Monica Diaz Barriga Figueroa v. Consuelo Prieto Mariscal , 414 P.3d 590 ( 2018 )

FILED
APRIL 3, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
MONICA DIAZ BARRIGA FIGUEROA ) No. 34671-4-III
as parent and natural guardian of )
BRAYAN MARTINEZ, a minor, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
CONSUELO PRIETO MARISCAL, )
individually and the marital property )
thereof, if any, )
)
Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Monica Diaz, as parent and guardian for her son
Brayan Martinez, appeals from a defense verdict finding Consuelo Prieto not negligent
for driving over and fracturing Brayan’s lower right leg. Ms. Diaz primarily argues that
the trial court erred in admitting the personal injury protection (PIP) application to her
insurer. She argues that the PIP application was hearsay and confidential work product.
We hold that the PIP application was not hearsay because it was an admission by a
party opponent under ER 801(d)(2)(iv). However, we hold that the trial court erred when
it failed to extend work product protection to the PIP application and that this error was
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prejudicial. We therefore reverse the jury’s verdict and grant Ms. Diaz a new trial.
FACTS
On October 30, 2013, Ms. Prieto was driving her minivan southbound on North
Cedar Avenue in Pasco, Washington. Her teenage daughter, Melissa Guzman, was riding
in the front passenger seat. There were vehicles, including an orange pickup, parked on
the right side of the road. As Ms. Prieto passed the orange pickup, she heard a noise on
the passenger side of her van and felt her van jump a little. She stopped, got out, and saw
eight-year-old Brayan Martinez lying near the pickup and next to his bicycle. It was
evident that Brayan’s lower right leg had been run over by one of the minivan’s tires.
Melissa called 911. Brayan was taken to the hospital and treated for his injuries.
A police officer arrived at the scene to investigate and prepare a report. The
officer spoke to a few people, including Ms. Prieto and her daughter. No one the officer
spoke to actually saw what happened. Nevertheless, the officer’s report indicated that
Brayan had ridden his bike from between two parked cars and into the road.
Ms. Diaz, a monolingual Spanish speaker, contacted a law firm and sought its
assistance in making a claim under her insurance policy to pay for medical expenses. On
November 21, 2013, Ms. Diaz met with an employee of the law firm who spoke Spanish.
Following this meeting, a legal assistant asked Ms. Diaz to sign a blank form that the
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assistant later completed. The form was an application for PIP benefits. Although PIP
benefits are available regardless of fault, the form had a line that required the applicant to
provide a brief description of the accident. The legal assistant used a copy of the police
report to complete the form. The legal assistant wrote:
Vehicle was traveling on North Cedar when child on a bike rode into road.
There were 2 parked cars on the road creating a blinde [sic] spot for the
driver. Child was struck and had right leg ran over.
Ex. 101 at 1.
Ms. Diaz, on behalf of her son, brought suit against Ms. Prieto. Ms. Diaz hired an
accident reconstruction expert to assist in establishing liability. The expert, Patrick
Stadler, met with Brayan at the accident scene to determine how the accident happened.
Brayan explained that prior to the accident, he rode his bicycle from the sidewalk
into the roadway in front of the orange pickup to make U-turn type maneuvers. Defense
counsel later deposed Brayan. Brayan’s statements during the deposition varied enough
that Mr. Stadler determined he should meet with Brayan again. Brayan’s second
explanation to Mr. Stadler was that his shoelace became tangled in his bike chain and that
the bike came to rest near the front of the orange pickup. He was stopped and leaning
over his bike with his right leg extended out in the road when the minivan ran over his
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leg. Brayan did not mention the shoelace becoming stuck during his initial interview with
Mr. Stadler.
The case proceeded to trial. During opening statements, Ms. Prieto referred to the
PIP application. After opening, Ms. Diaz orally requested that the PIP application be
excluded:
Your Honor, . . . in defendant’s opening [defense counsel] brought up some
piece of evidence that I think he might try to bring up again.
[The] Personal Injury Protection application. The personal injury
protection application is . . . .
. . . a first-party application and privilege is not waived when you
submit something to first-party insurance. And, in fact, first-party insurance
is not supposed to share the PIP file with defense without permission of
plaintiff.
In this case, [defense counsel] somehow got a copy of the PIP
application. This raises a number of concerns. . . .
So even though [defense counsel] already referenced it in his
opening, and I objected to it then, I would move to exclude any further
reference to this Personal Injury Protection application.
RP at 119-21.
In response, defense counsel argued:
First of all, this document is not privileged. . . .
....
The PIP insurance coverage is, in essence, a no fault benefit
provided on the insurance policy insuring Ms. Prieto. Okay?
So it’s her insurance company that’s providing this benefit of
medical coverage to Brayan.[1]
1
We granted oral argument and asked questions to shed light on these statements
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RP at 121-22.
The trial court then heard voir dire testimony from Ms. Diaz. Ms. Diaz explained
that her attorney’s legal assistant directed her to sign the blank PIP application. The trial
court determined that the form was prepared by plaintiff’s agent, constituted an admission
against interest, and therefore denied Ms. Diaz’s request to exclude it. The trial court
stated that the document was not privileged but provided no analysis in making its
conclusion.
During trial, Mr. Stadler opined that Brayan could not have been struck while
riding his bike. His opinion was based on the fact that the frame of the bike was not
damaged and that Brayan’s injuries did not include any impact or sliding on the
pavement. It was his opinion that Brayan had been stationary and adjacent to the orange
pickup when Ms. Prieto’s minivan ran over his extended right leg.
by counsel. During oral argument, defense counsel admitted that he did not receive the
PIP application through discovery, and that both parties had the same insurance company.
Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, Barriga Figueroa v. Prieto Mariscal, No. 34671-
4-III (Jan. 31, 2018) at 23 min., 57 sec. to 24 min. 52 sec., https://www.courts.wa.gov
/appellate_trial_courts/appellateDockets/index.cfm?fa=appellateDockets.showDateList&
courtId=a03&archive=y. Because only Ms. Diaz and her insurer had the PIP application,
and because Ms. Diaz did not provide the PIP application to defense counsel, we infer
that defense counsel received the PIP application directly from the parties’ shared
insurance company.
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Ms. Diaz asked one of her medical experts how Brayan had described the accident.
On cross-examination, Ms. Prieto asked the expert about statements in the medical
records that indicated Brayan had ridden his bike out into the road. Ms. Diaz objected on
the basis of speculation and hearsay. The trial court noted that the expert had reviewed
and relied on the medical record, and overruled the objection on the basis that Ms. Diaz
had opened the door during her questions to her expert.
Defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, Eric Hunter, testified that it would
have taken Ms. Prieto 1.6 seconds or less to stop once she saw an object in the roadway.
He also testified that accident reconstruction experts rely on police reports when forming
opinions and that he relied on the police report for this accident. Ms. Prieto began
reading the police report into evidence, and Ms. Diaz objected. The trial court overruled
the objection but qualified its ruling by saying the jury would be instructed that the police
report was admitted only for a limited purpose and could not be considered as substantive
evidence. Ms. Prieto did not continue reading the police report. Rather, she then focused
on the description of the accident contained in the PIP application.
After both sides presented their evidence and closing arguments, the case was
submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict finding Ms. Prieto not negligent. Ms.
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Diaz moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial court denied her
motion. Ms. Diaz appeals.
ANALYSIS
THE PIP APPLICATION
Ms. Diaz argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the PIP application. She
argues that the PIP application was hearsay and was confidential. We review these two
claims independently.
1. The PIP application was not hearsay
The trial court’s factual determination regarding whether a statement falls within a
hearsay exception will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Strauss,
119 Wash. 2d 401, 417, 832 P.2d 78 (1992).
The unrefuted evidence established that a legal assistant for Ms. Diaz’s attorney
prepared the PIP application based on the police report, and the police report was not
based on eye-witness evidence. Ms. Diaz argues that the PIP application has multiple
levels of hearsay, is speculative and, for these reasons, the trial court erred in admitting it.
We disagree.
ER 801(d) defines certain statements that are not hearsay. That rule provides in
relevant part: “A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party
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and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or servant acting within the scope of the
authority to make the statement for the party.” ER 801(d)(2)(iv).
Ms. Diaz hired an attorney to assist her in making a PIP claim. A legal assistant
for the attorney completed the PIP application. During oral argument, Ms. Diaz conceded
that a legal assistant could speak for a law firm by virtue of being part of that firm.2 This
is dispositive. We conclude that the legal assistant was a speaking agent for Ms. Diaz and
that the statement contained in the PIP application was made within the legal assistant’s
scope of authority.
Ms. Diaz implies that because the legal assistant’s statement was derived from the
police report instead of from Ms. Diaz, the statement was not admissible. She offers no
authority for this.3 ER 801(d)(2)(iv) does not explicitly require that the agent or servant
have firsthand knowledge or direct knowledge from the party. Nor does the rule
2
Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, supra, at 2 min. 37 sec. to 3 min. 17 sec.
3
Ms. Diaz cites Lockwood v. A C & S, Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987)
for the proposition that the agent must have authority to speak for the principal. Here,
Ms. Diaz’s law firm had authority to speak for Ms. Diaz by completing the PIP
application.
Ms. Diaz fails to cite Lockwood for the proposition that an agent’s statement must
not be based on speculation. Lockwood notes, “arguments for exclusion of evidence
[under ER 801(d)(2)] have been based on the theory that statements of an agent without
firsthand knowledge could too easily be based on rumor or speculation to be routinely
admitted.” Id. at 263. Lockwood did not accept the argument, but instead noted the
argument did not apply because the agent’s statement was based on scholarly papers. Id.
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explicitly require the agent’s statement to be nonspeculative. The vast majority of
jurisdictions and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require firsthand knowledge as a
requirement for the admissibility of an admission. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 255, at
139-40 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Washington courts have relaxed the rules
regarding personal knowledge with respect to admissions by an agent of a party because a
strict rule totally excluding the admission would be worse than allowing the trier of fact
to hear the admission. 5B KARL B. TEGLAND, WASH. PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 801.38, at 406-07 (6th ed. 2016). Here, the trial court properly found that the
legal assistant was an agent of Ms. Diaz and that her statement was within the scope of
her agency.4 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the PIP application
was not hearsay.5
4
Courts interpreting the parallel federal rule, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) have held
that admissions are granted generous treatment when determining admissibility and
guarantees of trustworthiness are not required. Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315
F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. EVID. 801, Advisory Committee Note).
5
The concern noted in Lockwood can be allayed in two ways. First, a trial court
can exclude a speculative statement under ER 403 for a variety of reasons. Second, even
if the trial court admits a speculative statement, the statement’s opponent can present
evidence that questions the statement’s accuracy. Here, Ms. Diaz presented significant
evidence that called into question the statement’s accuracy.
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2. The PIP application was confidential work product
Ms. Diaz argues that the trial court erred in admitting the PIP application because
the application was confidential work product.6 We agree.
Ms. Diaz cites Harris v. Drake, 152 Wash. 2d 480, 99 P.3d 872 (2004). There,
Harris was injured when Drake rear-ended him. Id. at 484. Harris cooperated with his
insurer’s request to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) in conjunction
with Harris’s application for PIP benefits. Id.
Later, in litigation between Harris and Drake, Drake sought to have the PIP IME
doctor testify about his earlier IME report. Id. Drake did not obtain the IME report
through Harris or Harris’s attorney. Id. Harris objected to the doctor testifying. Id. The
trial court eventually agreed with Harris that the doctor could not testify. Id. at 485.
Harris prevailed, and Drake appealed.
In affirming the trial court, the court noted that an insured was contractually
required to cooperate with his insurer or risk losing coverage. Id. at 488. The court
determined that this contractual obligation creates a reasonable expectation in the insured
6
Ms. Diaz did not assign error to the trial court’s ruling that the PIP application
was not confidential work product. But she raised this argument in her opening brief, she
cited relevant authority in support of it, and Ms. Prieto responded to it. The issue
therefore is appropriately before us. See State v. Olson, 126 Wash. 2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d
629 (1995); see also Tham Thi Dang v. Ehredt, 95 Wash. App. 670, 677, 977 P.2d 29
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that his statements to his insurer would be kept confidential. Id. The court concluded that
the trial court properly gave work product protections to the IME report and properly
excluded the PIP IME doctor from testifying. Id. at 488-89.
Like Harris, in the present case, Ms. Diaz had a contractual obligation to cooperate
with her insurer, which included an obligation to complete the PIP application. She
therefore had a reasonable expectation that her PIP application would be kept confidential
and not be shared with opposing counsel. It would work an injustice to permit Ms. Prieto
to surreptitiously obtain Ms. Diaz’s PIP application and use it against Ms. Diaz simply
because the two shared the same insurance company. The injustice is more pronounced
given that the description of the accident in the PIP application was taken from a police
officer’s speculation, unsupported by any eyewitness, and inconsistent with the physical
evidence. We hold that the trial court erred when it declined to give work product
protections to the PIP application.7
(1999); Viereck v. Fibreboard Corp., 81 Wash. App. 579, 915 P.2d 581 (1996).
7
The dissent argues that excluding the PIP application interferes with the search
for the truth. Dissenting opinion at 7-8. Although excluding work product sometimes
interferes with the search for the truth, that is not the case here. Ms. Diaz signed a blank
PIP application. That application was later completed by a legal assistant, who merely
wrote down what a police officer had written in his accident report. The officer spoke to
three people, none of whom saw what happened. Had the officer testified, his belief that
Brayan rode his bike out into the road would have been stricken as hearsay and
speculative.
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3. The trial court’s error in admitting confidential work product was
prejudicial
An erroneous evidentiary ruling does not result in reversal unless the error was
prejudicial. Driggs v. Howlett, 193 Wash. App. 875, 903, 371 P.3d 61, review denied, 186
Wash. 2d 1007, 380 P.3d 450 (2016). Here, Ms. Prieto repeatedly claimed throughout trial
that Brayan was hit after he rode his bicycle between two parked cars and into the road.
She repeated this claim in her opening statement, during the examination of several
witnesses, and throughout her closing argument. Her claim was based almost entirely on
the PIP application.
An argument can be made that the error in admitting the PIP application was not
prejudicial because the same evidence was admitted from the police report and at least
one medical record. Had Ms. Prieto made this argument, we would have rejected it.
First, the trial court refused to admit the police report as substantive evidence.
Second, the police report was not read into the record or admitted into evidence. Third,
Ms. Prieto focused almost entirely on the PIP application, not the police report or the
medical records. Viewing the evidence as a whole, we believe that the improper
admission of the PIP application was prejudicial. Given our resolution of this issue, we
need not consider Ms. Diaz’s other claims of error.
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Reversed.
I CONCUR:
Fearing,r
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KORSMO, J. (dissenting)-Although I agree with the majority's analysis of the
hearsay issue and its conclusion that the personal injury protection (PIP) application was
not hearsay, I disagree with the decision to consider and resolve a case on a theory barely
raised by the appellant in the trial court and not argued on appeal. Moreover, it would
perpetrate a fraud on the court to exclude the PIP application and allow the appellant to
testify without fear of self-contradiction. The judgment should be affirmed.
As to the procedural matter, the majority clearly errs in making up its own theory
that the PIP application constitutes privileged work product of the insured. The factual
basis for that theory was not established in the trial court. Indeed, the majority makes its
own fact-finding concerning the PIP application when it "infers" that the respondent
received the document from the shared insurance company. Majority opinion at 4 n.1.
Appellate courts have rejected appellate fact-finding since the Eisenhower administration.
See Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards,lnc., 54 Wash. 2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Having
not attempted to establish the facts in the trial court, the appellant understandably did not
pursue the issue in this court. There is simply no factual basis for the majority's
speculative analysis that the document was privileged and was obtained in an improper
manner.
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There were plenty of opportunities to pursue this issue in the trial court. As noted
by the majority, appellant raised a privilege objection and the respondent denied there
was any privilege. Appellant did not attempt to explain further how the document ended
up with the respondent or why it was privileged. Since the issue was not explored more
thoroughly in the trial court-and since this court does not make factual determinations-
there simply are not sufficient facts in the record to address this issue. In addition, the
failure to develop the record at trial means that we also cannot decide who holds the
privilege and whether it was waived.
Appellant also had plenty of opportunity to make that record. In addition to the
original objection in the trial court, the plaintiff sought a new trial due to alleged
violations of a pretrial ruling. The failure to exclude the supposedly privileged document
was not raised in that motion. When the case was appealed to this court, the appellant
likewise did not pursue the privilege argument. There was no assignment of error to the
trial court's ruling on the privilege claim. Appellant did not brief or argue the issue. 1
That should have been the end of the matter in this court. See State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d
244,258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995) ("However, the Court of Appeals should not have reached
1
Appellant mentions the privilege theory and its application to the PIP application
in the briefing only in conjunction with her claim that the trial court wrongly found that a
hearsay exception applied. See Br. of Appellant at 17-18. Appellant did not argue that
the application form itself should have been excluded as an allegedly privileged
document. Similarly, respondent did not (and had no reason to know that she should)
address the argument.
2
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any issue regarding this portion of Closson's testimony because no issue was raised in
Powell's briefs to the Court of Appeals. RAP 10.3(a), (g).").
RAP 12.l(a) states the governing rule: "the appellate court will decide a case only
on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs." 2 Our case law is rife with
examples of appellate courts applying that principle and recognizing that an issue is not
properly before the court. See, e.g., Matter ofRhem, 188 Wn.2d 321,328,394 P.3d 367
(2017) (noting that appellate courts "should not be placed in a role of crafting issues for
the parties"); State v. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992) (declining to
address a constitutional issue as neither party briefed the issue); State v. Sims, 1 Wash. App.
2d 472,485 n.2, 406 P.3d 649 (2017) ("an appellate court will not decide a case on
the basis of a theory not briefed by the parties."); Washington Prof'! Real Estate LLC v.
Young, 163 Wash. App. 800, 818 n.3, 260 P.3d 991 (2011) ("We will not decide a case on
the basis of issues that were not set forth in the parties' briefs."); Holder v. City of
Vancouver, 136 Wash. App. 104, 107, 147 P.3d 641 (2006) ("A party abandons an issue by
failing to pursue it on appeal by ... failing to brief the issue."); 1515-1519 Lakeview
Blvd. Condo. Ass'n v. Apt. Sales Corp., 102 Wn. App. 599,610, 9 P.3d 879 (2000), rev'd
2 The only exception is recognized in RAP 12.l(b) that advises appellate courts to
notify the parties and provide an opportunity to present written argument if the appellate
court believes an issue should be considered. More typically, appellate courts simply
recognize that an evidentiary issue is waived if not briefed in the appeal. E.g., Powell,
126 Wash. 2d at 258.
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in part and remanded, 146 Wash. 2d 194, 43 P.3d 1233 (2002) ("An issue is not properly
before an appellate court if not set forth in the party's brief, even if raised at oral
argument.").
Accordingly, we should not be engaging in this discussion in the least. But having
done so, the majority further compounds the error by awarding plaintiff a new trial on the
theory that her original inconsistent statement to her insurance company was somehow a
privileged document of her own that must be kept from the jury. On this record, I doubt
that is the case. When a work product privilege is recognized, it typically exists because
litigation is expected. Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wash. 2d 392, 396, 706 P.2d 212
(1985). The work product privilege is, after all, an attorney work product privilege.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). It only extends to
the work product of nonattomeys if the document was prepared for litigation.
Heidebrink, 104 Wash. 2d at 396. Privileges are disfavored because they obstruct the truth-
seeking process and, for that reason, are narrowly construed. As observed in the context
of the statutory attorney-client privilege:
Because the privilege sometimes results in the exclusion of evidence
otherwise relevant and material, and thus may be contrary to the philosophy
that justice can be achieved only with the fullest disclosure of the facts, the
privilege is not absolute; rather, it is limited to the purpose for which it
exists. Dietz v. Doe, 131 Wash. 2d 835, 843, 935 P.2d 611 (1997); see also
Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360, 102 S. Ct. 1103, 71 L. Ed. 2d 199
( 1982) (Statutes establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed
narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth.).
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VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 127 Wash. App. 309, 332, 111 P.3d 866 (2005);
accord Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wash. 2d 769, 778, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012).
It is not conceivable to me that every claim made to one's own insurance company
is made with litigation in mind, let alone that run-of-the-mill business records are
privileged due to the subjective view of either the insured or the insurer that litigation
might result. We have a hearsay exception for business records for a reason, and that
exception even serves to waive the constitutional protection to confront witnesses
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. E.g., State v.
Ziegler, 114 Wash. 2d 533, 789 P.2d 79 (1990). A routine claim form such as this one
("please pay the emergency room for treating my son who was hit by a car") is processed
in the normal course of business, not in anticipation of litigation.
Whether the privilege exists is dependent upon a review of the facts of the
relationship between insurer and insured at the time of the statement and the expectations
of the parties. Heidebrink, 104 Wash. 2d at 400. In that case a privilege existed because the
insured reasonably expected that the information provided would be passed on in
confidence to the attorney who subsequently would be hired to defend him. Id. at 399-
401 ("we hold that a statement made by an insured to an insurer following an automobile
accident is protected from discovery."). Similarly, an independent medical examination
required by a PIP claim was the work product of the insurer and was not discoverable by
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a third party once the insurance company asserted the privilege. 3 Harris v. Drake, 152
Wash. 2d 480, 492, 99 P.3d 872 (2004). An insured would reasonably believe her medical
information would be kept confidential by her insurance company. Id. at 488.
Unlike these lead cases, the alleged privilege found in this case is being asserted
by the insured, not the insurer, and involves a statement made for the purpose of showing
the claim was within the scope of the PIP coverage in order to obtain medical benefits for
Brayan. It was not necessarily a statement made in anticipation of litigation since the
Diaz family was preparing to sue Ms. Mariscal rather than its own insurance company.
While the preceding are all factual and prudential concerns arising from the
majority's decision to decide a factual question not presented in the briefing to this court,
the real problem with going down this unbriefed road is that it focuses on the wrong
aspect of the alleged privilege. The question is not whether counsel for Ms. Mariscal
improperly4 obtained the document, but whether the plaintiff is allowed to perpetrate a
fraud on the court by excluding the inconsistent original statement from the jury's
consideration. The very reasons that the majority believes this information was harmful
3
This aspect of Harris hurts the majority's argument here. The privilege does not
belong to appellant, but to appellant's insurance carrier, who arguably is free to decide
whether it will or will not assert the privilege.
4
If the plaintiff was damaged by some unlawful act, the remedy should be to sue
the insurer for damages. Since the insurer was the privilege holder, however, I question
whether anything untoward occurred here at all.
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are the very reasons it should be admitted in order to advance the jury's truth-finding
function.
Whatever the basis for the new privilege created by the majority here, it should
give way for the greater public policy of preventing a fraud on the court. Even evidence
suppressed due to a violation of the constitution is admissible at trial to counter a
defendant's contrary testimony at trial. E.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 105 S.
Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985) (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct.
643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971)) (suppressed statements); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1980) (physical evidence); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954) (same). As forcefully stated in
Walder:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use
of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the
defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide
himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an
extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 65. I would presume the civil justice system is at least as concerned with truth
finding as the criminal justice system. I can think of no policy reason why the majority's
new privilege should be stronger than the protections of our constitution.
Most privileges exist to promote honest reporting of facts. Coburn v. Seda, 101
Wash. 2d 270, 274, 677 P.2d 173 (1984) (attorney client privilege). It is a perversion of that
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purpose to authorize perjury by excluding a party's contrary report of events and let the
jury hear only the current version. The privilege should be honored at the discovery level
but, once the information has been disclosed, even if wrongly so, the purpose of the
privilege is not furthered by allowing it to abuse the truth-seeking function of trial. Even
assuming that the PIP application statement was privileged, it was properly admitted here
to rebut the contrary version of events that plaintiff was asserting at trial. She was able to
explain why that initial version was incorrect, and the jury was able to listen to the
explanation and give the statement any weight it deserved. This issue was handled fairly
for both sides.
Even if the issue is properly before us and even if the statement is privileged, the
evidence was properly put before the jury to contradict the version of events presented at
trial. I dissent from the decision to exclude the initial report and grant a new trial.
8