Sara & Cameron Monte, V Clark County ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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SARA MONTE and CAMERON No. 76031-9-1
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MONTE, husband and wife and the
marital community comprised thereof, -a I—
CLARA MONTE, a minor child, and P -t) rri
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GRACE MONTE, a minor child through ▪r—
their guardians ad litem, Sara Monte Z-j cr)
and Cameron Monte. CD
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Appellants,
DIVISION ONE
V.
CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON, a
political subdivision of the State of
Washington and ANTHONY GOLIK,
elected Prosecuting Attorney for Clark UNPUBLISHED OPINION
County,
Respondents. FILED: January 17, 2017
MANN, J. — Sara Monte and her husband Cameron Monte sued Clark County
and its prosecuting attorney for; (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; and (3) outrage
stemming from a 2014 arrest of Sara Monte for attempted murder of her daughter C.M.
The trial court granted summary judgment based on the claim that the prosecutor's
office had absolute immunity from liability for Monte's arrest. Because there is a dispute
No. 76031-9-1/2
of material fact as to whether the prosecutor's office was acting within the scope of its
normal prosecutorial function, we reverse.
FACTS
In November 2010, Sara Monte suffered an acute psychotic episode during
which she tried to suffocate her daughter, C.M. While delusional and hallucinating,
Monte placed her hand over her daughter's mouth and pinched her nose in an attempt
to suffocate the child out of a belief that in order for her daughter to survive she needed
to die. Monte then wandered naked in the snow to her neighbor's house where Clark
County sheriff's deputies later found her. When the deputies found Monte, she
"appeared to be confused and. . . startled." She did not know why she was at her
neighbor's house. The deputies did not arrest Monte. Instead, an ambulance
transported Monte to Legacy Salmon Creek Hospital where she was held for an
involuntary medical evaluation and released.
Between November 2010 and February 2011, Monte's case was referred to Child
Protective Services (CPS) and Detective Barry Folsom of the Clark County sheriffs
office. Monte admitted to a CPS social worker that "[she] felt that in order to let [C.M.]
live, [Monte] needed to kill her" and that "[Monte] plugged [C.M.'s] nose and put [her]
hand over [C.M.'s] mouth." Detective Folsom investigated the incident and referred the
case to the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office in February 2011.
In February 2011, CPS brought a dependency action and removed Monte's two
children. As a condition of the dependency, Monte underwent treatment. Over the next
year, Monte addressed her mental illness, and on April 10, 2012, the dependency was
1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 250.
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dismissed. The Clark County Prosecutor's Office was aware that the dependency was
dismissed and that Monte was reunited with her children. The prosecutor's office did
not object to the dismissal.
In July 2013, Scott Jackson, the Chief Criminal Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for
Clark County, took over as team leader of the County's Children's Justice Center (CJC)
and reviewed Monte's case again as part of "cold intake." In September 2013, Jackson
brought Monte's case forward to a multidisciplinary team meeting at the CJC to
determine what action should be taken on Monte's case. At the September 19, 2013,
meeting, Jackson summarized that "everyone in the room was requesting Monte be
arrested on this matter."
On October 5, 2013, Jackson informed Detective Folsom and Vancouver Police
Investigator Barbara Kipp that the prosecutor's office was "ready to file Attempted
Murder 1" against Monte. In an e-mail, Jackson asked how Kipp wanted to bring Monte
in:
"I assume [Kipp] may want to do a PC arrest. If not, then we will need a
PC affidavit for a summons. Please let me know which way you want to
proceed,p181 Wash. 2d 775, 783, 336 P.3d 1142 (2014). In reviewing a summary judgment
order, we engage in the same inquiry as a trial court. Lyons, 181 Wash. 2d at 783
(quotations omitted). We interpret all of the facts and inferences therefrom in favor of
the Montes, the nonmoving party. Lyons, 181 Wash. 2d at 783. "Summary judgment is
appropriate only if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." j_vons, 181 Wash. 2d
at 783.
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It is well established that a prosecutor acting within the scope of his or her duties
in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is absolutely immune from liability.
Tanner v. Citv of Federal Way, 100 Wash. App. 1, 4, 997 P.2d 932 (2000) (citing Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)). Absolute
immunity protects prosecutors from liability even where willful misconduct is alleged.
Musso-Escude v. Edwards, 101 Wash. App. 560, 568, 4 P.3d 151 (2000); McCarthy v.
Clark County, 193 Wash. App. 314, 336-37, 376 P.3d 1127 (2016). Whether a prosecutor
enjoys absolute immunity depends on the nature of the function performed. Tanner,
100 Wash. App. at 4 (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126, 119 S. Ct. 502, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 471 (1997)). A prosecutor's absolute immunity applies only when the actions fall
"within the scope of traditional prosecutorial functions." McCarthy, 193 Wash. App. at 337.
Prosecutorial functions are those "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process," in which the prosecutor is acting as "an officer of the court." Lacey
v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341, 342, 129 S. Ct. 855, 172 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2009)).
A prosecutor is not immune for actions taken outside of the judicial phase of the
criminal process. Actions "normally performed by a detective or a police officer" fall
outside of absolute immunity's scope. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113
S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993). For example, providing legal advice to the police
falls outside of absolute immunity's scope. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495-96,
111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991). Similarly, ordering arrests or advising those
making arrests are not prosecutorial functions. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914.
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A.
The Montes argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and
dismissing their complaint. They claim that Jackson was not entitled to absolute
immunity when his office directed Kipp to arrest Monte without a summons and prior to
the probable cause hearing.
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Montes, the e-mail
exchange between Kipp and Jackson's office demonstrates that Jackson's office
directed the arresting officers how to proceed with Monte's arrest. Two days before
Monte was arrested, Harris, the arresting officer, asked Kipp how to proceed with the
arrest. Kipp e-mailed Jackson's office, to ask if Jackson wanted Monte "summons or
arrested." Jackson's legal assistant responded that Monte should be arrested because
"[t]he child is living with [Monte] so there was fear with summonsing her in." We agree
with the Montes that the exchange raised at least a question of material fact precluding
summary judgment. Advising law enforcement about how Monte was to be
apprehended was not a prosecutorial function for which Jackson is entitled to absolute
immunity. To the extent that Jackson advised or directed Monte's arrest, he may not be
entitled to absolute immunity.
B.
The County argues that Jackson did not give legal advice to the law enforcement
officers in this case. They claim first that the record demonstrates that Jackson left the
method of arrest up to Kipp and Folson. In support, the County asserts that a "follow-
up" email, after the April 22, 2014, exchange between Jackson's office and Kipp, made
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clear that Jackson was asking Kipp and Folsom how they would like to proceed with the
arrest. But the referenced "follow up" e-mail occurred in November 2013—five months
prior to Jackson's office directing Kipp to arrest without a summons.8 The County
claims second that the April 2014 e-mail from Jackson's office to Kipp "merely
communicated a concern about how the arrest would be accomplished based on
legitimate concerns about [Monte] disappearing, or harming her daughter again." But
directing "how an arrest would be accomplished"8 is not a function "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," in which the prosecutor is
acting as "an officer of the court." Lacey, 693 F.3d at 913 (quoting Van de Kamp, 555
U.S. at 341, 342).
Here, Kipp asked Jackson how he wanted Monte apprehended. This implies that
Jackson was advising law enforcement on how to apprehend Monte. Jackson is not
entitled to immunity for these actions because neither advising nor ordering a suspect's
apprehension are prosecutorial functions. To the extent that Jackson directed Kipp
about how to apprehend Monte, he is not entitled to absolute immunity for his action's
consequences.
The County argues that McCarthy v. Clark County supports their position. But
McCarthy is distinguishable. In McCarthy, Division Two of this court found that that an
assistant city attorney did not act outside the scope of her duties as a prosecutor when
she investigated a child abuse allegation. 193 Wash. App. 314, 339-40, 376 P.3d 1127
(2016). In McCarthy, the city prosecutor asked a witness to secure records from a
8 CP at 160.
9 Br. of Resp't. at 12-13.
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fitness club to show that the witness's then-husband violated a no-contact order. 193
Wash. App. at 339. The prosecutor asked for more records so that she could bolster her
existing charges against the then-husband. McCarthy, 193 Wash. App. at 338-39. The
court held that the prosecutor did not act outside of her scope as a prosecutor because
her actions (asking for the fitness club records and directing the witness to report no-
contact order violations) were related to her duty to make charging decisions. McCarthy,
193 Wash. App. at 339.
In this case, however, the April 22, 2014, e-mail exchange between Jackson's
office and Kipp was not related to a charging decision. Jackson had already told Kipp
on October 5, 2013, that he was "ready to file Attempted Murder 1" against Monte.
Thus, unlike in McCarthy, the April 22, 2014, e-mail from Jackson's office to Kipp was
not related to a charging decision. The e-mail advised law enforcement how to
apprehend Monte (summons versus arrest).
Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to the Montes, there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Jackson advised Monte's arrest, an action for
which Jackson does not enjoy absolute immunity. We reverse.
tetAiqi
WE CONCUR:
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