State Of Washington v. Fawn Lefay Little Sky ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         No. 79586-4-I
    Respondent,
    v.
    FAWN LEFAY LITTLE SKY,                       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Appellant.
    VERELLEN, J. — Fawn Little Sky appeals her jury conviction for second
    degree assault and violation of a no-contact order. She argues that the trial
    court erred in (1) giving an aggressor instruction, (2) giving a to convict
    instruction that did not include the State’s burden to disprove self-defense, and
    (3) permitting a police officer to give improper opinion testimony regarding the
    ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. She also contends that defense counsel
    was ineffective for failing to object to the aggressor instruction.
    We affirm.
    FACTS
    This case arises from an incident in which Little Sky assaulted her cousin,
    Jerry Clown. Clown lived in a house owned by his aunt, Carol Rave, who is Little
    Sky’s mother. Also living in the house were Little Sky’s adult son, Elijah Little
    No. 79586-4-I/2
    Sky, and Little Sky’s brother, Luta Martinez. Little Sky frequently stayed at the
    home even though she was prohibited from doing so by a no-contact order.
    Clown suffered from chronic health issues, including hypertension,
    diabetes, and kidney failure. He used a cane to walk and attended kidney
    dialysis appointments several times a week. On the morning of November 6,
    2018, Clown drove Rave’s car to his appointment. When Clown returned home
    around 11:30 a.m., he was tired and went to sit in a recliner in the living room,
    facing the television. Martinez and Elijah were both still in their bedrooms.1
    Clown heard someone coming down the stairs behind him. He turned
    around and saw a man he didn’t know. Clown asked the man who he was, but
    the man just put on his shoes and left.
    Little Sky came downstairs a few minutes later. She asked Clown where
    the man went, and Clown told her that he left. Little Sky began looking for
    Rave’s car keys. She asked both Clown and Martinez where the car keys were.
    Clown ultimately told Little Sky that he had them. Little Sky demanded the keys,
    but Clown refused. He believed Little Sky was under the influence of
    methamphetamine because she was acting “[v]ery angry” and “short-tempered”
    and because he could smell the odor of methamphetamine.2 Clown turned his
    back on Little Sky and resumed facing the television.
    Clown testified he felt something hit him on the back of his neck. He
    turned and saw Little Sky was holding his wooden cane and swinging it. Clown
    1   We refer to Elijah Little Sky by his first name for clarity.
    2   Report of Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 5, 2019) at 223.
    2
    No. 79586-4-I/3
    was unable to get out of the recliner and raised his hands to defend himself. He
    was hit on the hands and forearms with the cane. Clown yelled for Martinez to
    come help him. Little Sky continued hitting Clown with the cane until it broke into
    pieces. She then advanced on Clown as though to stab him with the broken
    cane handle, yelling “die mother fucker, handicapped, fuckin’ die. I hate you. I
    hate you.”3 Clown rolled from side to side to avoid being stabbed. When
    Martinez came running down the stairs, Little Sky threw the handle at Clown and
    left the house. According to Martinez, Clown was crying and said that Little Sky
    had broken his arm.
    Clown called 911, and Martinez drove Clown to the hospital. Clown told
    the emergency room physician that he was hit in the head with his cane and saw
    bright flashing lights. The physician noted obvious injuries to Clown’s forearms,
    and x-rays showed fractures to Clown’s left wrist and left thumb. The physician
    did not document any injuries to Clown’s head or neck.
    Bellingham Police Officer McKenzie Roorda interviewed Clown at the
    hospital. Roorda testified that Clown appeared in pain and had obvious injuries
    to his hands and wrists. When Roorda asked Clown what happened, Clown
    began crying and said that Little Sky hit him from behind with his cane and he
    sustained the injuries by putting up his hands to protect his head.
    Elijah confirmed that he could hear Little Sky yelling and upset because
    she wanted the car keys. He testified that Little Sky was acting impatient,
    3
    Id. at 227.
    3
    No. 79586-4-I/4
    aggressive, and seemed to be under the influence of something. Martinez also
    stated that Little Sky was cursing and screaming regarding the car keys.
    Little Sky asserted she acted in self-defense. She testified Clown was
    irritable from dialysis and angry that she had brought a man into the house.
    According to Little Sky, she calmly asked Clown for the car keys, but Clown
    ignored her. He then told her “you ain’t getting the F’in car keys.”4 The two
    began arguing and Clown “just stood up, like leapt up real fast.”5 Little Sky
    testified that Clown “lunged” at her and hit her on the side of her arm.6 She
    stated that she was afraid because Clown had “threatened to fight [her] before”7
    and had a history of assaulting other female family members. Accordingly, she
    grabbed the first thing she saw to defend herself, which was Clown’s cane. She
    testified that she was “swinging wildly”8 and did not realize she hit Clown until the
    cane broke. Little Sky denied hitting Clown from behind. She also denied being
    under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
    Little Sky requested the jury be instructed on self-defense. The State also
    requested, and the court granted, an aggressor instruction. The instruction,
    patterned on 11 Washington Practice: Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal § 16.04,
    at 256 (4th ed. 2016) (WPIC), read:
    4   RP (Feb. 6, 2019) at 409.
    5
    Id. at 411.
           6
    Id. at 412.
           7
    Id. at 411.
           8
    Id. at 412.
    4
    No. 79586-4-I/5
    No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to
    provoke a belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in self-
    defense and thereupon use force upon or toward another person.
    Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
    was the aggressor, and that defendant’s acts and conduct
    provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available
    as a defense.[9]
    Defense counsel agreed to the instruction:
    As far as the State’s supplemental instructions this morning,
    we have got a first aggressor instruction and reasonableness
    instruction, and I think those are both appropriate under the
    circumstances, and I have no objection to them.[10]
    In closing argument, the State argued that Little Sky’s claim of self-
    defense was not credible because Clown’s medical issues would have prevented
    him from threatening Little Sky in the manner she claimed. The State also
    argued that Little Sky was not entitled to claim self-defense because she was the
    aggressor:
    [I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
    aggressor and it was the defendant’s acts and conduct that
    provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available
    as a defense.
    Jerry is sitting in his chair and he is watching television, she
    comes downstairs, she wants the car keys, and he says no. She
    instigated the entire event. She is not entitled to be claiming self-
    defense in this case. For those reasons, I’ll ask that you find her
    guilty as charged.[11]
    A jury convicted Little Sky of second degree assault and violation of a no-
    contact order.12 Little Sky appeals.
    9   Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 37.
    10   RP (Feb. 7, 2019) at 484.
    11
    Id. at 531-32.
          12   The jury acquitted Little Sky of first degree burglary.
    5
    No. 79586-4-I/6
    DISCUSSION
    Little Sky contends that the trial court erred in giving an aggressor
    instruction because the evidence did not support it. Because Little Sky failed to
    object to the instruction at trial, she has waived any claim of error.
    We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when
    they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury,
    and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of
    proof.14
    A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the
    defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15
    The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant
    is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden
    of producing some evidence that his or her actions occurred in circumstances
    amounting to self-defense.’”17 Because self-defense negates the unlawfulness
    element of an assault, the State then bears the burden of disproving the defense
    beyond a reasonable doubt.18
    13   State v. Clausing, 
    147 Wash. 2d 620
    , 626-27, 
    56 P.3d 550
    (2002).
    14   State v. Willis, 
    153 Wash. 2d 366
    , 370, 
    103 P.3d 1213
    (2005).
    15   State v. Werner, 
    170 Wash. 2d 333
    , 337, 
    241 P.3d 410
    (2010).
    16   RCW 9A.16.020(3).
    17 State v. Grott, 
    195 Wash. 2d 256
    , 266, 
    458 P.3d 750
    (2020) (quoting State
    v. Riley, 
    137 Wash. 2d 904
    , 909, 
    976 P.2d 624
    (1999)).
    18   State v. McCullum, 
    98 Wash. 2d 484
    , 490, 
    656 P.2d 1064
    (1983).
    6
    No. 79586-4-I/7
    However, a defendant may not claim self-defense when he or she initiated
    the fight, and thereby, the need to act in self-defense.19 A court may give an
    aggressor instruction where there is credible evidence that the defendant
    provoked the need to act in self-defense.20 The provoking conduct must be
    intentional conduct reasonably likely to elicit a belligerent response and cannot
    be words alone.21 It also may not be the conduct that forms the basis for the
    assault.22
    Little Sky argues that the evidence did not warrant the giving of an
    aggressor instruction. She argues that, at most, the evidence showed that she
    argued with Clown over the car keys, but that this is insufficient to establish she
    provoked the conflict.
    In this regard, we agree with Little Sky. The State’s theory of the case
    was that Little Sky assaulted Clown while Clown did nothing other than cover his
    face with his hands and arms. Little Sky’s version of events was Clown initiated
    the conflict by striking her arm and she only hit Clown with the cane to protect
    herself. A jury could believe either that Little Sky assaulted Clown without
    provocation or that Little Sky acted in self-defense, but there was no evidence
    from which a jury could conclude that Little Sky provoked an altercation resulting
    in Clown needing to defend himself with lawful force.
    19   
    Riley, 137 Wash. 2d at 909-10
    .
    20   State v. Kidd, 
    57 Wash. App. 95
    , 100, 
    786 P.2d 847
    (1990).
    21
    State v. Sullivan, 
    196 Wash. App. 277
    , 289-90, 
    383 P.3d 574
    (2016); 
    Riley, 137 Wash. 2d at 912
    .
    22   
    Kidd, 57 Wash. App. at 100
    .
    7
    No. 79586-4-I/8
    However, Little Sky did not object to the giving of the instruction. When a
    defendant does not object to a jury instruction below, review is precluded unless
    the defendant can demonstrate a “manifest error affecting a constitutional
    right.”23 We first determine whether the alleged error raises a constitutional
    interest, as compared to another form of trial error.24 If the alleged error raises a
    constitutional interest, we look to whether the error is manifest. To be “manifest”
    requires a showing of actual prejudice.25 “To demonstrate actual prejudice, there
    must be ‘a plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had
    practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.’”26
    The Washington Supreme Court recently held in State v. Grott that not all
    erroneously given aggressor instructions are errors of constitutional magnitude.27
    This is because although an aggressor instruction impacts a defendant’s claim of
    self-defense, it does not relieve the State of its burden of proof.28 Instead, an
    aggressor instruction is “used to explain to the jury one way in which the State
    may meet its burden: by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
    provoked the need to act in self-defense.”29 If the jury is properly instructed on
    self-defense, the defendant is not prevented from arguing self-defense, and
    23   RAP 2.5(a)(3).
    24   State v. O’Hara, 
    167 Wash. 2d 91
    , 98, 
    219 P.3d 756
    (2009).
    25   State v. Kirkman, 
    159 Wash. 2d 918
    , 935, 
    155 P.3d 125
    (2007).
    
    26O’Hara, 167 Wash. 2d at 99
    (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting id.).
    27   
    195 Wash. 2d 256
    , 268-69, 
    458 P.3d 750
    (2020).
    28
    Id. at 268.
           29
    Id. 8 No.
    79586-4-I/9
    because the aggressor instruction properly holds the State to its burden of proof
    by requiring the jury to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
    the aggressor, and that defendant’s acts and conduct provoked or commenced
    the fight,” the giving of an instruction is not an error of constitutional magnitude.30
    Here, the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, and Little Sky was
    fully able to present her theory of self-defense to the jury. Moreover, the jury
    instructions properly held the State to its burden of proof. Consequently, Little
    Sky fails to demonstrate an error of constitutional magnitude entitling her to
    review.
    In the alternative, Little Sky contends she received ineffective assistance
    of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to the aggressor instruction.
    We disagree because Little Sky fails to show she was prejudiced by the
    instruction.
    We review ineffective assistance claims de novo.31 “To prevail on an
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that (1) defense
    counsel’s representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard
    of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.”32
    The reasonableness inquiry presumes effective representation and requires the
    defendant to show the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons for the
    30
    Id. at 268-69.
           31   State v. Sutherby, 
    165 Wash. 2d 870
    , 883, 
    204 P.3d 916
    (2009).
    32
    Id. (citing State
    v. McFarland, 
    127 Wash. 2d 322
    , 334-35, 
    899 P.2d 1251
    (1995)).
    9
    No. 79586-4-I/10
    challenged conduct.33 To show prejudice, the defendant must show that but for
    the deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
    would have been different.34 Failure on either prong defeats a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel.35
    Based on the record, we conclude Little Sky fails to make a plausible
    showing she was prejudiced by the aggressor instruction. The jury was
    adequately instructed on self-defense including, as discussed below, the State’s
    burden of proof. Little Sky was fully able to present her theory of self-defense.
    Additionally, there was overwhelming evidence Little Sky did not act in self-
    defense. Clown had significant medical problems, used a cane for mobility, and
    was exhausted from kidney dialysis. Both the hospital physician and the
    investigating officer observed significant defensive wounds on his hands and
    forearms. Clown, Martinez, and Elijah all testified that Little Sky was acting angry
    and aggressive, which Clown and Elijah believed to be due to her use of
    methamphetamine. Even if the jury had believed Little Sky’s version of events,
    the amount of force she used—which resulted in fractures to Clown’s thumb and
    wrist—far exceeded what was reasonable and necessary for self-defense. The
    State presented sufficient evidence to disprove Little Sky’s claim of self-defense,
    and there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
    33   
    McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d at 336
    .
    34   In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 
    136 Wash. 2d 467
    , 487, 
    965 P.2d 593
    (1998).
    35   State v. Foster, 
    140 Wash. App. 266
    , 273, 
    166 P.3d 726
    (2007).
    10
    No. 79586-4-I/11
    been different had defense counsel objected to the aggressor instruction. Little
    Sky fails to show she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Little Sky also contends the trial court erred in denying her request to
    include the State’s burden to disprove self-defense in the to convict instruction
    for second degree assault. We disagree, as the jury instructions as a whole
    properly informed the jury of the State’s burden of proof regarding self-defense.
    The to convict instruction for second degree assault provided:
    To convict the defendant of count 2, the crime of assault in
    the second degree, each of the following two elements of the crime
    must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
    (1) That on or about November 6, 2018, the defendant:
    (a) intentionally assaulted Jerry Clown and thereby
    recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm; or
    (b) assaulted Jerry Clown with a deadly weapon; and
    (2) That this act occurred in the state of Washington.[36]
    The court gave a separate instruction, patterned after WPIC 17.02,
    regarding Little Sky’s self-defense claim:
    It is a defense to an assault that the force was lawful as
    defined in this instruction.
    ....
    The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the force used by the defendant was not lawful. If you
    find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense
    beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of
    not guilty as to any charge in which the State must prove an assault
    as an element of the offense.[37]
    36   CP at 26.
    37   CP at 34.
    11
    No. 79586-4-I/12
    The trial court rejected defense counsel’s request to incorporate the State’s
    burden to disprove self-defense into the to convict instruction, stating, “I would be
    reluctant to change the pattern instruction on that issue in this case.”38
    In State v. Hoffman, the Washington Supreme Court held that the to
    convict instruction need not refer to the State’s burden to prove the absence of
    self-defense, as long as that burden is made clear through a separate
    instruction.39 Little Sky contends Hoffman is not controlling because it did not
    involve an aggressor instruction. She argues that the erroneous aggressor
    instruction confused the jury and allowed it to disregard her claim of self-defense.
    But it is unquestionable that the jury instructions accurately stated the law
    regarding the State’s burden to disprove self-defense. And Little Sky does not
    articulate how including the State’s burden in the to convict instruction would
    eliminate the alleged prejudice of an erroneous aggressor instruction. In
    essence, Little Sky is restating her challenge to the giving of the aggressor
    instruction, an argument we have already rejected. Little Sky fails to
    demonstrate any error in the to convict instruction.
    Finally, Little Sky contends the trial court erred when it permitted Roorda
    to testify that the cane Little Sky used to hit Clown was capable of causing
    substantial bodily harm. She contends this constitutes an impermissible opinion
    38   RP (Feb. 7, 2019) at 489.
    39   
    116 Wash. 2d 51
    , 109, 
    804 P.2d 577
    (1991).
    12
    No. 79586-4-I/13
    on the ultimate issue for the jury. Even assuming the testimony was improper,
    any error was harmless.
    During Roorda’s testimony, the following exchange took place:
    STATE:         Okay. And I showed you earlier the cane depicted by
    photograph. I’m handing you what has been entered
    into evidence as State’s Exhibits 1B and 1C, is that
    the same cane depicted in photograph Exhibit No. 2?
    ROORDA:        Yes.
    STATE:         And in your opinion is this an item that is capable,
    readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm?
    DEFENSE: Objection to speculation, Your Honor.
    ROORDA:        Yes.
    DEFENSE: Also invades the province of the jury.
    STATE:         It’s an opinion on ultimate issue which should be
    allowed under Evidence Rule 704.
    COURT:         Overruled. You may answer the question.
    ROORDA:        Yes, it is.[40]
    As charged here, the State was required to prove Little Sky either
    intentionally assaulted Clown and recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm or
    assaulted Clown with a deadly weapon.41 The jury instructions defined
    “substantial bodily harm” as “bodily injury that involves a temporary but
    substantial disfigurement, or that causes a temporary but substantial loss or
    40   RP at 349-50.
    41   See RCW 9A.36.021(a); (c).
    13
    No. 79586-4-I/14
    impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or that causes a fracture of
    any bodily part.”42
    We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.43
    ER 701 allows testimony as to opinions or inferences which are rationally based
    on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the
    witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. But a witness may not
    offer an opinion on the guilt or veracity of the defendant because it is unfairly
    prejudicial and invades the exclusive province of the jury.44
    Here, even if admitting Roorda’s testimony was error, it was harmless.
    “Where evidence is improperly admitted, the trial court’s error is harmless ‘if the
    evidence is of minor significance in reference to the overall, overwhelming
    evidence as a whole.’”45 The fact that the cane inflicted substantial bodily harm
    was not in dispute. Clown sustained fractures to his wrist and thumb. The jury
    was properly instructed that “a fracture of any bodily part” constituted substantial
    bodily harm. Because there was overwhelming evidence Clown suffered
    substantial bodily harm, a reasonable jury would have reached the same
    42   CP at 24.
    43   State v. Halstien, 
    122 Wash. 2d 109
    , 126, 
    857 P.2d 270
    (1993).
    44State v. Demery, 
    144 Wash. 2d 753
    , 759, 
    30 P.3d 1278
    (2001) (quoting
    State v. Carlin, 
    40 Wash. App. 698
    , 701, 
    700 P.2d 323
    (1985), overruled on other
    grounds by City of Seattle v. Heatley, 
    70 Wash. App. 573
    , 
    854 P.2d 658
    (1993)).
    45State v. Yates, 
    161 Wash. 2d 714
    , 764, 
    168 P.3d 359
    (2007) (quoting State
    v. Bourgeois, 
    133 Wash. 2d 389
    , 403, 
    945 P.2d 1120
    (1997)), cert. denied sub nom.
    Yates v. Washington, 
    554 U.S. 922
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 2964
    , 
    171 L. Ed. 2d 893
    (2008).
    14
    No. 79586-4-I/15
    determination regardless of Roorda’s testimony. Therefore, we hold that any
    error in admitting this evidence was harmless.
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    15