Regina K. Cota, V Anthony F. Cota ( 2013 )

FILED
002T OF APPEALS
DIMS10M ii
2013 NOV - 5 AM 8: 51
STATE OF WASHINGT O1A
BYM
4UTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Marriage 'of:
REGINA KATHERINE COTA,
Petitioner, No. 43037 -1 - II
and PUBLISHED OPINION
ANTHONY FRANCIS COTA,
MAXA, J. — Anthony Cota appeals the trial court' s child support order requiring him to
pay for one -third of his daughter' s college expenses. He argues that the trial court ( 1) did not
have authority to order postsecondary educational support because his former wife did not
request the support award until after his daughter turned 18, ( 2) abused its discretion when it
determined that an award of postsecondary educational support was proper, and ( 3) violated
RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) because the award of postsecondary educational support increased his child
support obligation to more than 45 percent of his net income.
We affirm on the first two issues. Because the 2010 child support order expressly
provided that Anthony' s1 support obligation would terminate at the age of majority except for
postsecondary educational support, the trial court had authority to order such support even
1 Because the parties in this case share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names.
We intend no disrespect.
No. 43037 -1 - II
though the request for postsecondary educational support was filed after the daughter turned 18.
Further, the record supports the trial court' s conclusion that a postsecondary educational award
was appropriate under the factors outlined in RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). However, we reverse and
remand on the third issue. We are constrained to hold that postsecondary educational expenses
constitute " child support" under RCW 26. 19. 065( 1), and therefore the trial court' s order
improperly required Anthony to pay more than 45 percent of his net monthly income in child
support without first finding good cause.
FACTS
Anthony and Regina Cota divorced in 2006. The trial court entered an order of child
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support providing for their two minor children, ages 14 and 11. This initial child support order
provided for postsecondary educational support and required the parties to pay their pro rata
shares of any postsecondary educational expenses.
In 2010, Regina requested that the trial court award specific postsecondary educational
support for their daughter Annamarie, who at that time was 17. The commissioner reserved
ruling on the issue, reasoning thatz ruling on postsecondary educational support was premature
because Annamarie had not yet been accepted to college and the amount of her educational
expenses was not yet clear. Consistent with that ruling, the commissioner modified the
applicable sections of the original support order to read as follows:
3. 13 Termination of Support
Support shall be paid until the children turn 18 or until the children
graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, except as set forth in
Paragraph 3. 14 below.
3. 14 Post Secondary Educational Support
Post -secondary support determination is premature and is reserved for
future determination.
2 The couple has a third daughter who was age 18 at the time the order was entered.
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Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 130.
In 2011, Anthony moved to modify his child support obligation. Regina opposed the
motion and again requested that the commissioner award postsecondary educational support for
Annamarie. At the time of the motion Annamarie had turned 18, graduated from high school,
and enrolled at Pacific Lutheran University. The total cost for the 2011 -12 school year was
22, 282 after financial aid and scholarships. This amount was less than the cost to attend
Washington State University. Annamarie took out loans in her own name for $5, 474 and Regina
paid the remaining $ 16, 808. Regina requested that the commissioner order Anthony to
reimburse her for his pro rata share.
Anthony opposed Regina' s request for postsecondary educational support. He argued
that Regina failed to adequately document Annamarie' s educational expenses and that the
commissioner did not have authority to award postsecondary educational support because
Annamarie was over 18 when the petition was filed. The commissioner rejected these arguments
and ordered Anthony to pay his pro rata share of the postsecondary educational expenses
pursuant to the statutory criteria and the 2006 order of child support." CP at 306.
Anthony moved for revision of the commissioner' s ruling. The parties presented
evidence and argument regarding application of the factors in RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) for evaluating
postsecondary educational support. The trial court denied the motion. In its oral ruling, the trial
court stated that it had evaluated the statutory factors and had determined that a postsecondary
educational support award was appropriate. The trial court also stated that it evaluated the
parents' " current and future capacity to pay." Report of Proceedings ( Dec. 2, 2011) at 34. Based
on these factors, the trial court ordered Anthony to pay his pro rata share of Annamarie' s 2011-
12 college tuition third of
and one - her future tuition.
No. 43037 -1 - II
Anthony moved for reconsideration of the trial court' s ruling. He argued that the
payment of postsecondary educational expenses would increase his child support obligation to
more than 45 percent of his net monthly income, in violation of RCW 26. 19. 065( 1). The trial
court concluded that postsecondary educational expenses were not included in the statutory cap.
Anthony appeals the trial court' s order regarding postsecondary educational expenses and
denial of the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
ANALYSIS
A. POST -MAJORITY MOTION FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT
Anthony argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to award postsecondary
educational support because at the time Regina made the request, Annamarie had reached age 18.
However, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to address postsecondary educational support.
In re Marriage of Major, 71 Wn. App. 531, 533 -36, 859 P.2d 1262 ( 1993). At issue here is
whether the trial court had authority to order postsecondary educational support in light of RCW
26. 09. 170( 3). See Major, 71 Wash. App. at 536.
RCW 26. 09. 170( 3) provides: " Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided
in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child."
For purposes of this statute, " emancipation" refers to the age of majority —18. In re Marriage of
Gimlett, 95 Wash. 2d 699, 702 -04, 629 P.2d 450 ( 1981). If a decree does not provide for post-
majority support, a party must file a motion to modify to add such support before the child turns
18. Balch v. Balch, 75 Wn. App. 776, 779, 880 P.2d 78 ( 1994). Conversely, if a decree
expressly provides for post- majority support, a court may modify such support as long as the
movant files a motion to modify before the " termination of support". Balch, 75 Wash. App. at 779.
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No. 43037 -1 - II
Here, it is undisputed that the trial court entered its order requiring postmajority support
after Annamarie turned 18. Therefore, the question is whether, under the child support order in
effect when Annamarie turned 18, Anthony' s support obligation had terminated when Regina
filed her motion to modify. If such support had not terminated, the motion was timely.
Interpretation of a child support order is a question of law that we review de novo." In
re Marriage ofSagner, 159 Wash. App. 741, 749, 247 P.3d 444, review denied, 171 Wash. 2d 1026
2011). In determining whether the child support order authorizes an award of postsecondary
educational support, we look to whether " the support- paying parent has notice that the support
obligation will extend past the age of majority." Rains v. Dep' t of Soc. & Health Servs., 98 Wn.
App. 127, 137, 989 P.2d 558 ( 1999) ( citing Balch, 75 Wn. App. at 780). The rationale for
requiring post- majority support to be expressly provided in a decree is that the support- paying
parent must be " given advance notice of the termination date or event, rather than being forced to
wait for some elusive or fortuitous date of the dependency cessation." Gimlett, 95 Wash. 2d at 703.
Where the terms of a dissolution decree clearly state that support terminates upon the
occurrence of specific events, courts have held that the trial court lacked authority to consider a
postsecondary educational support award. In re Marriage of Gillespie, 77 Wash. App. 342, 347-
48, 890 P.2d 1083 ( 1995). In Gillespie, the dissolution decree provided that support would
continue until the child " shall reach the age of eighteen ( 18) years, shall marry, shall become
supporting or shall no
self - longer be dependent upon the wife." 77 Wash. App. at 344 ( emphasis
omitted) ( internal quotation marks omitted). After the child turned 18, the mother filed a petition
to modify the decree to provide for postsecondary educational support. Gillespie, 77 Wash. App.
at 344. Division Three of this court held that the trial court did not have authority to modify the
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No. 43037 -1 - II
decree because the support obligation had terminated when the child turned 18 under the
conditions in the decree. Gillespie, 77 Wash. App. at 347 -48.
However, the result is different if an order expressly extends support beyond the age of
majority. In Balch, the dissolution decree provided that " the children shall be supported until
they are no longer in need of support." 75 Wash. App. at 780 ( internal quotation marks omitted).
The trial court declined to consider an award for postsecondary educational support because the
child had reached the age of majority at the time the modification petition was filed. Balch, 75
Wn. App. at 778. This court reversed, holding:
Although this stipulated language lacks precision as to the duration and nature of
child support, it clearly expresses an intention to continue child support beyond
majority if [the child] remained dependent in fact. See RCW 26. 09. 170( 3).
Further, the language is sufficient to put the payor parent on notice that the child
support obligation may continue after majority.
Balch, 75 Wn. App. at 780. The court concluded that the decree language was " ` sufficiently
explicit' " under RCW 26. 09. 170( 3) to allow the imposition of postsecondary educational
support. Balch, 75 Wash. App. at 780 ( quoting In re Marriage ofNielsen, 52 Wash. App. 56, 60,
757 P.2d 537 ( 1988)).
Here, both the original decree and the 2010 modification order expressly provided that
support would terminate when the child turned 18 ( or graduated from high school if later) except
for postsecondary educational support. The 2010 order did not state the amount of
postsecondary educational support or when the support obligation would end, but it clearly did
contemplate that support would continue beyond the age of 18. The trial court reserved for the
future the determination of whether postsecondary support would be appropriate and, if so, the
specific amount. And by referencing postsecondary educational support and reserving ruling for
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No. 43 03 7 -1 - II
a future date, the order put the parents on notice that their support obligations could continue past
the age of majority. Gimlett, 95 Wash. 2d at 703; Balch, 75 Wash. App. at 780.
Because the modification order " otherwise ... expressly provided" as required in RCW
26. 09. 170( 3) that the postsecondary educational support obligation would not terminate when
Annamarie turned 18, Regina filed her motion to modify before support terminated as required in
Balch. 75 Wash. App. at 779. Accordingly, the trial court had authority under RCW 26. 09. 170( 3)
to modify its previous order and award postsecondary educational support.
Our holding would be the same even if the modification order had not expressly extended
postsecondary educational support beyond the age of majority. Regina filed a motion before
Annamarie turned 18 requesting that the trial court award postsecondary educational support.
The trial court reserved ruling on the issue because it was premature. To preclude Regina from
requesting postsecondary educational support after Annamarie reached age 18 when the trial
court ruled that the issue was premature at age 17 would be inequitable. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court' s pre -majority ruling that the issue of postsecondary educational support was
reserved for a later date did not foreclose the trial court from ruling on the issue after the child
reached the age of majority.
B. POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT AWARD
Anthony argues that even if the trial court had the authority to consider a postsecondary
educational support award, it abused its discretion in deciding to make the award. We disagree.
The trial court has broad discretion to order support for postsecondary education. Childers v.
Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 601, 575 P.2d 201 ( 1978); see also In re Marriage ofNewell, 117 Wn.
App. 711, 718, 72 P.3d 1130 ( 2003); In re Marriage ofKelly, 85 Wash. App. 785, 795, 934 P.2d
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1218 ( 1997). A trial court abuses that discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds
or reasons. Newell, 117 Wash. App. at 718.
RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) gives the trial court discretion to order support for postsecondary
educational expenses and sets forth criteria the trial court should consider when making such an
award. The trial court initially must find that the child is dependent and " relying upon the
parents for the reasonable necessities of life." RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). Once that threshold
requirement is satisfied, the trial court must also consider the following non -exhaustive list of
factors:
Age of the child; the child' s needs; the expectations of the parties for their
children when the parents were together; the child' s prospects, desires, aptitudes,
abilities or disabilities; the nature of the postsecondary education sought; and the
parents' level of education, standard of living, and current and future resources.
RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). " Also to be considered are the amount and type of support that the child
would have been afforded if the parents had stayed together." RCW 26. 19. 090( 2).
Anthony argues that the record does not show that the trial court had properly considered
the factors in RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). However, the parties presented evidence and argument
regarding the factors, and the trial court stated that it had reviewed the factors to determine that
an award was appropriate. Although the trial court did not make extensive findings on the record
as to each factor, RCW 26. 19. 090 sets forth no requirement that the trial court explicitly consider
the factors on the record. In re Marriage ofMorris, No. 69430 -8 -I, 2013 WL 5310206, at * 7
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No. 43037 -1 - II
3
Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2013). And we presume that the court considered all evidence before
it in fashioning an order on postsecondary educational expenses. Kelly, 85 Wn. App. at.793.
Further, the record supports the trial court' s conclusion that the postsecondary
educational support award was appropriate. Initially, the trial court knew Annamarie was a
recent high school graduate enrolled in a full -ime university program and there was no evidence
t
that she had or was capable of earning an income sufficient to meet her " reasonable necessities
of life." RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). Accordingly, there was evidence from which the trial court could
reasonably find that she was dependent under RCW 26. 19. 090( 2).
With regard to the statutory factors, the trial court was aware of Annamarie' s age and the
cost of attending college. The 2006 child support order' s provision for postsecondary
educational expenses showed that Anthony and Regina expected to contribute to their children' s
college education. Annamarie' s admission to a highly regarded university and her receipt of a
5, 500 academic achievement scholarship demonstrated her aptitude and her abilities. The trial
court knew the nature of the education sought — attendance at Pacific Lutheran University. The
trial court had both parents' tax returns and pay stubs for the preceding two years to assess
3
We note that in In re Marriage ofShellenberger, 80 Wash. App. 71, 85, 906 P.2d 968 ( 1995),
Division One of this court held that before a trial court can require a parent to pay for
postsecondary educational expenses at a private institution, it must " make specific findings as to
the cost and availability of college education in the child' s chosen field at publicly funded
institutions." The court reasoned, " A trial court should not require objecting parents of modest
means to pay for private college where the child can obtain a degree in his or her chosen field at
a publicly subsidized App. at 85. We note that this rule may
institution." Shellenberger, 80 Wn.
draw an arbitrary distinction between private and public schooling when a more appropriate
analysis would be on the actual cost of the school as compared to other reasonable alternatives.
However, because Anthony does not raise this issue on appeal, we need not address the propriety
of the rule or whether the trial court properly complied with it in this case. Moreover, although
the trial court did not make specific findings on the issue, our review of the record shows that
Regina presented evidence that the net cost of attending Pacific Lutheran University was less
than the cost at Washington State University.
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No. 43037 -1 - II
standard of living and resources. And the parents' level of education —neither attended college —
did not necessarily negate a finding that it was appropriate for Annamarie to seek postsecondary
education. We do not second guess the trial court' s discretionary evaluation of these factors.
See In re Parentage of Goude, 152 Wn. App. 784, 791, 219 P.3d 717 ( 2009) ( trial court does not
abuse its discretion in determining postsecondary educational support if it considers all factors in
RCW 26. 19. 090( 2)).
Anthony also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay
postsecondary educational support because it would cause him an " undue hardship ". Br. of
Appellant at 9. In support of his contention, he cites In re Marriage ofShellenberger, 80 Wn.
App. 71, 84, 906 P.2d 968 ( 1995), in which Division One of this court held that a trial court
abuses its discretion if it awards a postsecondary educational support obligation that would force
the obligor parent into bankruptcy or would require selling the family home. The court stated
that "[ t]his is especially true where the parent also supports a minor child, and the postsecondary
support obligation prevents the parent from meeting that obligation to the minor child."
Shellenberger, 80 Wash. App. at 84. However, other than showing that his expenses exceeded his
income, Anthony did not demonstrate sufficient financial hardship to trump the trial court' s
discretionary ruling that postsecondary educational support was appropriate for Annamarie.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding postsecondary
educational support because the record supports the conclusion that such support was appropriate
under RCW 26. 19. 090( 2).
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C. 45 PERCENT CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT
Anthony argues that even if an award for postsecondary educational expenses was
appropriate, the trial court' s order violated RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) because it increased his child
support obligation to more than 45 percent of his net income.' RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) provides:
Neither parent' s child support obligation owed for all his or her biological or legal children may
exceed five
forty - percent of net income except for good cause shown." The statute defines
good cause" as " possession of substantial wealth, children with day care expenses, special
medical need, educational need, psychological need, and larger families." RCW
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26. 19. 065( 1)( c). The issue is whether the term " child support obligation" in the statute includes
postsecondary educational support.
The interpretation of statutory language is a question of law that we review de novo.
Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC v. Grant County, 156 Wash. 2d 84, 89, 124 P.3d 294 ( 2005). The
primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature' s intent.
Dept of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 ( 2002). "[ I] f the
4
Anthony' s net monthly income at the time the trial court ordered him to pay postsecondary
support was $ 2, 169. 88. The trial court ordered him to pay $433. 66 per month in support for his
younger daughter and $ 8, 135. 07 for Annamarie' s college expenses. The college expense
reimbursement amounts to approximately $677. 92 per month if divided over a full year.
Therefore, under the trial Anthony' s
court' s order child support obligation totaled $ 1, 111. 58 per
month, or 51 percent of his net monthly income.
5
RCW 26. 19. 065 was amended in 2009. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 84, § 2 ( eff. Oct 1, 2009). Former
RCW 26. 19. 065 ( 1998) provided:
Limit at five
forty - percent of a parent' s net income. Neither parent' s total
child support obligation may exceed forty -
five percent of net income except for
good cause shown. Good cause includes but is not limited to possession of
substantial wealth, children with day care expenses, special medical need,
educational need, psychological need, and larger families.
Former RCW 26. 19. 065( 1). The changes do not affect our analysis. And because the
modification order increasing the child support award above 45 percent of Anthony' s net income
took place in 2011, we cite the current version of the statute.
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No. 43037 -1 - II
statute' s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an
expression of legislative intent." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 9 -10. The plain meaning of
a statute is derived from all the legislature has said in the statute and related statutes that disclose
legislative intent about the provision in question. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 11.
The child support statutes do not address the parameters of the term " child support".
RCW 26. 19. 090 does not state whether " postsecondary educational support" constitutes " child
support". Similarly, RCW 26. 19. 011 — the definitions section of chapter 26. 19 RCW —does not
define " child support" or " child support obligation ". RCW 26. 19. 011( 1) does define "[ b] asic
child support obligation" as the " monthly child support obligation determined from the economic
table" set out in RCW 26. 19. 020. ( Emphasis added.) But use of the term " child support
obligation" in RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) contemplates a broader concept. There are no other statutes
that provide insight into whether the legislature intended to include postsecondary educational
support in the definition of child support obligation.
We are guided by two cases tangentially discussing this issue. In In re Marriage of
Daubert, Division One of this court addressed the allocation of postsecondary educational
support in light of RCW 26. 19. 090( 1), which provides that the " child support schedule" is
advisory and not mandatory for postsecondary educational support. 124 Wash. App. 483, 499 -500,
99 P.3d 401( 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by McCausland v. McCausland, 129 Wn.
App. 390, 118 P.3d 944 ( 2007). The issue was whether all of chapter 26. 19 RCW (entitled
Child Support Schedule ") was advisory or just the economic table set out in RCW 26. 19. 020.
Daubert, 124 Wn. App. at 500 -01. In this context, the court stated ( without analysis or citation
to authority) that "[ p] ostsecondary educational support is child support." Daubert, 124 Wn.
App. at 502. Later in the opinion, the court used an example indicating that postsecondary
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No. 43037 -1 - II
educational support would count against the 45 percent cap in RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) when a
younger sibling is involved. 6 Daubert, 124 Wash. App. at 503.
More significantly, our Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "child support" in In re
Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wash. 2d 353, 367 -68, 268 P.3d 215 ( 2011). In Schneider, the court
addressed whether postsecondary educational support constituted " support" within the meaning
of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, chapter 26. 21 RCW. 173 Wash. 2d at 367. The
court explained that postsecondary educational support " fits within the structure of the child
support statute in general" and in some situations " can function just like ordinary child support."
Schneider, 173 Wash. 2d at 368. Accordingly, the court concluded that postsecondary educational
support " is money paid to support a dependent child, therefore it is child support." Schneider,
17' ) Wn.2d at 368.
Although Schneider did not involve RCW 26. 19. 065( 1), we believe that our Supreme
Court' s statement that postsecondary educational support is child support controls here.
Therefore, we hold that postsecondary educational support is part of a parent' s " child support
obligation" for the purposes of the 45 percent limitation in RCW 26. 19. 065( 1). The trial court
violated RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) when it set Anthony' s child support obligation, including
postsecondary educational support, at an amount greater than 45 percent. of his net monthly
income.
We are aware that capping the child support obligation at 45 percent — including
postsecondary educational expenses — may in certain circumstances mean that a parent cannot be
required to pay such expenses, even when the RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) factors support payment.
6
Similarly, in Morris, Division One assumed without discussion that postsecondary educational
support would be included in the 45 percent cap. 2013 WL 5310206, at * 9.
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No. 43037- 1- 11
However, RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) allows the trial court to exceed the 45 percent cap " for good cause
shown ", which includes " educational need ".
We affirm the trial court' s authority to award postsecondary educational support and its
determination that an award of postsecondary educational support was proper. But we reverse the
trial court' s postsecondary educational support order and remand to the trial court with directions
to comply with RCW 26. 19. 065( 1) by either reducing Anthony' s child support obligation to 45
percent of his net monthly income or determining that good cause exists for exceeding the 45
percent cap.
Maxa, T
We concur:
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