Personal Restraint Petition Of Joseph Emmanuel Rowley III ( 2020 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 25, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the No. 53702-8-II
Personal Restraint of (consolidated with No. 54009-6-II)
JOSEPH EMMANUEL ROWLEY, III,
Petitioner.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MELNICK, J. -- Joseph Rowley III seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as a result
of his 2013 pleas of guilty to second degree rape of a child and unlawful delivery of controlled
substances to a minor. In a prior petition, Rowley challenged the trial court’s imposition of
discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). In an order dated September 5, 2018, the
Washington State Supreme Court ordered,
That the Petitioner’s personal restraint petition is granted only on the issue
of imposition of [LFOs] and the case is remanded to the Pierce County Superior
Court to reconsider the imposition of discretionary [LFOs] consistent with the
requirements of State v. Nicholas Peter Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680(2015).
Order, In re Pers. Restraint of Rowley, No. 95883-1, at 2 (Wash. Sep. 5, 2018).
Consol. Nos. 53702-8-II / 54009-6-II
The Pierce County Superior Court scheduled a hearing on the reconsideration of LFOs for
February 1, 2019. But on January 23, 2019, the deputy prosecutor and Rowley’s counsel presented
an agreed motion and order correcting order revoking sentence, which stated,
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Judgment
and Sentence granted the defendant on February 11, 2013, be and the same is
hereby corrected as follows:
l) The page five § 4.1 of the Judgment and Sentence should reflect, in light
of [Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827], that the State is no longer seeking, and the Court is
no longer imposing the following discretionary [LFOs]: $500 [Department of
Assigned Counsel] Recoupment and the $200 Criminal Filing Fee; the total cost
should reflect $600.00.
2) All other terms and conditions of the defendant’s Judgment and Sentence
shall remain in full force and effect as if set forth in full herein.
Resp. to Pet., App. at 48-49.
In his current petitions,1 Rowley argues that he had the right to be present at the
presentation of the agreed order. But in entering the agreed order, the trial court did not “exercise
its independent judgment to review and reconsider” the LFOs, so Rowley did not have the right to
be present for the entry of the agreed order. State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d 48, 51, 846 P.2d 519(1993); see also State v. Ramos, 171 Wn.2d 46, 48, 246 P.3d 811 (2011). He argues that by not
being present, he was denied the opportunity to raise a myriad of claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct before the trial court. But the trial court’s authority was
1
In addition to filing a personal restraint petition with this court, Rowley filed a motion for
discretionary review in the trial court. That court transferred his motion to us under CrR 7.8(c) to
be considered as a personal restraint, and we consolidated it with the petition he filed with this
court.
2
Consol. Nos. 53702-8-II / 54009-6-II
limited by the scope of the remand ordered by the Supreme Court: the discretionary LFOs. State
v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 42, 216 P.3d 393 (2009).2
Rowley does not show that he is entitled to relief from restraint. We therefore deny his
petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
MELNICK, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
GLASGOW, J.
2
And to the extent Rowley seeks to raise those issues and other issues pertaining to the entry of
his pleas of guilty in these petitions, they are time-barred by RCW 10.73.090. In re Pers. Restraint
of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 170, 267 P.3d 324 (2011).
3