Windsor Park I, Llc v. Carolyn Weikel, Snohomish County Auditor ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
WINDSOR PARK I, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company, DIVISION ONE
Appellant, No. 78177-4-1
V. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CAROLYN WEIKEL, SNOHOMISH
COUNTY AUDITOR, FILED: April 15, 2019
DWYER, J. — Windsor Park I, LLC appeals from a trial court order
dismissing its lawsuit seeking declaratory relief against the Snohomish County
Auditor. The trial court determined that no justiciable controversy existed that
would entitle Windsor Park I to relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act,'chapter 7.24 RCW. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Windsor Park I, LLC (Windsor Park) is a developer of real property in
Snohomish County. On November 1, 2016, Windsor Park submitted an
application for a formal plat and name reservation to the Snohomish County
Auditor (county auditor)for the name "Windsor Park I." This name had not been
reserved nor reserved for use on any recorded plat in Snohomish County. After
the county auditor refused to accept this application, Windsor Park submitted a
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revised application seeking to reserve the name "Windsor Parke," which had also
neither been used nor reserved for use at that time.
On December 20, 2016, the county auditor denied this revised application.
The auditor's denial stated that the "NAME REQUESTED IS TO[0]SIMILAR TO
EXISTING PLAT," referring to an existing plat of record with the name "Windsor
Park."
Windsor Park filed a complaint for declaratory relief on April 13, 2017.
The County filed an answer with affirmative defenses on May 5, 2017, that
disclosed the County's policy on plat name usage and reservations pursuant to
RCW 65.04.050.
Subsequently, on August 2, 2017, Windsor Park filed its first amended
complaint for declaratory relief, challenging the County's policy as noncompliant
with RCW 65.04.050. Meanwhile, Windsor Park filed a different plat name
reservation request for the name "Windsor Park RB." On July 20, 2017, the
auditor accepted this name reservation, and Windsor Park recorded a plat with
that name on October 11,2017.
Windsor Park filed a motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2018.
The County responded; its principal argument was that the case was moot as no
justiciable controversy existed. The trial court entered its order dismissing
plaintiff's claims on February 15, 2018. The court stated:
The Court, deeming itself fully advised finds that there is no
disputed or genuine issue of material fact and that the case is moot.
Alternatively, the Court finds that the Auditor properly acted within
her authority to carry out the requirements of RCW 65.04.050. The
Auditor's Policy is consistent with state law, and that the Defendant,
Carolyn Weikel, is entitled to dismissal of this action,
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No. 78177-4-1/3
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Plaintiff Windsor Park 1, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice and without
fees or costs.
Windsor Park filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court.
denied. It now appeals.
11
Windsor Park assigns error to the trial court's alternative ruling, asserting
that the trial court did not have the authority to make an adjudication on the
merits and that, if it did, the ruling that the policy was consistent with state law is
incorrect. The county auditor urges affirmance on the ground that the trial court
correctly determined that no justiciable controversy existed. The county auditor
has the better argument.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Plese-Graham,
LLC v. Loshbauph, 164 Wash. App. 530, 541, 269 P.3d 1038 (2011). Summary
judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clark v. Baines, 150
Wash. 2d 905, 911, 84 P.3d 245 (2004). An order of summary judgment may be
affirmed on any ground supported by the record. Estep v. Hamilton, 148 Wn.
App. 246, 256, 201 P.3d 331 (2008).
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act(UDJA), a court with
jurisdiction has the power to "declare rights, status and other legal relations."
RCW 7.24.010. Absent issues of major public importance, a "justiciable
controversy" must exist before a court may invoke its jurisdiction under the
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UDJA. Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wash. 2d 811, 814-15, 514 P.2d
137 (1973). A justiciable controversy has been defined as
"(1). . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature
seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant,
hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement,(2) between
parties having genuine and opposing interests,(3) which involves
interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential,
theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of
which will be final and conclusive."
Nw. Animal Rights Network v. State, 158 Wash. App. 237, 247 n.8, 242 P.3d 891
(2010)(emphasis added)(quoting Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp., 82 Wash. 2d at
815).
"A moot case is one which seeks to determine an abstract question which
does not rest upon existing facts or rights." Hansen v. W. Coast Wholesale Drug
Co., 47 Wash. 2d 825, 827, 289 P.2d 718 (1955). Generally, cases presenting moot
issues on appeal are dismissed. City of Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wash. App. 64, 66-
67, 791 P.2d 266 (1990). However, a court may address a moot issue if "matters
of continuing and substantial public interest are involved." Sorenson v. City of
Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972).
Whether a continuing and substantial public interest exists is determined
by an analysis of three factors: the public or private nature of the question
presented; the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future
guidance of public officers; and the likelihood of the question's future recurrence.
Sorenson, 80 Wash. 2d at 558. "Arguably a fourth factor exists, that being the level
of genuine adverseness and the quality of advocacy of the issues." Hart v. Dep't
of Soc. & Health Servs., 111 Wash. 2d 445, 448, 759 P.2d 1206 (1988).
4
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At the heart of Windsor Park's suit was the claim that the denial of its first
two name reservation requests was erroneous. However, Windsor Park then
filed a successful name reservation request for "Windsor Park RB." The record
supports the inference that this request applied to the same parcel of real
property as its earlier "Windsor Parke" and "Windsor Park I" request, meaning
Windsor Park effectively abandoned the earlier requests. At the time of its
decision, the trial court had no outstanding name reservation request to consider.
Furthermore, Windsor Park's claim does not meet the requirements for the
substantial public interest exception to the mootness rule. The issue of the
county auditor's authority to accept or deny plat name reservation requests has
not surfaced in any prior case law, nor has it been demonstrated to be likely to
reoccur. Thus, Windsor Park has not demonstrated that there is "an actual,
present, and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one," as required for a
court to provide declaratory relief under the UDJA. Nw. Animal Rights Network,
158 Wash. App. at 247 n.8 (quoting Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp., 82 Wash. 2d at
815). The trial court correctly determined that no justiciable controversy existed.1
Affirmed.
We concur:
1 Given this resolution, we decline the invitation to analyze the alternative basis for ruling
discussed in the trial court's order. To do so would be to produce a forbidden advisory opinion.
Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp., 82 Wash. 2d at 815. The trial court ruling that we affirm resolves this
case.
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