Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation and Futurewise ( 2013 )

FILED
September 05, 2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION III
KITTITAS COUNTY, a political) No. 30728-0-111
Subdivision of the State of )
Washington, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) ORDER AMENDING OPINION
)
KITTITAS COUNTY )
CONSERVATION and )
FUTUREWISE, )
And )
ELLISON THORP PROPERTY, LLC )
and ELLISON THORP PROPERTY )
II, LLC, )
And )
EASTERN WASHINGTON )
GROWTH MANAGEMENT )
HEARINGS BOARD, )
)
Respondents. )
)
The Court on its own motion amends the opinion filed on August 13, 2013, as
follows:
The following language, on page 4, line 2 of the opinion that reads: "The County
and Ellison" appealed is deleted.
No. 30728-0-III
Kittitas County v. Futurewise
The reference to "The County and Ellison" will be replaced with "Futurewise" so
the complete sentence on page 4, Line 2 of the opinion reads as follows: .
board's decision. Futurewise appealed.
Dated: 9 / a5 / 13
KEViNM?'koRSMO
Chief Judge
2
FILED
AUG. 13,2013
In the Office ofthe Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
KITTITAS COUNTY, a political ) No. 30728-0-111
subdivision of the State of )
Washington, )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
KITTITAS COUNTY CONSERVATION )
and FUTUREWISE, )
And )
ELLISON THORP PROPERTY, LCC )
and ELLISON THORP PROPERTY II,
LCe,
And
EASTERN WASHINGTON GROWTH
)
)
)
)
I
MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD, )
)
Respondents. )
BROWN, J. - Development opponents Kittitas County Conservation Coalition and
Futurewise (collectively Futurewise) ask us to reinstate a decision the Eastern
Washington Growth Management Hearings Board entered against development
proponents Kittitas County (the County), Ellison Thorp Property LLC. and Ellison Thorp
No. 30728-0-111
Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
Property II LLC (collectively Ellison), but which the superior court dissolved. The
hearings board invalidated the County's planning actions in amendments 10-12 and 10­
13 after finding and concluding the County did not, in adopting them, comply with the
Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, or the State Environmental
Policy Act (SEPA), chapter 43.21C RCW. The superior court held, and the County and
Ellison now contend, the hearings board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the
County's rezone because it is a site-specific land use decision within the superior
court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C
RCW. Additionally, the County and Ellison contend the hearings board's decision lacks
substantial evidence, erroneously interprets and applies the law, and is arbitrary and
capricious. We reject their contentions and reverse.
FACTS
In June 2010, Ellison proposed two amendments to the County's comprehensive
plan map and zoning map "for the purpose of developing the Thorp Travel Center
consisting of a truck stop, restaurant and hotel and RV park." Administrative Record
(AR) at 13, 14. The first proposal, amendment 10-12, expanded a Type 3 Limited Area
of More Intensive Rural Development (LAMIRD) from 12 to 30.5 acres within the
property's Agriculture Study Overlay. The second proposal, amendment 10-13,
changed the property's comprehensive plan category from Rural to Commercial and
changed its zone designation from Agriculture 20 to Commercial Highway.
The proposed development would cover over 29 acres, comprising a 4,000
square foot fuel station, a 10,000 square foot retail store, a 5,000 square foot retail
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Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
store, a 6,000 square foot restaurant, a 24,000 square foot hotel with 50 units, a 5,000
square foot recreational vehicle park with 45 spaces, and parking lots with spaces for
hundreds of cars and trucks. These uses would operate 24 hours a day, employ up to
140 people, and generate $10.9 million annually. The proposed development would
require new roads and a six-acre septic or sewer reserve area. Surrounding uses are
mainly agricultural.
The proposed development would be located next to Interstate Highway 90. The
existing LAMIRD encompasses a fuel station and retail store located across the
highway from the proposed development, and an energy utility and office building
located next to the proposed development. A truck stop once stood on a small portion
of the existing LAMIRD located next to the proposed development.
Apparently, Ellison submitted a SEPA environmental checklist on June 10, 2010
but the County made no corresponding threshold determination. Then, the County
issued a SEPA environmental checklist on October 15, 2010 and a corresponding
determination of nonsignificance on November 2, 2010. The determination of
nonsignificance stated, "There is no agency administrative appeal ([Kittitas County
Code (KCC)] 15.04.210 and 15B.05.010)." AR at 465. Thus, Futurewise did not appeal
the determination of nonsignificance to any county-level official.
On December 21,2010, the Board of County Commissioners enacted Ordinance
2010-14, adopting Ellison's proposals along with five others during the annual
comprehensive plan amendment cycle. The hearings board invalidated the County's
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planning actions upon Futurewise's appeal. The superior court dissolved the hearings
board's decision. The County and Ellison appealed.
REVIEW STANDARD
We review the hearings board decision under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) , chapter 34.05 RCW. Feil v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 367,
376,259 P.3d 227 (2011); see RCW 34.05.510. We apply APA standards directly to
the hearings board record, performing the same function as the superior court. City of
Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 45, 959 P.2d
1091 (1998); see RCW 34.05.526. The party challenging the hearings board decision
(here the County and Ellison) bears the burden of proving it is invalid. RCW
34.05.570(1)(a). The decision is invalid if it suffers from at least one of nine enumerated
I
infirmities. RCW 34.05.570(3). We must grant relief from the decision if, as relevant
here:
(b) The order is outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency conferred by any provision of law;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) The order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when
viewed in light of the whole record ... ; [or]
(i) The order is arbitrary or capricious.
RCW 34.05.570(3)(b), (d)-(e), (i).
Our review is de novo under RCW 34.05.570(3)(b) or (d), determining whether
the decision contains a legal error. Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd.,
172 Wash. 2d 144, 155,256 P.3d 1193 (2011). We accord the hearings board's
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interpretation of the GMA "substantial weight." King County v. Cent. Puget Sound
Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 553,14 P.3d 133 (2000). Butthe
interpretation does not bind us. City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46.
We apply the substantial evidence review standard to challenges under RCW
34.05.570(3)(e), determining whether there exists '''a sufficient quantity of evidence to
persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order. fI
' City of
Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46 (quoting Calle cod v. Wash. State Patrol, 84 Wash. App. 663,
673,929 P.2d 510 (1997». We view the evidence "in the light most favorable to ... 'the
party who prevailed in the highest forum that exercised fact-finding authority.'" City of
Univ. Place v. McGuire, 144 Wash. 2d 640, 652,30 P.3d 453 (2001) (quoting State ex rei.
Uge & Wm. B. Dickson Co. v. County of Pierce, 65 Wash. App. 614, 618,829 P.2d 217
(1992». Doing so '''necessarily entails accept[ing] the factfinder's views regarding the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given reasonable but competing
inferences.'" Id. (quoting Uge & Wm. B. Dickson Co., 65 Wash. App. at 618).
We apply the arbitrary and capricious review standard to challenges under RCW
34.05.570(3)(i), determining whether the decision constitutes '''willful and unreasoning
action, taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the action.'" City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46-47 (quoting Kendall v.
Douglas, Grant, Uncoln & Okanogan Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No.6, 118 Wash. 2d 1, 14,
820 P.2d 497 (1991)). "'Where there is room for two opinions, an action taken after due
consideration is not arbitrary and capricious even though a reviewing court may believe
it to be erroneous.'" Id. at 4 7 (quoting Kendall, 118 Wash. 2d at 14).
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ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The issue is whether the hearings board had subject matter jurisdiction to review
amendment 10-13's rezone under the GMA The County and Ellison contend the
rezone is within the superior court's exclusive jurisdiction under LUPA. We review the
hearings board's assertion of jurisdiction de novo. RCW 34.05.570(3){b); Kittitas
County, 172 Wash. 2d at 155.
Certain local governments like Kittitas County must "adopt a comprehensive plan
under [the GMA] and development regulations that are consistent with and implement
the comprehensive plan." RCW 36.70A040(3){d), (4)(d), (5)(d). If a county later
amends its comprehensive plan, it must concurrently adopt or amend consistent
implementing development regulations. WAC 365-196-805{ 1). A comprehensive plan
is a county's "generalized coordinated land use policy statement." RCW 36.70A030(4).
Development regulations are a county's "controls placed on development or land use
activities ... , including ... zoning ordinances." RCW 36.70A.030(7). But a "decision
to approve a project permit application" is not a development regulation, even if it
appears in a legislative ordinance or resolution. Id. Instead, a project permit approval is
a "land use decision" under LUPA. RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a). Project permit applications
include proposals for "site-specific rezones authorized by a comprehensive plan" but
exclude proposals for "the adoption or amendment of a comprehensive plan ... or
development regulations." RCW 36.70B.020(4).
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The hearings board has exclusive jurisdiction to review petitions alleging a
county did not comply with the GMA in adopting or amending its comprehensive plan or
1
development regulations. RCW 36.70A280(1)(a); former RCW 36.70A290(2) (1995);
Somers v. Snohomish County, 105 Wash. App. 937, 945,21 P.3d 1165 (2001).
Additionally, the hearings board may review petitions alleging a county did not comply
with SEPA in adopting or amending its comprehensive plan or development regulations.
RCW 36.70A280(1)(a); former RCW 36.70A290(2). But the hearings board "do[es] not
have jurisdiction to decide challenges to site-specific land use decisions because
[those] decisions do not qualify as comprehensive plans or development regulations."
Woods v. Kittitas County, 162 Wash. 2d 597, 610, 174 P.3d 25 (2007); see RCW
36.70A030(4), (7); RCW 36.70B.020(4); RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a). Instead, the superior
court has exclusive jurisdiction under LUPA to review site-specific land use decisions
not subject to review by quasi-judicial agencies like the hearings board. RCW
36.70C.030(1)(a)(ii); Woods, 162 Wash. 2d at 610.
Here, whether the hearings board had subject matter jurisdiction to review
amendment 10-13's rezone depends on whether it is an amendment to a development
regulation under the GMA or a project permit approval under LUPA Woods, 162 Wash. 2d
at 610; see RCW 36.70A.030(7); RCW 36.708.020(4). The parties agree the rezone
was site specific. See Woods, 162 Wash. 2d at 611 n.7 (stating a site-specific rezone is a
change in the zone designation of a '''specific tract''' at the request of '''specific parties. II!
1 The Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board has jurisdiction
over such petitions arising from counties "east of the crest of the Cascade Mountains,"
including Kittitas County. RCW 36.70A.260(1)(b).
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(quoting Cathcarl-Maltby-Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wn.2d
201,212,634 P.2d 853 (1981»). But the parties dispute whether the rezone was or
needed to be "authorized by a comprehensive plan." RCW 36.708.020(4).
First, the County and Ellison argue the rezone was a project permit approval
regardless of whether the comprehensive plan authorized it. They reason RCW
36.708.020(4) contains a nonexclusive list of project permit approvals including all site-
specific rezones without restriction. But the County and Ellison ignore express
limitations on the items listed. See In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 393, 119
P.3d 840 (2005) (stating a court must not "simply ignore" express terms when
interpreting a statute); State ex reI. Baisden v. Preston, 151 Wash. 175, 177,275 P. 81
(1929) (stating a court must interpret a statute as a whole so that, if possible, "'no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant''' (quoting Wash.
Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-16,25 L. Ed. 782 (1879»); Murrayv. Oep'tof
Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. 95, 102,275 P. 66 (1929) {a court must, if possible, interpret
a statute so as to give every word or phrase "meaning" as well as "significance and
effect" (internal quotation marks omitted». Under RCW 36.708.020(4). a site-specific
rezone is a project permit approval solely if "authorized by a comprehensive plan";
otherwise, it is "the adoption or amendment of a ... development regulation[]." We
must interpret this language so as to give it meaning. significance, and effect.
Second, the County and Ellison argue the comprehensive plan authorized the
rezone because the County found the rezone met all necessary criteria, including
compatibility with the comprehensive plan. They reason the County ensured such
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compatibility by changing the property's comprehensive plan category from Rural to
Commercial "as a precondition to" changing its zone designation from Agriculture 20 to
Commercial Highway. Br. of Resp't Kittitas County at 24. But the County accomplished
each act concurrently by approving amendment 10-13. And, to be "authorized by a
comprehensive plan" within the meaning of RCW 36.70B.020(4), the rezone had to be
"allowed by an existing comprehensive plan." Spokane County v. E. Wash. Growth
Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 160 Wash. App. 274, 281-83, 250 P.3d 1050 (emphasis added), review
denied, 171 Wash. 2d 1034 (2011); see also Woods, 162 Wash. 2d at 612 n.7, 613;
Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wash. 2d 169, 179-80,4 P.3d 123
(2000).
The County and Ellison acknowledge the Rural comprehensive plan category
existing before amendment 10-13 did not allow the rezone to Commercial Highway.
And, the Commercial comprehensive plan category existing after amendment 10-13
was not part of the existing comprehensive plan at the time of the rezone. Thus, the
rezone is not a project permit approval under LUPA because the then-existing
comprehensive plan did not authorize it. Instead the rezone is an amendment to a
development regulation under the GMA because it implements the comprehensive plan
amendment. The hearings board's decision is within its statutory authority. See RCW
34.05.570(3)(b).
Dictum in Coffey v. City of Walla Walla, 145 Wash. App. 435, 187 P.3d 272 (2008),
does not require a different conclusion. There, the city amended its comprehensive
plan but did not rezone the property. Id. at 438. The Coffey court held the superior
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court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the comprehensive plan amendment
under LUPA because the hearings board had exclusive jurisdiction to do so under the
GMA. Id. at 441. The Coffey court continued,
It is not uncommon for those hoping to develop property to seek both a
comprehensive plan amendment and a rezone of property in the same
proceeding. Anyone seeking to challenge both aspects of a ruling
granting both requests would by statute have to appeal to two entities: the
[hearings board] for the comprehensive plan amendment and superior
court for the rezone.
Id. at 442. This statement was unnecessary to the Coffey court's holding because the
city amended its comprehensive plan but did not rezone the property. Additionally, this
statement is true solely if a rezone is site specific and authorized by a then-existing
comprehensive plan. In making this statement, the Coffey court did not consider
whether a rezone that implements a comprehensive plan amendment can be an
amendment to a development regulation.
Considering all, we hold a site-specific rezone is a project permit approval under
LUPA if it is authorized by a then-existing comprehensive plan and, by contrast, is an
amendment to a development regulation under the GMA if it implements a
comprehensive plan amendment. In sum, the superior court erred because the
hearings board had subject matter jurisdiction to review amendment 10-13's rezone for
compliance with both the GMA and SEPA. See RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a); former RCW
36.70A.290(2).
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1 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
.~
1 Ellison contends Futurewise failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy
j
because it did not appeal the County's SEPA determination of nonsignificance to the
county commissioners before petitioning the hearings board. Whether a party must
exhaust an available administrative remedy is a legal issue we review de novo. See
Evergreen Wash. Healthcare Frontier, LLC v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 171 Wn.
App. 431,445,287 P.3d 40 (2012) (citing Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 19
n.10, 829 P.2d 765 (1992».
A party aggrieved by a county's SEPA action must use any available
administrative appeal before petitioning the superior court for judicial review. RCW
43.21C.075(4); WAC 197-11-680{3)(c); Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114
Wash. 2d 20, 26, 785 P .2d 447 (1990); see also RCW 34.05.534; Citizens for Mount
Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 866, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). Butthis
requirement does not apply to Futurewise because it did not petition the superior court
for judicial review; the County and Ellison did. And, the GMA's standing and
jurisdictional requirements allowed Futurewise to petition the hearings board directly for
administrative review. See RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a), (2), (4); former RCW
36.70A.290(2); RCW 34.05.530. Even if Futurewise were required to use some other
administrative appeal before petitioning the hearings board, the procedure the County
and Ellison suggest was not available to Futurewise.
While a party may appeal the County's SEPA action to the county
commissioners, this procedure applies solely if the action relates to the County's
I
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decision on a "land use permit[]"-a project permit application. KCC 15A.01.030; see
KCC 15A.02.050{1); KCC 15A.04.020(2); KCC 15A.1 0.020. But a party may appeal the
County's SEPA action to the hearings board directly if the action relates to the County's
"amendments to the ... comprehensive plan or development regulations." KCC
15B.05.010; see KCC 15.04.210(1)(b). Because amendments 10-12 and 10-13 are not
. decisions on land use permits but amendments to the comprehensive plan and
development regulations, Futurewise could not appeal the determination of
nonsignificance to the county commissioners. Indeed, the determination of
nonsignificance recognizes this, stating, "There is no agency administrative appeal
(KCC 15.04.210 and 15B.05.010)." AR at 465. In sum, Futurewise was not required to
appeal the County's SEPA determination of nonsignificance to the county
commissioners before petitioning the hearings board.
C. Verities and Abandoned Issues Noted
Because the County and Ellison bear the burden of proving the hearings board
decision is invalid, see RCW 34.05.570(1 )(a), their briefs to this court had to "set forth a
separate concise statement of each error which [they] contend[] was made by the
[hearings board], together with the issues pertaining to each assignment of error," RAP
10.3(h); see 3 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE RAP 10.3
drafters' cmt. 1994 amends. at 54 (7th ed. 2011) (stating RAP 10.3(h) applies to "[a]
party contending that the administrative agency decision was in error, regardless of the
party's designation as 'appellant' or 'respondent'" before the appellate court).
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This required their briefs to include "[a] separate assignment of error for each
finding of fact [they] contend[] was improperly made," and to do so "with reference to the
finding by number." RAP 10.3{g); see RAP 10.3{h). Unchallenged agency factual
findings are verities on appeal. Hilltop Terrace Homeowners Ass'n v. Island County,
126 Wn.2d 22,30,891 P.2d 29 (1995). Additionally, their briefs had to present
"argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal
authority and references to relevant parts of the record." RAP 10.3{a){6); see RAP
10.3(b). Unsubstantiated assignments of error are deemed abandoned. Howell v.
Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wash. 2d 619, 624,818 P.2d 1056 (1991).
The County and Ellison's briefs to this court do not assign error to or argue
against the hearings board's factual findings. Therefore, the factual findings are verities
on appeal. See RAP 10.3{g)-{h); Hilltop Terrace, 126 Wash. 2d at 30. Additionally, the
County and Ellison's briefs to this court assign error to but do not argue against the
merits of the hearings board's decision on SEPA n0l1compliance. 2 Therefore, these
assignments of error are abandoned. See RAP 10.3(a)(6), (b); Howell, 117 Wash. 2d at
624. Notably, the County and Ellison did not raise the above issues in their petitions to
the superior court either. In sum, we review solely the hearings board's legal
conclusions on GMA noncompliance. 3
2 While the County and Ellison baldly assert the environmental checklists and
determination of nonsignificance were adequate under SEPA, they do not substantiate
this ar~ument.
But when addressing Ellison's challenges under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d) and (e),
we still consider the hearings board's factual findings to determine whether they support
the hearings board's legal conclusions. See generally Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
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Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
D. Hearings Board Decisions
The issue is whether the hearings board erred by invalidating amendments 10-12
and 10-13. Ellison contends the hearings board erroneously decided amendment 10­
12's expansion of the Type 3 LAMIRD is noncompliant with the GMA's requirements
and is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan's goals, policies, and objectives. Next,
Ellison contends the hearings board erroneously decided amendment 10-13's rezone is
inconsistent with the comprehensive plan's prior designation of an Agriculture Study
Overlay. We review the hearings board's decision to ensure it is supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record, does not erroneously interpret or apply
the law, and is not arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d)-(e), (i); Kittitas County,
172 Wash. 2d at 155; City of Redmond, 136 Wash. 2d at 46-47.
The hearings board may decide a petition alleging a county did not comply with
the GMA in adopting or amending its comprehensive plan or development regulations.
RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a); former RCW 36.70A.290(2). The petitioner (here Futurewise)
bears the burden of proving noncompliance. See RCW 36.70A.320(2). But a county
has "broad discretion in adapting the requirements of the GMA to local realities."
Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224,236,
110 P .3d 1132 (2005); see RCW 36.70A.320 1. Thus, the hearings board must
presume validity and find compliance unless the county's planning action is "clearly
erroneous in view of the entire record before the board and in light of the goals and
requirements of [the GMA]." RCW 36.70A.320(1), (3). A county's planning action is
Am., 86 Wash. 2d 432, 437,545 P.2d 1193 (1976) (stating the review standard applicable
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clearly erroneous if it leaves the hearings board with a "'firm and definite conviction that
a mistake has been committed.'" King County, 142 Wash. 2d at 552 (quoting Dep't of
Ecology v. Pub. Util. Dist. No.1, 121 Wn.2d 179,201,849 P.2d 646 (1993».
A comprehensive plan amendment must "conform to [the GMA]." RCW
36.70A130(1)(d). But "the GMA is not to be liberally construed." Woods, 162 Wash. 2d at
612 & n.8, 614 (citing Skagit Surveyors & Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135
Wash. 2d 542, 565, 958 P.2d 962 (1998». Thus, a comprehensive plan must obey the
GMA's clear mandates. See Thurston County v. W Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd.,
164 Wash. 2d 329, 341-42, 190 P.3d 38 (2008). A newly adopted or amended
development regulation must be "consistent with and implement the comprehensive
plan." RCW 36.70A040(3)(d), (4)(d), (5)(d); RCW 36.70A130(1 )(d); see WAC 365­
196-805(1). But "a comprehensive plan is a 'guide' or 'blueprint' to be used when
making land use decisions." Citizens for Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 873 (quoting
Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 849, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980». Thus, a
development regulation need not strictly adhere but must "generally conform" to the
comprehensive plan. Id. (quoting Barrie, 93 Wn.2d at 849).
A county's comprehensive plan must contain "a rural element including lands that
are not designated for urban growth." RCW 36.70A070(5)(d); see WAC 365-196-425.
This rural element "may allow for limited areas of more intensive rural development,
including necessary public facilities and public services." RCW 36.70A070(5)(d); see
WAC 365-196-425(6). Type 3 LAMIRDs allow "intensification of ... isolated small-scale
to factual findings and legal conclusions entered after a bench trial).
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businesses that are not principally designed to serve the existing and projected rural
population and nonresidential uses, but do provide job opportunities for rural residents."
RCW 36.70A070(5)(d)(iii); see WAC 365-196-425(6)(c)(iii). Under these area types,
"Rural counties may allow the expansion of small-scale businesses [or] ... new small-
scale businesses to utilize a site previously occupied by an existing business." RCW
36.70A070(5)(d)(iii); see WAC 365-196-425(6)(c)(iii)(A). But such small-scale
businesses must "conform[] to the rural character of the area." RCW
36.70A070(5)(d)(iii); see WAC 365-196-425(6)(c){iii){A).
The County's rural element allows for Type 3 LAMIRDs, calling them "Rural
Employment Center[s]-Intensi'fication of development on lots containing isolated
nonresidential uses or new development of isolated small-scale businesses that are not
principally designed to serve the rural area, but do provide job opportunities for rural
residents." KITTITAS COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (KCCP) 8.5.8. These area types
must meet certain standards:
a) Intensification of development on lots containing isolated nonresidential
uses or new development of isolated small scale businesses is
permitted;
b) Businesses should provide job opportunities for rural residents, but do
not need to be principally designed to serve local residents;
c) Small scale employment uses should generally be appropriate in a
rural community, such as (but not limited to) independent contracting
services, incubator facilities, home-based industries, and services
which support agriculture; and
d) Development should conform to the rural character of the surrounding
area.
KCCP Goal, Policy, & Objective 8.78. Once the County fixes an area's boundaries, it
may not expand them unless doing so is "otherwise consistent with the requirements of
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the GMA" KCCP Goal, Policy, & Objective 8.69. Such expansion, where permitted,
may include "undeveloped land ... for limited infill, development or redevelopment
when consistent with rural provisions of the [GMA]." KCCP Goal, Policy, & Objective
8.70. However, "uses that require urban level of services should not be allowed."
KCCP Goal, Policy, & Objective 8.73. Urban services are "public services and public
facilities at an intensity historically and typically provided in cities, specifically including
storm and sanitary sewer systems." RCW 36.70A030(18); WAC 36S-196-200(19).
We begin our analysis with amendment 10-12. First, Ellison argues the hearings
board erred in deciding the travel center would not be "isolated" as required by RCW
36.70A070(S)(d)(iii) and KCCP 8.S.8(a). The hearings board defined "isolated"
according to Whitaker v. Grant County, No. 99-1-0019, at 13-14 (E. Wash. Growth
Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd. Nov. 1,2004), which decided proposed developments on contiguous
Type 3 LAMIRDs would not be isolated but would permit low-density sprawl. Thus, the
hearings board concluded the proposed development must stand apart from other
similar uses. Giving this GMA interpretation substantial weight, we reject Ellison's
argument because the undisputed facts show a fuel station and retail store exist on the
Type 3 LAMIRD across the highway from the proposed development. This is a
sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person the travel center would
not be isolated from other similar uses. In reaching this decision, the hearings board
correctly interpreted and applied the law upon thorough reasoning with due
consideration for the facts.
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No. 30728-0-111
Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
Second, Ellison argues the hearings board erred in deciding the travel center
would not be "small scale" as required by RCW 36.70A070(5){d){iii) and KCCP 8.5.8(a)
and (c). The hearings board defined "small scale" according to state and local
standards for Type 3 LAMIRDs, which require proposed developments to be
appropriate for and visually compatible with a rural community. Thus, the hearings
board concluded the proposed development must be small relative to surrounding uses.
Giving this GMA interpretation substantial weight, we reject Ellison's argument because
the undisputed facts detailed below support the hearings board's decision.
The facts show while surrounding uses are mainly agricultural, the proposed
development would cover over 29 acres, comprising a 4,000 square foot fuel station, a
10,000 square foot retail store, a 5,000 square foot retail store, a 6,000 square foot
restaurant, a 24,000 square foot hotel with 50 units, a 5,000 square foot recreational
vehicle park with 45 spaces, and parking lots with spaces for hundreds of cars and
trucks. These uses would operate 24 hours a day, employ up to 140 people, and
generate $10.9 million annually. Additionally, the proposed development would require
significant infrastructure, including roads from the highway and a six-acre septic or
sewer reserve area the hearings board concluded was an urban service. This is a
sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person the travel center would
not be small in scale relative to surrounding uses. In reaching this decision, the
hearings board again correctly interpreted and applied the law upon thorough reasoning
with due consideration for the facts.
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No. 30728-0-111
Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
Third, Ellison argues the travel center would conform to the surrounding area's
rural character as required by RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(iii) and KCCP 8.5.8(d). But the
hearings board never reached this issue, instead noting no evidence showed the county
commissioners ever considered it. We will not exercise discretion the legislature placed
in the hearings board. See RCW 34.05.574(1); RCW 36.70A280(1)(a); former RCW
36.70A.290(2).
To summarize, the hearings board correctly decided the travel center would not
be isolated or small in scale. Therefore, we conclude the hearings board did not err in
deciding amendment 10-12 is noncompliant with the GMA and inconsistent with the
comprehensive plan. We do not reach Ellison's remaining arguments on whether the
expansion properly utilized a former truck stop site not included in the original Type 3
LAMIRD and whether the expansion fixed more logical outer boundaries than the
original Type 3 LAMIRD.
We turn now to amendment 10-13. On December 22,2009, the County
designated an Agriculture Study Overlay applicable to "[p]roperties containing prime
farmland soils, ... and located in the former Thorp Urban Growth Node Boundaries and
outside of LAMIRD boundaries." AR at 506. Amendment 10-13 changed the property's
comprehensive plan category from Rural to Commercial and changed its zone
designation from Agriculture 20 to Commercial Highway.
First, Ellison argues the hearings board erred in deciding an inconsistency exists
because the record does not reveal the County's intent in designating the property as
an Agriculture Study Overlay. But the undisputed facts show the County did so
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No. 30728-0-111
Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
because it intended to preclude commercial development until it determined whether the
property qualified as Agricultural Lands of Long Term Commercial Significance:
"Outside of the LAMIRD boundaries, some parcels have been identified as
meeting some though not all designation criteria for lands of long-term
commercial sjgnificance for agriculture. An overlay zone is proposed to
limit the potential for lot creation and some potentially incompatible land
uses until the County completes a review of the needs of industry in
2010". . .. "The County intends to study the needs and nature of the ...
agriculture industries and the designation criteria in conjunction with its
consideration of its critical areas regulations update in 2010. In the
interim, an agriculture ... study overlay zone were [sic] considered in
these areas; and standards proposed in Kittitas County Code Title 17 that
would be applied to the overlay zones."
AR at 601 (second and third omissions in original) (quoting Kittitas County Ordinance
2009-025 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Findings of Fact 128, 171». The County apparently had not
made this determination at the time of the rezone.
Second, Ellison argues the hearings board erred in deciding the property might
have qualified as Agricultural Lands of Long Term Commercial Significance because
doing so improperly entertained a collateral attack on the County's prior designation.
But the hearings board merely concluded the rezone is inconsistent with the Agriculture
Study Overlay's interim use limitations, which remained in effect at the time of the
rezone. Indeed, the undisputed facts show the Commercial Highway zone designation
permitted commercial development that the Agriculture Study Overlay prohibited. This
is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person amendment 10­
13's rezone is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan's prior designation of an
Agriculture Study Overlay. In reaching this decision, the hearings board again correctly
interpreted and applied the law upon thorough reasoning with due consideration for the
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No. 30728-0-111
Kittitas County v. Kittitas County Conservation Coal.
facts. Therefore, we conclude the hearings board did not err in deciding amendment
10-13 is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan.
In conclusion, the hearings board's decision is supported by substantial evidence
in light of the whole record, does not erroneously interpret or apply the law, and is not
arbitrary or capricious. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(d)-(e), (i). We hold the hearings board
did not err by invalidating amendments 10-12 and 10-13 on grounds the County did not
comply with the GMA in adopting them. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court. We
do not reach Futurewise's remaining contentions on whether the superior court erred in
dissolving rather than remanding the hearings board's decision.
Reversed.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, J.
I
I
r
Kulik, J.
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