In The Matter Of: Linda Cameron, App v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Aka, Resp , 442 P.3d 31 ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
LINDA CAMERON for Herself and as )
Personal Representative for the Estate ) No. 76663-5-I
of GARY R. CAMERON, Deceased, )
) DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
v.
) PUBLISHED OPINION
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY )
a/k/a ARCO; ASBESTOS CORP., )
LTD.; CBS CORPORATION, f/k/a )
Westinghouse Electric Corporation; )
CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, )
INC.; FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY )
CORPORATION; GENERAL )
ELECTRIC COMPANY; LONE STAR )
INDUSTRIES, INC.; METROPOLITAN )
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; )
SABERHAGEN HOLDINGS, INC.; )
and TRANSALTA CENTRALIA
GENERATION LLC, )
Defendants, )
)
PACIFICORP, dba Pacific )
Power & Light Company, )
) FILED: May 13, 2019
Respondent. )
_________________________________________________________________________________ )
No. 76663-5-I I 2
LEACH, J. — Gary Cameron died in 2012 of mesothelioma caused by
asbestos exposure. Gary’s wife, Linda Cameron,1 appeals a summary judgment
dismissing her claims against PacifiCorp, one of the companies she claims
exposed Gary to asbestos. She challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the
six-year construction statute of repose,2 which applies to improvements on real
property, barred her claims. Cameron asserts that the current statute of repose
applies and does not bar her claims. But the date of substantial completion of
construction provides the operative date for application of the statute. Here,
substantial completion occurred in 1972, so the 1967 version of the statute
applies and bars her claims arising from construction activities but not those
arising from PacifiCorp’s status as a premises owner. We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
The parties do not dispute the following facts. Pacific Power & Light
Company, PacifiCorp’s predecessor (together, “PacifiCorp”), and seven other
utility companies sponsored construction of the Centralia Steam Plant (Plant) in
the 1970s. PacifiCorp contracted with Bechtel Corporation for engineering and
construction management and for construction of the Plant. In 1970, Bechtel
hired Owens Corning Fiberglass to install thermal insulation materials at the
1For purposes of clarity, we use Gary Cameron’s first name and Linda
Cameron’s surname.
2 RCW4.16.300, .310.
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No. 76663-5-I / 3
PTant. Asbestos was installed as part of the insulation; From April 26, 1971, to
December 3, 1971, Gary Cameron worked at the Plant as a boilermaker.
Construction finished in 1972. PacifiCorp retained its ownership interest in the
Plant until 2000.
Gary was exposed to asbestos over the course of his career. He was
diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2012 and died in September 2012.
Cameron sued PacifiCorp and others, claiming, in part, that a dangerous
condition at PacifiCorp’s facilities injured Gary. PacifiCorp asked the trial court to
dismiss Cameron’s claims against it on summary judgment. Cameron and
PacifiCorp then agreed to address only the statute of repose issue and defer
consideration of the remaining issues until the completion of additional discovery.
The trial court granted PacifiCorp’s dismissal request, concluding that the
construction statute of repose barred Cameron’s claims. Cameron appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo and performs the
same inquiry as the trial court.3 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no
genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.4
~ Life Designs Ranch, Inc. v. Sommer, 191 Wash. App. 320, 327, 364 P.3d
129 (2015).
~ Life Designs, 191 Wash. App. at 327; CR 56(c).
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Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews de
novo.5 When a statute is unambiguous, a reviewing court gives effect to the
plain language of the statute.6
ANALYSIS
Cameron makes three related claims: that the current version of the
construction statute of repose applies to this case, that genuine issues of
material fact exist about whether the statute bars her claims, and that no version
of the statute bars her claims arising out of PacifiCorp’s status as a premises
owner. We disagree about the first two claims and agree on the third one.
“A statute of repose terminates the right to file a claim after a specified
time even if the injury has not yet occurred.”7 Two statutes comprise the
construction statute of repose. RCW 4.16.300 defines the scope of the statute
and describes those entitled to claim its protection. RCW 4.16.310 defines when
this statute of repose bars a claim. Together, they bar certain claims arising from
construction of any improvement upon real property that have not accrued within
six years after substantial completion of construction.
5Williamsv. Tilaye, 174 Wash. 2d 57, 61, 272 P.3d 235 (2012).
6 Parkridge Assocs. v. Ledcor Indus., Inc., 113 Wash. App. 592, 602, 54
P.3d 225 (2002).
~ Wash. State Maior League Baseball Stadium Pub. Facilities Dist. v.
Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co., 176 Wash. 2d 502, 511, 296 P.3d 821
(2013).
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The history of this statute of repose bears on the outcome of this case.
The legislature first enacted it in 1967.8 In 1986, the legislature amended RCW
4.16.300 to exclude manufacturers from the statute’s protections.9 In 2004, the
legislature again amended this statute, this time removing the language about
manufacturers and specifically identifying the persons protected by the statute.1°
The 1967 version of RCW4.16.300 provided,
RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320 shall apply to all claims or causes
of action of any kind against any person, arising from such person
having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real
property, or having performed or furnished any design, planning,
surveying, architectural or construction or engineering services, or
supervision or observation of construction, or administration of
construction contracts for any construction, alteration or repair of
any improvement upon real propertyJ11i
The 1986 version provided,
RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320 shall apply to all claims or causes
of action of any kind against any person, arising from such person
having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real
property, or having performed or furnished any design, planning,
surveying, architectural or construction or engineering services, or
supervision or observation of construction, or administration of
construction contracts for any construction, alteration or repair of
any improvement upon real property. This section is intended to
benefit only those persons referenced herein and shall not apply to
claims or causes of action against manufacturers.[121
8 LAWS OF 1967, ch. 75, § 1, 2(formerRCW4.16.300, .310 (1967)).
~ LAWS OF 1986, ch. 305, § 703 (former RCW4.16.300 (1986)).
10 LAWS OF 2004, ch. 257, § 1 (RCW 4.16.300).
~ LAWS OF 1967, ch. 75, § 1 (former RCW4.16.300 (1967)).
12 LAWS of 1986, ch. 305, § 703 (former ROW 4.16.300 (1986)). The
underlined portion represents the 1986 amendment.
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In 2004, the legislature amended both RCW 4.16.300 and Laws of
1986, chapter 305, section 703. This amendment changed the description
of the persons protected by the statute: “This section is specifically
intended to benefit persons having performed work for which the persons
must be registered or licensed under RCW 18.08.310, 18.27.020,
18.43.040, 18.96.020, or 19.28.041, and shall not apply to claims or
causes of action against persons not required to be so registered or
licensed.”13 So the current version of the statute protects only persons
registered or licensed as an architect, contractor, engineer or land
surveyor, landscape architect, or electrician.14
The 1967 version of RCW4.16.310 provided,
All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall
accrue, and the applicable statute of limitation shall begin to run
only during the period within six years after substantial completion
of construction, or during the period within six years after the
termination of the services enumerated in RCW 4.16.300,
whichever is later. The phrase “substantial completion of
construction” shall mean the state of completion reached when an
improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its
intended use. Any cause of action which has not accrued within six
years after such substantial completion of construction, or within six
years after such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be
barred: Provided, That this limitation shall not be asserted as a
defense by any owner, tenant or other person in possession and
control of the improvement at the time such cause of action
accrues.1151
13 LAWS OF 2004, ch. 257,§ 1 (RCW4.16.300).
14 RCW 18.08.310, .27.020, .43.040, .96.020; RCW 19.28.041.
15 LAWSOF 1967, ch. 75, §2(former RCW4.16.310 (1967)).
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The 1986 (current) version of RCW 4.16.310 provides,
All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall
accrue, and the applicable statute of limitation shall begin to run
only during the period within six years after substantial completion
of construction, or during the period within six years after the
termination of the services enumerated in RCW 4.16.300,
whichever is later. The phrase “substantial completion of
construction” shall mean the state of completion reached when an
improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its
intended use. Any cause of action which has not accrued within six
years after such substantial completion of construction, or within six
years after such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be
barred: Provided, That this limitation shall not be asserted as a
defense by any owner, tenant or other person in possession and
control of the improvement at the time such cause of action
accrues. The limitations prescribed in this section apply to all
claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 brought in
the name or for the benefit of the state which are made or
commenced after June11, 1986.[161
The 1967 Version of the Construction Statute of Repose Applies
The parties dispute which version of the statute of repose applies to
Cameron’s claim. She asserts that the current statute applies. She contends
that the date her claim accrued, 2012, determines which version of the statute
applies. She also claims that the 2004 amendment to RCW 4.16.300 applies to
actions filed after August 1, 1986, so the current statute applies. Alternatively,
Cameron asserts that RCW 4.16.300 applies retroactively. We disagree.
16 LAWS OF 1986, ch. 305, § 702 (former ROW 4.16.310 (1986)). The
underlined portion represents the 1986 amendment. In 2002, the legislature
added a provision to former ROW 4.16.310 about written notice that is not
relevant here. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 323, § 9 (RCW4.16.310).
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First, Cameron relies on Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co.17 Washburn
suffered serious injuries from a 1986 propane fuel system explosion.18 Beatt
installed this propane system in 1969. Because our Supreme Court applied the
1986 statute of repose, the statute in effect when Washburn’s claim accrued, and
not the 1967 version,19 Cameron asserts Washburn shows that the statute in
effect when a claim accrues controls. But in Washburn, the issues before the
court about the statute of repose concerned whether the pipeline was an
“improvement” on real property and whether the contractor qualified as a
“manufacturer” of the pipeline system; the parties did not contest which version of
the statute applied to Washburn’s claim.20 And the Washburn opinion contains
no analysis of this issue.
While not relied on by Cameron for this issue, two other reported
Washington cases apply the statute of repose in effect when the injured party’s
claim accrued. In neither case did the court analyze the issue before this court.
In Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co.,21 a
property owner and lessee sued a contractor for property damage allegedly
caused by faulty installation of a refrigeration system substantially completed in
1961. This predated the first statute of repose. The refrigeration system failed in
17120 Wash. 2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992).
18 Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 252.
19 Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 252-54.
20Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 251, 253-54.
21 81 Wash. 2d 528, 529-30, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
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No. 76663-5-I I 9
1968. Our Supreme Court applied the 1967 statute, the one in effect when
plaintiffs’ claims accrued, to bar the claim.22 No party claimed that this statute did
not apply.
And in Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc.,23 the court applied the 1967 statute
to a project substantially completed in 1960. But the court considered only one
issue, whether a ski lift constituted, as a matter of law, “‘an improvement upon
real property.”24 No party claimed that the 1967 statute did not apply.
The parties have cited only one Washington state court decision analyzing
the relationship between the statute of repose’s bar, the date of completion, and
the date a plaintiff’s claim accrues. In 1000 Virciinia Ltd. Partnership v. Vertecs
Corp.,25 decided after Washburn, Yakima Fruit, and Pinneo, our Supreme Court
described an application of the statute of repose. It stated, “[l]f, for example, a
negligence claim against a contractor arising out of the construction of a building
does not accrue until seven years after substantial completion, it is barred by
RCW 4.16.310 because it did not accrue within the six-year period of the statute
of repose.”26 In the court’s example, the statute of repose bars a negligence
claim before it accrues. This result depends upon the date of substantial
completion, not the date the plaintiff’s claim accrues. Because Washburn,
22 Yakima Fruit, 81 Wash. 2d at 529-30.
23 14 Wash. App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207 (1976).
24 Pinneo, 14 Wash. App. at 850 (quoting RCW 4.16.300).
25158 Wash. 2d 566, 575, 146 P.3d 423 (2006).
26 1000 Virginia, 158 Wash. 2d at 575.
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Yakima Fruit, and Pinneo provide no analysis of the issue before this court and
1000 Virginia does, we follow that guidance about the operation of a statute of
repose. A court looks to the date of substantial completion to determine which
version of the statute of repose applies.
Cameron also cites the principle that a court “look[s] to the subject matter
regulated by the statute and considers its plain language to determine the
precipitating or triggering event.”27 RCW 4.16.310 states that it does not apply to
“any owner, tenant or other person in possession and control of the improvement
at the time such cause of action accrues.” She maintains that because
ownership or tenancy may be relinquished or regained, it is not possible to
determine whether the statute applies in any one instance until a claim actually
accrues.
As the trial court aptly noted, Cameron’s argument that the statute cannot
be applied until a claim has accrued “conflicts with the purpose of the statu[t]e of
repose, which was to bar claims that arise after completion of construction, even
if no injury had yet occurred.” Because the date of substantial completion starts
the six-year period after which a person’s claim is barred, the subject matter and
plain language of the statute support using the date of substantial completion to
determine which version of the statute of repose applies. Here, the Plant was
27 In re Estate of Haviland, 177 Wash. 2d 68, 75, 301 P.3d 31(2013).
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No. 76663-5-I Ill
substantially complete by 1972. In 1972, the 1967 statute applied. Thus, the
1967 version of the statute of repose applies.
Cameron additionally claims the 2004 amendment applies to all actions
filed after August 1, 1986. She correctly notes that the legislature’s 2004
amendment revised both RCW 4.16.300 and section 703 of Laws of 1986,
chapter 3Q528 She reasons that the 2004 amendment to RCW 4.16.300
incorporates the effective date of the 1986 amendment. This argument ignores
the plain language of the relevant legislation and could lead to absurd results.
The legislature included the 1986 amendment to RCW 4.16.300 as
section 703 of Laws of 1986, chapter 305, an act that made substantial changes
to tort law across many statutes. Section 910 of this act states, in relevant part,
“[T]his act applies to all actions filed on or after August 1, 1986.”29 It describes
the effective date of the act and says nothing about the effective date of future
amendments to the statutes amended by the act. Cameron’s proposed
construction would make section 910 apply to all future amendments to any
statute amended by chapter 305 to make them also apply to all actions filed on or
after August 1, 1986. Section 910 says nothing about future amendments, let
alone their effective dates. Cameron does not explain how a court could apply a
2004 amendment to a statute to an action filed after August 1, 1986, and fully
28 LAWS OF 2004, ch. 257, § 1 (RCW4.16.300).
29 LAWS OF 1986, ch. 305, § 910 (former RCW 5.40.901 (1986)).
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No. 76663-5-I / 12
resolved before 2004. While her argument would require this, the legislature
could not have intended this meaning and used no words supporting it.
In Washington, an act takes effect 90 days after the legislative session in
which the legislature that enacted it adjourns unless the legislature specifies a
different effective date.3° The 2004 amendment did not specify an effective date
and explicitly amended only section 703 of Laws of 1986, chapter 305, not
section 910 of Laws of 1986, chapter 305. Current RCW 4.16.300 applies to
claims with an operative date any time after the effective date of the 2004
amendment.
Alternatively, Cameron claims that the current statute applies retroactively.
A court presumes that a statute operates prospectively unless the legislature
indicates that it operates retroactively.31 But a statutory amendment is
retroactive, if constitutionally permissible under the circumstances,32 when “(1)
the Legislature explicitly provides for retroactivity; (2) the amendment is curative;
30 Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wash. 2d 671, 675, 619 P.2d 357 (1980); see WASH.
CONST. art. II, §41.
31 Densley v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 162 Wash. 2d 210, 223, 173 P.3d 885
(2007).
32.1000 Virginia, 158 Wash. 2d at 584 (retroactive application may not “run
afoul of any constitutional prohibition”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting McGee Guest Home. Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wash. 2d
316, 324, 12 P.3d 144 (2000)).
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or (3) the statute is remedial.”33 Cameron contends that the 2004 amendment to
RCW4.16.300 satisfies all three of these criteria.
First, she again asserts that the 2004 amendment incorporates the
effective date of the 1986 amendment to show that the legislature explicitly
provided for retroactivity. But we have rejected this claim. Cameron also cites
language from the House Bill Report (HBR) on the 2004 amendment stating that
the amendment would restore the original legislative intent of the statute, but the
report says nothing about retroactivity and the act adopted by the legislature did
not explicitly provide for retroactivity.
Next, Cameron maintains that the 2004 amendment is curative and
remedial because the HBR and testimony in support of the bill indicated that the
legislature intended the amendment to clarify the meaning of “manufacturers” in
the 1986 amendment. “A curative amendment clarifies or technically corrects an
ambiguous statute.”34 “A statute is remedial when it relates to practice,
procedure, or remedies and does not affect a substantive or vested right.”35 “An
amendment is curative and remedial if it clarifies or technically corrects an
~ Densley, 162 Wash. 2d at 223 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (quoting State v. T.K., 139 Wash. 2d 320, 332, 987 P.2d 63 (1999)).
~ State v. Wilcox, 196 Wash. App. 206, 212, 383 P.3d 549 (2016) (quoting
State v. Smith, 144 Wash. 2d 665, 674, 30 P.3d 1245 (2001)).
~ 1000 Virginia, 158 Wash. 2d at 586 (quoting Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102
Wash. 2d 170, 181, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984)).
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ambiguous statute without changing prior case law constructions of the statute.”36
Cameron relies on New Grade International, Inc. v. Scott Technologies,37 in
which the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington held that
the 2004 amendment clarified the former statute and was thus retroactive. The
court reasoned that the legislative history showed that the legislature intended for
the amendment to distinguish contractors from manufacturers.38
We disagree with New Grade. “[A] statute fixing a time limitation upon the
assertion of a right or the enforcement of an obligation will not be held ~y
construction to operate retroactively, and it will be deemed so to operate only
when, by its plain terms or by necessary implication, such intention is
apparent.”39 The 2004 amendment neither states nor makes apparent any
legislative intent that the statute applies retroactively. It limited application of
RCW 4.16.310 to those licensed professionals named in RCW 4.16.300 and did
not clarify or correct ambiguous language; it substantively changed the law, so it
was not curative. In addition, because statutes of repose are substantive law4°
36 Barstad v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 145 Wash. 2d 528, 537, 39 P.3d 984
(2002).
~ 2004 WL 5571416 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2004) (court order), affd, 205
F. App’x 571 (9th Cir. 2006).
38 New Grade, 2004 WL 5571416, at *2.4
~ Lane v. Dept of Labor & Indus., 21 Wash. 2d 420, 423, 426, 151 P.2d 440
(1944) (“There is no constitutional inhibition against the revival of a barred
remedy.”).
40 Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124 Wash. 2d 205, 212, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994)
(“The general authority is that statutes of repose are to be treated not as statutes
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No. 76663-5-I / 15
and the 2004 amendment made a substantive change, the amendment did not
simply change a remedy and thus was not remedial.
Because the operative date of the statute of repose is the date of
substantial completion of construction and the 2004 amendment to the statute
does not apply retroactively, the 1967 version of the statute of repose applies
here.
The 1967 Version Bars Only Cameron’s Claims Arising from Construction
Cameron contends that even the 1967 version of the statute does not bar
her claims because it does not protect premises owners sued in their capacity as
premises owners. To the extent that Cameron bases her claims on activities
arising out of PacifiCorp’s activities as a premises owner and not on its acts or
omissions arising out of its construction activities, we agree.
Cameron relies on Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham,41 in which our Supreme
Court held that the construction statute of repose did not bar claims against the
defendant construction company that was both the seller and builder of an
apartment complex because the claim arose from the company’s sales activities.
The court explained, “[T]he focus is on activities. If the claim arises from those
activities, the person is covered; if it does not, he is not covered. Here the claim
of limitation, but as part of the body of a state’s substantive law in making choice
of-law determinations.”).
41112 Wash. 2d 562, 564-65, 569, 772 P.2d 1018 (1989).
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No. 76663-5-I /16
arises from concealment [of a known dangerous condition] during sale—the
activity of selling is not covered.”42
Here, Cameron sued PacifiCorp for both its construction activities and its
activities as a premises owner. She alleged and the record shows that
PacifiCorp performed engineering and construction observation services during
the construction of the Plant and was not solely an uninvolved premises owner.
But she also alleges that PacifiCorp “negligently failed to take corrective action to
eliminate a dangerous condition that the defendants knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known existed at their facilities.”
Former RCW 4.16.300 protects persons or entities that performed
engineering services or observation of construction for any construction of an
improvement upon real property. Consistent with our Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Pfeifer, because Cameron’s claims arise from activities covered by the statute
and activities not covered, the 1967 version of the statute applies to bar claims
arising out of PacifiCorp’s construction activities but not those arising out of its
status as a premises owner.
PacifiCorp contends that RCW 4.16.310 bars claims arising out of its
activities as a premises owner because it did not own the Plant when Cameron’s
claim accrued. PacifiCorp relies on this proviso in the statute, “Provided, That
42 Pfeifer, 112 Wash. 2d at 569.
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No. 76663-5-I /17
this limitation shall not be asserted as a defense by any owner, tenant or other
person in possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of
action accrues.” This proviso only deprives an owner of a defense to claims
arising out of construction activities when that owner still owns the property when
the plaintiff’s claim accrues. It does not provide any protection against claims
arising out of other activities.
The trial court should not have dismissed Cameron’s claims arising out of
PacifiCorp’s status as a premises owner as barred by the statute of repose.
Policy Considerations
Cameron also contends that the legislature did not intend that the statute
of repose applies to claims for latent occupational diseases such as
mesothelioma. She states that no Washington appellate case has held that
Washington’s construction statute of repose applies to bar a claim for an
occupational disease similar to mesothelioma. And she asserts that because
mesothelioma has a latency period well beyond six years, application of the
statute of repose to a mesothelioma plaintiff could cause a denial of access to
the courts and raise constitutional concerns. Because this court generally will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal,43 we decline to review this
claim.
~ RAP 2.5(a).
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The Trial Court’s Denial of Cameron’s Request for a Continuance
Last, Cameron claims that because PacifiCorp asserted for the first time in
its reply brief to the trial court that the current statute of repose bars her claims,
the trial court committed error when it relied, in part, on this argument in granting
PacifiCorp summary judgment and in denying her request for a continuance to
obtain discovery about the issue. We disagree.
By granting PacifiCorp’s summary judgment motion and dismissing
Cameron’s claims against PacifiCorp, the trial court denied Cameron’s request
for a continuance contained in her response to PacifiCorp’s reply. This court
reviews a trial court’s denial of a request for a continuance for an abuse of
discretion.44
A court may deny a motion for a continuance when
(1) the requesting party does not offer a good reason for the
delay in obtaining the desired evidence; (2) the requesting
party does not state what evidence would be established
through the additional discovery; or (3) the desired evidence
will not raise a genuine issue of material fact.~451
King County Super. Ct. Local Civ. R. 7(b)(4)(G) states, “[Amy reply
material which is not in strict reply[ ] will not be considered by the court over
objection of counsel except upon the imposition of appropriate terms, unless the
court orders otherwise.” In Cameron’s memorandum in opposition to
~ Tellevik v. Real Prop. Known as 31641 W. Rutherford St., 120 Wash. 2d
68, 90, 838 P.2d 111,845 P.2d 1325 (1992).
~ Tellevik, 120 Wash. 2d at 90.
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No. 76663-5-1/19
PacifiCorp’s motion for summary judgment, she claimed that the current statute
applies. In reply, PacifiCorp asserted the same arguments that it does on appeal
and stated that even if the current statute applies, it still bars Cameron’s claim.
Consistent with the local rule, PacifiCorp’s reply directly responded to Cameron’s
argument that the current statute does not bar her claim. Thus, the trial court
could consider PacifiCorp’s arguments and did not abuse its discretion by
denying Cameron’s continuance.
CONCLUSION
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. The 1967 version of the construction statute of
repose applies to bar Cameron’s claims arising out of PacifiCorp’s construction
activities but not those arising out of its acts or omissions as a premises owner.
WE CONCUR:
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