State Of Washington, Respondent/cr-appellant v. Brian David Martin, Appellant/cr-respondent ( 2019 )


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  •      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    No. 77547-2-I
    Respondent,
    v.                                        DIVISION ONE
    BRIAN DAVID MARTIN,                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                FILED: April 29, 2019
    LEACH, J.   —    Brian Martin appeals his convictions for possession of a
    controlled substance (Alprazolam) and driving under the influence (DUI).        He
    challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, claiming
    that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.           Because
    substantial evidence supports the trial court’s challenged findings of fact showing
    probable cause, Martin does not show error. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Procedural Facts
    Following a vehicle accident, the State charged Martin with possession of
    a controlled substance, DUI (drugs), and bail jumping.      Martin asked the trial
    court to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest.     Martin claimed that the
    arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. The trial court denied
    No. 77547-2-I I 2
    Martin’s request and concluded, based on its 25 factual findings, that the totality
    of the circumstances provided probable cause to arrest Martin for DUI. After a
    five-day trial, the jury found Martin guilty as charged. Martin appeals.
    Substantive Facts
    Witness Merle Humphreys testified at trial that on November 15, 2014,
    between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., he was driving southbound on Interstate 5 (1-5)
    when he saw Martin’s Jaguar hit a truck in front of him. Humphreys testified that
    he was traveling at 75 m.p.h. on cruise control and Martin “flew by [him].” Martin
    passed Humphreys in the far right lane and “at the last minute he went to veer
    and       ipped the back of the truck and went tumbling down the freeway.”
    Martin’s car flipped end to end and came to a stop in the far left lane.
    Humphreys described the collision as “violent” and stated that he “was surprised
    that somebody even lived through it. [He] wouldn’t have walked over to that car if
    [he] could have because it looked so mangled.” He pulled over to the side of the
    road. Later, he talked to “the State Patrol [who he] filled out the statement for” at
    the scene.
    Corey Webb, the driver of the truck that Martin hit, testified at trial that he
    was driving a milk truck tank trailer at about 55 or 60 m.p.h. when he felt Martin’s
    car strike the left rear corner of the truck. After the collision, Webb’s truck “had a
    flat tire, the fender was bent up, and a couple welds were broken on the
    suspension.” Webb talked to “law enforcement” at the scene of the collision.
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    No. 77547-2-I I 3
    Antonio Tararan, an off-duty police detective, also saw the collision. He
    testified at trial that he first saw Martin’s car behind him “traveling extremely
    quickly.”   Martin’s car “got so close” that he could not see Martin’s car’s
    headlights in his rearview mirror and thought Martin was going to hit his vehicle.
    Tararan then saw Martin hit the back of the milk truck. He approached Martin
    after the collision.    He testified that Martin’s eyes were watery and he was
    stumbling and slurring his words. Tararan also remembered that Martin “was
    very determined to try to find medication in the vehicle.” Martin said it was his
    uncle’s medication and then stated that he had changed lanes and someone had
    hit him. Tararan told Martin that it was Martin who had hit the truck. While
    Tararan was speaking with Martin, Tararan observed that Martin was trying to
    pick up a reflector attached to the roadway. Tararan testified that Martin was
    “very kind of blasé about what had happened.    .   .   .   Wasn’t really concerned about,
    you know, was anyone else hurt, you know, what had really happened. It was
    like, ‘We need to find the pill bottle.” When Trooper John Tyler, the responding
    officer, arrived, Tararan told Tyler what he had seen.
    Tyler testified at the suppression hearing that he received a call about the
    collision around 9:20 p.m.     Tyler stated that he was not and is not a drug
    recognition expert (DRE), which requires training in addition to the Washington
    State Patrol (WSP) Academy training and the advanced drug intoxication
    detection training.    He attended six months of basic WSP Academy training,
    which included 40 hours of DUI investigation training, and some, but not all, of
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    No. 77547-2-1/4
    the   WSP advanced training in drug intoxication detection. He had made at least
    two previous arrests for drug-related DUIs involving a drug other than marijuana.
    Tyler testified that when he contacted Martin, “It was very hard to
    understand what he was saying. It was very—very slurred speech, almost to the
    point that a lot of it didn’t sound like speech so much as just sort of incoherent
    noises.” Tyler described Martin’s physical appearance as “[v]ery relaxed, almost
    to where he looked like.     .   .   he was falling asleep. He seemed to have a really
    hard time keeping his eyes opened.” Tyler described Martin’s coordination as
    “very poor. Seemed to have a very hard time just—staying on his feet.” Tyler
    observed that “[Martin d]idn’t seem to understand the severity of the actual
    collision that had happened.”            While Tyler and Martin were walking toward
    Martin’s car to retrieve his identification,
    he went over to the shoulder. The front bumper of the car was
    laying in the median of the interstate, and he walked over to the
    front bumper, and he was kind of bending over, and trying to grab it
    while he’s trying to stay on his feet. He had to be instructed a
    couple of times to leave the front bumper. He was trying to drag it
    with him back towards the car.             [H]e was struggling pretty
    .   .   .
    significantly just to lean over to grab the bumper.
    Tyler also testified that Martin did not have any “obvious injuries” to his
    limbs or torso that would explain his lack of coordination, did not complain of any
    injuries at the time, was generally oriented to their conversation, and provided
    answers to Tyler’s questions. Tyler acknowledged that difficulty staying awake,
    slurred speech, and lack of balance could be symptoms consistent with a head
    injury. He observed blood coming from Martin’s mouth and hand. The aid crew
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    No. 77547-2-I I 5
    assessed Martin at the scene but did not transport him anywhere.                Martin
    testified at the suppression hearing that he was later treated for a head injury and
    two broken bones in his back.
    Tyler affirmed that he ‘spoke with the witnesses, specifically, [Tararan], to
    get their version of how the collision occurred.” Tyler learned from the witnesses
    that Martin moved into the right lane to pass traffic and then struck the rear of the
    truck as he tried to change lanes. Tyler believed that the damage to the front of
    Martin’s Jaguar was from the initial contact with the truck and the damage to the
    sides and top of the Jaguar appeared fresh because it was not rusted. Tyler also
    stated that Tararan told him that he had seen Martin grab a prescription pill bottle
    from the shoulder of the interstate. After his conversation with Tararan, Tyler
    found an orange prescription pill bottle with no label in the median near the
    accident scene. The bottle contained several pills, which Martin told Tyler were
    his paraplegic uncle’s pills. Tyler testified that based on his observations and the
    witnesses’ statements, he thought Martin was likely impaired by “some sort of
    drugs.”
    Martin consented to provide a sample for the portable breath test (PBT)
    and did the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test.            The PBT did not show
    alcohol impairment, and the HGN test did not show nystagmus. But Tyler noted
    that while he was conducting the HGN test, Martin still had “heavily slurred”
    speech and was “having a very hard time keeping his eyes open and several
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    No. 77547-2-I I 6
    times looked like he was either passing out or falling asleep.” Following these
    tests, Tyler arrested Martin for DUI.
    After Martin’s arrest, Trooper Anson Statema, a DRE, performed a drug
    evaluation on Martin and concluded that he was under the influence of a narcotic
    analgesic like heroin, Oxycodone, or OxyContin. Martin received a blood draw at
    Providence Hospital after the DRE exam pursuant to a warrant. His blood tested
    positive for the opiate Oxycodone and the benzodiazepines Aiprazolam (Xanax),
    Diazepam, and Nordiazepam. The Washington State Crime Lab tested the pills
    in the prescription bottle. They were Alprazolam.
    ANALYSIS
    Martin challenges two of the trial court’s findings of fact in its order
    denying his motion to suppress and contends that the court’s remaining findings
    do not support its conclusion that Tyler had probable cause to arrest him. We
    disagree.
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
    section 7 of the Washington Constitution both require that probable cause
    support a warrantless arrest.1      “Probable cause exists where the facts and
    circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which the officer
    has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of
    reasonable caution in a belief that an offense has been committed. Probable
    1State v. lnman, 
    2 Wash. App. 281
    , 287-88, 
    409 P.3d 1138
    , review denied,
    
    190 Wash. 2d 1022
    (2018).
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    No. 77547-2-I I 7
    cause is not a technical inquiry.”2 This determination rests on “the totality of facts
    and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest.”3
    When reviewing the denial of a request to suppress evidence, we
    determine whether substantial evidence presented at the suppression hearing
    supports the challenged findings of fact and whether the findings support the
    conclusions of law.4 “Evidence is substantial when it is enough ‘to persuade a
    fair-minded person of the truth of the stated premise.”5 Unchallenged findings
    are true on appeal.6 We review conclusions of law de novo.7
    First, Martin challenges the finding that “Trooper Tyler had direct
    observation of the defendant. The trooper is not a Drug Recognition Expert, but
    is qualified to make observations and reach an opinion based on his training and
    experience.”   Martin asserts that substantial evidence does not support this
    finding “to the extent [that it] is meant to indicate Trooper Tyler was qualified to
    find probable cause at the time of [the] arrest.” He states that Tyler had some
    cause to suspect that he was driving impaired as a result of his slurred speech,
    difficulty staying awake, and compromised balance. But he contends that Tyler’s
    testimony that these symptoms could have been consistent with a head injury
    shows Tyler did not have probable cause to arrest him.
    2 State v. Terrovona, 
    105 Wash. 2d 632
    , 643, 
    716 P.2d 295
    (1986).
    ~ State v. Fricks, 
    91 Wash. 2d 391
    , 398, 
    588 P.2d 1328
    (1979).
    ~ State v. Garvin, 
    166 Wash. 2d 242
    , 249, 
    207 P.3d 1266
    (2009).
    ~ 
    Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d at 249
    (quoting State v. Reid, 
    98 Wash. App. 152
    , 156,
    
    988 P.2d 1038
    (1999)).
    6 State v. O’Neill, 
    148 Wash. 2d 564
    , 571, 
    62 P.3d 489
    (2003).
    ~ 
    Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d at 249
    .
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    No. 77547-2-I I 8
    Consistent with the court’s finding, Tyler testified that he interacted with
    Martin at the scene and was not a DRE. Contrary to Martin’s argument, Tyler’s
    observation of symptoms possibly consistent with a head injury does not
    establish that he could not rely on those and other observations to form an
    opinion that alcohol or drugs caused Martin’s admitted impairment.              Tyler
    completed the basic training that the WSP requires before a trooper may conduct
    DUI   accident investigations.       Martin’s   suppression    request raised     the
    constitutional issue of whether Tyler had sufficient evidence of impairment to
    provide probable cause to arrest Martin, not whether Tyler was qualified to make
    observations and draw from them opinions about impairment.                Substantial
    evidence supports the court’s finding.
    Second, Martin challenges the court’s finding, “The driving is consistent
    with operating [a] motor vehicle under the influence. The defendant was driving
    on 1-5 and rear ended [a] milk truck after passing other vehicles on the right.
    That driving is indicative of impairment.”      He claims the suppression hearing
    record does not support a finding that his driving pattern shows impaired driving.
    But Tyler testified about the observations the witnesses reported to him. And
    they saw Martin passing vehicles in the far right lane of the interstate at high
    speed before huffing the back of a milk truck while trying to change lanes. Martin
    appears to claim that evidence of his aggressive driving is not, in itself, sufficient
    to establish probable cause. But the trial court did not make this finding. The
    trial court found that Martin’s driving was a piece of evidence that supported a
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    No. 77547-2-I I 9
    conclusion that he drove while impaired. The court did not base its probable
    cause conclusion on just this finding but on the totality of the circumstances
    known to Tyler. The record supports the court’s challenged finding about part of
    these circumstances.
    Last, Martin claims that the trial court’s conclusion of law that Tyler had
    probable cause to arrest him for DUI does not flow from the remaining findings.
    But because substantial evidence supports the findings that Martin challenges
    and Martin does not claim that the court’s conclusion does not flow from all 25
    findings, we do not address this claim. Similarly, because he does not show that
    his arrest was unlawful, we do not address his claim that the court should not
    have admitted the results of the DRE evaluation and the blood draw completed
    after his arrest.
    CONCLUSION
    Affirmed.
    /
    WE CONCUR:
    did      IC                          _______________________
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