In Re Dep Of V.w., Dob: 10/6/05 Felicia Kirkland, App. v. Dshs, Resp. ( 2016 )


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  •       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    In the Matter of the Dependency of                No. 73000-2-I
    (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1,
    V.W. (DOB: 10/06/05);                             73002-9-1, 73003-7-1, 73004-5-1,
    I.W. (DOB: 05/20/07);                             73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, 73007-0-1)
    K.W. (DOB: 09/12/08); and
    P.K. (DOB: 05/18/11),                             DIVISION ONE
    Minor Children.
    FELICIA KIRKLAND,                                 UNPUBLISHED
    Appellant,                   FILED: January 19, 2016
    v.
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
    HEALTH SERVICES,                                                                  UD
    Respondent.
    CO
    COX, J. - Felicia Kirkland appeals the trial court order terminating her
    parental rights to P.K., K.W., I.W., and V.W. She contends that the trial court
    committed reversible error by failing to include on the termination order a
    statement addressing sibling relationships in accordance with RCW
    13.34.200(3). She also argues that the statutory "best interests of the child"
    standard in RCW 13.34.190 is unconstitutionally vague. But Kirkland fails to
    demonstrate any prejudice from the trial court's alleged failure to address sibling
    relationships or that the best interests standard is unconstitutional as applied to
    the facts of her case. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1,
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/2
    The relevant facts are unchallenged on appeal. Felicia Kirkland is the
    mother of P.K. (born 2011), K.W. (born 2008), I.W. (born 2007), and V.W. (born
    2005). During 2010 and 2011, the trial court found all four children dependent as
    to Kirkland based on concerns about her drug use, erratic behavior, mental
    health issues, neglect of the children, periods of incarceration, and failure to
    comply with court-ordered substance abuse treatment. Among other things, the
    dispositional orders required Kirkland to participate in mental health counseling, a
    parenting assessment and parenting coaching, random urinalysis, and
    consultation with a public health nurse.
    The Department of Social and Health Services (Department) offered
    Kirkland numerous services designed to address her parental deficiencies,
    including mental health counseling, a parenting assessment and extensive
    parenting coaching, Parent Child Interactive Therapy (PCIT), a foster care
    assistance program for child reunification, rental assistance, and various in-home
    services.   In 2012, the Department found that Kirkland had made sufficient
    progress to return the children to her care.
    The Department removed the children again in February 2013, after an
    incident in which Kirkland threatened to shoot several people at a gas station.
    Kirkland's participation in services diminished, she visited the children only
    intermittently, and her behavior became increasingly volatile. Kirkland's
    outbursts of anger and unpredictable behavior severely affected the children's
    -2-
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1,
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/3
    emotional stability. The Department petitioned for termination of Kirkland's
    parental rights. Following an eight-day trial in July 2014, the court found that
    despite years of services, Kirkland had been unable to correct her parenting
    deficiencies and that her inability to regulate her mental condition prevented her
    from providing a safe and healthy environment for the children. The court
    concluded that the Department had proved the six statutory termination factors in
    RCW 13.34.180 by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,1 and that termination
    was in the children's best interests.2
    Kirkland appeals.
    RCW 13.34.200(3) and Sibling Relationships
    Kirkland contends that the termination order must be reversed because
    the trial court failed to include a statement addressing the children's sibling
    relationships in accordance with RCW 13.34.200(3). RCW 13.34.200(3)
    provides that "[a]n order terminating the parent-child relationship shall include a
    statement addressing the status of the child's sibling relationships and the nature
    1 Under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(a)-(f), the court must determine by clear, cogent, and
    convincing evidence that: (1) the child is dependent, (2) the court has entered a
    dispositional order, (3) the child has been removed from the parent's custody for at least
    six months pursuant to a dependency finding, (4) all necessary services which could
    correct the parental deficiencies have been offered, (5) there is little likelihood that the
    parental condition can be remedied in the near future, and (6) continuation of the parent
    and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a
    stable and permanent home.
    2 See RCW 13.34.190(1 )(b). The court also terminated the parental rights of Ira
    Washington, the father of three of the children.
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/4
    and extent of sibling placement, contact, or visits."3 This provision reflects the
    legislature's intent
    to recognize the importance of emotional ties formed by siblings
    with each other, especially in those circumstances which warrant
    court intervention into family relationships. It is the intent of the
    legislature to encourage the courts and public agencies which deal
    with families to acknowledge and give thoughtful consideration to
    the quality and nature of sibling relationships when intervening in
    family relationships. It is not the intent of the legislature to create
    legal obligations or responsibilities between siblings and other
    family members whether by blood or marriage, step families, foster
    families, or adopted families that do not already exist. Neither is it
    the intent of the legislature to mandate sibling placement, contact,
    or visitation if there is reasonable cause to believe that the health,
    safety, or welfare of a child or siblings would be jeopardized.
    Finally, it is not the intent of the legislature to manufacture or
    anticipate family relationships which do not exist at the time of the
    court intervention, or to disrupt already existing positive family
    relationships."141
    Contrary to Kirkland's allegations, the trial court's extensive written
    findings of fact included specific information about the nature and quality of
    sibling relationships, contacts, and placements. Among other things, the findings
    identified all of Kirkland's six children and the nature of their current placements.
    Kirkland's parental rights to her two older children, who are 17 and 15, were
    terminated shortly after they were born. The maternal grandmother adopted both
    of these children, who were serving sentences as juvenile offenders at the time
    of the termination trial. The trial court noted conflicting evidence on whether the
    3 (Emphasis added.) In its trial brief, the State acknowledged that compliance with
    RCW 13.34.200(3) is mandatory.
    4 In re Welfare of A.G.. 
    155 Wn. App. 578
    , 596-97, 
    229 P.3d 935
     (2010) (quoting
    Laws of 2003, ch. 227, § 1), review granted and reversed on other grounds following
    remand. 
    160 Wn. App. 841
    , 
    248 P.3d 611
     (2011).
    -4-
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1,
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/5
    two older children posed a risk to the younger children. The findings also
    document the mother's inconsistent, hostile, and chaotic visits with the four
    younger children, which left them angry, upset, and in need of stabilizing
    relationships.
    Kirkland's arguments suggest that RCW 13.34.200(3) mandates a
    separate and discrete entry about sibling relationships on the termination order.
    Although a separate statement may be the preferred approach, the statute does
    not direct the trial court to follow any specific format. Kirkland does not address
    the trial court's written findings on sibling relationships or argue that they are
    insufficient to satisfy the spirit, if not the letter, of RCW 13.34.200(3).
    But even if the termination order failed to comply with RCW 13.34.200(3),
    Kirkland has not cited any authority supporting her request for automatic
    reversal. The trial court concluded that the Department had established the six
    statutory termination factors in RCW 13.34.180(1 )(a)-(f) by clear, cogent, and
    convincing evidence, and that termination was in the children's best interest.5 On
    appeal, Kirkland has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    these conclusions. Nor has she alleged that the failure to comply with RCW
    13.34.200(3) affected the court's assessment of the evidence to support the
    statutory termination factors or the decision to terminate her parental rights.
    5 See RCW 13.34.190.
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1,
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/6
    Because Kirkland fails to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged
    error, reversal of the termination order is not warranted.6
    Due Process and RCW 13.34.190
    Kirkland also contends that RCW 13.34.190, which requires the trial court
    to find that termination is in the "best interests of the child,"7 is unconstitutionally
    vague. She argues that the statute violates due process because it provides no
    guidelines to reduce the risk of arbitrary application.
    An appellate court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de novo.8 The
    statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the
    presumption bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    statute is unconstitutional.9
    When considering a vagueness challenge, the court first determines "if the
    statute in question is to be examined as applied to the particular case or to be
    reviewed on its face."10 But a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not
    involve First Amendment rights must be evaluated "in light of the particular facts
    of each case."11
    6 See Thomas v. French. 
    99 Wn.2d 95
    , 104, 
    659 P.2d 1097
     (1983) (error without
    prejudice is not grounds for reversal). In light of our decision, we need not address the
    State's contention that Kirkland failed to preserve the alleged error for review.
    7 RCW 13.34.190(1 )(b).
    8 In re Dependency of K.R.. 128Wn.2d 129, 142, 
    904 P.2d 1132
     (1995).
    9 In re Welfare of A.W.. 
    182 Wn.2d 689
    , 701, 
    344 P.3d 1186
    (2015).
    10 Citv of Spokane v. Douglass. 115Wn.2d 171, 181-82, 
    795 P.2d 693
     (1990).
    11 Id. at 182.
    No. 73000-2-1 (consolidated with Nos. 73001-1-1, 73002-9-1, 73003-7-1,
    73004-5-1, 73005-3-1, 73006-1-1, and 73007-0-l)/7
    Termination proceedings do not involve First Amendment rights.12
    Kirkland makes no meaningful argument that the "best interests" standard is
    vague as applied to the facts of her case. Because Kirkland's challenge to RCW
    13.34.190 is purely facial, we decline to consider it.13 Kirkland has failed to
    satisfy her burden of proving that the statute is unconstitutional.
    We affirm the order terminating Kirkland's parental rights.
    &5%J-
    WE CONCUR:
    12 See In re Welfare of H.S.. 
    94 Wn. App. 511
    , 524, 
    973 P.2d 474
     (1999)
    (vagueness challenge to RCW 13.34.180(5)); In re Dependency of C.B.. 
    79 Wn. App. 686
    , 689, 
    904 P.2d 1171
     (1995) (challenge to former RCW 13.34.190(2)).
    13 See Douglass. 
    115 Wn.2d at 182
    .