In re Post-sentence Review of: Shundrae Armie Cage ( 2014 )

FILED
JUNE 3, 2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In re Post-Sentence Review of: ) No. 31848-6-111
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) PUBLISHED OPINION
SHUNDRAE CAGE. )
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LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - The trial court granted Shundrae Cage a postsentence
furlough for a medical emergency. The Washington State Department of Corrections
(DOC) filed an emergency motion to vacate the furlough, arguing that only DOC has
authority to grant furloughs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding DOC's
authority to grant furloughs is not exclusive. In this postsentence review, DOC contends
the trial court lacked the authority to grant a furlough. We agree with DOC, and therefore
reverse.
FACTS
Shundrae Cage was convicted of second degree assault, domestic violence, and
sentenced to 13 months of confmement in the custody of DOC. His early release date
was September 26,2013, and his planned release date was September 16,2013, pursuant
to DOC's 10-day early release authority.
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On July 31,2013, Mr. Cage filed a motion in Spokane County Superior Court for a
furlough under RCW 9.94A.782(2). He explained that his wife needed help with their
other children due to serious pregnancy related complications. A note from his wife's
doctor stated that she was experiencing pregnancy related heart and kidney issues and that
she needed Mr. Cage to help at home with their other children. The State objected,
stating that it had a "longstanding policy in our office of objecting to furloughs in the first
place." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 8.
On August 2,2013, the court granted Mr. Cage a temporary furlough to be served
on electronic home monitoring. The order stated that the furlough was to begin at
10:00 a.m. on August 5, 2013, and end six weeks after the birth of his child.
As soon as DOC was aware of the furlough order, it filed an emergency motion to
vacate it. At the August 9, 2013 hearing, it argued the trial court lacked statutory
authority to grant a furlough, maintaining, "[ f]urloughs are allowed solely under
RCW 72.66.012. And that statute applies to the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections, not to the Court." RP at 16.
The trial court denied the motion to vacate,stating that RCW 72.66.012, which
authorizes the secretary of DOC to grant a furlough, does not prohibit a trial court from
granting a furlough.
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DOC filed an emergency motion for accelerated review of the furlough order and a
motion to stay. On August 22,2013, a commissioner of this court granted the stay and
the motions to accelerate review and supplement the record. On September 9,2013, the
case was referred to a panel for a detennination on the merits.
ANALYSIS
Discretionary Review ora Moot Case. The issue before us is whether the trial
court had the authority under the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A
RCW, to grant Mr. Cage's postsentence furlough. As an initial matter, we note that Mr.
Cage's sentence expired in September 2013. The expiration of his maximum tenn
technically renders this case moot. "A case is moot if a court can no longer provide
effective relief." In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373,376-77,662 P.2d 828 (1983). However, a
court may decide an appeal that has otherwise become moot when "matters of continuing
and substantial public interest are involved." Sorenson v. City o/Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d
547,558,496 P.2d 512 (1972).
In evaluating whether a technically moot case merits review, courts consider '''the
desirability of an authoritative detennination for the future guidance of public officers,
and the likelihood of future recurrence ofthe question. '" In re Pers. Restraint 0/
Mattson, 166 Wash. 2d 730, 736, 214 P.3d 141 (2009) (quoting Sorenson, 80 Wash. 2d at 558).
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" , [M]ost cases in which appellate courts utilized the exception to the mootness doctrine
involved issues of constitutional or statutory interpretation.'" Mattson, 166 Wash. 2d at 736
(quoting In re Pers. Restraint ofMines, 146 Wn.2d 279,285,45 P.3d 535 (2002».
Mr. Cage does not address the issue of mootness, but DOC contends that despite
technical mootness, we should address the merits ofthe case because the issue of a trial
court's authority to grant a furlough for inmates is capable of repetition and is likely to
evade review . We agree. We exercise our discretion and choose to decide whether a trial
court has inherent authority under the SRA to grant a postsentence furlough.
A uthority to Grant a Postsentence Furlough. This question raises an issue of
statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons,
136 Wn.2d 453,456,963 P.2d 812 (1998). "Statutory interpretation begins with the
statute's plain meaning." Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass 'n, 169 Wash. 2d 516, 526,
243 PJd 1283 (2010). We discern plain meaning "from the ordinary meaning of the
language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related
provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572,578,
210 P .3d 1007 (2009). Only if statutory language is ambiguous do we resort to aids of
construction. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash. 2d 106, 110, 156 PJd 201 (2007). The
court's primary goal is to construe the statute in a manner consistent with the legislative
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intent.
Two statutes intersect here. First, RCW 9.94A.728(2) provides, "An offender may
leave a correctional facility pursuant to an authorized furlough or leave of absence." The
only statute that authorizes furloughs is RCW 72.66.012, which provides, "The secretary
may grant a furlough but only if not precluded from doing so under RCW 72.66.014,
72.66.016, 72.66.018, 72.66.024, 72.66.034, or 72.66.036." A "furlough" is defined as an
"authorized leave of absence for an eligible resident." RCW 72.66.010(3).
The statutory language here is not ambiguous. Viewing the interrelationship of the
two statutory provisions and the statutory language, RCW 72.66.012 expressly applies to
DOC and gives its secretary the discretion to grant a furlough. Trial courts are not
mentioned. Under the plain language ofRCW 72.66.012, the sole authority to grant
furloughs vests with DOC.
This conclusion is supported by Washington case law. In January v. Porter, our
Supreme Court noted that after sentencing, the court loses jurisdiction to DOC:
The judiciary's function ends with either a verdict of acquittal, or the
revocation of probation, or the final entry of a judgment and sentence.
Upon entry of a final judgment and sentence of imprisonment, legal
authority over the accused passes by operation of law to the Department of
Institutions and the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and those agencies
of the executive branch bear full responsibility for executing the judgment
and sentence or granting parole . . .. The courts have long recognized this
division of power and the transfer ofthe jurisdiction over afinally
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convicted felon from the judicial to the executive branch ofgovernment.
January v. Porter, 75 Wash. 2d 768, 773-74, 453 P.2d 876 (1969) (emphasis added).
Consistent with Porter, this court has stated, "Once sentenced, felons are under the
jurisdiction of [DOC], even if serving time in a county jail." State v. Law, 110 Wn. App.
36,40,38 P.3d 374 (2002). More significantly, Law stated, "Under this chapter [chapter
72.66 RCW], the Secretary ... grants furloughs." Id. at 41.
The structure of Washington sentencing laws further supports our interpretation.
The SRA is structured as a system of determinate sentencing. State v. Shove, 113 Wash. 2d
83, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). This determinate sentence is ascertained at the time of
sentencing and generally is not subject to later change. Id. at 86. The SRA permits
modifications of sentences in specific circumstances. RCW 9.94A.728. This "leaves no
room for inherent authority to be exercised by the sentencing court." State v. Murray, 118
Wn. App. 518,524, 77 P.3d 1188 (2003). The Shove court emphasized the importance of
finality in rendered judgments, noting that final judgments may be modified only in
specific limited circumstances. Shove, 113 Wash. 2d at 86. None of these specified
exceptions apply here.
Here, Mr. Cage had been sentenced when he asked for a furlough. His judgment
and sentence provided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in
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and sentence provided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in
the custody of DOC. Under Porter and Law, .legal authority over Mr. Cage was
transferred from the judiciary to the executive after entry of his judgment and sentence.
As such, the trial court did not have the authority to grant a furlough. A sentencing court
has discretion in sentencing only where the SRA so authorizes. Shove, 113 Wash. 2d at 89
n.3. "When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority under the SRA, it commits
reversible error." State v. Hale, 94 Wash. App. 46, 53, 971 P.2d 88 (1999).
In view of the plain meaning ofthe statutes at issue and well-settled case law, we
conclude that DOC has the exclusive authority to release prisoners for furlough, and that
the trial court exceeded its authority.
We reverse.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
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