State Of Washington v. Michael Thomas Thrasher ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 70613-6-1 r-3
c5
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION *"
MICHAEL THOMAS THRASHER,
Appellant. FILED: August 4, 2014
Appelwick, J. — Thrasher appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for
relief from the duty to register as a sex offender. He argues that trial court improperly
denied his petition and failed to hold a hearing on the petition. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 1992, Michael Thrasher entered an Alford1 plea of guilty to second degree
assault with sexual motivation. He was sentenced to a nine month standard range
sentence and was notified of his statutory duty to register as a sex offender.
Between 1993 and 2006, Thrasher was found or pleaded guilty to 9 felonies and
31 misdemeanors. This included a 2006 conviction for felony failure to register as a sex
offender. In 2009, Thrasher was again convicted of felony failure to register as a sex
offender.
On April 26, 2013, Thrasher petitioned pro se for relief from the duty to register as
a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.142. He stated in his petition:
I have served 167 months past my release date of probation, fines,
sentences that far [exceed] the standard sentencing for a second degree
1 North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). In
an Alford plea, the accused technically does not acknowledge guilt, but concedes there
is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 178 Wash. 2d
519, 521, 309 P.3d 1186(2013).
No. 70613-6-1
assault w/ a finding of sexual motivation on May 18th 1992. I served my
whole sentence of my sentencing range of 0-12 months in the King County
Jail work release program. Sucessfull [sic] was able to volenteer [sic] for
the King County Park Services. Doing janitorial type work. I was also
employed full time as a dish washer and waiter at the pancake house, and
Cafe Minnie's, working for merchant Dick Wright, business man and mentor.
I was released from my incarceration with excellent reviews and thanks for
all my help and volenteer [sic] work at the King County court house waxing
floors on my days off. I also completed my 12 months of probation that was
a requirement of my [judgment and sentence] on an [Alford] plea
agreement.
The superior court denied Thrasher's petition without a hearing, but without
prejudice. The court concluded that Thrasher "failed to provide sufficient information so
that the Court can make a determination as to whether the defendant should be relieved
from his obligation to register and the Defendant has not filed the appropriate forms with
the court." Thrasher appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Relief from Sex Offender Registration
Thrasher argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for relief from sex
offender registration, because he provided sufficient facts to show he was rehabilitated.
He further asserts that the court erred in denying him a hearing at which he could present
evidence in support of his petition.
We review a trial court's decision to deny a petition for relief from the duty to
register as a sex offender for abuse of discretion. State v. Gossage, 138 Wash. App. 298,
306, 156 P.3d 951 (2007), rev'd in part on other grounds, 165 Wash. 2d 1, 195 P.3d 525
(2008). Determining whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is also within the superior
court's discretion, ]g\ at 305-06. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.
No. 70613-6-1
State v. Powell. 126 Wash. 2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. State v. Norlin, 134 Wash. 2d 570, 582, 951 P.2d 1131 (1998).
Thrasher's 1992 conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation is a
felony sex offense that requires him to register as a sex offender.2 RCW 9A.36.021(2)(b);
RCW 9A.44.128(10)(a); RCW 9.94A.030(46)(c); RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). Sex offenders
may petition a superior court for relief from the duty to register if, among other conditions,
they have "spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a
disqualifying offense during that time period." RCW 9A.44.142(1)(b). A disqualifying
offense includes "a conviction for: Any offense that is a felony." RCW 9A.44.128(3).
The record before us shows that Thrasher was convicted of felonies in 1996,1997,
1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2009. He has not been felony-free for any
consecutive 10 year period since his 1992 sex offense. The superior court had no
discretion to grant Thrasher's petition. Doing so would have been an error of law.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Thrasher's petition for relief
from the duty to register as a sex offender. For the same reason, the court did not err in
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Thrasher's petition.
2 Thrasher's judgment and sentence listed the crime charged as former RCW
9A.36.020(1) (1975) and the date of the crime as September 30, 1991. However, former
RCW9A.36.020(1) was repealed in 1986. Laws of 1986, ch. 257, § 9. In 1991, second
degree assault was codified at former RCW 9A.36.021 (1988). At that time, second
degree assault was a class Bfelony, which required Thrasher to registeras a sex offender
for 15 years after release from confinement. Former RCW 9A.36.021 (1988). However,
a "sex offense" also includes felony failure to register as a sex offender ifthe person has
been convicted of failure to register on at least one prior occasion. RCW
9.94A.030(46)(a)(v). Thrasher was convicted of failure to register in 2006 and again in
2009, extending his sex offender registration period.
No. 70613-6-1
II. Statement of Additional Grounds
Thrasher makes several arguments in his statement of additional grounds. He
reiterates his counsel's argument that the superior court abused its discretion in denying
his petition for relief from sex offender registration. This does not raise a new issue for
our review.
Thrasher also contests the length of his sentence and asserts his innocence for
the 1992 sex offense. These arguments are not supported by credible evidence in the
limited record before us, so we cannot review them. See RAP 10.10(c). If material facts
exist that have not been previously presented or heard, then Thrasher's recourse is to
bring a properly supported personal restraint petition. See RAP 16.4; State v. McFarland,
127 Wash. 2d 322, 339, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
Lastly, Thrasher argues at length about the injustice of sex offender registration.
We are likewise unable to review this issue, because Thrasher fails to inform us of the
nature and occurrence of the alleged error. RAP 10.10(c); see also State v. Ward, 123
Wash. 2d 488, 492, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994) (holding that the sex offender registration statute
does not violate due process or equal protection).
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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