparable to Washington
offenses and should have been excluded under RCW 9.94A.525(3). The State asserts this
issue is moot because Mr. Parker has completed his confinement in Washington and is
currently serving a sentence in an Arkansas prison. We agree.
An issue is moot if this court can no longer provide the requested relief. State v.
Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220,228,95 P.3d 1225 (2004). We may still decide an issue, however,
if it involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest. State v. Hunley, 175
Wn.2d 901,907,287 P.3d 584 (2012).
The remedy for an incorrect offender score is to remand to the superior court for
resentencing with the correct score. State v. Tili, 148 Wash. 2d 350, 358, 60 P.3d 1192
(2003). This resentencing may result in less confinement. See Ross, 152 Wash. 2d at 228.
Even if Mr. Parker returns to Washington to serve his term of community custody, and
even ifhe receives a reduced sentence due to a remand for correction of the offender
score, any excess time he served in prison cannot be credited toward his sentence of
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State v. Parker
community custody. See State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236,242-43,257 PJd 616 (2011).
And he does not show that this issue involves matters of continuing and substantial public
interest justifying a decision. Thus, because this court can no longer provide him
effective relief, we find that the challenge of his offender score is moot.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Brown, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
~.
Feari~
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