State Of Washington, V Ibrahim H. Hassan ( 2014 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 44807 -6 -II
Respondent,
v.
PUBLISHED OPINION
IBRAHIM HASSAN,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Ibrahim Hassan appeals his convictions for two counts of second degree
theft and two counts of unlawful issuance of a bank check ( UIBC), as well as the trial court' s
restitution order. He claims that ( 1) the information and to- convict instructions for second
degree theft were inadequate because they did not identify aggregation of multiple theft incidents
based on a common scheme or plan as an essential element of the crime, ( 2) the to- convict
instructions for UIBC omitted the essential element that the check be drawn on a bank or other
depository for the payment of money, and ( 3) the sentencing court miscalculated his restitution
and trial counsel' s failure to challenge the restitution amount denied him his right to effective
assistance of counsel.
We hold that the information and to- convict instructions for second degree theft were not
required to reference aggregation because the amounts Hassan obtained control over when he
deposited the checks satisfied the $ 750 threshold value, and that any defect in the UIBC to-
convict instruction was harmless. We also hold that Hassan failed to preserve his challenge to
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the restitution award, but that defense counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel
during the restitution hearing by not arguing that the victim did not lose the full amount of the
check Hassan gave her. Accordingly, we affirm Hassan' s convictions but remand for correction
of the restitution order.
FACTS
Hassan had both personal and business accounts with the Navy Federal Credit Union
NFCU). NFCU apparently notified Hassan that he did not qualify to be a member and needed
to close his accounts. On November 15, 2012, Hassan came into the Bremerton branch, closed
his accounts, and withdrew all the funds that had been in those accounts. Hassan subsequently
opened business and personal checking and savings accounts at O' Bee Credit Union.
On December 29, Hassan deposited a $ 2, 450 check payable to himself drawn on a closed
NFCU account into his O' Bee personal checking account. O' Bee allowed $ 1, 000 of that amount
to be immediately available for Hassan' s use based on the assumption that it would clear the
account. Immediately after depositing the check Hassan made a $ 500 cash withdrawal. Also
that same day he made a $ 302 ATM (automatic teller machine) withdrawal.
On December 31, Hassan deposited a $ 955 check payable to himself drawn on a closed
NFCU account into his O' Bee personal checking account. O' Bee allowed the entire amount to
be immediately available for Hassan' s use. That same day, Hassan made a $ 600 ATM
withdrawal and a $ 160 debit card withdrawal. Both the December 29 and December 31 NFCU
checks were returned to O' Bee unpaid because the NFCU account was closed.
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On January 4, 2013, Hassan gave an $ 875 check drawn on a closed NFCU account to
Rene Cavallo, the on -site manager of the Capitol Club Apartments, for his January rent. The
check did not clear because it was written on a closed account.
On January 12, Hassan told his friend Tiffany Gilpin that he would loan her $ 1, 000 to
help repair her car. On January 14, Hassan gave her a $ 2,400 check drawn on the closed NFCU
account. He asked her to deposit the check in her account, and then immediately withdraw
1, 400 to give to him because it was an easier way for him to get cash than to go to his bank. As
requested, Gilpin deposited the check in her account, withdrew $ 1, 400, and gave that money to
Hassan. Hassan' s check did not clear.
The State charged Hassan with two counts of second degree theft for the two checks
deposited in his O' Bee account, and with two counts of UIBC for the checks written to Capitol
Club Apartments and Gilpin. A jury convicted Hassan on all counts. At the sentencing hearing,
Hassan objected to the State' s request for $2, 400 in restitution to Gilpin, claiming only that
Hassan had repaid $400 to her. The trial court ordered Hassan to pay the full $2, 400. Hassan
appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. ADEQUACY OF SECOND DEGREE THEFT INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS
Hassan argues that the information charging the two second degree thefts was inadequate
because it did not identify aggregation of multiple theft incidents based on a common scheme or
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plan as an essential element of the crime.' He claims that the State had to aggregate the amounts
from multiple transactions to reach the $ 750 value for second degree theft, and therefore it had to
identify aggregation as an element of the crime in the information. Similarly, Hassan argues that
the trial court' s to- convict instructions for the second degree theft charges were inadequate
because they did not impose on the State the burden of showing the aggregation of multiple
transactions as part of a common scheme or plan.2 We hold that the amount of money under
Hassan' s control after he deposited the checks, and not the amount of money he withdrew,
determines whether he reached the $ 750 value threshold for second degree theft.
Former RCW 9A. 56. 040( 1)( a) ( 2012) 3 provides that second degree theft constitutes the
theft of property or services exceeding $ 750 in value but not exceeding $ 5, 000 in value. Under
RCW 9A.56. 010( 21)( c), the State can aggregate a series of transactions that constitute theft in
one count and use the aggregate value of the transactions in determining the degree of theft.
However, aggregation is permitted only if the State can show that the transactions are part of a
criminal episode or a common scheme or plan. RCW 9A.56. 010( 21)( c). If the State aggregates
value to reach a statutory value threshold, a common scheme or plan is an essential element of a
1 The information for both second degree theft counts stated that Hassan " did by color or aid of
deception, obtained [ sic] control over the property or services of another or the value thereof,
with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services, the value of which exceeds seven
hundred and fifty dollars ($ 750. 00)." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 2 -3
2
The to- convict instructions for both second degree theft counts stated in part: "( 1) That ... the
defendant by color or aid of deception, obtained control over property of another or the value
thereof; and ( 2) That the property exceeded $ 750 in value; [ and] ( 3) That the defendant intended
to deprive the other person of the property." CP at 36 -37.
3 RCW 9A.56. 040 was amended in 2013, but this amendment did not affect the subsection cited.
LAws OF 2013, ch. 322, § 3.
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crime that must be included in the information and in the to- convict instruction. See State v.
Rivas, 168 Wn. App. 882 -90, 278 P. 3d 686 ( 2012), review denied, 176 Wn.2d 1007 ( 2013)
applying rule to second degree malicious mischief charge).
Hassan argues that the only way the State could meet the $ 750 threshold for second
degree theft was to aggregate the $ 500 and $ 302 withdrawals based on the first deposit and the
600 and $ 160 withdrawals, based on the second deposit. In contrast, the State argues that it did
not need to aggregate Hassan' s withdrawals in order to reach the $750 value threshold because
Hassan had the ability to immediately withdraw up to $ 1, 000 based on his deposit of the first
check and up to $ 955 based on his deposit of the second check.4 The issue is when the defendant
fraudulently deposits a bad check in his own bank account, whether the value of the transaction
is based on the amount immediately available for withdrawal or on the amount the defendant
actually withdraws.
The State charged Hassan with second degree theft under RCW 9A. 56. 020( 1)( b), which
defines theft as:
By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or services of another or
the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services.
Emphasis added). RCW 9A.56. 010( 10)( a) defines " obtain control over" as " to bring about a
transfer or purported transfer to the obtainer or another of a legally recognized interest in the
property."
4 The State made this argument at trial, and it did not argue that the jury needed to aggregate the
individual withdrawals to reach the $750 threshold for second degree theft. However, the trial
court did give an aggregation instruction. The record does not explain why the trial court gave
this instruction.
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In interpreting statutory language, we give effect to the plain meaning of that language.
State v. Ervin, 169 Wn. 2d 815, 820, 239 P. 3d 354 ( 2010). Based on the plain language of RCW
9A.56. 020( 1)( b) and RCW 9A.56. 010( 10)( a), we hold that the amount immediately available to
the defendant after depositing a bad check into his bank account determines the value of the theft
transaction. Here, by depositing the checks in his bank accounts Hassan obtained immediate
control" over $ 1, 000 for the first deposit and $ 955 for the second deposit —the funds were
transferred" to his account and he was free to withdraw those full amounts. His deposits of
these checks and his acceptance of this control knowing that he did not have money to cover the
amounts were the criminal acts. That Hassan actually withdrew lesser amounts does not affect
the fact that he had control over more.
The amount under Hassan' s control was $ 1, 000 after depositing the first check and $ 955
after depositing the second check. Accordingly, because the State did not need to use
aggregation to reach the $ 750 threshold, the information and the to- convict instructions for the
second degree theft charges did not need to reference aggregation based on a common scheme or
plan. As a result, we hold that the information was not deficient and the to- convict instructions
did not fail to state an essential element of the crime.
B. ADEQUACY OF THE UIBC To- CONVICT INSTRUCTIONS
Hassan argues that the trial court' s to- convict instructions for the two UIBC charges
omitted an essential element of the offense: that the check be drawn on a bank or other
depository for the payment of money. He also claims that the to- convict instructions and the
instruction defining the crime irreconcilably conflict because the definitional instruction does
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contain the language omitted from the to- convict instructions. We hold that any error in the to-
convict instructions was harmless, and disagree that the instructions conflict.
We review the adequacy of jury instructions de novo. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor,
170 Wn.2d 628, 635, 244 P. 3d 924 ( 2010). A trial court' s failure to instruct the jury as to every
element of the charged crime violates due process. Rivas, 168 Wn. App. at 891. Such a failing
constitutes reversible error. State v. Mills, 154 Wn. 2d 1, 6 -7, 109 P. 3d 415 ( 2005). Hassan did
not object to the instructions at trial, but challenges to instructions that omit an element of the
crime charged can be raised for the first time on appeal under RAP 2. 5( a)( 3). See State v.
O' Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 101, 217 P. 3d 756 ( 2009).
Hassan first argues that the trial court' s to- convict instructions for the two UIBC charges
omitted an essential element of the offense: that the check be drawn on a bank or other
depository for the payment of money. RCW 9A.56. 060( 1) provides:
Any person who shall with intent to defraud, make, or draw, or utter, or deliver to
another person any check, or draft, on a bank or other depository for the payment
ofmoney, knowing at the time of such drawing, or delivery, that he or she has not
sufficient funds in, or credit with the bank or other depository, to meet the check
or draft, in full upon its presentation, is guilty of unlawful issuance of bank check.
Emphasis added). The trial court omitted the first italicized portion but included the second
italicized portion from the to- convict instructions, both of which provided:
1) That on or about [ date], the defendant, acting with intent to defraud, made or
delivered a check or draft to another person;
2) That said check or draft was in,an amount greater than $750;
3) That at the time of such making or delivery the defendant knew that he did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank or depository to meet the check
or draft in full upon its presentation; and
4) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
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Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 34, 35. These instructions followed WPIC 73. 02, which does not include
the statutory phrase " on a bank or other depository for the payment of money" in the first
element. 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
73. 02, at 115 -116 ( 3d ed. 2008 and Supp. 2011).
We need not determine whether the to- convict instructions omitted an essential element
of UIBC because even assuming that the instructions were defective, the error was harmless.
Where a to- convict instruction omits an essential element of a crime, it is constitutionally
defective unless the State can demonstrate that the omission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330, 339 -41, 58 P. 3d 889 ( 2002). In this context, the error is
harmless if uncontroverted evidence supports the omitted element. Brown, 147 Wn.2d at 341.
Here, the uncontroverted evidence showed that the checks Hassan delivered to the
apartment manager and Gilpin were drawn on a bank or other depository for the payment of
money. Hassan did not contest this fact. Further, the third element of the to- convict instructions
required the State to prove that Hassan delivered the checks knowing that he did not have
sufficient funds or credit with the bank or depository to meet the checks or drafts in full upon
presentation. The jury would have understood from this provision that the checks had to be
drawn on a bank or other depository.
Second, Hassan claims that the to- convict instructions and the definitional instruction
irreconcilably conflict because the definitional instruction contains the language omitted from
the.first element of the to- convict instructions. We disagree that the to- convict instructions
conflicted with the instruction defining the crime. Instruction 9 stated:
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A person commits the crime of unlawful issuance of a bank check when, with intent to
defraud, he or she makes or delivers to another person any check or draft in an amount
greater than $750 on a bank or other depository for the payment of money, and the person
knows at the time of such making or delivery that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the bank or other depository, to meet the check or draft, in full, upon its
presentation.
CP at 35 ( emphasis added). This instruction included the statutory language omitted from the to-
convict instructions.
When the trial court provides inconsistent instructions to the jury, we review them to
determine whether the inconsistency results in a clear misstatement of the law and, if so, we
presume the instructions misled the jury and prejudiced the defendant. State v. Walden, 131
Wn.2d 469, 478, 932 P. 2d 1237 ( 1997). But here there was no inconsistency. Although the
phrase " on a bank or other depository for the payment of money" was omitted from the first
element listed in the to- convict instructions, it was included in the third element. And nothing in
those instructions conflicted with the phrase " on a bank or other depository for the payment of
money" in instruction 9,
We reject Hassan' s arguments that the trial court' s UIBC jury instructions require a new
trial.
C. RESTITUTION
Hassan argues that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution to Gilpin at
2, 400 because Gilpin' s only loss was the $ 1, 400 she gave to him, and that amount should have
been further reduced because he repaid her $400. He also claims that trial counsel' s failure to
object to the additional $ 1, 000 in restitution denied him his right to effective assistance of
counsel. We do not directly address the amount of restitution other than the disputed $400
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because Hassan did not object below, but hold that his defense counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the additional $ 1, 000 in restitution based on Hassan' s loan to Gilpin.
1. Restitution Amount
We review a sentencing court' s restitution award for an abuse of discretion. State v.,
Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P. 3d 506 ( 2008). A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. State v. Sisouvanh, 175
Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P. 3d 942 ( 2012).
The evidence at trial showed that Gilpin suffered a loss of at least $ 1, 400, the amount in
cash she gave Hassan after she deposited his $2, 400 check. Gilpin testified that she asked
Hassan for her money back but he did not give the money back to her. Hassan claims that he
repaid $400, and Gilpin testified that Hassan did give her $400 at some unstated time. But the
trial court reasonably could have interpreted Gilpin' s testimony as stating that the $ 400 payment
occurred before the incident.
With regard to the additional $ 1, 000 in restitution the trial court ordered, Hassan did not
object at the time of sentencing and therefore did not preserve this issue for appeal. Accordingly,
do the amount of restitution on appeal under RAP 2. 5( a). However, we
we not directly address
do address this issue below under Hassan' s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A defendant has the right to counsel at a restitution hearing. State v. Milton, 160 Wn.
App. 656, 657, 252 P. 3d 380 ( 2011). Hassan argues that his counsel' s failure to challenge the
2, 400 restitution award at trial denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel. We
agree.
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To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show both
that ( 1) defense counsel' s representation was deficient, and ( 2) the deficient representation
prejudiced the defendant. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32 -33, 246 P. 3d 1260 ( 2011).
Representation is deficient if after considering all the circumstances, it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 34. Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable
probability that except for counsel' s errors, the result of the proceeding would have differed.
Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 34.
Unless a defendant agrees to the restitution amount, the State must prove the losses by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Tobin, 161 Wn.2d 517, 524, 166 P. 3d 1167 ( 2007).
Here, the State proved that Gilpin suffered a loss of $1, 400. But there is nothing in the record
supporting the trial court' s conclusion that Gilpin suffered a loss relating to the $ 1, 000 she
deposited in her account and did not pay to Hassan in cash. Gilpin admitted that this amount was
a loan, not money that Hassan owed to her. And there is no evidence that Gilpin suffered any
loss due to the $ 1, 000 loan she thought she was receiving not materializing. Therefore, the State
failed to the that Gilpin incurred more than a $ 1, 400 loss.
prove by a preponderance of evidence
Because there was no evidence to support a $ 2, 400 restitution award, counsel should
have objected to that award. And there was no conceivable tactical reason not to object.
Accordingly, defense counsel was deficient in this respect. Further, defense counsel' s failure to
object prejudiced Hassan because if counsel had pointed out the State' s failure to sustain its
burden of proving an additional $ 1, 000 loss, the trial court would have declined to include that
amount in its restitution award.. Accordingly, we hold that defense counsel' s representation was
ineffective regarding the restitution award.
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The record shows that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $2,400 in
restitution rather than $ 1, 400. Therefore, We remand for correction of the restitution order to
reduce the amount of restitution by $1, 000.
We affirm Hassan' s convictions but remand for correction of the restitution order.
We concur:
W ZSWICK, P. J.
LEE, J.
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