State Of Washington v. Mary Lynn Anderson ( 2013 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 68069-2-1
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
MARY ANDERSON, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
_ _ _ _ _ ____,Ac.!Jp~p,e'""ll""a'-"ntc...._ _ _) FILED: March 18. 2013
SPEARMAN, A.C.J.- A law enforcement officer's request for identification from
an automobile passenger is a constitutionally permissible seizure if the passenger
has committed a traffic infraction. If the passenger is of an age likely to possess
identification documents but denies having any, the permissible scope of the seizure
is not exceeded by detention for the limited purpose of establishing the passenger's
identity.
In this case, Mary Anderson denied ever possessing an identification card
after being discovered with an open beer container at her feet in the passenger seat
of a car. Given she appeared to be old enough to drive, the officer's follow up
questions regarding her identification were proper, and the trial court did not err by
No. 68069-2-1/2
declining to suppress all evidence acquired after Anderson admitted her identity. We
therefore affirm Anderson's conviction for possession of cocaine.
FACTS
After learning that the registered owner of a silver Nissan Maxima had a
suspended license, and that an arrest warrant existed for a person who had
previously been seen in the Maxima, Seattle Police Officer Earnest DeBella pulled
the car over. When the car stopped, DeBella approached on the passenger side in
order to avoid being struck by passing cars. Mary Anderson was in the front
passenger seat and the registered owner, "Mr. Braxton," was in the driver's seat.
DeBella saw two open 22-ounce cans of beer standing upright on the floorboard of
the car; one between Anderson's feet and the other between Braxton's feet.
DeBella asked Anderson and Braxton for identification, and Anderson stated
that she had none. DeBella then asked Anderson if she had ever had a Washington
state driver's license or identification (I.D.) card, and Anderson again replied "no."
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (11/21/11) at 7. DeBella asked Anderson if
she had ever in her life had a driver's license or I. D. card issued to her in any state,
and Anderson again replied "no." VRP (11/21/11) at 7-8. DeBella testified at the CrR
3.6 hearing that, based on his experience, when a person who is old enough to drive 1
denies ever having had an I. D. card, he is suspicious that the person is trying to
conceal his or her identity. DeBella informed Anderson he found it suspicious that
she claimed to have never had an I. D. card anywhere, at which point Anderson
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Anderson was born in 1959.
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produced an I. D. card and admitted that she had a warrant out for her arrest.
Anderson also admitted that she was carrying a knife. When DeBella had Anderson
get out of the car to pat her down for weapons, he saw her place what appeared to
be crack cocaine on the center console.
The State charged Anderson with violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act: possession of cocaine. Anderson moved to suppress the cocaine as
the result of an unlawful seizure, and the trial court denied the motion. A jury found
Anderson guilty as charged. Anderson appeals.
DISCUSSION
Anderson argues that Officer DeBella's requests for identification amounted to
an unconstitutional seizure, and that the trial court therefore should have suppressed
the cocaine discovered after she identified herself. We disagree.
Warrantless seizures are presumptively unconstitutional under article 1, section
7 of the Washington State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wash. 2d 176, 184, 240 P.3d 153(201 0). An exception exists, however, for investigative stops, which are lawful when
based upon "'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' State v. Kennedy. 107
Wash. 2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).
The exception set forth in Terrv applies to stops incident to traffic violations.
State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d 166, 173-74, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). Although in general, an
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automobile passenger is impermissibly seized under article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution when an officer requests identification, such requests
are permissible if "'other circumstances give the police independent cause to question
[the] passengers."' State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202, 205 (2004)
(quoting State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)).
Such circumstances existed here. Under RCW 46.61.519(2), "[i]t is a traffic
infraction for a person to have in his or her possession while in a motor vehicle upon a
highway, a bottle, can, or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage if the
container has been opened or a seal broken or the contents partially removed."
Additionally, RCW 46.61.021(2) states that "[w]henever any person is stopped for a
traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time
necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of
the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and
complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction." Furthermore, "[a]ny person requested
to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation
of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current
address," RCW 46.61.021 (3), and "[a]ny person who wilfully fails ... to comply with
RCW 46.61.021(3), is guilty of a misdemeanor." RCW 46.61.022. In light of the open
can of beer at Anderson's feet, Officer DeBella had independent cause to question
Anderson, and she was not unconstitutionally seized when he asked her for
identification.
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Anderson contends, however, that DeBella's multiple requests for identification
exceeded the scope of any investigative seizure. Anderson cites no authority for this
proposition, and instead simply asserts that the scope of the seizure, i.e., asking
follow up questions about identification, was not reasonable. We disagree. The facts
in this case are similar to those in State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App 254, 970 P.2d 376(1999). In that case, officers stopped the driver of a car for a traffic infraction. Two
passengers were not wearing seatbelts, which also is a traffic infraction. Chelly. 94
Wn. App. at 259-60. The officer asked for identification from one of the passengers,
Martinez. When Martinez stated he had no identification, the officer asked if he had
ever possessed identification. ld. at 256. Martinez responded that he had not. ld. At
that point, the officer asked Martinez to step out of the car to question him privately,
away from the other people in the car. ld. at 256-57. We held that the officers'
detention of Martinez while he was being identified was not an unconstitutional
seizure:
Noticing that the passengers were not wearing safety belts, Officer
Thacker had the authority to detain them for a reasonable period of
time necessary to identify them. The legitimate scope of the stop
properly expanded at that point beyond a stop only for the initial
traffic infraction, the inoperative brake light. Pursuant to the statute,
RCW 46.61.021 (3), the passengers had a duty to identify
themselves to Officer Thacker. Any person who wilfully fails to fulfill
this statutory duty to identify himself or herself when requested to
do so as part of an investigation of a traffic infraction is guilty of a
misdemeanor. When Martinez told Officer Thacker that he did not
have, and had never possessed, identification, Officer Thacker
suspected, based on the circumstances including his 15 years of
experience as a police officer and Martinez's age and demeanor,
that Martinez was trying to hide his identity and would likely provide
a false name. Under the totality of the circumstances, the specific
and articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, we find Officer Thacker's detention of Martinez for a
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reasonable time for the purpose of ascertaining his true identity was
warranted.
ld. at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
In sum, under Chelley, Officer DeBella's multiple requests for identification from
Anderson did not exceed the scope of any investigative seizure, and the trial court did
not err by declining to suppress all evidence acquired after Anderson admitted her
identity.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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