State Of Washington, V Spencer Leroy Miller ( 2014 )

FILED
COLIPT OF APPEALS
DIVISION 11
2giliMiY 13 11 9: 13
TE TON
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 42899 -7 -II
Appellant, PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
SPENCER MILLER,
Respondent.
BJORGEN, J. — The State appeals from the superior court' s order vacating Spencer
Miller' s sentence and requiring a new sentencing hearing under CrR 7. 8. Because the superior
court did not err in determining that a significant intervening change in the law, material to
Miller' s sentence, established a fundamental defect in the original sentencing proceeding, we
affirm.
FACTS
In October 2010, Miller, a Washington State Department of Corrections inmate, filed a
motion pro se to vacate his judgment and sentence under CrR 7. 8. A jury had found Miller,
along with two codefendants, guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder based on
charges stemming from a 2001 shooting. The trial court had sentenced
No. 42899 -7 -II
Miller near the bottom of the standard range, imposing two consecutive 200 -month terms of
incarceration. In his motion, Miller argued that the superior court should hold a new sentencing
hearing because the original sentencing court had failed to recognize, based on a
misunderstanding of the law, that it had discretion to impose concurrent sentences as an
exceptional downward departure, thus depriving Miller of the opportunity to argue for such an
exceptional sentence. Miller pointed out that our Supreme Court had subsequently held in In re
Personal Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 166 P. 3d 677 ( 2007), that sentencing courts
have discretion to impose concurrent sentences for multiple serious violent felonies, despite the
mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( b). After obtaining counsel,
Miller filed a motion to modify or correct the judgment and sentence based on substantially the
same grounds.
After holding hearings on Miller' s motion, the superior court concluded that ( 1) the one -
year time bar of RCW 10. 73. 090 did not apply to Miller' s collateral attack because the motion
was based entirely on a significant change in the law; ( 2) Miller had made a substantial showing
that he was entitled to relief; (3) the sentencing court hadfailed to realize it could run Miller' s
sentences concurrently;' and ( 4) despite the fact that Miller had not, in fact, requested a mitigated
sentence, the sentencing court' s failure to recognize its discretion constituted a fundamental
defect inherently resulting in a miscarriage ofjustice. The court therefore vacated the sentence
1
The judicial officer who conducted all the hearings related to Miller' s CrR 7. 8 motion, Pierce
County Superior Court Judge Cuthbertson, also presided over Miller' s trial and pronounced the
sentence at issue here.
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and ordered a new sentencing hearing. Prior to Miller' s resentencing, the State timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
The State' s six assignments of error may be condensed to two essential issues: whether
the superior court erred in determining that ( 1) the relevant holding in Mulholland constitutes a
significant change in the law, material to Miller' s sentence; and ( 2) the original sentencing court
failed to recognize its discretion to impose concurrent terms of confinement, inherently resulting
in a miscarriage of justice.
If the holding in Mulholland does not represent a significant change in the law, the rest of
the superior court' s findings and conclusions were necessarily erroneous. We thus first address
whether the relevant holding in Mulholland constituted a significant change in the law.
Concluding that it did, we then consider whether Miller' s failure to request a mitigated sentence
at the time of sentencing precludes relief, an issue raised through the assignments of error.
Holding that relief is not precluded, we consider whether the superior court properly found that
the sentencing court had failed to recognize its discretion to impose concurrent terms, and if so,
whether such failure amounts to a fundamental defect entitling Miller to a new sentencing
-
hearing. Concluding that superior court did not err, we affirm its decision vacating Miller' s
sentence and requiring a new sentencing hearing.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our Supreme Court succinctly articulated the applicable standard of review in a recent
case:
A trial court' s order on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or vacate a judgment is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision
is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons. A court' s
decision is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the
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No. 42899 -7 -II
facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard. A court' s decision is
manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the
facts and the applicable legal standard. The untenable grounds basis applies if the
factual findings are unsupported by the record.
State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P. 3d 27 ( 2012) ( internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). When we consider whether a trial court properly applied the correct legal standard,
we review de novo the choice of law and its application to the facts in the case." State v.
Corona, 164 Wn. 76, 79, 261 P. 3d 680 ( 2011); Barton Dep' t of Transp., 178
App. accord, v.
Wn.2d 193, 201 - 02, 308 P. 3d 597 ( 2013). Thus, we limit our review of challenged factual
findings to whether substantial evidence in the record supports them, but consider de novo
whether the challenged conclusions of law properly follow from the supported facts.
II. MULHOLLAND WORKED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LAW
Trial courts have discretion under CrR 7. 8( b) to " relieve a party from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding" for various enumerated reasons, as well as the catchall "[ a] ny other reason
justifying relief." The rule provides, however, that
t]he court shall transfer a motion filed by a defendant to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as a personal restraint petition unless the court determines that the
motion is not barred by [ the one -year limit provided in] RCW 10. 73. 090 and
either ( i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that he or she is entitled to
relief or ( ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.
CrR 7. 8( c)( 2). Miller filed his motion more than one year after his judgment and sentence
became final. Thus, the trial court could consider the motion on its merits only if it properly
determined that the statutory time bar on collateral attacks did not apply. The rule also required
the superior court to properly determine that either Miller had made a substantial showing that
his claim had merit or that proper resolution required a factual hearing.
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No. 42899 -7 -II
The trial court concluded that Miller' s collateral attack was not time barred based on a
statutory exception, which provides that the time limitation of RCW 10. 73. 090
does not apply to a petition or motion that is based solely on ... a significant
change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the
and either the legislature has expressly provided that
conviction [ or] sentence, ...
the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a
change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive
application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive
application of the changed legal standard.
RCW 10. 73. 100( 6). Thus, we must first decide whether the holding in Mulholland on which
Miller relies qualifies as a " significant change in the law" under RCW 10. 73. 100( 6).
The State points out that courts have interpreted " significant change in the law" in RCW
10. 73. 100( 6) " as a change that effectively overturns prior material law so that the arguments
currently at issue were previously unavailable to the litigants" and argues, without elaboration,
that " Mulholland did not constitute a significant change in the law where it did not reverse
established precedent." Br. of Appellant 24 ( citing In re Pers. Restraint ofDomingo, 155 Wn.2d
356, 119 P. 3d 816 ( 2005)). Miller asserts first that the State has failed to present argument in
support of its position, as required-by RAP 10. 3( a)( 6), and therefore invites this court to refuse to
consider the State' s assignment of error on the issue. Miller further argues that the superior court
did not err in determining that Mulholland effected a significant change, pointing to State v.
Flett, 98 Wn. App. 799, 806, 992 P. 2d 1028 ( 2000), an opinion of this court contrary to the
relevant holding of the Mulholland court.
Turning to Miller' s initial argument, we acknowledge that the State' s brief in this appeal
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No. 42899 -7 -II
contains a large amount of irrelevant material,2 while its entire argument on the key issue in this
case, whether Mulholland worked a significant change in the law, amounts to two short
paragraphs. Nonetheless, we conclude that the State has presented sufficient argument and
citation to authority to merit review.
On the merits of the issue, the State' s sole contention is that an appellate decision only
qualifies as a significant change in the law if it reverses prior precedent. The authorities cited,
however, do not establish this proposition.
The State' s argument relies on the following language from Domingo:
I] t is untenable to claim that [ State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 14 P. 3d 7132000)] and [ State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568, 14 P. 3d 752 ( 2000)] " effectively
overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a
material issue" as required by [ In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687,
697, 9 P. 3d 206 ( 2000)]; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71,
83, 74 P. 3d 1194 ( 2003) ( stating that an appellate decision that merely settles a
point of law without overturning precedent, or applies settled law to new facts,
does not constitute a significant change in the law).
155 Wn.2d at 368 ( quoting Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697). The portion of Greening cited by the
Domingo court, however, merely states that "[ w] e hold that where an intervening opinion has
effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material
issue, the intervening opinion constitutes a ` significant change in the law' for purposes of
exemption from procedural bars." Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697. The Turay court described
2
For example: ( 1) although Miller never raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and
the trial court in no way relied on ineffective assistance, 13 pages of the brief are devoted to
arguing that Miller received effective assistance and that this court wrongly decided In re
Personal Restraint of Crace, 157 Wn. App. 81, 236 P. 3d 914 ( 2010), the relevant part of which
our Supreme Court has already approved, 174 Wn.2d 835, 844 - 45, 280 P. 3d 1102 ( 2012); and
2) although the superior court did not conclude that Miller' s judgment and sentence was facially
invalid, more than 6 pages of the brief are devoted to a boilerplate discussion of our Supreme
Court' s facial invalidity jurisprudence.
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No. 42899 -7 -II
Greening' s holding on this point as "[ o] ne way in which a significant change in the law occurs,"
noting that "[ a] n appellate decision that settles a point of law without overturning prior precedent
is not such a case." 150 Wn.2d at 83.
Neither Turay nor Domingo, however, purport to overrule prior decisions, discussed
below, in which our Supreme Court held that an appellate decision worked a significant change
in the law even though it did not reverse established precedent. Giving consistent effect to these
decisions requires the conclusion that reversing established precedent is sufficient, but not
necessary, to effect a significant change in the law. Other routes to a significant change remain
viable.
In In re Personal Restraint of Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d 427, 433 -34, 842 P. 2d 950 ( 1992),
our Supreme Court found a significant change in the law as to whether future dangerousness
properly supports an exceptional sentence, based on two intervening cases, State v. Pryor, 115
Wn.2d 445, 799 P. 2d 244 ( 1990) and State v. Barnes, 117 Wn.2d 701, 818 P. 2d 1088 ( 1991).
While the Barnes court may have overruled prior decisions sub silentio, see Barnes, 117 Wn.2d
at 716 -17 ( Dolliver, J., dissenting), the Pryor court, after acknowledging that no Washington —
Supreme Court opinion had yet addressed the question, explicitly agreed with this court' s
holdings on the question. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d at 451 -54. Thus, the reversal of precedent was not
a necessary element of a significant change.
Likewise, in In re Personal Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 808 -13, 792 P. 2d 5061990), our Supreme Court accepted an argument that the identically- worded provision in RAP
16. 4( c)( 4) would permit review of Cook' s petition despite the RCW 10. 73. 090 time bar based in
part on the intervening decision in State v. Caliguri, 99 Wn.2d 501, 664 P. 2d 466 ( 1983). The
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No. 42899 -7 -II
Caliguri court had interpreted RCW 10. 43. 040, a statute in effect since 1909, to bar dual state
and federal prosecutions for the same crime. 99 Wn.2d at 512. The Caliguri court addressed the
3
matter as a question of first impression in this state and did not overrule any prior precedent. 99
Wn.2d at 511 -12. Nonetheless, Cook accepted the argument that Caliguri worked a significant
change in the law.
Cook' s treatment of Caliguri appears closely analogous to the situation here, where the
Mulholland court expressly interpreted as an issue of first impression a statute in effect since
well before Miller' s sentencing. 161 Wn.2d at 328. As it argues here that Mulholland did not
work a significant change in the law, the State argued in Cook that Caliguri did not constitute a
significant change in the law, which argument the Cook court rejected without comment. Cook,
114 Wn.2d at 807 -14. Thus, the State' s argument that Mulholland did not qualify as a
significant change because it did not explicitly reverse established precedent rests on a false
premise.
If reversal of an established precedent is not necessary to work a significant change in the
law, the question remains what is necessary. Our Supreme Court has stated that it will consider
whether an argument was " available" to a litigant in deciding whether there has been a
significant change in the law. See Domingo, 155 Wn.2d at 366; Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697.
An argument is not available, though, merely because it conceivably could be made. The
Greening court rejected the view that arguments contrary to published precedent are " available"
simply because established precedent has been reversed in the past. 141 Wn.2d at 697 n.9. The
3 We are aware of no Washington cases interpreting RCW 10. 43. 040 prior to Caliguri. The
Caliguri court discussed only cases decided by the appellate courts of other states in its analysis
of the relevant point, all of which had also interpreted similarly worded state statutes to bar dual
federal and state prosecutions. 99 Wn.2d at 512.
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inquiry, thus, ends where common sense would take it: in the examination of how clear and
unequivocal the law was before Mulholland that consecutive sentences were mandatory in these
circumstances.
In this inquiry we keep in mind that where courts and practitioners have uniformly
worked under the assumption that a certain principle is the law, no occasion may have arisen for
an appellate court to repudiate that principle for a long span of time. Dicta from our Supreme
Court, furthermore, may constrain the conduct of trial courts as surely as does a holding of this
court or a statute. When a case does arise that squarely presents the issue, as occurred in Pryor
and Caliguri, an appellate court' s repudiation of such a long- accepted principle could still
amount to a significant change in the law. See Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d at 433 -34; Cook, 114
Wn.2d at 808 -13. As the dicta from our Supreme Court discussed below demonstrate, the notion
that sentences for multiple serious violent felonies must run consecutively is just such a long -
accepted principle. The Mulholland court' s reliance on the plain language of the statute in
rejecting this principle, 161 Wn. 2d at 330, subtracts nothing from the consistent and categorical
message of the case law before Mulholland that these sentences must run consecutively:
On more than one occasion prior to Mulholland, our Supreme Court had stated that
sentencing courts lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences for multiple serious violent
offenses. In State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 602 -03, 115 P. 3d 281 ( 2005) ( footnote omitted),
the court stated:
Although sentencing courts generally enjoy discretion in tailoring
sentences, for the most part that discretion does not extend to deciding whether to
apply sentences concurrently or consecutively. Where a person is sentenced for
two or more current offenses, the legislature has specified that if those offenses
stem from the same criminal conduct, the sentences shall be served concurrently;
consecutive sentences can be imposed only as an exceptional sentence under
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No. 42899 -7 -II
RCW 9. 94A. 535. RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( a). In contrast, sentences for " two or more
serious violent offenses arising from separate and distinct criminal conduct" must
be applied consecutively to each other. RCW 9. 94A. 589( 1)( b). In RCW
9. 94A.589 the legislature also specified that courts must impose consecutive
sentences for certain firearm related offenses. RCW 9. 94A. 589( 1)( c).
Additionally, in In re Post -
Sentencing Review of Charles, a case decided before Miller' s trial,
our Supreme Court similarly stated that "[ t]he exception to the rule that current offenses are to be
served concurrently occurs when the person has committed two or more ` serious violent
offenses,' in which case sentences are consecutive," specifying that " unless the court imposes an
exceptional sentence, or there are two or more statutorily -defined serious violent offenses, the
sentences run concurrently." 135 Wn.2d 239, 245 n. 2, 254, 955 P. 2d 798 ( 1998) ( footnote
omitted).
Although dicta, the passages cited show that the Jacobs and Charles courts believed that
discretion to run prison terms concurrently as a downward departure did not extend to sentences
for multiple serious violent offenses. This is undoubtedly a plausible reading of the statute. As
the State pointed out in Mulholland, the statute' s same- criminal -conduct provision, RCW
9. 94A.589( i)(a), explicitly refers to RCW 9. 94A.535, the exceptional sentence provision-,- hile
w
the multiple- serious -violent -
offense and firearm -
offense provisions, RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( b) and
c), do not. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 329 -30.
In Mulholland, furthermore, the State had urged the Supreme Court to follow this court' s
decision in State v. Flett, 98 Wn. App. 799, 806, 992 P. 2d 1028 ( 2000), an opinion also filed
prior to Miller' s sentencing, which stated that "[ c] onsecutive sentencing is mandatory" for
multiple serious violent offenses. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 330. The Flett court held that a
sentencing court had erred in imposing concurrent terms of confinement for multiple firearm
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No. 42899 -7 -II
enhancements as a mitigated exceptional sentence when the underlying crimes were serious
violent offenses. 98 Wn. App. at 808. The court analyzed the issue as follows:
Under [ In re Post -
Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239, 955
P. 2d 798 ( 1998)], the court addressed an ambiguity in sentencing when multiple
concurrent sentences with sentencing enhancements were involved. Here, the
trial court ordered four consecutive sentences for the first degree assaults because
they are serious violent offenses required to be consecutively sentenced. RCW
9. 94A. 030( 31)( a); RCW 9. 94A.400( 1)( b). A sentencing enhancement is added to
the base sentence to reach a single presumptive sentence for a particular offense;
it is not itself a separate sentence. Charles, 135 Wn. 2d at 253 -54.
The ambiguity
in Charles does not arise here. Consecutive sentencing is mandatory.
Flett, 98 Wn. App. at 806 ( emphasis omitted). Thus, this court also plainly believed that trial
courts lacked discretion to impose concurrent terms of confinement for multiple serious violent
felonies. In contrast, the State has not directed our attention to any case, and we know of none,
in which a sentencing court imposed concurrent terms for multiple serious violent felonies prior
to Mulholland.
In light of Vandervlugt, 120 Wn.2d at 433 -34, Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 602 -03, Flett, 98
Wn. App. at 806, and Cook, 114 Wn.2d at 808 -13, Mulholland marks a significant change in the
law, allowing defendants convicted of multiple serious violent offenses to argue for concurrent
terms of confinement as an exceptional sentence. The State has failed to meet its burden of
establishing that the trial court committed reversible error when it determined that Mulholland
announced such a change.
III. MULHOLLAND WAS MATERIAL TO MILLER' S SENTENCE
The State argues that Mulholland was not material to Miller' s sentence because ( 1) the
superior court' s finding that the original sentencing court misunderstood its discretion is
incorrect; ( 2) even if the sentencing court did misunderstand, it would have imposed the same
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No. 42899 -7 -II
sentence anyway had it recognized the extent of its discretion; and (3) Miller waived the issue by
not requesting an exceptional downward departure. The State' s argument fails for a number of
reasons. Substantial evidence in the record supports the challenged finding and suggests that the
sentencing court would have considered imposing a concurrent sentence, had it known it could,
even though Miller did not argue for such a sentence at the hearing.
A. The Sentencing Court Misunderstood the Extent of Its Discretion
Whether the sentencing court believed it had discretion to impose a concurrent sentence
presents a question of fact. As discussed above, we will not overturn a trial court' s factual
finding under the abuse -of-discretion standard unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d at 127; State v. Rosas- Miranda, 176 Wn. App. 773, 779, 309 P. 3d
728 ( 2013).
Here, the State points out that, when the sentencing court imposed a mitigated
exceptional sentence on one of Miller' s codefendants, Tonya Wilson, the State asked whether the
terms would run concurrently or consecutively, and the court specified that they were to run
consecutively. -The State argues that this interaction suggests that the court knew it could impose
concurrent terms as an exceptional sentence. While the State' s reading is plausible, the
interaction is also consistent with the trial court' s finding that the sentencing court believed it
had no discretion to impose concurrent terms: even though the court imposed a mitigated
exceptional sentence, it ordered the terms to run consecutively.
Other remarks by the sentencing court also support the challenged finding. For example,
while discussing Wilson' s sentence, the court stated, " You put count one and two together and
they run consecutively, as you know, and that' s about 35 years.... [ A] nd the [ RCW 9. 94A.589]
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No. 42899 -7 -II
stacking provision puts her at 35 years in prison even at the midrange." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at
237 -38. Similarly, in sentencing Robert Bonds, the third codefendant, the court stated,
I' m going to sentence you to the middle of the range on count one, and
that' s actually 350 months, and on count two in the middle for the range at 210
months. The weapons enhancements are 60 months for each of those counts, and
all of those necessarily run consecutively.
CP at 211 ( emphasis added). These statements confirm that the sentencing court believed it had
no discretion to run the terms concurrently.
Further support for the finding appears on Miller' s judgment and sentence. Most of the
preprinted language regarding consecutive versus concurrent terms is crossed out and replaced
by a handwritten notation that the terms would be served " consecutively pursuant to RCW
9. 94A. 589( b)." CP at 36.
Finally, as noted above, the judge who presided over Miller' s trial and imposed the
sentence at issue here is the same judge who presided over the hearing on Miller' s CrR 7. 8
motion and entered the challenged finding. Although some years had passed, after reviewing the
transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the judge would likely have remembered what he
believed about the extent of the court' s discretion at the time. We hold that the superior court
did not err in finding that the original sentencing court misunderstood its discretion.
B. The Sentencing Court Might Have Imposed a Concurrent Sentence
Even where the defendant did not request a mitigated exceptional sentence, if the
sentencing court fails to recognize its discretion to impose such a sentence, resentencing is an
appropriate remedy except " when the reviewing court is confident that the trial court would
impose the same sentence" after properly exercising its discretion. State v. McGill, 112 Wn.
App. 95, 100, 47 P. 3d 173 ( 2002). If " [ sentencing] court' s comments indicate it would have
the
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No. 42899 -7 -II
considered an exceptional sentence had it known it could," resentencing is appropriate. McGill,
112 Wn. App. at 100 -01.
The State suggests that the fact that Miller did not receive the minimum standard -
range
sentence itself establishes that concurrent sentences lay outside the realm of possibility.
According to the court' s offender score calculation, the bottom of the range for both counts
combined was 391. 5 months. Thus, the 400 -month sentence imposed was only about two
percent higher than the minimum term the court believed it could pronounce.4 A sentence this
close to the bottom of the range does not show that the court' s mind was closed to running the
terms concurrently.
On the contrary, the sentencing court' s remarks when it addressed Miller suggest it was
reluctant to impose such a long term, but felt constrained by the perceived mandate of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9. 94A RCW:
I believe you when you say that you are a changed man, and in fact, I think
Detective Ringer testified to that at trial and indicated that during this
incident.... I believe you when you say you get to a point where you understand
that running around doing stupid stuff is stupid, and it doesn' t help you or your
family or other folks that you' re responsible for. I get the sense you understand
that or have - or are beginning to understand that when this happened.
It is unfortunate that you were out there that night... .
400 months in my calculation comes out to a long time, Mr. Miller. It' s like 30
years, 33 years.... So maybe you' ll take some time to think and get some good
time and maybe other things will happen. I don' t know, but that' s the sentence
based on the information I have before me.
CP 259 -61.
4
The State had sought to have the superior court impose firearm enhancements on each count,
but the jury found by special verdict form that Miller had not been armed with a firearm.
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No. 42899 -7 -II
While these remarks are perhaps not as clear as the Mulholland court' s remarks, the facts
of Miller' s case closely resemble those in Mulholland itself. Like Miller, Mulholland did not
argue for an exceptional mitigated sentence at his sentencing hearing. 5 Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d
at 326. Nonetheless, the sentencing court " made statements on the record which indicated some
openness toward an exceptional sentence, expressing sympathy toward Mulholland because of
his former military service." Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 333.
Our Supreme Court held that, although "[ t] he record does not show that it was a certainty
that the trial court would have imposed a mitigated exceptional sentence if it had been aware that
such a sentence was an option," the sentencing court' s remarks were " sufficient to conclude that
a different sentence might have been imposed had the trial court" recognized the extent of its
discretion. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 334. The Mulholland court followed this court' s holding
in McGill that "[ w]here the appellate court `cannot say that the sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence had it known an exceptional sentence was an option,' remand is
proper." Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at• 334 ( quoting McGill, 112 Wn. App. at 100 - 101). Similarly,
this court in McGill had remanded for resentencing based on the sentencing court' s sympathetic
remarks to the defendant "[ e] ven though McGill' s counsel had not asked for an exceptional
sentence below the standard range." 112 Wn. App. at 98, 102. As in McGill and Mulholland,
5 Mulholland did argue that the terms should run concurrently as a standard -range sentence under
RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( a), because the six assault charges all stemmed from the same criminal
conduct. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 326. Mulholland had fired several shots into a room where
six people were dining. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 325. Because each charge involved a
different victim, the sentencing court rejected that argument, and we affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 326 ( citing State v. Mulholland, noted at 121 Wn. App.
1081, 2004 WL 1303160 ( 2004)). We subsequently granted Mulholland' s timely personal
restraint petition, however, for the same reasons articulated by our Supreme Court. See
Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 326 -27.
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No. 42899 -7 -II
the sentencing court' s sympathetic remarks to Miller suggest that it was open to considering a
concurrent sentence had it known that option lay within the reach of its discretion.6 We cannot
conclude that the sentencing court would have nevertheless imposed consecutive sentences had it
known the scope of its discretion.
C. Miller did not waive his challenge by failing to request an exceptional mitigated sentence
As just noted, neither the defendant in McGill nor in Mulholland requested an exceptional
downward departure at sentencing. Consequently, Miller' s failure to do so does not forfeit his
challenge. The superior court did not err in concluding that the relevant holding in Mulholland
was material to Miller' s sentence.
IV. THE SENTENCING COURT' S BELIEF THAT IT COULD NOT IMPOSE CONCURRENT SENTENCES
AMOUNTED TO A FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT RESULTING IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
In order " to receive collateral review . f a conviction on nonconstitutional grounds, a
o
petitioner must establish that the claimed error constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Cook, 114 Wn.2d at 812. The superior court
concluded that the sentencing court' s misunderstanding of the extent of its discretion amounted
to such a fundamental defect.
Although the State assigned error to this conclusion, its brief presents no argument and
cites to no authority in support of the claim. Under RAP 10. 3( a)( 6), we consider an assignment
of error waived where the party presents no argument and cites to no relevant legal authority on
6
To the extent that this presents a factual question, the evidence in the record is at least sufficient
to support the finding, implicit in the court' s ruling below, that the original sentencing court
might have imposed such a mitigated sentence had it known that it could.
7 The discussion in Parts II and III of this analysis also shows that under Mulholland and the
other cited authority, sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed
legal standard, one of the criteria of RCW 10. 73. 100( 6), set out above.
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No. 42899 -7 -II
the issue in its brief. State v. Harris, 164 Wn. App. 377, 389 n. 7, 263 P. 3d 1276 ( 2011) ( citing
Smith v. King, 106 Wn.2d 443, 451 -52, 722 P. 2d 796 ( 1986)). Thus, we do not consider the
8
claim.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Mulholland constituted a significant change in the law, material to Miller' s
sentence, and that the superior court did not err in finding that the original sentencing court failed •
to recognize its discretion to impose concurrent terms of confinement. Because the record
indicates that the original sentencing court might have imposed concurrent terms as a mitigated
exceptional sentence had it realized that it could, the superior court' s findings properly support
its conclusion that Miller was entitled to a new sentencing hearing due to a fundamental defect
inherently resulting in a miscarriage ofjustice.
Affirmed.
We concur:
8
We note, however, that Mulholland itself would appear to foreclose the State' s assignment of
error in this regard: the Mulholland court held that " the trial court' s failure to recognize that it
had the discretion to impose a mitigated exceptional sentence" amounted to " a fundamental
defect" and affirmed this court' s grant of Mulholland' s petition. 161 Wn.2d at 332 -33.
17