Personal Restraint Petition of Lewis A. Lawrence ( 2016 )

FILED
August 16, 2016
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of )
) No. 31827-3-111
)
LEWIS A. LAWRENCE, )
)
Petitioner. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
KORSMO, J. -An incompetent person may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced
as long as the incapacity continues. RCW 10.77.050. Lewis A. Lawrence seeks relief
from personal restraint imposed in his 2010 Whitman County convictions of three counts
of attempted first degree murder. He contends he was incompetent to stand trial and to
represent himself at trial due to his fetal alcohol syndrome disorder (FASD). After this
court remanded the matter to superior court for a reference hearing, the superior court
entered findings that he suffered from FASD at the time of trial and sentencing, and that
this disorder rendered him incompetent to stand trial and to waive counsel. Accordingly,
we grant his personal restraint petition, reverse his convictions, and remand for further
proceedings.
No. 31827-3-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence
In March 2009, Mr. Lawrence had a disagreement with two friends over dinner
plans and left their apartment. 1 Later, he returned with a shotgun, shot one friend in the
face with birdshot, and fired twice into the apartment without injuring the two other
people inside. When he was arrested, he told the police he wanted to kill his friends
because they were part of a Samoan gang that has threatened his family. These
allegations of a Samoan gang threat had no basis in reality.
From the time he was charged, it was apparent that Mr. Lawrence's behavior was
unusual. Based on competency evaluations by Eastern State Hospital (Eastern), the trial
court initially found him incompetent to stand trial, but later ruled him competent after
treatment. Mental health experts variously diagnosed him with psychosis, antisocial
personality disorder with narcissistic personality features, and bipolar disorder. Mr.
Lawrence requested permission to represent himself. Counsel for both parties again
questioned his competence and defense counsel advised the court that Mr. Lawrence's
family believes he may have fetal alcohol syndrome. In two successive competency
hearings, the trial court first found that he was incompetent and later relied on a new
report from Eastern to find him competent. The trial judge, however, denied Mr.
Lawrence's request to proceed prose. Three days later, Mr. Lawrence filed an affidavit
1
A full recitation of the facts of Mr. Lawrence's crimes and the lengthy pretrial
and trial proceedings is set out in State v. Lawrence, 166 Wash. App. 378, 380-85, 271 P.3d
280, review denied, 174 Wash. 2d 1009(2012).
2
No. 31827-3-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence
of prejudice against the judge, who recused himself. The new trial judge later accepted
Mr. Lawrence's waiver of counsel.
Mr. Lawrence's jury trial was held in April 2010. He represented himself, served
as the sole defense witness, and testified that he was on the other side of town robbing six
men of their black diamonds at the time of the crimes. The jury convicted him as charged
and he represented himself again at sentencing.
On appeal, Mr. Lawrence argued, in part, that the trial court erred in finding that
he was competent to stand trial and to represent himself. This court affirmed his
judgment and sentence and the Washington Supreme Court denied review. See State v.
Lawrence, 166 Wash. App. 378, 271 P.3d 280, review denied, 174 Wash. 2d 1009 (2012).
Mr. Lawrence then filed a timely personal restraint petition and submitted a new mental
health evaluation of his incompetence due to FASD. The chief judge of this court
I
dismissed his personal restraint petition, concluding that the trial court's competency
I
decision was reasonable under the circumstances. See Order, In re Pers. Restraint of II
'
Lawrence, No. 31827-3-III (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014).
In October 2015, the Washington Supreme Court accepted review of Mr. Ii
Lawrence's petition, vacated the order dismissing it, and remanded to this court. See I'
i
l
I
Amended Order, In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence, No. 91063-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, l
II
2015). The Supreme Court directed this court to transfer the case to the Whitman County
I
!
3 II
1
No. 31827-3-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence
Superior Court for a RAP 16.12 reference hearing concerning Mr. Lawrence's
competency during trial and sentencing.
On October 26, 2015, we entered an order transferring the personal restraint
petition to superior court for a reference hearing, and directed the superior court to enter
findings on the following questions:
1. Did Mr. Lawrence suffer from the effects of FASD at the time of trial and
sentencing?
2. If so, what effects of Mr. Lawrence's reported FASD, if any, would have been
relevant to his competency to stand trial?
3. Taking into consideration any relevant effects of Mr. Lawrence's reported
FASD, was he competent to stand trial at the time of trial, conviction and
sentencing?
4. What effects of Mr. Lawrence's reported FASD, if any, would have been
relevant to his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel?
5. Taking into consideration any relevant effects of Mr. Lawrence's reported
FASD, did he knowingly and willingly waive his right to counsel at the time of
trial, conviction, and sentencing? See, e.g., In re Rhome, 172 Wash. 2d 654, 260
P.3d 654 (2011).
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No. 31827-3-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence
In a March 2016 reference hearing with a new judge, 11 witnesses testified. The
judge found that (1) Mr. Lawrence suffered from FASD at the time of his trial,
conviction, and sentencing; (2) the FASD, along with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, periods of delusional thinking, and psychotic symptoms, impaired his
ability to understand and assist in his defense; (3) he was therefore incompetent at the
time of trial, conviction, and sentencing; (4) his pervasive and severe impairments due to
FASD and the other disorders-impairments that caused difficulty in relating actions to
consequences-interfered with his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive the right
to counsel; and (5) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the
time of his trial, conviction, and sentencing. The State in supplemental briefing to this
court does not dispute the superior court's findings and agrees that Mr. Lawrence "has
met his burden to show that he was incompetent at the time of trial and did not knowingly
waive his right to counsel." Resp't's Supplemental Br. re: Reference Hearing at 4.
To prevail in a personal restraint petition, a petitioner must show that he is
unlawfully restrained due to an error of constitutional magnitude that substantially
prejudiced him, or due to a fundamental defect of a nonconstitutional nature that caused a
complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wash. 2d 501, 506,
301 P.3d 450 (2013). Mr. Lawrence's trial and conviction while incompetent and his
involuntary waiver of counsel violated his constitutional right to due process. See State v.
5
No. 31827-3-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Lawrence
Heddrick, 166 Wash. 2d 898, 904, 215 P .3d 201 (2009) (incapacity to stand trial); In re
Disciplinary Hrg. against Meade, 103 Wash. 2d 374, 380-81, 693 P.2d 713 (1985)
(incompetence to appear pro se ). This error substantially prejudiced his defense.
Consequently, we grant his personal restraint petition, reverse his conviction, and
remand for further proceedings.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J.
6