State Of Washington v. Michael J. Brady ( 2020 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 22, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52120-2-II
Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL JOSEPH BRADY, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Michael J. Brady, an incarcerated offender, appeals the trial court’s order
denying his motion to remit his legal financial obligations (LFOs). Brady argues that the trial court
erred by retroactively applying RCW 10.73.160, which now provides that a defendant may move
to remit LFOs once released from total confinement, rather than “at any time,” as authorized under
the former statute. Former RCW 10.73.160 (2015). The State concedes that the trial court erred.
We accept the State’s concession and hold that the trial court erred by retroactively
applying amended RCW 10.73.160(4), and thus, we remand and order a hearing to determine
whether manifest hardship exists.
FACTS
Michael Brady has been incarcerated since 2002, and the earliest he will be released from
prison is June 2024. His discretionary LFOs total over $8000. Brady has consistently paid on his
LFOs throughout his incarceration.
No. 52120-2-II
Brady filed his motion to remit LFOs on May 29, 2018, under former RCW 10.73.160.1
At that time, former RCW 10.73.160(4) provided that “[a] defendant who has been sentenced to
pay costs and who is not in contumacious default in the payment may at any time petition the court
. . . .” LAWS OF 2015, ch. 265 § 22 (emphasis added). On June 7, 2018, the 2018 amendments to
RCW 10.73.160 became effective, which provide that a defendant may move to remit once
released from “total confinement.” LAWS of 2018, ch. 269 § 12. Brady also filed a motion to
dismiss interest on his restitution LFOs on June 26, 2018. The trial court denied both of Brady’s
motions, citing to the 2018 amended versions of the statutes.2
Brady appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to remit.
ANALYSIS
Brady argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his motion to remit his LFOs under
RCW 10.73.160(4). He argues that the trial court erred by retroactively applying the 2018
amendments rather than the former RCW 10.73.160(4) (2015). The State concedes the error and
agrees that a remand is necessary. We agree with Brady and accept the State’s concession and
hold that the trial court erred by retroactively applying the 2018 amendments to RCW 10.73.160(4)
when denying Brady’s motion to remit because the precipitating event that triggered his right to
relief occurred before the statue’s enactment.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Estate of Haviland, 177
Wash. 2d 68, 75, 301 P.3d 31 (2013). “Generally statutes are presumed to operate prospectively,
1
Brady first filed a motion to waive his LFOs on May 8, 2018. However, there is no indication
from the record how the court disposed of that motion.
2
The court cited to three statutes in its order: RCW 10.01.160(4); 10.82.090(2); and 10.73.160(4).
2
No. 52120-2-II
unless there is indication of legislative intent to the contrary.” State v. Blank, 131 Wash. 2d 230, 248,
930 P.2d 1213 (1997). “‘A statute operates prospectively when the precipitating event for [its]
application . . . occurs after the effective date of the statute.’” Blank, 131 Wash. 2d at 248 (alterations
in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 83
Wash. 2d 523, 535, 520 P.2d 162 (1974)).
RCW 10.73.160(4) (2018) states,
A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in contumacious
default in the payment may at any time after release from total confinement petition
the court that sentenced the defendant . . . for remission of the payment of costs or
of any unpaid portion.
(Emphasis added). The previous version of the statute allowed a defendant to move the court for
remission at any time. “A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in
contumacious default in the payment may at any time petition the court . . . for remission of the
payment of costs or of any unpaid portion.” Former RCW 10.73.160(4) (emphasis added).
Here, Brady incurred over $8000 in LFOs for numerous appeals and PRPs. On May 29,
2018, Brady moved the court to remit his LFOs pursuant to former RCW 10.73.160 (2015), the
applicable statute. The amended RCW did not become effective until June 7, 2018, and thus, that
statute did not apply when Brady filed his motion. Because the precipitating event—Brady filing
his motion—occurred before June 7, 2018, the effective date of the amendment, the trial court
erred by applying the statute retroactively to deny Brady’s motion to remit LFOs.3
3
Because we decide this issue on statutory grounds, we decline to reach Brady’s constitutional
arguments. State v. Gregory, 192 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 427 P.3d 621 (2018).
3
No. 52120-2-II
Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession and hold that the trial court erred by
retroactively applying amended RCW 10.73.160(4), and thus, we remand to the trial court to
conduct a hearing under former RCW 10.73.160.4
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
CRUSER, J.
4
The State asks us to decide the issue of whether to waive interest under RCW 10.82.090(2).
However, that issue is a matter for the trial court.
4