Donnie Durrett v. Stephen Sinclair ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DONNIEDURRETT,
No. 78246-1-I
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
v.
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STEPHAN SINCLAIR,
)
and )
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
STATE OF WASHINGTON, a )
government entity. )
Respondent. )
__________________________________ ) FILED: July 29, 2019
HAzELRIGG-HERNANDEz, J. — Donnie Durrett appeals a trial court order
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims the Department of
Corrections (DOC) failed to comply with the terms of his 2011 judgment and
sentence by refusing to run the community custody portion of an earlier sentence
concurrently with the confinement imposed in the 2011 cause. But community
custody must be served in the community following a term of confinement, if
confinement is ordered. And the statute required the DOC to toll Durrett’s
outstanding community custody during his confinement for the later offense. We
affirm.
No. 78246-1-1/2
FACTS
In 2007, a jury convicted Donnie Durrett of two counts of failure to register
as a sex offender. The court imposed concurrent terms of 43 months to be
followed by a variable term of community custody. After Durrett’s successful
appeal, the court resentenced him on a single count of failure to register on
October 21, 2011. The court again imposed a sentence of 43 months of
confinement and clarified that the term of confinement in conjunction with
community custody could not exceed the statutory maximum of 60 months.1
In a separate proceeding, on October 25, 2011, a jury convicted Durrett on
a new charge of failure to register, committed between November 2, 2009 and
January 29, 2010. On December 9, 2011, the court imposed an exceptional
sentence, based on the parties’ stipulation, of 60 months, the statutory maximum,
with no community custody. Durrett’s purpose in stipulating to the exceptional
sentence was to avoid serving community custody upon his release. At the
request of the defense, the court ordered the 2011 sentence to run concurrently
with the previous 2007 cause. Defense counsel explained that she was
uncertain whether Durrett had any confinement time remaining on the 2007
cause, and wanted to avoid “confusion” following the recent remand for
resentencing on the 2007 cause.2 In fact, Durrett completed serving the term of
1 Following a second appeal, in December 2012, the court amended the
term of community custody to 17 months.
2 Based on her recollection of the file, the prosecutor believed Durrett had
served the confinement portion of the sentence imposed on the 2007 cause and
Durrett confirmed that he had only community custody remaining.
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confinement on the 2007 matter and had been released to community custody
two years earlier, on September 8, 2009.~
The DCC again released Durrett from its custody in 2015. The DCC then
took the position that while Durrett was not subject to supervision on the 2011
cause, he had remaining community custody time and was subject to supervision
on the earlier 2007 cause.
Durrett filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in King County Superior
Court. The trial court dismissed the petition.4
DISCUSSION
A person may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court to
challenge the lawfulness of government restraint. RCW 7.36 .010; In re Pers.
Restraint of Becker, 96 Wash. App. 902, 903, 982 P.2d 639 (1999), affd, 143
Wash. 2d 491, 20 P.3d 409 (2001). RCW 7.36.010 provides, “Every person
restrained of his or her liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ
of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered
therefrom when illegal.” We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for habeas
~ As Durrett implicitly acknowledges, because he was serving community
custody on the 2007 matter when he committed the new offense of failure to
register, the court lacked authority to impose a concurrent sentence under RCW
9.94A.589 (2)(a), however, the DCC did not file a petition to correct the sentence.
See 9.94A.585(7).
~ The trial court dismissed Durrett’s petition for a writ with prejudice on the
merits. Likewise, we resolve his appeal on the merits and do not address the
State’s request to dismiss the appeal based on the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine. See City of Seattle v. Klein, 161 Wash. 2d 554, 559, 166 P.3d 1149 (2007)
(doctrine applying presumption that defendant in criminal appeal who files an
appeal and flees the jurisdiction forfeits right to pursue appeal)
3
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corpus for an abuse of discretion. Fathers v. Smith, 25 Wash. 2d 896, 899-900, 171
P.2d 1012 (1946).
As he argued below, Durrett claims the trial court ordered his sentence on
the 2011 cause to run concurrently with the remaining portion of his 17-month
term of community custody on the 2007 cause. And because he served more
than 17 months in custody on the 2011 offense, the DCC had no authority to
supervise him once it released him from custody in 2015. He claims that by
tolling community custody while he served the sentence imposed on the 2011
cause, the DCC failed to comply with the terms of the 2011 sentence.
Durrett’s claim fails for several reasons. First, because Durrett had
outstanding community custody on the 2007 cause when he was confined on the
2011 cause, the DCC was required by statute to toll the remaining community
custody. RCW 9.94A.171(3)(a) provides, in relevant part:
[A}ny period of community custody shall be tolled during any period of time
the offender is in confinement for any reason unless the offender is
detained pursuant to RCW 9.94A.740 or 9.94A.631 for the period of time
prior to the hearing or for confinement pursuant to sanctions imposed for
violation of sentence conditions, in which case, the period of community
custody shall not toll.
The exceptions to the tolling requirement involving violation of conditions
of sentence do not apply here. The DCC, therefore, properly tolled Durrett’s
community custody in accordance with the statute.
Second, no authority supports Durrett’s position that imposition of a
concurrent sentence converted the community custody portion of Durrett’s prior
sentence into a period of confinement. Several provisions of the Sentencing
4
No. 78246-1-1/5
Reform Act (SRA)5 distinguish between periods of post-release supervision and
periods in confinement. Therefore, time spent in confinement cannot also be a
period of supervision under community custody. Durrett’s interpretation of
concurrent sentencing would eviscerate these provisions. For instance, RCW
9.94A.707(l), which applies to all sentences, provides that, “Community custody
shall begin: (a) Upon completion of the term of confinement; or (b) at the time of
sentencing if no term of confinement is ordered.”
The SRA defines “confinement” as “total or partial confinement.” RCW
9. 94A. 030(8).
“Partial confinement” means confinement for no more than one year in a
facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or any
other unit of government, or, if home detention, electronic monitoring, or
work crew has been ordered by the court or home detention has been
ordered by the department as part of the parenting program or the
graduated reentry program, in an approved residence, for a substantial
portion of each day with the balance of the day spent in the community.
Partial confinement includes work release, home detention, work crew,
electronic monitoring, and a combination of work crew, electronic
monitoring and home detention.
RCW 9.94.030(36).
“Total confinement” means confinement inside the physical boundaries of
a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or
any other unit of government for twenty-four hours a day, or pursuant to
RCW 72.64.050 and 72.64.060.
RCW 9.94A.030(52).
On the other hand, the SRA defines “community custody” as “that portion
of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release time or
imposed as part of a sentence under this chapter and served in the community
~ Chapter 9.94A RCW.
5
No. 78246-1-116
subject to controls placed on the offender’s movement and activities by the
department.” RCW 9.94A.030(5) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jones is instructive. 172 Wash. 2d
236, 257 P.3d 616 (2011). In Jones, the court held that an offender who had
been confined longer than the original period of confinement (in that case, under
a void sentence) was not entitled to credit the excess time in confinement toward
an outstanding term of community custody. ki. at 245-46. The court reasoned
that allowing such a credit would conflict with the statute requiring tolling of
community custody during periods of confinement. ~ at 244-46; See former
RCW 9.94A.170(3) (1999). The court further reasoned that allowing such a
credit would contravene the SRA’s definition of “community custody” as the time
actually spent under supervision in the community. ki. at 244. The reasoning in
Jones applies here. Allowing Durrett to serve the community custody portion of
his sentence in confinement would defeat the legislature’s intent with respect to
these provisions.
Durrett points out that some individuals may serve the community custody
portion of their sentence in confinement. For instance, under RCW 9.94A.729(5),
when the DOC is unable to approve the individual’s release plan, it may refuse to
release that individual to community custody in lieu of earned early release time.
But these provisions involve offenders who do not become eligible for community
custody and clearly do not apply to Durrett, who was, in fact, eligible and
transferred to community custody before he was confined on the 2011 cause.
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No. 78246-1 -117
Finally, the DCC asked the court below to make a finding that Durrett’s
petition was frivolous for purposes of ROW 4.24.430, which provides that
individuals serving criminal sentences who have filed three or more lawsuits
deemed frivolous are not entitled to fee waivers. The trial court declined to make
such a finding in dismissing Durrett’s petition. Without a cross appeal or
reference to the court’s ruling below, the DCC again asks this court to find the
petition seeking a writ was a frivolous action and a “strike” for purposes of ROW
4.24.430. In these circumstances, while we affirm the trial court’s order
dismissing Durrett’s petition, we decline to make such a finding.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
}