In Re The Marriage Of: Michael Morgan v. Colleen Morgan ( 2013 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
No. 69047-7-1
MICHAEL F. MORGAN,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
and
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
COLLEEN MORGAN,
FILED: July 29, 2013
Respondent.
Becker, J. — Michael Morgan appeals the trial court's orders dissolving
his marriage to Colleen Morgan and providing for the care and support of their
child. Because Michael fails to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion in
the orders before this court on review, we affirm. We also grant Colleen's
request for attorney fees on appeal.
Michael and Colleen married in January 1998 and had one daughter in
May 1999. During the marriage, Colleen did not work outside the home, but
cared for the couple's child. Colleen had some college education but never
obtained a degree. Colleen also struggles with alcoholism. Michael is an
attorney. During the marriage, Michael had worked as a public defender and as
a municipal court judge. At the time of trial, Michael was self-employed as an
attorney. Michael and Colleen separated in November 2009.
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The trial court heard evidence and argument at trial in September 2011
and made an oral ruling on November 9, 2011. On March 1, 2012, the trial court
entered a parenting plan providing for the couple's child to reside with Michael
and limiting Colleen's residential time under RCW 26.09.191 (3)(c) based on
Colleen's admitted alcohol problem. The plan provides for three phases of
increasing visitation and residential time for Colleen. The first phase requires
Colleen to comply with treatment conditions for six months, with Michael
responsible for paying supervision fees for Colleen's limited visitation. The
second six-month phase requires each party to pay half the cost of supervision of
Colleen's increased visitation. The final phase allows Colleen residential time
and does not require a paid supervisor.
On March 20, 2012, the trial court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, a final dissolution decree, and a child support order. The
court listed the separate property of each party and valued the community
property at $353,290 and determined that Colleen would receive 55 percent and
Michael would receive 45 percent. The final division of the property included a
cash payment of $137,393 from Michael to Colleen. The court ordered Michael
to pay maintenance to Colleen for five years. The trial court also found that
Michael intentionally failed to pay maintenance as required by temporary orders
from November 2011 to February 2012 and entered a contempt order requiring
him to pay $10,000 in overdue maintenance plus $976 in fees.
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On August 29, 2012, the trial court found Michael in contempt for failing to
pay supervision fees charged for Colleen's visitation with the couple's child
between March and August 2012.
Michael appeals.
ANALYSIS
Property Division
Michael first challenges the trial court's division of the couple's assets and
liabilities as well as its characterization of certain property. In a dissolution action,
all property, community and separate, is before the court for distribution. In re
Marriage of Stachofskv. 90 Wn. App. 135, 142, 951 P.2d 346, review denied. 136
Wn.2d 1010 (1998). The trial court's characterization of property as community
or separate is a mixed question of law and fact. In re Marriage of Skarbek, 100
Wn. App. 444, 447, 997 P.2d 447 (2000). Mischaracterization does not require
remand unless the characterization is crucial to the distribution. In re Marriage of
Langham & Kolde. 153 Wn.2d 553, 563 n.7, 106 P.3d 212 (2005).
We review an order distributing property for an abuse of discretion and will
only reverse a trial court's decision if there is a manifest abuse of discretion. In
re Marriage of Kraft. 119 Wn.2d 438, 450, 832 P.2d 871 (1992). The relevant
factors in determining a just and equitable distribution of property are provided by
statute. They include (1) the nature and extent of community property, (2) the
nature and extent of separate property, (3) the duration of the marriage, and (4)
the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of the
property is to become effective. RCW 26.09.080. The trial court is in the best
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position to determine what is "fair, just and equitable" under the circumstances.
In re Marriage of Brewer. 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 102 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted), quoting In re Marriage of Had lev, 88 Wn.2d 649, 656,
565 P.2d 790 (1977). We do not weigh conflicting evidence or the credibility of
witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In re Marriage of
Rich, 80 Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234, review denied. 129 Wn.2d 1030,
129 Wn.2d 3031 (1996).
Michael first argues that the trial court "improperly awarded $31,453" to
Colleen by failing to divide the contents of a U.S. Bank account in Colleen's
name. The account had a balance of $31,453 as of the date of separation and a
zero balance at the time of trial. He argues that the trial court allowed Colleen a
"windfall" based on her removal of community funds from the account after
separation and before trial and complains that at the final hearing on March 20,
2012, Colleen's counsel falsely argued that the funds had been addressed in
temporary orders.
But Michael does not argue or establish that Colleen wasted, concealed,
or misused the money and fails to identify any court order prohibiting Colleen
from accessing community funds prior to trial. And Michael mischaracterizes
Colleen's argument at the hearing. In response to Michael's request for a
distribution of 45 percent of the account balance as of the date of separation,
counsel for Colleen argued that the proper date of valuation was the date of trial,
given the parties' acknowledged need to pay their respective living expenses
following separation. Counsel argued that the court entering temporary orders
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"was taking into account the fact that each had these various accounts in their
respective names" when it directed each party to be responsible for his or her
own living expenses. Thus, counsel argued, "[l]t's complete fiction to pretend
that my client is awarded $31,000 when the account is down to zero because she
had to live on it."
Based on the record before this court, Michael fails to establish any abuse
of discretion in the trial court's decision to value the account as of the date of trial
and make no distribution based on the zero balance. See In re Marriage of
Kaseburg, 126 Wn. App. 546, 556, 108 P.3d 1278 (2005) (court may consider
waste or concealment, but only distributes assets before it at the time of trial).
Michael next claims that the trial court "improperly enriched" Colleen by
crediting him only $4,403 to reimburse him for his payment of $7,485 of Colleen's
separate debts and $34,934 of community debts. Michael complains that the trial
court failed to enter sufficiently specific findings to explain what he describes as a
"39% reimbursement." Without citation to authority, Michael asserts that he
should be reimbursed for the entire $7,485 he claims he paid for Colleen's
separate debts and $19,214 for his payment of community debts, based on a 55
to 45 percent division.
In the decree of dissolution, the trial court stated, "Petitioner
sought/claimed paid separate debt of the respondent in the amount of $11,426.
Petitioner is awarded $4,403 which was taken into account when computing the
cash payout by petitioner to respondent." In its oral ruling, the trial court
explained,
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I looked carefully at a number of the different items that Mr. Morgan
was asking for that he asserted was, essentially, separate debt.
And I actually disagree with Mr. Morgan's analysis on a number of
the items.... I don't find that those are necessarily separate debt
of Mrs. Morgan that Mr. Morgan paid. But I am going to award Mr.
Morgan some money that he is seeking for paying what he has
describe[d] as Mrs. Morgan's debt.
The record demonstrates that the trial court considered Michael's request
for reimbursement, reviewed his supporting evidence, disagreed with his analysis,
and entered a ruling within the range of the evidence presented at trial. Contrary
to Michael's bare assertions, the trial court is not required to demonstrate
mathematical precision in order to make an equitable property division. In re
Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996). Michael fails
to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the trial court's treatment of his claim
for reimbursement.
Next, Michael contends that the trial court failed to properly characterize
as his separate property a ring he had inherited from his mother but was lost at
the time of trial. Colleen testified that Michael gave her the ring as a gift and that
she lost the ring while swimming. Recognizing the factual dispute, the trial court
found that "neither party proved by a preponderance of the evidence" that the
ring was his or her own separate property. The trial court listed the ring as
community property and explained, "I'm splitting that 50/50," "in light of all the
factors that need to be taken a look at for property division, and specifically,
under [RCW] 26.09.080." The court determined the value at $18,300, and gave
Michael a $9,150 credit against his cash payment to Colleen.
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Michael does not contend or demonstrate that the trial court's
characterization of the missing ring was crucial to its distribution or that the
alleged mischaracterization of the ring as community property resulted in an
inequitable property division. Each party claimed the ring as separate property
and admitted that it was lost and not available for distribution. Under the
circumstances, whether or not the trial court properly characterized the missing
ring, Michael fails to establish an abuse of discretion it its decision to give him a
credit for half the value he claimed for the ring. See Worthington v. Worthington.
73 Wn.2d 759, 768, 440 P.2d 478 (1968) (although trial court may not have
properly characterized timberland, its approach was correct in light of facts,
statute's emphasis on just and equitable division, and law providing all property is
subject to jurisdiction of court); In re Marriage of Zier. 136 Wn. App. 40, 46, 147
P.3d 624 (2006) (where division of property is just and equitable under all the
circumstances of the marriage, mischaracterization of one or another asset is not
proper basis to reverse property distribution), review denied. 162 Wn.2d 1008(2007).
Michael also argues that the trial court failed to characterize and distribute
a Moclips condominium listed in Colleen's trial brief. Because Michael fails to
identify any evidence in the record before the trial court indicating that either
Michael or Colleen had any ownership interest in a condominium in Moclips,
Washington, he fails to demonstrate error.
No. 69047-7-1/8
Parenting Plan
Michael contends that the trial court exceeded its authority and abused its
discretion by allocating costs for Colleen's visitation supervision to him in the
parenting plan. Without citation to relevant authority, Michael claims that the trial
court lacks statutory authority to order a nonsupervised parent to pay for
supervision of the other parent's visits. He also claims that the trial court abused
its discretion by ordering him to contribute to Colleen's supervision costs
because it creates financial disincentives for each party.
Parenting plan decisions are within the trial court's broad discretion, and
we will not reverse unless the decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of Kovacs. 121 Wn.2d 795, 801,
854 P.2d 629 (1993). A primary concern in establishing parenting plans is that
parenting arrangements should serve the best interests of the child. RCW
26.09.002. RCW 26.09.191 (3)(c) specifically authorizes the trial court to place
limits on parenting plan provisions where the court finds that a parent's
performance of parenting functions is impaired by alcohol abuse. There is
nothing in the statute, nor does Michael cite any other legal authority, which
prevents the court from requiring supervised visitation in such a situation and
allocating associated costs between the parents.
Here, the trial court found that the child's best interests included a
relationship with both parents, regular visits with Colleen, and increasing
residential time with Colleen conditioned on Colleen's demonstrated sobriety.
Given the increase in visitation and residential time for Colleen and the
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No. 69047-7-1/9
decreasing allocation of costs to Michael over the course of the three phases,
each party has sufficient incentive to comply with the court's conditions. Michael
fails to demonstrate that the trial court exceeded its authority or abused its broad
discretion in the challenged provision in the parenting plan.
Contempt
Michael next challenges the trial court's orders finding him in contempt.
We review a trial court's decision in a contempt proceeding for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of James. 79 Wn. App. 436, 439-40, 903 P.2d 470(1995). Contempt of court is defined in part as intentional disobedience of a
lawful court order. In re Marriage of Humphreys. 79 Wn. App. 596, 599, 903
P.2d 1012 (1995), citing RCW 7.21.010(1). In the context of dissolution and
parental support, contempt is governed by RCW 26.09.160. Under that statute, a
court "shall find" a party in contempt based on a written finding, after a hearing,
"that the parent, in bad faith, has not complied with the order establishing
residential provisions for the child." RCW 26.09.160(2)(b); see James. 79 Wn.
App. at 440.
Michael challenges the August 29, 2012, contempt order, claiming (1) the
trial court lacked authority to enter a contempt finding for nonpayment of
visitation supervision costs under In re Marriage of Young. 26 Wn. App. 843, 615
P.2d 508 (1980); (2) the order at issue was not lawful because the court lacked
authority to order one party to pay visitation supervision costs of another party;
and (3) evidence of Colleen's failure to complywith the order excused him from
paying for completed visitation sessions.
No. 69047-7-1/10
Michael's reliance on Young is misplaced. In Young, the court held that
contempt proceedings cannot be used to enforce provisions of a property division
not related to a support obligation. Young. 26 Wn. App. at 845-46 (property
division requiring monthly installments on settlement in lieu of interest in military
pension was not related to support obligation and therefore not enforceable in
contempt action). Here, RCW 26.09.160(2)(b) specifically provides for
enforcement of parenting plan provisions through contempt proceedings. And as
discussed above, Michael offers no support for his bald assertion that the trial
court lacked authority to allocate costs of Colleen's visitation supervision to him
in the parenting plan. We also reject Michael's baseless claim that his obligation
to pay supervision fees for completed visitation sessions was in any way
conditioned on the supervisors' submission of monthly reports or Colleen's
compliance with treatment conditions. Given the provision in the parenting plan
stating "During Phase 1 the father shall pay the cost of the supervisor," and
Michael's admission that he did not pay the $1,560 charged for supervised visits
between March 3, 2012, and August 18, 2012, despite having the ability to pay,
the trial court did not err in finding him in contempt in the August 29 order.
Michael also challenges the March 20, 2012, contempt order, arguing that
the April 22, 2010, temporary order directing him to pay $2,500 per month in
maintenance was (1) not valid after the trial court's November 9, 2011 oral ruling
and/or (2) "superseded by later court orders." Michael also claims that the
contempt order required him to pay more maintenance than he was initially
ordered to pay.
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No. 69047-7-1/11
Nothing in the record supports Michael's claims. Although a temporary
order may be revoked or modified, it will terminate only "when the final decree is
entered." RCW 26.09.060(10)(c). Michael fails to identify any order revoking or
modifying the April 22, 2012, temporary maintenance order before the March 20,
2012, entry of the final decree. And in the findings of fact and conclusions of law
also entered on March 20, 2012, the trial court specifically adjusted the date of
the final maintenance payment to take into account the amount of back
maintenance addressed in the contempt order. Michael fails to demonstrate any
error in the March 20, 2012, contempt order.
Maintenance
Michael next challenges the trial court's award of maintenance to Colleen.
We review the trial court's decision on an award of maintenance for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Zahm. 138 Wn.2d 213, 226-27, 978 P.2d 498 (1999).
"An award of maintenance that is not based upon a fair consideration of the
statutory factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Crosetto. 82 Wn. App. at
558. The court must consider the parties' postdissolution financial resources;
their abilities to meet their needs independently; the duration of the marriage; the
standard of living established during the marriage; the parties' age, health, and
financial obligations; and the ability of one spouse to pay maintenance to the
other. In re Marriage of Williams. 84 Wn. App. 263, 267-68, 927 P.2d 679 (1996),
review denied. 131 Wn.2d 1025 (1997); RCW 26.09.090(1 )(a)-(f). Ultimately, the
court's main concern must be the parties' economic situations postdissolution.
Williams. 84 Wn. App. at 268. "The only limitation on amount and duration of
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maintenance under RCW 26.09.090 is that, in light of relevant factors, the award
must be just." In re Marriage of Bulicek. 59 Wn. App. 630, 633, 800 P.2d 394(1990).
It is clear from the record that the trial court here explicitly considered
each factor in its oral ruling and finally determined Colleen had a need for
maintenance and Michael had the ability to pay. Michael does not contend that
the trial court failed to consider any of the statutory factors. Instead, without
citation to relevant authority, Michael contends that the trial court improperly
imputed income to him in determining the maintenance award. He claims that
income may be imputed only for setting child support and that the trial court's
decision here exceeded its authority and was not supported by sufficient
evidence.
But Michael mischaracterizes the record. The trial court imputed income
to him under RCW 26.19.071 for the purposes of determining the amount of child
support. The court also imputed income to Colleen for child support purposes.
After reviewing those factors on the record, the trial court directed Colleen's
counsel to "work on the child support work sheets, as well as the final child
support order," "with those imputed income figures." Then the court turned to the
issue of maintenance and reviewed the statutory factors under RCW 26.09.090,
as well as "a number of other non-statutory factors that are set forth within case
law." The trial court found that Michael had the ability to pay maintenance, in
part, based on an
analysis of separate property that I have taken a look at, as well as
the ability of Mr. Morgan to meet his financial needs. And again, in
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No. 69047-7-1/13
part, that is based on my finding that Mr. Morgan is under
employed and the amount that I have imputed income to him.
Michael fails to identify any authority prohibiting a trial court from considering its
previous rulings on child support when making its determination on maintenance.
The trial court has the discretion to weigh the relevant statutory factors and
circumstances of the case, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court. Zahm. 138 Wn.2d at 227. Michael fails to demonstrate any abuse of
discretion.
Exclusion of GAL
Michael requests a new trial based on a violation of "open proceedings
law." Under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, justice "in all
cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." "This
provision guarantees the public open access to judicial proceedings and court
documents in both civil and criminal cases." In re Dependency of J.A.F.. 168 Wn.
App. 653, 660, 278 P.3d 673 (2012). In order to close a courtroom, the trial court
must consider certain factors and enter certain findings. See State v. Bone-Club.
128 Wn.2d 254, 258-59, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). A closure requiring such
consideration occurs "when the courtroom is completely and purposefully closed
to spectators so that no one may enter and no one may leave." State v. Lormor.
172 Wn.2d 85, 93, 257 P.3d 624 (2011).
During trial on September 26, 2011, the trial court asked the guardian ad
litem, who was also listed by Michael as a rebuttal witness, to step into the hall.
While the guardian ad litem was out of the courtroom, the trial judge informed the
parties on the record about his relationship with another judge Michael had listed
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as a rebuttal witness. The court and the parties discussed the relationship, the
court's impartiality, and the relevance of the expected testimony at some length.
Then Michael removed the witness from his list.1
Michael fails to demonstrate a court closure. Michael does not contend
and the record does not indicate that any other spectators were asked to leave or
prevented from entering the courtroom at any time. Michael fails to demonstrate
a violation of the constitutional provision regarding open proceedings and
therefore fails to identify grounds for a new trial. See Lormor. 172 Wn.2d at 96(exclusion of one spectator from courtroom does not constitute closure and does
not implicate constitutional right to open proceedings).
Attorney Fees
Finally, Michael contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his request for attorney fees based on Colleen's intransigence. A trial court has
discretionary authority to order an award of attorney fees. Crosetto. 82 Wn. App.
at 563. A trial court may award a party legal fees caused by the other party's
intransigence. In re Marriage of Greenlee. 65 Wn. App. 703, 708, 829 P.2d 1120,
review denied. 120 Wn.2d 1002 (1992). Intransigence is the quality or state of
being uncompromising. Schumacher v. Watson. 100Wn. App. 208, 216, 997
P.2d 399 (2000). Intransigent conduct includes "foot-dragging" or obstructionist
behavior, repeatedly filing unnecessary motions, or making a trial unduly difficult
with increased legal costs. Greenlee. 65 Wn. App. at 708.
1 In March 2012, after the entry of the final orders, Michael filed a motion for a
new trial. The trial court denied his motion in a written order on May 31, 2012. Michael
did not designate the order for review. Generally, our review is limited to orders properly
before us based on a timely notice of appeal. RAP 5.2(a).
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No. 69047-7-1/15
Without citation to the record, Michael claims that Colleen falsified a
urinalysis test, made a false report of domestic violence, and repeatedly lied
during her trial testimony. He also argues that Colleen prolonged the litigation by
resisting his efforts to limit her residential time with their child based on her
alcoholism. Michael also claims that Colleen's counsel made derogatory
comments about him.
Michael's unsupported claims do not demonstrate abuse of discretion in
the trial court's refusal to find Colleen intransigent. Colleen's attempts to
maximize her residential time and the fact that the litigants presented
contradictory testimony and other evidence at trial do not require a finding of
intransigence. In re Marriage of Wright. 78 Wn. App. 230, 239, 896 P.2d 735(1995) (highly contested nature of dissolution action alone does not constitute
intransigence).
Colleen requests attorney fees on appeal under RCW 26.09.140,
providing for an award of attorney fees based on the financial circumstances of
the parties, for Michael's intransigence, and for her successful defense of the
contempt orders. See In re Marriage of Rideout. 150 Wn.2d 337, 359, 77 P.3d
1174(2003).
The trial court did not enter findings regarding intransigence on Michael's
part, and Colleen does not claim or demonstrate that he has been intransigent
during the proceedings before this court. However, upon a finding of contempt in
the parental support context, a court "shall order" the parent in contempt to pay
the moving party "all court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred as a
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No. 69047-7-1/16
result of the noncompliance." RCW 26.09.160(2)(b)(ii). Thus, Colleen is entitled
to an award of fees for defending the order of contempt under the parenting plan.
See In re Marriage of Eklund. 143 Wn. App. 207, 218-19, 177 P.3d 189 (2008).
And Colleen timely submitted a financial affidavit under RAP 18.1(c)
indicating that she is still unemployed and only able to meet her expenses
through loans from her father. Determining whether a fee award is appropriate
under RCW 26.09.140 requires the court to consider the parties' relative ability to
pay and the arguable merits of the issues raised on appeal. Leslie v. Verhev. 90
Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d 330 (1998). review denied. 137 Wn.2d 1003 (1999).
Having considered the merits of Michael's appeal as well as the financial
resources available to both parties, we exercise our discretion and grant Colleen
her attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 26.09.140, provided that she
complies with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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