State Of Washington v. Jose Juan Lemasson ( 2013 )


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  •                                COURT Or APPEALS L,;
    STATE CF WASHINGTC;.
    2013 JUN 17 AH 8= 5U
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                No. 68645-3-1
    Respondent,
    v.
    JOSE JUAN LEMASSON,                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.                    FILED: June 17, 2013
    Verellen, J. — Jose LeMasson appeals the judgment and sentence entered
    upon his conviction by a jury of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. LeMasson
    argues that the trial court erred in finding that he has the current or likely future ability
    to pay the legal financial obligations imposed. We affirm.
    At sentencing, in addition to $600 in mandatory financial obligations, the State
    requested that the court impose court costs and costs of incarceration under
    RCW 10.01.160 and a $1,000 fine for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances
    Act, RCW 69.50.430.1 The prosecutor suggested that the court take note ofthe fact
    that LeMasson was represented by privately-retained counsel in this case and in a
    related case, and infer that while he might not have extensive financial resources, he
    1The mandatory financial obligations consist of the $500 victim penalty
    assessment and the $100 DNA collection fee. RCW 7.68.035(1 )(a); RCW 43.43.7541.
    No. 68645-3-1/2
    was not indigent. LeMasson, on the other hand, asked the court to waive all financial
    penalties on the basis of indigency. Defense counsel pointed out that LeMasson was
    initially represented by appointed counsel and that counsel's services were retained
    by LeMasson's family. The trial court imposed some, but not all, of the financial
    penalties sought by the State. The court imposed the $600 in mandatory financial
    obligations, $465 in court costs and waived all other discretionary penalties.
    LeMasson's judgment and sentence includes the following preprinted finding:
    Having considered the defendant's present and likely future financial
    resources, the Court concludes that the defendant has the present or
    likely future ability to pay the financial obligations imposed. The Court
    waives financial obligation(s) that are checked below because the
    defendant lacks the present and future ability to pay them.[2]
    LeMasson claims that no evidence in the record supports the sentencing
    court's boilerplate finding. Therefore, he argues that the finding is clearly erroneous
    and must be stricken from the judgment and sentence.
    Mandatory legal financial obligations must be imposed regardless of financial
    circumstances, so the finding about ability to pay is immaterial with respect to the
    mandatory penalties imposed.3 LeMasson does not challenge the mandatory legal
    financial obligations imposed.
    2Clerk's Papers at 50.
    3See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 
    153 Wash. App. 325
    , 336-39, 
    223 P.3d 1165
    (2009) (DNA fee is mandatory and imposed regardless of hardship); State v. Williams,
    
    65 Wash. App. 456
    , 460-61, 
    828 P.2d 1158
    (1992) (victim penalty assessment "is
    mandatory and requires no consideration of a defendant's ability to pay" at
    sentencing).
    No. 68645-3-1/3
    The sentencing court has discretion to impose court costs under
    RCW 10.01.160, but in order to do so, must consider the present and likely future
    financial resources of the defendant and the burden that the imposition of costs will
    impose.4 RCW 10.01.160 does not require the court to enter findings regarding a
    defendant's ability to pay before imposing financial obligations.5
    Here, the sentencing court imposed legal financial obligations, including the
    nonmandatory legal financial obligations, after hearing the positions of both the State
    and the defense on LeMasson's indigence. The court's rejection of certain
    discretionary costs sought by the State reflects its consideration of LeMasson's
    financial resources and the burden of the legal financial obligations. The record is
    sufficient to conclude that the court complied with the requirements of the statute by
    considering LeMasson's financial resources before imposing the legal financial
    obligations.6
    4 RCW 10.01.160(3) ("The court shall not ordera defendant to pay costs unless
    the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of
    payment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the
    defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose."); State v.
    Baldwin. 
    63 Wash. App. 303
    , 308-12, 
    818 P.2d 1116
    (1991), 
    837 P.2d 646
    (1992); State
    v. Calvin. No. 67627-0-I, 
    2013 WL 2325121
    at *11 (Wash. Ct. App. May 28, 2013).
    5See State v. Curry. 
    118 Wash. 2d 911
    , 916, 
    829 P.2d 166
    (1992); Calvin. WL
    2325121 at 11.
    6See 
    Baldwin, 63 Wash. App. at 311
    (inquiry into ability to pay satisfied by
    statement in presentence report that defendant was employable); Calvin. WL 2325121
    at 11.
    No. 68645-3-1/4
    We affirm LeMasson's sentence, including the imposition of $465 in
    discretionary legal financial obligations.7
    WE CONCUR:
    IkiL^ej^
    7A formal finding about LeMasson's ability to pay is not required. See State v.
    Bertrand, 
    165 Wash. App. 393
    , 404, 
    267 P.3d 511
    (2011), review denied. 
    175 Wash. 2d 1014
    , 
    276 P.3d 10
    (2012). Nevertheless, the finding is supported by the record as a
    whole, including the statements of both counsel at sentencing as well as the testimony
    at trial that LeMasson is in his 30s, able-bodied, and was carrying a substantial sum of
    money at the time of the crime.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 68645-3

Filed Date: 6/17/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014