In re the Paternity of: O. A. J. ( 2015 )

FILED
OCTOBER 27, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Parentage of: )
) No. 32579-2-III
O.AJ., )
a minor. )
)
STATE OF WASHINGTO~, )
) OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
AMY KRISTIN JAMISESON BURNS, )
)
Respondent, )
)
CHRISTOPHER FIDEL LABER, )
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. The father appeals the child support order entered in this paternity
action, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant a deviation due to his support
of another child, erred in its calculation of the mother's income and in imputing income
to the mother, and should have explained its rejection of his other arguments. Both
parties also request attorney fees for this appeal. We agree in part with his arguments
concerning the mother's imputed income and reverse and remand this action for further
proceedings.
No. 32579-2-III
In re the Parentage ofo.AJ
FACTS
O.AJ. is the daughter of Amy Bums and Christopher Laber. The couple, who
were not married, separated in 2006 when their daughter was about two. The mother was
the primary custodian and moved to Spokane to be with her family, while the father
remained in Bellingham. O.AJ. would visit her father in the summers and Mr. Laber
made intermittent child support payments to Ms. Burns. l
In 2012, the State brought an action to establish paternity and set past and future
child support obligations. The parents agreed that Mr. Laber was the father and also
agreed to a parenting schedule. However, the support aspect of the case was heavily
contested. The parties disputed their respective incomes and resources and also made
claims for deviations from the standard child support schedule.
Mr. Laber has been employed since 2008 as a machinist in a plant that
manufactures airplane parts. His documented earnings were his only source of income.
He also argued that his future income would be less than his recent income because he
had worked some temporary overtime assignments that would not be continuing.
In contrast, the mother's income calculation was much more complicated. She
owns at least eight residential properties, and has a history of rental income on six of
them. However, the rental income on the properties has never exceeded the sum of the
IThe amount of visitation and the amount of child support previously paid were
disputed issues in the trial court, but are not issues in this appeal.
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interest on the mortgages, depreciation, property tax, and maintenance expenses. She
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also operates a colon hydrotherapy business, but every year her business expenses I
exceeded her gross receipts, resulting in her receiving no income from the business.
Finally, she also has been employed part-time in a law office since at least 2007 working
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for $13 per hour. When all of this is summed up, Ms. Bums reports negative income i!
!
every year on her taxes despite gross income in the vicinity of $90,000. Aside from
these, the mother reported no other assets, investments, or sources of income. Her I
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stepfather indicated that he helped her with living expenses. !,
II
Mr. Laber argued that Ms. Bums was hiding income, pointing to the facts that she It
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has no consumer debt, and had accumulated more than $150,000 in equity on her rental
properties. As evidence of additional income, he pointed to the mother's bank account
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records documenting total annual deposits in excess of the gross receipts reported on her i
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taxes by an average of approximately $80,000. He then argued that the court should
consider the excess bank deposits as additional income and the value of her real estate
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•f
f
,.
assets as well. In her trial court briefing and declarations, the mother described her ,
f
finances consistent with her tax returns, but never addressed the excess deposits. f
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The trial court rejected Mr. Laber's arguments and determined that Ms. Burns had
no income. The court then imputed income to her at minimum wage. Mr. Laber
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requested a deviation downward to account for child support payments he made for his
other child, but the court reasoned that his declaration alone provided insufficient proof
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that he owed a duty of support to that child. The order of child support states:
"Deduction for another child was not supported by proof of paternity and a child support
order directed by a Court." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1433. After his motion for
reconsideration was denied, Mr. Laber timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
We first address Mr. Laber's request for a downward deviation due to his other
child, before turning to his arguments that the court erred by imputing income to the
mother at minimum wage and by ignoring the additional unexplained funds in her bank
account. We then briefly consider together his contentions that the trial court did not
explain its reasoning on other matters and the request by both parties that they be
awarded attorney fees for this appeal.
Initially, we note that this court reviews child support orders for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage ofGriffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990).
Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.
In re Marriage ofLittlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). Discretion
also is abused when the court uses an incorrect legal standard. State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn.
App. 786,793,905 P.2d 922 (1995). Substantial evidence must support the trial court's
factual findings. In re Parentage ofGoude, 152 Wn. App. 784, 790, 219 P.3d 717(2009). This court will not substitute its judgment for trial court judgments if the record
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shows the court considered all relevant factors and the award is not unreasonable under
the circumstances. Griffin, 114 Wn.2d at 776.
Deviation for Additional Child
Mr. Laber argues that he is entitled to a deviation from the support schedule
because he has another child and makes support payments for that child. Ms. Burns
argues that the deviation was not available because Mr. Laber could not produce a court
order to establish that he had a support obligation. Her argument requires us to construe
the meaning of the additional child deviation provision.
Child support is set by statute with the support obligation divided proportionately
to the parents' respective income levels. RCW 26.19.001, .080(1). The statutes allow the
trial court to deviate from the standard schedule and provide a nonexclusive list of
reasons for deviation. RCW 26.19.075. Deviation is not allowed if it will leave
insufficient funds in the household receiving the support to provide for the basic needs of
the children. Id. Whenever asked to consider a deviation request, the trial court must
explain its rationale for ruling:
The court shall enter findings that specify reasons for any deviation or any
denial of a party's request for any deviation from the standard calculation
made by the court. The court shall not consider reasons for deviation until
the court determines the standard calculation for each parent.
RCW 26.19.075(3).
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We review the court's deviation request ruling for abuse of discretion. RCW
26.19.075(4); In re Marriage ofRusch, 124 Wn. App. 226, 236,98 P.3d 1216 (2004),
overruled in part on other grounds by In re Marriage ofMcCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607,
152 P.3d 1013 (2007). Substantial evidence must support the trial court's factual
findings. Goude, 152 Wn. App. at 790. This court will not substitute its judgment for
trial court judgments if the record shows the court considered all relevant factors and the
award is not unreasonable under the circumstances. Griffin, 114 Wn.2d at 776.
The specific deviation at issue here is found in RCW 26.19.075(1). It provides:
(e) Children from other relationships. The court may deviate from
the standard calculation when either or both of the parents before the court
have children from other relationships to whom the parent owes a duty of
support.
(i) The child support schedule shall be applied to the mother, father,
and children of the family before the court to determine the presumptive
amount of support.
(ii) Children from other relationships shall not be counted in the
number of children for purposes of determining the basic support obligation
and the standard calculation.
(iii) When considering a deviation from the standard calculation for
children from other relationships, the court may consider only other
children to whom the parent owes a duty of support. The court may
consider court-ordered payments of child support for children from other
relationships only to the extent that the support is actually paid.
(iv) When the court has determined that either or both parents have
children from other relationships, deviations under this section shall be
based on consideration of the total circumstances of both households. All
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child support obligations paid, received, and owed for all children shall be
disclosed and considered.
(Emphasis added.) This legislation was created by Laws of 1991, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 28,
§ 6.
The concept of "duty of support" is not explained in chapter 26.19 RCW, but is
defined in chapter 26.18 RCW, the child support enforcement chapter.
"Duty of support" means the duty to provide for the needs of a
dependent child, which may include necessary food, clothing, shelter,
education, and health care. The duty includes any obligation to make
monetary payments, to pay expenses, including maintenance in cases in
which there is a dependent child, or to reimburse another person or an
agency for the cost of necessary support furnished a dependent child. The
duty may be imposed by court order, by operation of law, or otherwise.
RCW 26.l8.020(3) (emphasis added). This definition was enacted in by Laws of 1984,
ch. 260, § 2. The statute sets forth a very broad duty of supporting dependent children,
while specifically referencing financial support within that definition. The final sentence
of the definition concerning enforceable financial support obligations is primarily at issue
in this action.
The mother reads the sentence as precluding the father from receiving any
deviation because he has no duty to support his other child in the absence of a court
order. Noting that the "duty of support" obligation is not further defined in chapter
26.19, she argues that the plain language of RCW 26.19.07 5( 1)(e) requires that the
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No. 32579-2-III
In re the Parentage ofOAJ
obligation be court-ordered. The trial court agreed. We believe that position unduly
limits the statute's reach.
Initially, we conclude that the definition of "duty of support" in RCW
26.18.020(3), the child support enforcement statute, does apply to chapter 26.19, the child
support statute. Both chapters address the general topic of child support in different
areas, with one chapter charged with setting support and the other charged with enforcing
it. In order to be effectual, the enforcement statute and the support statute would have to
use the same standard. As the enforcement statute predates the current support statute, it
also is understandable that the legislature would look to the existing (enforcement) statute
when directing courts on how to measure the support obligation. 2 The question then
presented by this case involves the meaning of the final sentence of the "duty of support"
definition.
The phrase "duty of support" has a long history in our statutes. The first
codification of that phrase appears to have occurred when Washington adopted the
"Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" (URESA) former ch. 26.21 RCW
(1992). See Laws of 1951, ch. 196, §§ 2, 7. Those sections provided definitions of the
concept.
2 Thereis ample history of using chapter 26.18 RCW to enforce orders entered
under chapter 26.19. E.g., In re Marriage ofBriscoe, 134 Wn.2d 344, 350, 949 P.2d
1388 (1998) (Talmadge, 1., dissenting).
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"Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or
imposable by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether
interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce,
separate maintenance or otherwise.
Id. § 2 (formerly codified at RCW 26.21.010(6) (1992)).
Similarly, § 7 ofURESA as adopted in Washington provided:
Duties of support enforceable under this law are those imposed or
imposable under the laws of any state where the alleged obligor was present
during the period for which support is sought or where the obligee was
present when the failure to support commenced, at the election of the
obligee.
(formerly codified at RCW 26.21.060 (1992)).
The meaning of these provisions was at issue in Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wn.2d
155,524 P.2d 901 (1974). There a woman in Snohomish County sued a man from King
County for support of her child born when both individuals were married to other people.
Id. at 156. The question presented was whether URESA also could be used to determine
paternity as a prelude to a support order. Id. The court first noted that URESA left to the
states the question of defining the relationships that triggered a duty of support. Id. at
158. Washington long had a policy of requiring fathers to support "illegitimate children."
Id. at 159. Since the putative fathers could be required to provide support, it was a duty
"imposable by law" in Washington. Id. at 159-61. Therefore, URESA could be used to
determine paternity. Id. at 160-63.
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While the child support chapter does not use the flexible "imposable by law,,3
standard that was dispositive in Yetter, that case is still instructive here. Even though
URESA was interpreted to permit actions outside its express terms-determine paternity
instead of merely determine support-the mechanism employed was still a formal
process. A court would hear the evidence and make a paternity determination before
awarding support, if applicable. That formality is the key to reading the enforcement
statute definition "imposed by court order, by operation of law, or otherwise." RCW
26.18.020(3).
The definition urged by Ms. Bums and accepted by the trial court ignores the
"operation of law, or otherwise" alternatives. There are several methods by which
paternity can be established-and thus give rise to a duty of support-other than by court
order. For instance, a man can acknowledge paternity, RCW 26.26.300 et seq., or
presumptively be a father by the fact of marriage at the time of the child's birth. RCW
26.26.116(1)(a). These are examples of "operation of law." Similarly, a support
obligation can be imposed in an administrative proceeding-another "operation of law."
WAC 388-14A-3100. The meaning of "or otherwise" is harder to discern. One potential
"otherwise" might consist of a written contract between an unmarried couple setting forth
their respective child support obligations.
3 The
phrase is still used in URESA's successor statute, the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act. See RCW 26.21A.OIO(3).
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Because RCW 26.18 is a mechanism by which courts can enforce the support
obligation, there must be sufficient formality to the obligation that a court has something
to enforce. That is the essence of the statutory provision. And it is the reason that we
agree with the trial court's decision to deny the deviation request. We hold that to obtain
a deviation from the child support guidelines due to paying for the support of children
from other relationships, the parent must establish the existence of a judicially
enforceable support obligation concerning those children.
Mr. Laber failed to identifY any enforceable support obligation for his other child.
The trial court, therefore, correctly denied his request to deviate from the standard
support obligation.
Mother's Imputed Income
Mr. Laber next argues that the trial court erred by imputing income to the mother
at minimum wage. We agree. The statute sets forth a hierarchy for imputing wages.
Because Ms. Bums earned more than minimum wage when she worked, the trial court
erred in imputing income at that level.
RCW 26.19.071 states in relevant part:
(6) Imputation of income. The court shall impute income to a
parent when the parent is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily
underemployed.... In the absence of records of a parent's actual earnings,
the court shall impute a parent's income in the following order of priority:
(a) Full-time earnings at the current rate of pay;
(b) Full-time earnings at the historical rate of pay based on reliable
information, such as employment security department data;
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(c) Full-time earnings at a past rate of pay where information is
incomplete or sporadic;
(d) Full-time earnings at minimum wage in the jurisdiction where
the parent resides if the parent has a recent history of minimum wage
earnings, is recently coming off public assistance, aged, blind, or disabled
assistance benefits, pregnant women assistance benefits, essential needs and
housing support, supplemental security income, or disability, has recently
been released from incarceration, or is a high school student;
(e) Median net monthly income of year-round full-time workers.
(Emphasis added.) A court's decision on imputation of income due to voluntary
underemployment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Wright, 78 Wn.
App. 230, 234, 896 P.2d 735 (1995).
The statute expressly sets a priority order for the court to apply when imputing
income to a parent: current rate of pay, historic rate of pay based on reliable information,
historic rate based on incomplete information, minimum wage, and median monthly
income. The evidence in the record established that the mother was currently receiving
$13 per hour for her part time work at the law office and had received that wage since
2007. As "current rate of pay" is the first priority in the statutory hierarchy, $13 should
have been the figure used when imputing the mother's income.
By failing to follow the statutory priority order, the trial court abused its discretion
in using the fourth option. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. at 793. Accordingly, we reverse the
order of support and remand for recalculation of the mother's income applying the correct
current rate of pay.
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A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this
opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder
having no precedential value shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it
is so ordered.
Other Income
The father strenuously argues that the trial court erred in failing to account for the
unexplained additional monies found annually in the checking accounts. We are not in a
position to resolve the claim due to the status of the record, but we leave the matter to the
discretion of the trial court in the remand required by the imputed income ruling.
When calculating the child support obligation, the court begins by considering all
"income and resources of each parent's household." RCW 26.19.071 (1). "Income" is not
defined in the statute, but the statute does explain various sources of gross income that
either must be considered (RCW 26.19.071(3)) or not considered (RCW 26.19.071(4)).
Important in this action is the requirement that gross income include:
Income from self-employment, rent, royalties, contracts,
proprietorship of a business, or joint ownership of a partnership or closely
held corporation.
RCW 26.l9.071(3)(u). The self-employed are permitted to deduct their normal business
expenses from the gross income. 4 RCW 26.19.071(5)(h).
Although this issue was contested in the trial court, the father does not renew those
4
arguments here.
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No. 32579-2-III
In re the Parentage ofo.A.J.
Ms. Burns appears to have run both her business and personal finances through the
same accounts. That fact complicates the analytical challenge facing the trial court and
the father. However, he argues, and the record supports the contention, that
approximately $80,000 more each year passed through the checking accounts than is
accounted for in the gross business income reflected in the tax returns. Money in a
checking account is not necessarily "income," but it may reflect income or an existing
asset. 5 All assets must be reported to the court. RCW 26.19.071(1). Although assets are
not used in calculating support obligations, they can be a basis for deviating from the
support schedule. RCW 26.l9.075(l)(vi). Accordingly, the trial court's characterization
of this money was important to the father.
Unfortunately, the record of this appeal does not reflect the trial court's resolution
of this contention. It is the burden of the party presenting an issue to ensure that the
record is adequate for review. State v. Rienks, 46 Wn. App. 537, 544-45, 731 P.2d 1116(1987). Here that failure falls on the appellant's shoulders. Based on the reconsideration
documents, it appears that the trial court provided some answers to the question, but this
court has not been provided that reasoning. Accordingly, we are not in a position to
review the claim of trial court error.
5It might also reflect simple cash flow patterns between existing accounts in which
the same money returns again and again to the account, or some similar innocent concern.
We do not suggest there is anything untoward occurring.
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In re the Parentage ofOAJ
Nonetheless, this is a potentially significant issue that was properly raised6 to the
trial court. Since the matter is being returned to the trial court due to the imputed income
problem, we leave to the discretion of the trial judge, or her successor, whether to
reconsider the matter during its next effort at computing income. If the court was able to
successfully characterize this anomaly in the original action, it need not revisit the issue.
If the court did not answer the question previously, it should undertake to do so on
remand.
Remaining Matters
The father also argues that the trial court erred in not explaining its apparent
rejection of his "equitable" arguments such as a request for an offset against back support
obligations for the time the child spent with him each summer. However, he has
presented insufficient argument for us to consider the claims. Both parties also ask for
attorney fees. We decline the respective requests.
With respect to the "equitable" arguments contention, the father argues that since
he put the issues properly before the trial court, it was therefore required to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law concerning his arguments. The failure to do so, he
6 The father met his burden of identifying the discrepancy and putting it before the
court, requiring the court to characterize the funds. At that point the mother also was free
to explain the matter to the judge.
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No. 32579~2~III
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reasons, leaves this court unable to consider the issues and we should remand for the trial
court to address his arguments. This argument fails on several grounds.
First, the father has not established that the trial court failed to enter any findings
f
of fact or conclusions of law that it was required to enter. Findings typically need only be i
entered when a court rule or statute requires them. For instance, a request for a deviation f
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from the support schedule triggers a statutory duty for the trial court to explain why it did
t
or did not grant the deviation. RCW 26.19.075(3). While there are many instances in
which findings would facilitate appellate review, they are only required in specified
instances. The father has not demonstrated that any of his arguments were subject to
mandatory findings.
Second, the father was free to present his arguments to this court on the merits
since he presented them to the trial court. Having preserved the issues by presenting
supporting evidence and arguing them, he was then free to assign error to the court's
rejection of his claims (or any refusal to act) and argue the merits of those claims here.
RAP 10.3(a)(4), (6). In the event the trial court failed to perform some action required of
it, this court could remand for consideration of the claim. In most instances, however,
this court would be able to address the merits of the claim and order relief when
significant error was established.
However, the father did not assign error to any of the issues that he argues the trial
judge should have more fully addressed. We therefore are not in a position to assess the
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No. 32579-2-111
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merits of his claims. "The appellate court will only review a claimed error which is
included in an assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining
thereto." RAP 10.3(g). The "equitable" arguments contention is simply unreviewable
here.
The mother argues that she should receive attorney fees for responding to a
frivolous appeal. In view of the fact that the father prevailed on the imputed income
argument, we cannot say that his appeal was frivolous. The father, in tum, seeks attorney
fees under both RCW 26.09.140 and RCW 26.26.140. Both statutes permit a court to
exercise discretion to award attorney fees in, respectively, dissolution or paternity
actions. Without deciding whether the dissolution attorney fees statute could be applied
in a paternity action, we decline to award attorney fees under either statute.
The support award is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, A . .1.
Fearing, J.
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