Manivanh Sayasit v. Dale Santos, Jr. ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                              Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    April 21, 2020
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    In the Matter of the Parentage of D.S.S. and                    No. 51864-3-II
    I.S.S.,
    MANIVANH SAYASIT,
    Respondent,
    v.
    DALE SANTOS, JR.,                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    GLASGOW, J.—Dale Santos Jr. appeals the trial court’s final parenting plan, residential
    schedule, and child support1 orders involving his two sons with Manivanh Sayasit. He argues that
    the trial court improperly weighed the guardian ad litem report, which pertained to only one child,
    and the trial court abused its discretion by inadequately reviewing the case. We disagree and
    affirm.
    FACTS
    Santos and Sayasit have two sons together who were 12 and 10 years old at the time of
    trial. The four of them lived in California until Sayasit moved to Washington in 2009 with the
    children. Sayasit alleged that Santos engaged in domestic violence, which caused her to relocate.
    Santos then moved to Washington in 2016 to be closer to his sons.
    1
    Santos does not present any argument involving the child support order.
    No. 51864-3-II
    In 2018, Santos and Sayasit proceeded to trial to establish a parenting plan, residential
    placement of the children, and child support. During the one-day bench trial, Santos and Sayasit
    were the only witnesses. The trial court asked Sayasit and Santos if they had any objection to it
    considering a sealed guardian ad litem report in making its ruling. Santos objected, disagreeing
    with the factual assertions in the report. Santos also informed the trial court that the guardian ad
    litem report was limited in scope to their youngest son. The trial court acknowledged the report’s
    limited scope and admitted it as an exhibit.
    Sayasit testified that both she and Santos had strong relationships with the children. Sayasit
    told the trial court she had been the primary parent to the children since she separated from Santos
    in 2009. She noted the children’s relationships with her extended family including grandparents,
    uncles, and cousins. Sayasit testified that she worked five days a week, but her schedule was
    flexible so she could accommodate the needs of the children. Sayasit noted that Santos was a good
    father to the children, but she believed she was best suited to care for the children’s future needs
    given the stability of her employment and the support of her local family.
    Santos alleged that Sayasit’s live-in boyfriend had exposed himself to the children and
    regularly smoked marijuana in the children’s bedroom. Sayasit testified that she did not believe
    the allegation that her boyfriend exposed himself to the children. She testified that she spoke with
    the children about it, and they claimed Santos made it up because he was jealous of Sayasit’s
    boyfriend. Sayasit also explained that her boyfriend smoked marijuana at night but never in the
    same room as the children.
    2
    No. 51864-3-II
    Sayasit did not request that the trial court impose any residential or decision-making
    limitations on Santos. Sayasit did not have any concerns for the children’s physical safety when
    they were with their father.
    Santos testified that he had strong relationships with both his sons. He acknowledged that
    Sayasit had been the primary parent of the children up to the point of trial. When asked which
    parent he though was best suited to care for the boys’ future needs, Santos first answered “both of
    us,” and acknowledged that Sayasit is a “really good mother,” but then said he would be best suited
    because he paid attention to what the children wanted. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at
    54.
    Regarding Santos’s allegations against Sayasit’s boyfriend, Santos testified that the
    children told him Sayasit’s boyfriend smoked marijuana in their bedroom. Santos testified that in
    2015, his son told him that Sayasit’s boyfriend pulled his pants down in front of the child while
    Sayasit was in the restroom. Santos acknowledged that his son later denied that this occurred.
    At the conclusion of Sayasit’s and Santos’s testimony, the trial court issued an oral ruling
    in which it weighed the evidence in light of the relevant statutory factors. First, the trial court
    considered the relative strength, nature, and stability of each child’s relationship with each parent
    and found that both Santos and Sayasit had strong bonds with the children and appeared to be good
    parents. Next, the trial court found that Santos and Sayasit agreed the children’s relationship was
    stronger with their mother than with their father and that Sayasit had been the primary parent. The
    trial court considered the children’s emotional and developmental needs, referencing the guardian
    ad litem report’s finding that one of the children had some frustration issues. The trial court also
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    No. 51864-3-II
    considered the children’s strong and healthy relationships with Sayasit’s parents, their uncles, and
    their cousins.
    The trial court acknowledged that each parent wanted primary custody, and noted that the
    children were not mature enough to express a meaningful interest in their residential placement.
    The court found that both parents had jobs that were conducive to parenting, but noted that
    Sayasit’s job offered more flexibility. The trial court expressed concern about the allegations
    against Sayasit’s boyfriend, but found that they were not proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence. The trial court also expressed concern about the domestic violence allegations against
    Santos from 2009. The trial court noted that the references in the guardian ad litem’s report to that
    incident were “not particularly helpful.” VRP at 78. The trial court concluded, “All of which is to
    say that I have concerns about the mother’s boyfriend. I have some concerns about the father’s
    history of alleged domestic violence, so there’s some concern going either way.” VRP at 78-79.
    The trial court observed that both parents agreed that the other was a good parent and there
    were no concerns for the children’s physical safety. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that
    weighing all of the evidence in light of the statutory factors, the children were more properly placed
    primarily with Sayasit. Accordingly, the trial court entered a final parenting plan that placed the
    children primarily with Sayasit and with Santos every other weekend and for three hours every
    Wednesday during the school year. During the summer break from school, the children would
    alternate weeks between Sayasit and Santos. The parenting plan called for joint decision-making
    and placed no limitations on either Sayasit or Santos.
    Santos appeals.
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    No. 51864-3-II
    ANALYSIS
    A trial court has broad discretion in developing a parenting plan. In re Marriage of Katare,
    
    175 Wn.2d 23
    , 35, 
    283 P.3d 546
     (2012). This discretion must be wielded in the best interest of the
    children and only after considering the factors identified in RCW 26.09.187(3). In re Parentage of
    J.H., 
    112 Wn. App. 486
    , 492, 
    49 P.3d 154
     (2002). RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) provides that “[t]he court
    shall make residential provisions for each child which encourage each parent to maintain a loving,
    stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent with the child’s developmental level
    and the family’s social and economic circumstances.”
    We review a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a
    decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of
    Black, 
    188 Wn.2d 114
    , 127, 
    392 P.3d 1041
     (2017). We determine whether the trial court’s findings
    of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 
    Id.
     We do not reweigh the evidence to determine if
    we would reach a different conclusion. In re Marriage of McNaught, 
    189 Wn. App. 545
    , 561, 
    359 P.3d 811
     (2015). We are extremely reluctant to disturb child placement decisions “[b]ecause the
    trial court hears evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re
    Parenting & Support of C.T., 
    193 Wn. App. 427
    , 442, 
    378 P.3d 183
     (2016).
    First, Santos argues that the trial court improperly weighed the guardian ad litem report
    because the report only pertained to one son. The record does not support Santos’s contention and
    we disagree.
    During trial, Santos informed the trial court that the guardian ad litem report was limited
    in scope to only one of his sons. The trial court acknowledged the report’s limited scope when it
    admitted the report for consideration. Nothing in the trial court’s oral ruling or written findings
    5
    No. 51864-3-II
    suggests that the trial court improperly weighed the guardian ad litem report in making its decision.
    When the trial court referenced the guardian ad litem report in its oral ruling, it did so only in
    relation to the son who was the subject of the report. The only other time the trial court referenced
    the guardian ad litem report was to say that the report’s reference to domestic violence allegations
    was “not particularly helpful.” VRP at 78.
    Moreover, as Division One of our court explained in In re Guardianship of Stamm, “Judges
    understand that the [guardian ad litem] presents one source of information among many, that
    credibility is the province of the judge, and [a judge] can without difficulty separate and
    differentiate the evidence they hear.” 
    121 Wn. App. 830
    , 841, 
    91 P.3d 126
     (2004). The guardian
    ad litem report’s persuasiveness, as well as the persuasiveness of any contrary witness testimony,
    was for the judge to determine, and we will not reweigh that evidence on appeal.
    Second, Santos argues that the trial court erred by “not carefully reviewing all aspects of
    this particular case.” Br. of Appellant at 3. But the record shows that the trial court carefully
    considered the evidence presented at trial in light of each factor identified in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a).
    After carefully weighing all the evidence introduced at trial, the trial court concluded the children
    were more properly placed primarily with Sayasit and with Santos every other weekend and one
    evening a week, with alternating weeks during the summer. Nothing in the record suggests that
    the trial court ignored evidence or rushed its ruling. The trial court’s ruling was well-reasoned and
    supported by the evidence. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
    The core of Santos’s argument is that Santos takes his role as a father seriously, and he has
    made many sacrifices to serve the best interests of his children. We acknowledge that this position
    is supported by the record. But it does not provide a basis to reverse the trial court’s well-reasoned
    6
    No. 51864-3-II
    final parenting plan, residential schedule, or child support order. At trial, both Santos and Sayasit
    acknowledged that the strength, nature, and stability of the children’s relationship were stronger
    with Sayasit than with Santos and that Sayasit had been the primary parent up to that point. This
    does not negate the value of the children’s relationship with Santos, or his ability to provide a
    nurturing home for his children, but it does support the trial court’s conclusion that Sayasit’s home
    be the primary residential placement. On this record, given the trial court’s broad discretion to
    decide these matters, we affirm.
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
    it is so ordered.
    Glasgow, J.
    We concur:
    Maxa, P.J.
    Cruser, J.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 51864-3

Filed Date: 4/21/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2020