State of Washington v. Tyler J. Markwart ( 2014 )

FILED
July 3, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 31158-9-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
TYLER JOHN MARKWART, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, J. - Tyler Markwart appeals his convictions for manufacturing
marijuana, possession with intent to sell marijuana, and three counts of delivering
marijuana. He asks this court to dismiss the charges on the ground of police misconduct.
In the alternative, he seeks a new trial on the grounds that the trial court refused to
instruct the jury on his defenses of entrapment and under the former Washington State
Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MUMA), chapter 69.51A RCW (1999). Because law
enforcement officers engaged in a permissible ruse, we reject Markwart's request to
dismiss for police misconduct. We reverse the convictions of manufacturing and
possession with intent to sell, because, under our recent decision, State v. Shupe, 172 Wn.
App. 341,289 P.3d 741 (2012), review denied 177 Wn.2d 1010 (2013), decided after
No. 31158-9-II1
State v. Markwart
trial, the jury should have considered Markwart's medicinal marijuana defense. We
affirm the convictions for delivery of marijuana.
FACTS
Tyler Markwart's claim of police misconduct arises from his contact with
members of the Pullman Police Department and the Quad Cities Drug Task Force. This
interaction began, in August 2009, when an electrician reported to Pullman police that he
saw marijuana, paraphernalia, and possible supplies to grow marijuana in an apartment,
located at 1920 NE Terre View Dr., #J209, where he performed work. The address is
part of Campus Common North at Washington State University. Police applied for and
executed a search warrant for the apartment. Tyler Markwart and Michael Pecharko
rented the apartment, but only Pecharko was home when police executed the search
warrant. Police located marijuana plants and a handgun inside the apartment. Pecharko
claimed ownership to the handgun and produced forms authorizing him to possess
marijuana as a qualifYing patient under MUMA. Police tentatively decided not to file
criminal charges so long as Tyler Markwart, when he returned, produced an authorization
form for medicinal marijuana. The next day Markwart produced his authorization form.
In February 2011, police interviewed Tyler Markwart at his home as part ofa
robbery investigation. Officer Aaron Breshears of the Pullman Police Department
investigated the burglary and received Markwart's consent to search his residence, where
the officer observed a marijuana grow operation. During the burglary investigation,
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State v. Markwart
Markwart disclosed to police that he operated Allele Seeds Research, a dispensary for
medical marijuana patients. As proof, he produced medical marijuana forms. Upon
reviewing Markwart's paperwork, Officer Breshears determined Markwart's grow
operation was in compliance with the law, but he suggested Markwart tell other growers
to register their operations with the police department to avoid "pesky search warrants."
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 315.
Officer Aaron Breshears notified all Pullman police via e-mail that marijuana
growers may come to the police department to register their respective operations and
disclosed that, during the search of Tyler Markwart's home, officers found firearms and a
marijuana grow operation. Based on this e-mail, Detective Scott Patrick of the Quad
Cities Drug Task Force began an investigation into Markwart and Allele Seeds Research.
In describing why he initiated the investigation, Detective Patrick explained:
People who are involved in narcotic trafficking become targets for people
because if you rob somebody who's involved in narcotic trafficking,
oftentimes they don't report to the police. I know of at least three instances
in the City of Pullman in the last year in which we've had people who have
been robbed at either gunpoint or knifepoint, specifically one in particular
who was allegedly selling marijuana.
So, the firearm issue was a little bit-what I was concerned about
because of the proximity. Campus Commons North is about a 300-unit
apartment complex in the city. It's a courtyard situation, there's multiple
apartments in the area, and my concern was a run-and-gun battle through
the middle of that if someone was to break into his [Markwart's] apartment.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 128.
3
I
I
!
I
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No. 31158-9-II1
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I State v. Markwart
•
i Tyler Markwart is an outspoken advocate for medical marijuana. During his
I investigation, Detective Scott Patrick located statements Markwart made to the
I
,,:
,
Washington State University (WSU) Daily Evergreen and Moscow-Pullman Daily News
! that led him to believe Markwart violated MUMA. Specifically, Markwart disclosed to
~
i
I the press that he provided marijuana to more than one qualifying patient. MUMA
j
,
l
~
permits a person to be a "designated provider to only one patient at anyone time."
.l
~ FormerRCW 69.51A.01O(l)(d) (LAWS OF 2007, ch. 371, § 5).
I
i
j
,
1
~
:1
. Based on Tyler Markwart's public statements, Detective Patrick decided to
seek a "controlled buy" from Markwart. At a Whitman County deputy
I
I
i
prosecutor's request, Patrick postponed the purchase until the Whitman County
prosecuting attorney and he could meet with Markwart. The prosecutor's office
1
I wished to inquire from Markwart about his operations and determine if he
I
I
complied with MUMA.
I The Whitman County prosecutor and his deputy met with Tyler Markwart and
informed Markwart that he was in violation ofMUMA ifhe provided marijuana to more
I than one person at a time. Markwart assured them he did not. He claimed to provide
marijuana to one qualified patient at a time for a limited period of time. Perhaps
unsatisfied with Markwart's answer, the county prosecutor directed Detective Patrick to
continue his investigation.
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
Detective Scott Patrick conducted three controlled buys from Tyler Markwart. A
WSU student whom police previously arrested for marijuana distribution became a
confidential informant and conducted the first controlled buy in exchange for a reduced
sentence. The police gave the informant the website address for Allele Seeds Research
and directed the informant to contact Markwart. Markwart instructed potential
purchasers, via his website, that they must present valid authorization as a qualified
patient under MUMA and Washington State identification. The website also listed an e-
mail address belonging to Markwart.
The confidential informant sent a message to Tyler Markwart using the e-mail
address found on the Allele Seeds website. The informant stated that he recently
obtained authorization for medical marijuana and wanted to purchase marijuana. In his
response, Markwart sent the informant his phone number and again warned him that he
must present a valid medical marijuana authorization form and identification card. When
the confidential informant called Markwart to arrange a meeting to purchase marijuana,
the two agreed to meet at the restaurant Cougar Country. Markwart again repeated his
warning that he would need to see paperwork and identification to make a delivery.
Before the transactional meeting between the confidential informant and Tyler
Markwart, Detective Scott Patrick completed an ersatz medical marijuana authorization
form for the confidential informant and curiously directed another detective, with better
handwriting, to sign the form using the name of a fictionalized doctor. The physician's
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
authorization was written on non-tamper resistant paper, despite RCW 69.5IA.01O(7)(a)
requiring authorizations on tamper resistant paper.
On March 10, 2011, the confidential informant joined Tyler Markwart at a table at
Cougar Country restaurant. Markwart asked to see his authorization for medical
marijuana. The informant presented the authorization police created, showed Markwart
his identification card, and signed a form designating Markwart as his provider of
medical marijuana. Markwart told the informant that he would not need to see the
written forms in the future. Markwart and the informant left Cougar Country for
Markwart's truck where the informant purchased $200 worth of marijuana.
On March 24, 2011, the police informant contacted Tyler Markwart to purchase
marijuana again. The two met at Jimmy John's, a sandwich shop. Markwart did not ask
to see the informant's authorization or identification. Outside the restaurant, Markwart
again sold the informant $200 worth of marijuana.
On April 5, Detective Scott Patrick created a fake e-mail account for Police
Detective Bryson Aase, who sent an e-mail to Allele Seeds Research claiming to be a
"patient living in the Pullman area looking to purchase medicine." CP at 140. In the e-
mail, Aase also claimed to have his "paperwork." CP at 141. Markwart responded,
asking Aase to contact him by cell phone. Detective Patrick completed a medical
authorization form for Bryson Aase and signed the form in the name of a fictitious
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
doctor. Detective Patrick did not print the medical authorization on tamper resistant
paper.
The confidential informant purchased marijuana from Tyler Markwart a third time
outside a Starbucks on April 15. Markwart exited Starbucks as the informant arrived.
The police informant waived Markwart towards his or her vehicle and asked to purchase
$200 worth of marijuana. Markwart only brought $140 worth of marijuana to sell.
Markwart informed the informant that the informant could purchase more at a party that
evening and advised the informant he could "smell him at the party." RP at 60.
On April 19, police conducted a fourth controlled buy, this time with Detective
Aase. Bryson Aase called Markwart to schedule a meeting where he could purchase
marijuana. Markwart told Aase he would need a medicinal marijuana authorization form
and a government issued photo identification. The two agreed to meet in a parking lot.
Before the meeting, Detective Patrick directed Aase to feign that he had forgotten his
driver's license and to see how Markwart would react. Detective Patrick then handed
Aase a falsified authorization form. The form was identical, except for the name of the
doctor, as the form Patrick provided the confidential informant.
Detective Aase met Tyler Markwart in the parking lot. From a nearby location,
Scott Patrick listened to the conversation between Markwart and Aase, while task force
members awaited directions to arrest Markwart. Markwart entered Aase's car and
handed Aase a designated provider form to complete and sign. Markwart then asked
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No. 31158-9-II1
State v. Markwart
Aase for his identification and medical marijuana authorization. Aase handed Markwart
his forged medical marijuana authorization form and explained that he did not have
identification. Markwart commented that the authorization was not on tamper resistant
paper and explained that he could not sell Aase marijuana without a valid driver's
license. Due to Markwart's refusal to sell, Detective Patrick directed the task force
members to arrest Markwart. Police arrested Markwart for attempted delivery and
delivery of a controlled substance.
Upon his arrest, Tyler Markwart notified police he had marijuana plants in his
home. Based on this information, police procured a search warrant for Markwart's
apartment. At the home, police found a business plan for Allele Seeds Research, 24
marijuana plants, forms designating Markwart as the provider of marijuana to 15
individuals, a shotgun, and a handgun.
PROCEDURE
The State charged Tyler Markwart with three counts of delivering marijuana, one
each respectively on March 10, March 24, and April 15, 2011, all to the confidential
informant. The State also charged Markwart with one count of possessing marijuana
with the intent to distribute on April 19, 2011, to the undercover officer, and one count of
manufacturing marijuana, based upon the search of Markwart's home on April 19.
Throughout the prosecution, Markwart represented himself, despite the trial court's
repeated cautions.
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
Before trial, Tyler Markwart asked the trial court to strike down the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), chapter 69.50 RCW. After losing this request,
Markwart asked the trial court to permit him to present an affirmative "designated
provider" defense under MUMA and to forward an entrapment defense. Conversely, the
State asked the trial court to dismiss the defenses, as a matter oflaw, based upon the
undisputed evidence. The State contended Markwart did not comply with MUMA
because he served more than one patient at a time, he had more plants than permitted, he
accepted authorizations for using medicinal marijuana signed by a fictional doctor, and
the authorizations were not on tamper resistant paper.
The trial court preliminarily ruled that, if Markwart presented sufficient evidence
at trial, the trial court would instruct the jury on Markwart's theory of entrapment. The
trial court, however, ruled, at the beginning of the trial, to preclude a MUMA defense to
any of the five charges, because Markwart's offer of proof was insufficient to support the
defense. As to the delivery to the confidential informant, the trial court observed that
undisputed evidence established that the confidential informant was not a qualifying
patient and the medical authorization was forged and not on tamper resistant paper.
Therefore, Tyler Markwart could not be a designated provider, as a matter of law, under
MUMA. The trial court based his decision with regard to possession with intent to
deliver to Detective Aase upon the same three grounds and the additional ground that
Aase showed no identification. Although Markwart did not sell to Aase, it was
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
undisputed he had the marijuana in his possession and he intended to deliver the
marijuana, despite Aase not being a qualifying person. The trial court dismissed the
affirmative defense on count
5-manufacturing, because at the time of the offense, Markwart possessed 15 designated
provider authorization forms. The trial court qualified his ruling by stating, if Markwart
could provide evidence that he was a provider for only one person on April 19, the court
would reconsider the defense going to the jury on the manufacturing charge.
At trial, the State produced four witnesses: the confidential informant; Detectives
Patrick and Aase; and Nannette Bolyard, a certified marijuana technician. They testified
to the controlled buys. Markwart presented no witness or defense.
A jury found Tyler Markwart guilty on all five counts. After the verdict but before
sentencing, Markwart hired counsel and moved for a new trial. He argued prosecutorial
misconduct. He also argued the trial court erred by prohibiting him from presenting his
"designated provider" defense and refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment. The trial
court denied his motion, finding Markwart failed to raise the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct at trial, that police were permitted to forge documents under the
circumstances, and that he failed to present sufficient evidence entitling him to argue his
designated provider defense at trial.
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
The trial court sentenced Tyler Markwart to serve, concurrently, the low end of the
standard range on all five convictions-six months. In addition, the court imposed a
$10,000 fine as a deterrent to exploit MUMA for personal financial gain.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Government Misconduct
Tyler Markwart contends that the government engaged in misconduct that violated
his due process rights. Markwart emphasizes his actions in complying with the law by
avoiding a sale to the undercover detective and the police falsifying and forging
documents. Ifwe agreed with Markwart, we must dismiss the prosecution and all other
issues would become moot. Thus, we address this issue first. We acknowledge Tyler
Markwart's wish to follow the law and his steps taken to comply with the law, but we
agree with the trial court that police conduct was not so outrageous as to violate
Markwart's constitutional rights. The defense of government misconduct is nearly
impossible to establish.
erR 8.3(b) reads, in relevant part:
The court, in the furtherance ofjustice, after notice and hearing, may
dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental
misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused
which materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial.
This rule codifies, in part, the due process requirement that a prosecution be
dismissed upon outrageous conduct of law enforcement. Unlike entrapment, where the
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
focal issue is the predisposition of the defendant to commit the offense, outrageous
conduct is focused on the State's behavior. State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19,921 P.2d
1035 (1996). Outrageous conduct is founded on the principle that the conduct oflaw
enforcement officers and informants may be so outrageous that due process principles
would bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S. Ct. 1637,36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973);
Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 19. But such conduct must be so outrageous that it violates the
concept of fundamental fairness inherent in due process and shocks the sense of universal
justice mandated by the due process clause. Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Wash. State
Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388,402,288 P.3d 343, review denied, 176 Wn.2d
1009 (2012); State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 786, 794, 905 P.2d 922 (1995); State v.
Pleasant, 38 Wn. App. 78, 82, 684 P.2d 761 (1984).
The doctrine of outrageous police conduct must be sparingly applied and used
only in the most egregious situations. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. at 793. Each case must be
resolved on its own unique facts, bearing in mind proper law enforcement objectives-
the prevention of crime and the apprehension of violators, rather than the encouragement
of and participation in sheer lawlessness. Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 21 (quoting People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714,378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (1978». Whether the
State has engaged in outrageous conduct is a matter of law, not a question for the jury.
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 19 (citing United States v. Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir.
1995)).
Practical considerations require that, in the perfonnance by police of crime
detection duties, at least some deceitful practices and a limited participation in unlawful
practices be tolerated and recognized as lawful. Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 20; State v.
Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 240-41,517 P.2d 245 (1973). The United States Supreme
Court has stated that it is unlikely a due process violation will ever be found in the
context of contraband offenses, since the detection of such offenses requires law
enforcement officials to resort to covert methods which would be unacceptable in other
contexts. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,493-95,96 S. Ct. 1646,48 L. Ed. 2d
113 (1976); Emerson, 10 Wn. App. at 238. In crimes such as prostitution, liquor sales,
narcotics sales, and gambling, the use of the paid infonner, undercover agents, and
deceitful practices, as well as the practice of actually aiding and abetting the commission
of a crime by others, or even joining in a conspiracy for that commission, are well
known. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. at 238.
Deceitful police misconduct does not warrant dismissal of an entire case. State v.
Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 377, 158 PJd 27 (2007); State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 689
P.2d 38 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1. Mere instigation of
crime is not outrageous in the context of detecting contraband offenses. Pleasant, 38
Wn. App. at 82-83. Washington courts reject the outrageous conduct defense even in
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
cases where police engage in illegal activities. State v. Jessup, 31 Wn. App. 304, 312-14,
641 P .2d 1185 ( 1982). For example, police agents may engage in acts of prostitution and
attempt to recruit new prostitutes. Jessup, 31 Wn. App. at 312-14. Police may purchase
leWd table dances with public funds to gain evidence of violation of liquor rules.
Playhouse Corp. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 35 Wn. App. 539,667 P.2d 1136(1983). Police may establish an elaborate operation for the purchase and sale of stolen
goods. State v. Brooks, 30 Wn. App. 280, 281-82, 286-87, 633 P.2d 1345 (1981). Law
enforcement may create a phony job recruiting center and solicit the purchase of
marijuana from a potential job applicant. Pleasant, 38 Wn. App. at 79-80, 83. A federal
appellate court refused to dismiss a prosecution when federal agents sold illegally
imported bobcat hides and provided false forms intended to show that the hides were
legal. United States v. !vey, 949 F.2d 759, 762-63, 769 (5th Cir. 1991).
A review of many decisions shows that "the banner of outrageous misconduct is
often raised but seldom saluted." United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1993).
A majority of the United States Supreme Court has never approved of the outrageous
conduct defense. We find only one Washington decision that has dismissed a prosecution
for outrageous conduct by government agents. Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 19.
In Lively, the court found the police conduct so outrageous it violated Lively's due
process rights. Lively had just turned 21 and was raising 2 small children alone. She
became addicted to cocaine and alcohol at age 14. Although she stopped using drugs at
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No. 31158-9-111
State v. Markwart
15 when she found she was pregnant, she continued to drink heavily. After attempting
alcohol withdrawal on her own, she admitted herself into a detoxification program and
followed with attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings. She relapsed,
however, and thereafter entered and successfully completed a 28-day inpatient program.
She continued with AA meetings. She was emotionally upset, however, and attempted
suicide. Within weeks of her suicide attempt she met the police informant, Desai, at an
AA meeting. Despite her lack of criminal history or any information connecting her to
criminal conduct, the police informant targeted Lively. A few weeks later she was living
with Desai and he proposed marriage to her. Desai took advantage of her addiction and
extreme emotional reliance to involve her in police sponsored drug activity.
The Lively court announced that, to aid courts'in the evaluation of government
misconduct, a court should review several factors:
[(1)] whether the police conduct instigated a crime or merely infiltrated
ongoing criminal activity; [(2)] whether the defendant's reluctance to
commit a crime was overcome by ... persistent solicitation; [(3)] whether
the government controls the criminal activity or simply allows for the
criminal activity to occur; [(4)] whether the police motive was to prevent
crime or protect the public; [(5)] whether the government conduct itself
amounted to criminal activity or conduct "repugnant to a sense ofjustice."
Lively, 130 Wn.2d at 22 (citations omitted).
Since Lively, no Washington State court has dismissed a defendant's charges or
overturned a conviction because of outrageous government conduct-but not for lack of
the defense bar trying. At least 18 defendants sought to have their convictions overturned
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
because of outrageous government conduct. Only 2 of those cases have been reported,
and neither is dispositive.
Law enforcement did not induce Tyler Markwart to engage in any conduct he was
not already willing to perform. Markwart grew and sold marijuana before any interaction
with the Pullman Police Department. Police did not engage in persistent solicitations
before Markwart reluctantly sold marijuana. Nor did police promise profits or plead for
sympathy. Markwart was not emotionally attached to an officer or informant. Law
enforcement believed Markwart violated MUMA by selling to more than one patient at a
time, a reasonable belief before our Shupe decision. Police did not initially look for Tyler
Markwart, but rather Markwart came to the Pullman Police Department's attention when
investigating a robbery. The prosecuting attorney's office did not hide its intentions from
Markwart, but rather warned him that it was its position that Markwart could not be the
provider of medical marijuana to more than one patient at the same time. This case's
circumstances do not support a violation of the due process clause because of government
misconduct.
NIEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA ACT
Retroactive Application of 20 11 Amendments
In 1998, the citizens of Washington enacted Initiative 692, the Medical Use of
Marijuana Act (MUMA). The act is codified in chapter 69.51A RCW. The purpose of
the act is to allow patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses to use marijuana when
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
authorized by their treating physician. RCW 69.51A.005; State v. Ginn, 128 Wn. App.
872,877-78,117 P.3d 1155 (2005). In 2011, the state legislature adopted substantial
amendments to MUMA, now called Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA).
ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5073, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011)
(ESSSB). The bill's effective date is July 22,2011. Section 403 of the 2011 bill allows
creation of collective marijuana gardens by medical users of the plant. Markwart seeks to
benefit from this provision.
Police arrested Tyler Markwart, on April 19,2011, for manufacturing,
distributing, and possession with intent to sell marijuana. Therefore, he asks this court to
retroactively apply the legislature's 2011 changes. We decline to do so.
Washington courts disfavor retroactive application of a statute. State v. Brown,
166 Wn. App. 99, 103,269 P.3d 359 (2012). Nevertheless, courts may apply an
amendment retroactively if (1) the legislature intended to apply the amendment
retroactively, (2) the amendment is curative and clarifies or technically corrects
ambiguous statutory language, or (3) the amendment is remedial in nature. Barstad v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 145 Wn.2d 528,536-37,39 P.2d 984 (2002); McGee Guest
Home, Inc. v. Dep 't a/Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wn.2d 316,324-25, 12 P.3d 144(2000).
Tyler Markwart meets none of the three criteria. The legislature was silent on
whether it intended to apply the 2011 amending statute retroactively. An amendment is
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No. 31158-9-II1
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curative and remedial if it clarifies or technically corrects an ambiguous statute without
changing prior case law constructions of the statute. Barstad, 145 Wn.2d at 537; In re
Pers. Restraint ofMatteson, 142 Wn.2d 298,308, 12 P.3d 585 (2000). The 2011
amended statute changes, as well as clarifies, former RCW 69.51A.040. The
amendments add new requirements. The collective gardens provision ofESSSB 5073
adds an additional way qualified patients can obtain marijuana-through cooperative
gardens. Markwart agrees the section decriminalizes what otherwise would be criminal,
a concession acknowledging the 2011 amendments are substantive. Thus, we conclude
that the 2011 amendments do not apply retroactively.
The 2011 amendments would not assist Tyler Markwart anyway. The collective
garden provision states "no more than ten qualifying patients may participate in a single
collective garden at any time." RCW 69.51A.085(1)(a). Markwart was a designated
provider for 15 people. We decide the appeal on the basis of the version of the MUMA
in effect after its 2007 amendments, but before the 2011 amendments.
MUMA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
MUMA provides an affirmative defense for patients and providers against
Washington criminal laws relating to marijuana. State v. Shepherd, 110 Wn. App. 544,
549,41 P.3d 1235 (2002). "Any qualifying patient who is engaged in the medical use of
marijuana, or any designated provider who assists a qualifying patient in the medical use
of marijuana" charged with violating state marijuana law "will be deemed to have
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No. 31158-9-IIJ.
State v. Markwart
established the affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with
the requirements provided in this chapter." Former RCW 69.51 A.040 (LAWS OF 2007,
ch. 371, § 5). The chapter requires a qualifying patient or designated provider to (1) meet
all criteria for status as a qualifying patient or designated provider; (2) possess no more
marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal medical use, not exceeding a 60­
day supply; and (3) present his or her valid documentation to any law enforcement
official who questions the patient or provider. Former RCW 69.51A.040 (LAWS OF 2007,
ch. 371, § 5) .
. To be a "qualifying patient" under MUMA, a person must be a resident of
Washington with a debilitating or terminal medical condition and advised by a physician
that they may benefit from the medical use of marijuana. Former RCW 69.51A.01O(3)
(LAWS OF 2007, ch. 371, § 5). To be a "designated provider" under the chapter, a person
must be over 18, designated in writing by a qualified patient to be that patient's provider,
and be "the designated provider to only one patient at anyone time." Former RCW
69 .51A.0 1O( 1)(d) (LAWS OF 2007, ch. 371, § 5). Whether the person is a patient or a
designated provider, she or he, if questioned by any law enforcement official about her or
his use, must present her or his "valid documentation," specifically (l) a statement signed
and dated by the qualifying patient's health care professional written on "tamper-resistant
paper," stating that in the professional's opinion, the patient may benefit from the
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
medical use of marijuana and (2) proof of identity such as a Washington state driver's
license. Former RCW 69.51A.OI0(5) (LAWS OF 2007, ch. 371, § 5).
In order to affirmatively defend a criminal prosecution for possessing or
manufacturing marijuana, a defendant must show by a preponderance of evidence that he
has met the requirements ofMUMA. Shepherd, 110 Wn. App. at 550; Ginn, 128 Wn.
App. at 878. An affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the crime, but
excuses the conduct, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Riker,
123 Wn.2d 351, 368, 869 P.2d 43 (1994). Preponderance of the evidence means that
considering all the evidence, the proposition asserted must be more probably true than not
true. Shepherd, 110 Wn. App. at 550; Ginn, 128 Wn. App. at 878.
Tyler Markwart contends the trial court erred when it refused to allow the jury to
consider his MUMA designated provider defense. Whether the trial court erred in
disallowing a medical marijuana defense is a legal question this court reviews de novo.
State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 10-11,228 P.3d 1 (2010); State v. Tracy, 158 Wn.2d 683, 687,
147 P.3d 559 (2006). In general, a trial court must permit a party to present his theory of
the case if the law and the evidence support it; the failure to do so is reversible error.
Ginn, 128 Wn. App. at 879; State v. May, 100 Wn. App. 478,482,997 P.2d 956 (2000).
A defendant is entitled to have a jury consider his defense if he presents sufficient
evidence. Ginn, 128 Wn. App. at 879; State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220,236-37, 850 P.2d
495 (1993). To raise a medical marijuana defense, the defendant bears the burden of
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No. 31158-9-III
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offering sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing. Fry, 168 Wn.2d at 11; State
v. Adams, 148 Wn. App. 231, 236, 198 P.3d 1057 (2009); State v. Butler, 126 Wn. App.
741, 744, 109 P.3d 493 (2005) overruled on other grounds by State v. Kurtz, 178 Wn.2d
466,475,309 P.3d 472 (2013). In evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient, the trial
court must interpret the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendant. Adams, 148
Wn. App. at 235; Ginn, 128 Wn. App. at 879.
The State charged Tyler Markwart with three discrete crimes: delivery of
marijuana (counts 1 to 3), possession with intent to deliver marijuana (count 4), and
manufacturing marijuana (count 5). We address separately Markwart's quest to use the
MUMA defense for the three different crimes. We address manufacturing first, since its
resolution is easiest.
MANUFACTURING MARIJUANA
RCW 69.50.401(1) renders it is "unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver,
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." The trial court
dismissed the MUMA defense against the manufacturing charge because Markwart
possessed 15 provider designation forms at one time, and the statute only allows one to
be a provider "to only one patient at anyone time." Former RCW 69.51A.01O(1)(d).
After the trial court's ruling, our division interpreted the provision at issue in
Shupe, 172 Wn. App. at 354-55. Scott Shupe and others owned and operated a Spokane
medical marijuana dispensary that advertised in local papers. During one stop by Oregon
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No. 31158-9-II1
State v. Markwart
police, Shupe possessed four pounds of marijuana and $18,900 in cash. Police trailed
Shupe for months despite Shupe conducting business in the open. The State eventually
charged Shupe with delivery, possession with intent to deliver, and manufacture of
marijuana. At trial, Shupe testified he served only one patient at a time and sold only to
patients with medical marijuana documentation. Shupe's receipts showed the time to the
minute as to when he served each patient.
The Shupe court noted that the term "designated provider" implies an ongoing
relationship with a user, but found the word "at" gives a sense of "immediacy." Shupe,
172 Wn. App. at 354. The phrase "provider to only one patient at anyone time," this
court concluded, "is at war with itself; it is ambiguous." Shupe, 172 Wn. App. at 354.
Because the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity required the court to interpret the
ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant. Thus, the Shupe court accepted the
interpretation Shupe urged and held that'" only one patient at anyone time' means one
transaction after another so that each patient gets individual care." Shupe, 172 Wn. App.
at 356. The Shupe court reversed the conviction and dismissed the prosecution.
Tyler Markwart contends Shupe controls and requires that he be afforded the
opportunity to present his MUMA defense. The State distinguishes Shupe on the ground
that Shupe testified he served only one patient at a time, and the receipts showed the time
to the minute as to when he served each patient. Shupe, 172 Wn. App. at 356. We agree
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No. 311S8-9-III
State v. Markwart
with Tyler Markwart. The State's distinction is irrelevant for purposes of the rule
announced in Shupe.
The State emphasizes that law enforcement found IS provider forms in
Markwart's possession and nearly all of the patients served by Markwart signed the
designation on one of two days. The State is incorrect; the forms show IS people
designated Markwart as their respective provider on seven dates. No more than 3 people
on any given day designated Markwart as their provider on six of those dates.
Regardless of when a patient signed a designated provider form, construing the facts in
the light most favorable to Markwart, he could have served those patients at different
times during the day. Whether he did is a question for the jury.
The State also underscores that some of the forms designating Markwart as a
provider lacked expiration dates. Nevertheless, the statute does not require forms
designating a provider to have expiration dates. Former RCW 69.S1A.090.
Finally, the State contends that Scott Shupe's authorization from a patient, unlike
Tyler Markwart's authorization, ended upon the sale. Along these lines, the State argues
that a provider cannot grow marijuana for more than one person at a time. We find no
language in Shupe stating that Shupe's authorization form only consented to one sale.
Regardless, the statute does not require that the authorization end with one sale. Nor
does the statute limit the provider to growing for one patient at a time. The State's
argument conflicts with the language and spirit of Shupe. If one can be the provider for
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
more than one patient at one time, although one must conduct sales at different times, one
must be able to grow marijuana for more than one patient at a time.
The only other elements required under MUMA to be a "designated provider" are
(1) the provider is over 18 and (2) designated in writing to be the qualifying patient's
provider. FormerRCW 69.51A.010(l)(a), (b). Markwart's license, photocopied with the
designated provider forms, shows he was born in 1981, making him 30 at the time of his
offense. Those same forms designate him as a provider to qualifying patients and thereby
satisfy the remaining element.
Given the ambiguous statute, the patient trial court understandably erred. But
under this court's interpretation of the statute in Shupe, Markwart was entitled to present
his affirmative medical marijuana defense against the charge of manufacturing marijuana.
DELIVERY OF MARIJUANA
Whether Tyler Markwart, under the undisputed facts, could proceed with a
MUMA defense for the charges of delivery and possession with intent to sell is more
problematic. At trial, the State contended that Markwart could not proceed with his
defense to the possession and delivery counts since the police doctored the doctor's
authorization form for the confidential informant and Detective Aase; since both forms
were non-tamper resistant; and since Aase lacked identification, in addition to the high
number of patients served. During oral argument on appeal, the State conceded that
Markwart need not have investigated whether the physician's authorization forms were
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No.3U58-9-III
State v. Markwart
forged. The State continues to argue that Markwart should have known that the forms
were non-tamper resistant, and thus he does not qualify as a provider under MUMA.
The delivery charges relate to the sales to the confidential informant. Markwart
does not dispute that the authorization the informant showed was not on tamper resistant
paper. To establish the affirmative defense, a person must meet the criteria for status as a
designated provider and present his "valid documentation" to any law enforcement
official who questions him. Former RCW 69.51A.040 (LAWS OF 2007, ch. 371, § 5).
Valid documentation required a statement signed by a health care professional "on
tamper-resistant paper." Former RCW 69.51A.OI0(7)(a).
Tyler Markwart argues the trial court should have permitted him the opportunity to
argue to the jury that providers may reasonably rely on documentation presented by a
patient. We find no case that implies the medical marijuana provider 'may rely on the
patient to present the obligatory documentation. We find no case that waives the
requirement that a medical marijuana provider insure that the authorization be on special
paper. Further, Markwart's argument conflicts with the statute. MUMA expresses an
intent that the provider ascertain the qualifications of the patient. The citizens of
Washington, when adopting MUMA, and the state legislature, when enacting
amendments, necessarily considered tamper resistant paper critical in the delivery of
medical marijuana. The citizens and legislators understood the ease by which
authorizations could otherwise be forged. If Tyler Markwart did not know what
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No. 31 158-9-III
State v. Markwart
constituted tamper resistant paper or was unable to detect the special form of paper, he
should not have been in the business of selling medical marijuana. He should have
educated himself, before making any sales. Markwart's dealings with Detective Aase
also belie his claim that either he was unable to detect tamper resistant paper or he should
not be required to detect the nature of the paper.
POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO SELL
We finally address whether Tyler Markwart may present the MUMA defense to
the charges of possession with intent to sell. The trial court dismissed the defense to this
charge because Markwart had intended to sell to Detective Aase when Markwart was not
a qualified provider. We have already ruled that Markwart can present the defense that
he was a qualified provider, despite being designated as a provider by more than one
person. Critical to the count of possession are the facts that the State concedes Markwart
refused to sell to Aase because his authorization was not on tamper resistant paper and
Aase lacked identification. Tyler Markwart acted consistent with the law. Unlike his
failure to carefully observe the confidential informant's documentation, Markwart took
the precautions when meeting with Detective Aase. The MUMA defense is available to
Tyler Markwart on the charge of possession with intent to deliver.
SENTENCING
Tyler Markwart also complains about the sentence imposed by the trial court. We
are remanding the case for a new trial on the charges of manufacturing and possession
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No. 31158-9-III
State v. Markwart
with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's
sentence and direct the trial court to enter a new sentence after any new trial. Therefore,
we need not consider any sentencing errors at this time.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the convictions of Tyler Markwart for three counts of delivery of
marijuana to the confidential informant. We vacate the convictions for manufacturing
and possession with intent to sell and remand those charges for a new trial during which
Tyler Markwart may present his MUMA defense. We also vacate the sentence imposed
by the trial court. The court shall resentence Tyler Markwart after completion of a new
trial or a dismissal of the remaining charges.
WE CONCUR:
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Brown, 1.
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