State Of Washington v. Joseph P. Stone ( 2020 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 19, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52233-1-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOSEPH P. STONE,
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Joseph Stone appeals his judgment and sentence, contending that the trial
court improperly imposed legal financial obligations (LFO) and two community custody
conditions. Stone argues that (1) the trial court was prohibited from ordering attachment of his
income if he misses a monthly LFO payment because his only source of income is his Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) prohibits state courts from
ordering a defendant to pay mandatory LFOs if his only income is SSDI benefits, and (3) the
supervisory assessment fee is a discretionary LFO which should not have been imposed because
he is indigent. Stone also argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by ordering that he not
possess “any mind or mood-altering substances, to include the drug alcohol, [m]arijuana, or any
controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions,” and “submit to urinalysis
and/or breathalyzer testing . . . to verify compliance.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 145-46.
We hold that (1) the judgment and sentence must be amended to add language that clarifies
that Stone’s SSDI benefits may not be attached, garnished, or otherwise encumbered for the
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collection of LFOs; (2) under State v. Catling,1 the imposition of the crime victim penalty
assessment on Stone does not conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); and (3) the trial court did not err
by imposing the supervisory assessment fee because it is not a cost under RCW 10.01.160(3), but
on remand the court is encouraged to reconsider whether Stone has the ability to pay this fee, which
is discretionary.
We further hold that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain
from possessing “mind or mood-altering substances” because that condition is vague, and when it
ordered Stone to refrain from possessing alcohol because that condition is not crime related. We
hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain from possessing
“[m]arijuana, or any controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions,”
because the trial court may always instruct an offender to refrain from illegal activities. Finally,
we hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to “submit to
urinalysis and/or breathalyzer testing . . . to verify compliance,” because the condition regarding
illegal drugs is valid. We remand to the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence in
accordance with this opinion.
FACTS
A jury found Stone guilty of first degree burglary and third degree assault. At sentencing,
Stone informed the trial court that he was indigent and disabled, and that he was receiving SSDI
benefits. The trial court imposed a $500 crime victim penalty assessment and a supervisory
assessment fee. The judgment and sentence contained the following language:
1
193 Wash. 2d 252, 438 P.3d 1174 (2019).
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No. 52233-1-II
A notice of payroll deduction may be issued or other income withholding action may be
taken without further notice to the offender, if a monthly court-ordered legal financial
obligation payment is not paid when due and an amount equal to or greater than the amount
payable for one month is owed.
CP at 146.
The trial court also imposed community custody conditions that required Stone to refrain
from any “mind or mood-altering substances” in addition to controlled substances and required
Stone to submit to urinalysis or breathalyzer testing as a means of verifying compliance with the
community custody conditions. CP at 145. Stone appeals the trial court’s imposition of the LFOs
and the two community custody conditions.
ANALYSIS
I. ATTACHMENT AND CRIME VICTIM PENALTY ASSESSMENT
A. INCOME ATTACHMENT
Stone argues that the trial court was prohibited from ordering attachment of his income if
he misses a monthly LFO payment because his only source of income is his SSDI benefits. The
State concedes this argument. We accept the State’s concession.
Federal law prohibits the attachment of social security payments by any process of law. 42
U.S.C. § 407(a). Under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), “Social Security moneys cannot be reached to satisfy
a debt.” State v. Catling, 193 Wash. 2d 252, 260, 438 P.3d 1174 (2019). Accordingly, the attachment
provision should be stricken, and the trial court should amend the judgment and sentence to clarify
that social security benefits may not be attached, garnished, or otherwise encumbered for the
collection of LFOs.
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No. 52233-1-II
B. CRIME VICTIM PENALTY ASSESSMENT
Stone argues that imposition of the crime victim penalty assessment was improper because
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) prohibits state courts from ordering a defendant to pay any LFO if his only
income is social security benefits. We disagree because the imposition of the crime victim penalty
assessment on Stone does not conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
The crime victim penalty assessment authorized under RCW 7.68.035(1) remains a
mandatory LFO after the 2018 legislative amendments to that statute.2 Catling, 193 Wash. 2d at 259.
RCW 9.94A.760(1) now provides that an offender’s indigence is not grounds for failing to impose
the crime victim penalty assessment. The statute states in relevant part: “The court may not order
an offender to pay costs . . . if the court finds that the offender at the time of sentencing is indigent
. . . . An offender being indigent . . . is not grounds for failing to impose . . . the crime victim
penalty assessment [fee] . . . .” RCW 9.94A.760(1). Therefore, we must address whether this fee
can be assessed against a person such as Stone who receives SSDI.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a), the Social Security Act’s antiattachment provision, states:
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or
payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Under this statute, “Social Security moneys cannot be reached to satisfy a debt.” Catling, 193
Wash. 2d at 260.
2
In 2018, our legislature enacted Second Substitute House Bill (SSHB) 1783, effective June 7,
2018, which amended several statutes related to the imposition of discretionary costs on indigent
defendants and interest on such costs, nonrestitution, and fees. See LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269.
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No. 52233-1-II
Our Supreme Court in Catling clarified that the imposition of the crime victim penalty
assessment fee on a person receiving SSDI does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Catling, 193
Wash. 2d at 264. However, the court also held that the crime victim penalty assessment fee cannot
be satisfied out of funds subject to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Catling, 193 Wash. 2d at 264-65. The court
remanded for the court below to revise the judgment and sentence to state this limitation. Catling,
193 Wash. 2d at 265-66.
Following Catling, we hold that the trial court did not err by imposing the crime victim
penalty assessment fee on Stone. But, as we state above, the trial court on remand must amend
the judgment and sentence to reflect that LFOs cannot be satisfied out of funds subject to 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a).
II. SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENT FEE
Stone argues that the supervisory assessment fee is a discretionary LFO, and because his
only income is SSDI benefits, the fee was improperly imposed by the trial court. The State does
not dispute that a court cannot impose a discretionary LFO without inquiring into the defendant’s
ability to pay, but argues that the fee is mandatory. We hold that the trial court did not err by
imposing the supervisory assessment fee. However, we encourage the trial court on remand to
reevaluate the imposition of the supervisory assessment fee in light of Stone’s ability to pay.
RCW 10.01.160(3) provides that the trial court shall not order a defendant to pay costs if a
defendant is receiving disabled assistance benefits. Similarly, RCW 9.94A.760 provides that the
trial court cannot order “costs” as described in RCW 10.01.160 if the defendant is receiving
disabled assistance benefits. RCW 10.01.160(2) limits “costs” “to expenses specially incurred by
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No. 52233-1-II
the state in prosecuting the defendant or administering the deferred prosecution program under
chapter 10.05 RCW or pretrial supervision.”
Here, the trial court imposed Stone’s supervisory assessment fee under RCW
9.94A.703(2)(d), which states, “Unless waived by the court, as part of any term of community
custody, the court shall order an offender to . . . [p]ay supervision fees as determined by the
[Department of Corrections].” The issue is whether the supervision assessment, a discretionary
LFO, is a “cost” under RCW 9.94.703(3)(d). The supervision assessment fee fails to meet the
definition of a “cost” under RCW 10.01.160(2) because it is not an expense specially incurred by
the State to prosecute the defendant, to administer a deferred prosecution program, or to administer
pretrial supervision. Because the supervision assessment fee is not a cost as defined under RCW
10.01.160, the statutes do not prohibit the trial court from imposing the fee based on Stone’s
indigence.
We note, however, that “[t]he barriers that LFOs impose on an offender’s reintegration to
society are well documented . . . and should not be imposed lightly merely because the legislature
has not dictated that judges conduct the same inquiry required for discretionary costs.” State v.
Clark, 191 Wash. App. 369, 376, 362 P.3d 309 (2015). We agree that this important policy should
be broadly supported. Therefore, we encourage the trial court on remand to reexamine the
imposition of the supervision assessment fee on Stone.
III. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITIONS
Stone argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by ordering community custody
conditions that were neither crime related nor otherwise authorized by statute. Specifically, that
he not possess “any mind or mood-altering substances, to include the drug alcohol, [m]arijuana,
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No. 52233-1-II
or any controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” CP at 145. The
State concedes that, “the reference to ‘mind or mood-altering substances,’ should be redacted,”
from Stone’s judgment and sentence. Br. of Resp. at 7 (quoting CP at 145). Stone further argues
that the trial court exceeded its authority by ordering that he, “submit to urinalysis and/or
breathalyzer testing at the request of the [community custody officer] or treatment provider to
verify compliance.” Br. of Appellant at 12 (quoting CP at 146.)
We accept the State’s concession regarding the reference to “any mind or mood-altering
substances.” We hold that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain
from possessing “mind or mood-altering substances” because that condition is vague, and when it
ordered Stone to refrain from possessing alcohol because that condition is not crime related.
However, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain
from possessing “[m]arijuana, or any controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued
prescriptions,” because the trial court may always instruct an offender to refrain from illegal
activities. And we further hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered
Stone to “submit to urinalysis and/or breathalyzer testing . . . to verify compliance,” because the
trial court was authorized to impose a condition to monitor Stone’s compliance with other valid
conditions.
“We review de novo whether the trial court had statutory authority to impose a community
custody condition.” State v. Johnson, 180 Wash. App. 318, 325, 327 P.3d 704 (2014).
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No. 52233-1-II
A. POSSESSION OF SUBSTANCES
1. Possession of Mind or Mood-Altering Substances
The first condition at issue requires that Stone not possess “mind or mood-altering
substances.” CP at 145. The community custody conditions in the judgment and sentence do not
define these terms. The State concedes that this phraseology could include substances that are not
controlled substances and are lawful to possess. A community custody condition is
unconstitutionally vague if, “(1) it does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an
ordinary person can understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable
standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Padilla, 190 Wash. 2d 672, 677, 416
P.3d 712 (2018). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered
Stone to refrain from possessing “mind or mood-altering substances” because that condition is
vague.
2. Possession of Alcohol
The second condition at issue requires that Stone not possess alcohol. A trial court may
require an offender to comply with any crime-related prohibitions as a condition of community
custody. RCW 9.94B.050(5)(e). A “crime-related prohibition” is “an order of a court prohibiting
conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been
convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10). The trial court ordered Stone not to possess alcohol. Because
prohibiting Stone from possessing alcohol does not directly relate to his crimes of first degree
burglary and third degree assault, the trial court exceeded its authority in imposing the condition.
See RCW 9.94A.030(10).
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No. 52233-1-II
3. Possession of Marijuana, or Any Controlled Substances, Except Pursuant to Lawfully Issued
Prescriptions
The third condition at issue requires that Stone not possess “[m]arijuana, or any controlled
substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” CP at 145. “Washington no longer
criminalizes the use and possession . . . of marijuana.” In re Pers. Restraint of Brettell, 6 Wn.
App. 2d 161, 171, 430 P.3d 677 (2018). “But this conduct remains a federal offense, governed by
the Controlled Substances Act3.” In re Brettell, 6 Wash. App. 2d at 171. “The CSA preempts state
law.” In re Brettell, 6 Wash. App. 2d at 171. Further, “[u]nless waived by the court, as part of any
term of community custody, the court shall order an offender to . . . [r]efrain from possessing or
consuming controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” RCW
9.94A.703(2)(c) (emphasis added). Because the trial court may always instruct an offender to
refrain from illegal activities, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it
ordered Stone to refrain from possessing “[m]arijuana, or any controlled substances, except
pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” CP at 145.
B. URINALYSIS AND BREATHALYZER TESTING
The fourth condition at issue requires that Stone submit to urinalysis or breathalyzer testing
as a means of verifying compliance with the community custody conditions. Trial courts are
authorized to impose community custody conditions that monitor an offender’s compliance with
other valid conditions. State v. Olsen, 189 Wash. 2d 118, 130, 399 P.3d 1141 (2017). As discussed
above, the trial court did not exceed its authority by ordering that Stone refrain from possessing
“[m]arijuana, or any controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” CP
3
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844.
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No. 52233-1-II
at 145. Because this condition is valid, the trial court did not exceed its authority by imposing a
community custody condition requiring Stone to submit to urinalysis and breathalyzer testing. We
hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to “submit to urinalysis
and/or breathalyzer testing . . . to verify compliance,” because the condition regarding illegal drugs
is valid.
CONCLUSION
We hold that (1) the judgment and sentence must be amended to add language that clarifies
that Stone’s SSDI benefits may not be attached, garnished, or otherwise encumbered for the
collection of LFOs; (2) under State v. Catling, the imposition of the crime victim penalty
assessment on Stone does not conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a); (3) the trial court did not err by
imposing the supervisory assessment fee because it is not a cost under RCW 10.01.160(3), but on
remand the court is encouraged to reconsider whether Stone has the ability to pay this fee, which
is discretionary.
We further hold that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain
from possessing “mind or mood-altering substances” because that condition is vague, and when it
ordered Stone to refrain from possessing alcohol because that condition is not crime related. We
hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to refrain from possessing
“[m]arijuana, or any controlled substances, except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions,”
because the trial court may always instruct an offender to refrain from illegal activities. Finally,
we hold that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it ordered Stone to “submit to
urinalysis and/or breathalyzer testing . . . to verify compliance,” because the condition regarding
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No. 52233-1-II
illegal drugs is valid. We remand to the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence in
accordance with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
CRUSER, J.
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